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Foreword
Dramatic climate changes and weather extremes are already affecting millions of people around the world, 
damaging crops and coastlines and putting water security at risk.
Across the three regions studied in this report, record-breaking temperatures are occurring more fre-
quently, rainfall has increased in intensity in some places, while drought-prone regions like the Mediter-
ranean are getting dryer. A significant increase in tropical North Atlantic cyclone activity is affecting the 
Caribbean and Central America.
There is growing evidence that warming close to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels is locked-in to the 
Earth’s atmospheric system due to past and predicted emissions of greenhouse gases, and climate change 
impacts such as extreme heat events may now be unavoidable.
As the planet warms, climatic conditions, heat and other weather extremes which occur once in hundreds 
of years, if ever, and considered highly unusual or unprecedented today would become the “new climate 
normal” as we approach 4°C—a frightening world of increased risks and global instability.
The consequences for development would be severe as crop yields decline, water resources change, 
diseases move into new ranges, and sea levels rise. Ending poverty, increasing global prosperity and reduc-
ing global inequality, already difficult, will be much harder with 2°C warming, but at 4°C there is serious 
doubt whether these goals can be achieved at all.
For this report, the third in the Turn Down the Heat series, we turned again to the scientists at the 
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics. We asked them to look at the likely 
impacts of present day (0.8°C), 2°C and 4°C warming on agricultural production, water resources, cities 
and ecosystems across Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and parts of Europe 
and Central Asia.
Their findings are alarming.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, heat extremes and changing precipitation patterns will have adverse 
effects on agricultural productivity, hydrological regimes and biodiversity. In Brazil, at 2°C warming, crop 
yields could decrease by up to 70 percent for soybean and up to 50 percent for wheat. Ocean acidification, 
sea level rise, tropical cyclones and temperature changes will negatively impact coastal livelihoods, tour-
ism, health and food and water security, particularly in the Caribbean. Melting glaciers would be a hazard 
for Andean cities. 
In the Middle East and North Africa, a large increase in heat-waves combined with warmer average tem-
peratures will put intense pressure on already scarce water resources with major consequences for regional 
food security. Crop yields could decrease by up to 30 percent at 1.5–2°C and by almost 60 percent at 3–4°C. 
At the same time, migration and climate-related pressure on resources might increase the risk of conflict.
In the Western Balkans and Central Asia, reduced water availability in some places becomes a threat 
as temperatures rise toward 4°C. Melting glaciers in Central Asia and shifts in the timing of water flows 
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will lead to less water resources in summer months and high risks of torrential floods. In the Balkans, a 
higher risk of drought results in potential declines for crop yields, urban health, and energy generation. In 
Macedonia, yield losses are projected of up to 50 percent for maize, wheat, vegetables and grapes at 2°C 
warming. In northern Russia, forest dieback and thawing of permafrost threaten to amplify global warming as 
stored carbon and methane are released into the atmosphere, giving rise to a self-amplifying feedback loop.
Turn Down the Heat: Confronting the New Climate Normal builds on our 2012 report, which concluded 
the world would warm by 4°C by the end of this century with devastating consequences if we did not take 
concerted action now. It complements our 2013 report that looked at the potential risks to development 
under different warming scenarios in Sub-Saharan Africa, South East Asia and South Asia, and which 
warned that we could experience a 2°C world in our lifetime.
Many of the worst projected climate impacts outlined in this latest report could still be avoided by 
holding warming below 2°C. But, this will require substantial technological, economic, institutional and 
behavioral change. It will require leadership at every level of society. 
Today the scientific evidence is overwhelming, and it’s clear that we cannot continue down the current 
path of unchecked, growing emissions. The good news is that there is a growing consensus on what it will 
take to make changes to the unsustainable path we are currently on.
More and more voices are arguing that is possible to grow greener without necessarily growing slower. 
Today, we know that action is urgently needed on climate change, but it does not have to come at the 
expense of economic growth. We need smart policy choices that stimulate a shift to clean public transport 
and energy efficiency in factories, buildings and appliances can achieve both growth and climate benefits. 
This last report in the Turn Down the Heat series comes at a critical moment. Earlier this year, the UN 
Secretary General’s Climate Summit unleased a new wave of optimism. But our reports make clear that 
time is of the essence.
Governments will gather first in Lima and then Paris for critical negotiations on a new climate treaty. 
Inside and outside of the conference halls, global leaders will need to take difficult decisions that will require, 
in some instances, short term sacrifice but ultimately lead to long term gains for all.
At the World Bank Group we will use our financial capacity to help tackle climate change. We will 
innovate and bring forward new financial instruments. We will use our knowledge and our convening 
power. We will use our evidence and data to advocate and persuade. In short, we will do everything we 
can to help countries and communities build resilience and adapt to the climate impacts already being felt 
today and ensure that finance flows to where it is most needed.
 Our response to the challenge of climate change will define the legacy of our generation. The stakes 
have never been higher.
Dr. Jim Yong Kim
President, World Bank Group
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Executive Summary
The data show that dramatic climate changes, heat and weather extremes are already impacting people, damaging crops and coastlines 
and putting food, water, and energy security at risk. Across the three regions studied in this report, record-breaking temperatures are 
occurring more frequently, rainfall has increased in intensity in some places, while drought-prone regions are getting dryer. In an overview of 
social vulnerability, the poor and underprivileged, as well as the elderly and children, are found to be often hit the hardest. There is growing 
evidence, that even with very ambitious mitigation action, warming close to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by mid-century is already 
locked-in to the Earth’s atmospheric system and climate change impacts such as extreme heat events may now be unavoidable.1 If the 
planet continues warming to 4°C, climatic conditions, heat and other weather extremes considered highly unusual or unprecedented 
today would become the new climate normal—a world of increased risks and instability. The consequences for development would be 
severe as crop yields decline, water resources change, diseases move into new ranges, and sea levels rise. The task of promoting human 
development, of ending poverty, increasing global prosperity, and reducing global inequality will be very challenging in a 2°C world, but 
in a 4°C world there is serious doubt whether this can be achieved at all. Immediate steps are needed to help countries adapt to the 
climate impacts being felt today and the unavoidable consequences of a rapidly warming world. The benefits of strong, early action on 
climate change, action that follows clean, low carbon pathways and avoids locking in unsustainable growth strategies, far outweigh the 
costs. Many of the worst projected climate impacts could still be avoided by holding warming to below 2°C. But, the time to act is now.
This report focuses on the risks of climate change to development in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North 
Africa, and parts of Europe and Central Asia. Building on earlier Turn Down the Heat reports this new scientific analysis examines 
the likely impacts of present day (0.8°C), 2°C and 4°C warming above pre-industrial temperatures on agricultural production, water 
resources, ecosystem services and coastal vulnerability for affected populations.
Scope of the Report
This third report in the Turn Down the Heat series2 covers three 
World Bank regions: Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC); the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and parts of Europe and 
Central Asia (ECA).3 The focus is on the risks of climate change to 
development. While covering a range of sectors, special attention 
is paid to projected impacts on food and energy systems, water 
resources, and ecosystem services. The report also considers the 
social vulnerability that could magnify or moderate the climate 
1 Holding warming to below 2°C and bringing warming back to 1.5°C by 2100 is technically and economically feasible but implies stringent mitigation over the short term. 
While IPCC AR5 WGIII identified many mitigation options to hold warming below 2°C with a likely chance, and with central estimates of 1.5–1.7°C by 2100, only “a limited 
number of studies have explored scenarios that are more likely than not to bring temperature change back to below 1.5°C by 2100”. The scenarios in these studies are “charac-
terized by (1) immediate mitigation action; (2) the rapid upscaling of the full portfolio of mitigation technologies; and (3) development along a low-energy demand trajectory”.
2 Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided, launched by the World Bank in November 2012; and Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional 
Impacts, and the Case for Resilience, launched by the World Bank in June 2013 constitute the first two reports.
3 The World Bank Europe and Central Asia region in this report includes only the following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
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change repercussions for human well-being. The report comple-
ments the first Turn Down the Heat report (2012) that offered a 
global overview of climate change and its impacts in a 4°C world4 
and concluded that impacts are expected to be felt disproportion-
ately in developing countries around the equatorial regions. Also, 
it extends the analysis in the second report (2013) that focused 
on the consequences of climate change for present day, 2°C, and 
4°C warming above pre-industrial levels in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
South Asia, and South East Asia and demonstrated the potential 
of early onset of impacts at lower levels of warming. 
This analysis draws on the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) Working 
Group reports released in 2013 and 2014, as well as peer-reviewed 
literature published after the cutoff dates for AR5. The few cases 
where there are significant differences in interpretation of projected 
impacts from the IPCC assessments (such as for sea-level rise and 
El Niño) are highlighted and explained.
The Global Picture
This report reaffirms earlier assessments, including the IPCC AR5 
and previous Turn Down the Heat reports, that in the absence of 
near-term mitigation actions and further commitments to reduce 
emissions the likelihood of 4°C warming being reached or exceeded 
this century has increased. Under current policies there is about 
a 40 percent chance of exceeding 4°C by 2100 and a 10 percent 
chance of exceeding 5°C.5 However, many of the worst projected 
climate impacts in this report could still be avoided by holding 
warming below 2°C.
Selected Key Findings from Across 
the Regions
At the current level of 0.8°C warming above pre-industrial levels, 
adverse impacts of climate change have already been observed. 
Examples include:
• Extreme heat events are occurring more frequently. The occur-
rence of record-breaking monthly mean temperatures has 
been attributed to climate change with 80 percent probability.
4 In this report, as in the previous two reports, “a 4°C world” and “a 2°C world” is 
used as shorthand for warming reaching 4°C or 2°C above pre-industrial levels by 
the end of the century. It is important to note that, in the case of 4°C warming, this 
does not imply a stabilization of temperatures nor that the magnitude of impacts is 
expected to peak at this level. Because of the slow response of the climate system, 
the greenhouse gas emissions and concentrations that would lead to warming of 4°C 
by 2100 and associated higher risk of thresholds in the climate system being crossed, 
would actually commit the world to much higher warming, exceeding 6°C or more 
in the long term with several meters of sea-level rise ultimately associated with this 
warming. A 2°C world implies stabilization at this level beyond 2100. 
5 IEA (2012) World Energy Outlook 2012. This was reported in the second Turn 
Down the Heat report.
Box 1: The Case for Immediate 
Action 
CO2 emissions continue unabated. Current warming is at 0.8°C 
above pre-industrial levels. CO2 emissions are now 60 percent 
higher than in 1990, growing at about 2.5 percent per year. If emis-
sions continue at this rate, atmospheric CO2 concentrations in line 
with a likely chance of limiting warming to 2°C would be exceeded 
within just three decades. 
Observed impacts and damages. Widespread, recently 
observed impacts on natural and human systems confirm the high 
sensitivity of many of these systems to warming and the potential 
for substantial damage to occur at even low levels of warming. 
Examples include negative impacts on crop yields, the accelerating 
loss of ice from Antarctica and Greenland, and widespread bleach-
ing of coral reefs. The physical effects of warming to 1.5°C, such as 
extreme heat events, may be unavoidable.
21st-century projected impacts. The projected impacts 
for the 21st century confirm the scale of the risk to development 
at 2°C—and the severe consequences of exceeding this level of 
warming. Even at warming of 1.5°C–2°C, significant, adverse risks 
are projected for a number of regions and systems, such as the 
potential for the complete loss of existing long-lived coral reefs, 
associated marine biodiversity and the livelihoods from tourism and 
fishing.
Multi-century consequences of 21st-century emissions. 
Scientific evidence is growing of the multi-century consequences 
of CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions. Examples include: 
‘locking-in’ a long-term sea-level rise of about two meters per 
degree Celsius of sustained global mean warming and a multi-cen-
tury ocean acidification with wide-ranging adverse consequences on 
coral reefs, marine ecology, and ultimately the planet.
Risk of large-scale, irreversible changes in the Earth’s 
biomes and ecosystems. Large scale, irreversible changes in 
the Earth’s systems have the potential to transform whole regions. 
Examples of risks that are increasing rapidly with warming include 
degradation of the Amazon rainforest with the potential for large 
emissions of CO2 due to self-amplifying feedbacks, disintegration of 
the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets with multi-meter sea-level 
rise over centuries to millennia, and large-scale releases of methane 
from melting permafrost substantially amplifying warming. Recent 
peer reviewed science shows that a substantial part of the West 
Antarctic ice sheet, containing about one meter of sea-level rise 
equivalent in ice, is now in irreversible, unstable retreat. 
Rapidly closing window for action. The buildup of carbon 
intensive, fossil-fuel-based infrastructure is locking us into a future of 
CO2 emissions. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has warned, 
and numerous energy system modelling exercises have confirmed, 
that unless urgent action is taken very soon, it will become extremely 
costly to reduce emissions fast enough to hold warming below 2°C. 
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• Extreme precipitation has increased in frequency and intensity 
in many places.
• A robust drying trend has been observed for already drought-
prone regions such as the Mediterranean.
• A significant increase in tropical North Atlantic cyclone activity 
has been observed and is affecting the Caribbean and Central 
America.
Under future climate change scenarios projected impacts 
include:
1. Highly unusual and unprecedented heat extremes: State-
of-the-art climate modeling shows that extreme heat events 
increase not only in frequency but also impact a larger area 
of land under unabated warming. The prevalence of highly 
unusual and unprecedented heat extremes increases rapidly 
under an emissions pathway associated with a 4°C world.6 
Highly unusual heat extremes are similar to those experienced 
in Russia and Central Asia in 2010 and the United States in 2012 
and unprecedented heat extremes refer to events essentially 
absent under present day climate conditions. Unprecedented 
heat extremes would likely remain largely absent in a 2°C world 
but in a 4°C world, could affect 70–80 percent of the land area 
in the Middle East and North Africa and Latin America and 
the Caribbean and approximately 55 percent of the land area 
in the parts of Europe and Central Asia assessed in this report.
2. Rainfall regime changes and water availability: Precipitation 
changes are projected under continued warming with sub-
stantial, adverse consequences for water availability. Central 
America, the Caribbean, the Western Balkans, and the Middle 
East and North Africa stand out as hotspots where precipitation 
is projected to decline 20–50 percent in a 4°C world. Conversely, 
heavy precipitation events are projected to intensify in Central 
and Eastern Siberia and northwestern South America with 
precipitation intensity increasing by around 30 percent and 
flooding risks increasing substantially in a 4°C world. 
• In the Western Balkans and Central Asia, water avail-
ability becomes a threat as temperatures rise toward 
6 In this report, highly unusual heat extremes refer to 3-sigma events and unprec-
edented heat extremes to 5-sigma events. In general, the standard deviation (sigma) 
shows how far a variable tends to deviate from its mean value, which in this report 
refers to the possible year-to-year changes in local monthly temperature because of 
natural variability. For a normal distribution, 3 sigma events have a return time of 
740 years. Monthly temperature data do not necessarily follow a normal distribution 
(for example, the distribution can have long tails, making warm events more likely) 
and the return times can be different but will be at least 100 years. Nevertheless, 
3-sigma events are extremely unlikely and 4-sigma events almost certainly have not 
occurred over the lifetime of key infrastructure. A warming of 5 sigma means that 
the average change in the climate is 5 times larger than the normal year-to-year 
variation experienced today, and has a return period of several million years. These 
events, which have almost certainly never occurred to date, are projected for the 
coming decades.
4°C. With earlier glacier melt in Central Asia shifting 
the timing of water flows, and a higher risk of drought 
in the Balkans, this carries consequences for crop yields, 
urban health, and energy generation. In Macedonia, for 
example, there could be yield losses of up to 50 percent 
for maize, wheat, vegetables and grapes at 2°C warm-
ing. Flood risk is expected to increase slightly along the 
Danube, Sava and Tisza rivers.
3. Agricultural yields and food security: Significant crop yield 
impacts are already being felt at 0.8°C warming, and as 
temperatures rise from 2°C to 4°C, climate change will add 
further pressure on agricultural systems.
• The risks of reduced crop yields and production losses 
increase rapidly above 1.5°–2°C warming. In the Middle 
East and North Africa and the Latin America and the 
Caribbean regions, without further adaptation actions, 
strong reductions in potential yield are projected for 
around 2°C warming. For example, a 30–70 percent 
decline in yield for soybeans and up to 50 percent decline 
for wheat in Brazil, a 50 percent decrease for wheat in 
Central America and the Caribbean, and 10–50 percent 
reduction for wheat in Tunisia. Projected changes in 
potential crop yields in Central Asia are uncertain at 
around 2°C warming. Increasing droughts and flood-
ing events represent a major risk for agriculture in the 
Western Balkans.
• While adaptation interventions and CO2 fertilization may 
compensate for some of the adverse effects of climate 
change below 2°C warming, this report reaffirms the 
findings of the IPCC AR5 that under 3–4°C warming 
large negative impacts on agricultural productivity can 
be expected. There is some empirical evidence that, 
despite possible positive CO2 fertilization effects lead-
ing to increased productivity, higher atmospheric levels 
of carbon dioxide could result in lowered protein and 
micronutrient (iron and zinc) levels of some major grain 
crops (e.g., wheat and rice).
• The projected impacts on subsistence and export crops 
production systems (e.g., soybeans, maize, wheat, and 
rice) would be felt at the local, national, and global levels. 
While global trade can improve food security and pro-
tect against local shocks, there is a possibility for some 
regions to become over dependent on food imports and 
thus more vulnerable to weather events in other world 
regions and to the interruption of imports because of 
export bans in those regions. 
4. Terrestrial Ecosystems: Ecosystem shifts are projected with 
increasing temperatures and changes in precipitation patterns 
significantly diminishing ecosystem services. This would 
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have major repercussions on, for example, the global carbon 
cycle. For example: 
• Projected increases in heat and drought stress, together 
with continuing deforestation, substantially increase the 
risk of large-scale forest degradation (reduction in forest 
biomass and area) in the Amazon rainforest. This could 
turn this carbon sink of global importance into a source of 
carbon; this has already been observed as a consequence 
of the severe droughts in 2005 and 2010 when scientists 
estimated that the Amazon faced a decrease in carbon 
storage of approximately 1.6 Pg carbon (2005) and 2.2 Pg 
carbon (2010) compared to non-drought years.7
• Russia’s permafrost regions and boreal forests are sensitive 
to changes in temperature that could lead to productivity 
increases. But there is a risk of increasing disturbances, 
such as fires and pests, leading to widespread tree mortal-
ity. Forest dieback and thawing of permafrost threaten to 
amplify global warming as stored carbon and methane 
are released into the atmosphere, giving rise to a self-
amplifying feedback loop. With a 2°C warming, methane 
emissions from permafrost thawing could increase by 
20–30 percent across boreal Russia.
5. Marine ecosystems: Substantial, adverse effects on marine 
ecosystems and their productivity are expected with rising 
temperatures, increases in ocean acidity, and likely reductions 
in available oxygen due to their combined effects. Observed 
rates of ocean acidification are already the highest in 300 million 
years and rates of sea level rise are the highest for 6,000 years.
Projections of coral bleaching indicate that preserving 
more than 10 percent of these unique ecosystems calls for 
limiting global warming to 1.5°C. Reef-building corals are 
critical for beach formation, coastal protection, fisheries, 
and tourism. 
Physiological changes to fish and fish larvae have been 
observed and are expected with future ocean acidification. 
Below 2°C warming and without taking into account changes 
in ocean acidity, fishery catches in a number of locations are 
projected to markedly decrease by 2050 as fish populations 
migrate towards cooler waters.
6. Sea-level rise: In a 1.5°C world sea level rise is projected to 
increase by 0.36 m (range of 0.20 m to 0.60 m) and by 0.58 m 
(range of 0.40 m to 1.01 m) in a 4°C world for the period 
7 The change in carbon sequestration is caused by the combined effects of reduced 
uptake of carbon resulting from suppressed tree growth due to the drought, and loss 
of carbon due to drought induced tree mortality and decomposition over several years.
2081–2100 compared to the reference period 1986–2005.8 Due 
to the time lag in the oceans’ response and the long response 
time of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets to atmospheric 
temperatures (thermal inertia) sea levels will continue to rise 
for many centuries beyond 2100. 
• Sea-level rise poses a particular threat to urban communi-
ties in the Middle East and North Africa and Latin America 
and the Caribbean, where large urban settlements and 
important infrastructure are situated along coastlines. 
The impact of rising sea levels will be particularly severe 
for the Caribbean island communities as possibilities 
for retreat are extremely limited. Rising sea levels will 
substantially increase the risk posed by storm surges and 
tropical cyclones, in particular for highly exposed small 
island states and low-lying coastal zones. In addition, 
rising sea levels could contribute to increased salt-water 
intrusion in freshwater aquifers (particularly in the Middle 
East and North Africa), a process made worse by other 
climate impacts (e.g., reduction in water availability) and 
other human-induced drivers (e.g., resource overuse). 
7. Glaciers: A substantial loss of glacier volume and extent has 
been observed under current levels of warming in the Andes 
and Central Asia. Increasing glacial melt poses a high risk of 
flooding and severely reduces freshwater resources during 
crop growing seasons. It can also have negative impacts on 
hydropower supply.
• Tropical glaciers in the Central Andes have lost large 
amounts of ice volume throughout the 20th century and 
complete deglaciation is projected in a 4°C world. In 
Peru it is estimated that a 50 percent reduction in glacier 
runoff would result in a decrease in annual power output 
of approximately 10 percent, from 1540 gigawatt hours 
(GWh) to 1250 GWh.
• Since the 1960s Central Asian glaciers have reduced 
in area by 3–14 percent depending on their location. 
Further substantial losses of around 50 percent and up 
to 80 percent are projected for a 2°C and a 4°C world 
respectively. As a result, river flows are expected to shrink 
8 The sea-level projections presented here follow the methodology adopted in the IPCC 
AR5 WGI with the important update that more realistic scenario-dependent contribu-
tions from Antarctica based on post-IPCC literature are included. Recent publications 
suggest that IPCC estimates are conservative given the observed destabilization of 
parts of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet. Note that the regional projections given in this 
report are also based on this adjustment to the AR5 WGI methodology and do not 
include land subsidence. Sea-level rise projections presented in this report are based 
on a larger model ensemble with an ensemble mean warming of less than 1.75°C; 
as a result, end-of-century sea-level rise in RCP2.6 is classified as 1.5° warming. See 
Box 2.1 and Section 6.2, Sea-Level Rise Projections for further explanation.
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by 25 percent at around 3°C warming during the summer 
months when water demand for agriculture is highest. 
• In Central Asia hydropower generation has the potential 
to play a major role in the future energy mix however the 
predicted changes in runoff distribution will mean that 
there will be less water available for energy generation 
in summer months when it will compete with demands 
from agriculture.
Figure 1: Water resources: Relative change in annual discharge for a 2°C and a 4°C world in the 2080s relative to the 1986–2005 
period based on an ISI-MIP model inter-comparison.
Colors indicate the multi-model mean change; the saturation of colors indicates the agreement across the model ensemble. More saturated colors indicate 
higher model agreement. Source: Adjusted from Schewe et al. (2013).
8. Social Vulnerability to Climate Change. The social impacts 
of climate change are hard to predict with certainty as they 
depend on climatic factors and their interaction with wider 
development trends. However, there is clear evidence that 
climate change is already affecting livelihoods and wellbe-
ing in parts of the three regions and is likely to do so to a 
significantly greater extent if more extensive climate change 
occurs (Box 2). Where governance is weak, or infrastructure 
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outdated or insufficient (as in parts of all three regions), 
this is likely to amplify the social challenges associated with 
adapting to further climate change.
Latin America and the Caribbean 
The Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) region is highly 
heterogeneous in terms of economic development and social and 
indigenous history with a population of 588 million (2013), of 
which almost 80 percent is urban. The current GDP is estimated 
at $5.655 trillion (2013) with a per capita GNI of $9,314 in 2013. 
In 2012, approximately 25 percent of the population was living 
in poverty and 12 percent in extreme poverty, representing a 
clear decrease compared to earlier years. Undernourishment in 
the region, for example, declined from 14.6 percent in 1990 to 
8.3 percent in 2012. Despite considerable economic and social 
development progress in past decades, income inequality in the 
region remains high.
At the current 0.8oC warming significant impacts of climate 
change are being felt throughout the LAC region’s terrestrial 
(e.g. Andean mountains and rainforests) and marine (especially 
the coral reefs) biomes. As global mean temperatures rise to 2oC 
and beyond the projected intensity and severity of impacts will 
increase across the entire region (three significant impacts are 
described below). 
Figure 2 shows the occurrence of highly unusual summer 
temperatures in a 2oC and 4oC world. Box 3 gives an overview of 
the climate risks in the region.
Changes to the hydrological cycle could endanger 
the stability of freshwater supplies and ecosystem 
services.
Altered precipitation cycles characterized by more intense down-
pours followed by longer droughts, loss of glaciers, degradation of 
key ecosystems, and the loss of critical ecosystem services (e.g., 
water supplies, water buffering, retention, regulation, and soil 
protection) will impact freshwater supplies regionally and poten-
tially generate upstream-downstream tradeoffs and synergies. A 
range of impacts are expected to increase in intensity and severity 
as global mean temperatures rise from 2oC to 4oC.
• Projections indicate that most dry regions get drier and wet 
regions get wetter. Reductions in precipitation are as high 
as 20–40 percent for the Caribbean, Central America, central 
Brazil, and Patagonia in a 4°C world. Drought conditions are 
projected to increase by more than 20 percent. Limiting warming 
to 2°C is projected to reduce the risk of drought significantly: 
to a one percent increase of days with drought conditions in 
the Caribbean and a nine percent increase for South America. 
At the same time, an increase in frequency and intensity of 
extreme precipitation events is projected particularly for the 
tropical and subtropical Pacific coastline and southern Brazil. 
• Massive loss of glaciers is projected in the Andes in a 2°C 
world (up to 90 percent) and almost complete glacier loss 
beyond 4°C. Changes to glacial melt, in response to land 
surface warming, alter the timing and magnitude of river 
flows and result in a higher risk of flooding and freshwater 
shortages and damage to infrastructure assets. 
Box 2: Social Vulnerability Impacts of Climate Change 
Shocks and stresses related to climate change can undermine poverty reduction and push new groups into poverty. Informal settlements 
on flood plains and steep hillsides in many Latin American cities and the Western Balkans, for example, have been severely affected by floods and 
landslides in recent years. While many poor people will be living in isolated, rural areas, continued urban expansion into hazard-prone areas means 
that a growing proportion of urban populations will be at risk of climate-related extreme events and rising food prices, and thus of increasing poverty 
levels among urban groups. 
The impacts of climate change will often be most severely felt by poor and socially excluded groups, whose capacity to adapt to 
both rapid- and slow-onset climate change is more limited. These include indigenous people and ethnic minorities, migrant workers, women, 
girls, older people, and children. Although these groups—like their more advantaged counterparts—are already adapting to climatic and other 
changes, these efforts are often undermined by their limited assets, lack of voice, and discriminatory social norms. For example, increasing water 
stress, projected for parts of Latin America and low-income Middle East and North Africa countries, can dramatically increase the labor burden asso-
ciated with fetching water in rural and poor urban environments; and child malnutrition linked to climate change reducing protein and micronutrient 
contents of staple foods (wheat, rice) could have irreversible, negative life-time consequences for affected children.
Climate change may lead to displacement and also affect patterns and rates of migrations. Most displacement related to extreme 
weather events has, to date, been temporary. However, if climate change renders certain areas uninhabitable (for example, if they become too hot, 
too dry, or too frequently affected by extreme events—or sea-level rise) such migration may increase in scale and more often lead to permanent 
resettlement (as already being seen in some water-scarce parts of MENA). Large-scale migration may pose significant challenges for family relations, 
health, and human security. There is a risk of disadvantaged groups being trapped in adversely affected rural areas as they lack the funds and/or 
social connections to move.
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• Increased droughts and higher mean temperatures are 
projected to decrease water supplies and affect most ecosys-
tems and agroecosystems. The increasing risk of drought will 
raise the risk of forest fires, large-scale climate-induced forest 
degradation and the loss of associated ecosystem services. 
• Glaciers will melt at an even faster rate than observed, with 
a peak in river runoff expected in 20–50 years, and possibly 
earlier in some watersheds. Glacial lake outbursts and con-
nected flooding present a hazard for Andean cities. The loss of 
glaciers will likely impact the páramos (Andean, high carbon 
stock moorlands) which are the source of water for many 
Andean cities. Moreover, degraded highland ecosystems have 
less capacity to retain water and intensified downpours will 
increase erosion with a subsequent increase in siltation and 
damage to hydropower dams, irrigation works, and hydraulic 
and river defense infrastructure.
• The projected trend of more intense rainfall can significantly 
increase the risk of landslides especially in sloping terrain 
often occupied by the poorer rural and urban communities. 
The major landslides in 2011 in the State of Rio de Janeiro 
following intense rainfall are a harbinger of the likely severity 
of projected impacts from more intense rainfall events. Intense 
rainfall events can quickly overwhelm natural drainage chan-
nels in the landscape as well as urban drainage systems that 
are unlikely to have been designed for the projected more 
intense future rainfall events and flows. 
Climate change will place at risk small-scale 
subsistence agriculture and large-scale agricultural 
production for export 
Agriculture in the Latin America and the Caribbean region is 
heavily dependent on rain-fed systems for both subsistence and 
export crops; it is therefore vulnerable to climatic variations 
such as droughts, changing precipitation patterns, and rising 
temperatures. 
• Increasing risks for agriculture as warming rises beyond 
2°C. There is a clear negative signal for a large variety of crops 
with 2°C warming, including soybeans (up to a 70 percent yield 
decline in some areas of Brazil) and maize (up to a 60 percent 
yield decline in Brazil and Ecuador) by 2050 relative to a 
1989–2009 baseline. Simulated adaptation interventions (e.g. 
improved crop varieties, improved soil and crop management, 
and supplementary irrigation) alleviated but did not overcome 
the projected yield declines from climate change. Other studies 
Figure 2: Multi-model mean of the percentage of austral summer months (DJF), with highly unusual temperatures (normally 
unlikely to occur more than once in several hundred years) in a 2°C world (left) and a 4°C world (right) in 2071–2099 and relative to 
the 1951–1980 base line period.
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Box 3: Selected Climate Risks in the Latin America and the Caribbean Region
In a 4°C world, heat extremes, changes in hydrological cycles, tropical cyclones and changes in the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) are 
expected to pose severe problems with risks cascading to the agricultural sector, human health, large urban centers and the functioning of critical 
ecosystem services. At lower levels of warming, glacial melt in the Andes will reduce freshwater and hydropower for communities and large Andean 
cities during the dry season, while increasing the risks of flooding in the short term and impacting agriculture and environmental services down-
stream. Severe threats are expected from sea-level rise, damages to low-lying areas and coastal infrastructures. Degrading coral reefs will endanger 
tourism revenues and undermine biodiversity, fisheries, and the protection of coastal zones thereby negatively impacting livelihoods. For the global 
community, the potential impact of climate change on the Amazon rainforest is of high relevance. With increasing warming, degradation—if not 
dieback—of the Amazon rainforest is increasingly possible potentially turning the forest into a large carbon source during dry years and triggering 
further climate change.
Central America & the Caribbean
Higher ENSO and tropical cyclone frequency, 
precipitation extremes, drought, and heat 
waves. Risks of reduced water availability, crop 
yields, food security, and coastal safety.
Poor exposed to landslides, coastal erosion 
with risk of higher mortality rates and migration, 
negative impacts on GDP where share of 
coastal tourism is high.
Amazon Rainforest
Increase in extreme heat and aridity, risk of 
forest fires, degradation, and biodiversity loss.
Risk of rainforest turning into carbon source. 
Shifting agricultural zones may lead to conflict 
over land. Risks of species extinction threatening 
traditional livelihoods and cultural losses. 
Andes
Glacial melt, snow pack changes, risks of 
flooding, and freshwater shortages.
In high altitudes women, children, and 
indigenous people particularly vulnerable; and 
agriculture at risk. In urban areas the poor living 
on steeper slopes more exposed to flooding.
Dry Regions
Increasing drought and extreme heat events 
leading to cattle death, crop yield declines, and 
challenges for freshwater resources.
Risks of localized famines among remote 
indigenous communities, water-related health 
problems. Stress on resources may lead to 
conflict and urban migration.
Southern Cone
Decreasing agricultural yields and pasture 
productivity, northward migration of agro-
ecozones.
Risks for nutritious status of the local poor. 
Risks for food price increases and cascading 
impacts beyond the region due to high export 
share of agriculture. 
Data sources: Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University; United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Programme; and Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical—(2005). Gridded 
Population of the World, Version 3 (GPWv3): Population Count Grid. Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic 
Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). This map was reproduced by the Map Design Unit of The World 
Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, 
on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorse-
ment or acceptance of such boundaries.
A DISPUTE CONCERNING SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE
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suggest that in a 3°C world, the projected negative impacts on 
individual crops become stronger. For example up to almost 
70 percent decline in wheat in Central America and the Carib-
bean. This implies that climate change threatens not only 
smallholder farmers, and rural and indigenous communities 
but also large-scale commodity (soybeans, maize) producers, 
ranchers, and agribusinesses—with potential negative repercus-
sions on food security and prices in the region and beyond.
• Local food security is seriously threatened by the projected 
decrease in fishery catch potential. The Caribbean coasts, 
the Amazon estuaries, and the Rio de la Plata are expected to 
be particularly affected by declines in catch potential of more 
than 50 percent as fish stocks migrate in response to warming 
waters. The Caribbean waters could see declines in the range 
of 5–50 percent. These estimates are for warming of 2°C by 
2050, by which time many of the coral reefs—an important fish 
nursery and habitat—would be subject to annual bleaching 
events, further undermining the marine resource base. Ocean 
acidification could affect fish populations directly, including 
through physiological damages at early life stages. The effects 
on the food chain, however, are not yet clear. 
• The Southern Cone (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, 
and southern Brazil) as a major grain and livestock produc-
ing region is susceptible to climate shocks, mainly related 
to changing rainfall patterns and rising heat extremes. This is 
expected to severely impact maize and soy yields, important 
export commodities. For example, maize productivity is pro-
jected to decline by 15–30 percent in comparison to 1971–2000 
levels under warming of 2°C by 2050, and by 30–45 percent 
under 3°C warming. Strong and/or extreme El Niño events 
resulting in floods or droughts in the cropping season pose 
further substantial risks to agriculture in the region. 
A stronger prevalence of extreme events is 
projected that would affect both rural and urban 
communities, particularly on sloping lands and in 
coastal regions. 
The region is heavily exposed to the effects of more frequent and 
intense extreme events, such as those that occur during strong El 
Niño events and tropical cyclones. 
• An increase of approximately 40 percent in the frequency of 
the strongest north Atlantic tropical cyclones is projected for 
a 2°C world, and of 80 percent for a 4°C world, compared to 
present. In LAC, close to 8.5 million people live in the path of 
hurricanes, and roughly 29 million live in low-elevation coastal 
zones. The Caribbean is particularly vulnerable as more than 
50 percent of its population lives along the coast, and around 
70 percent live in coastal cities. More intense tropical cyclones 
would interact adversely with rising sea levels, exacerbating 
coastal flooding and storm surge risks, putting entire econo-
mies and livelihoods at risk (particularly for island states). 
• Risks associated with El Niño events and tropical cyclones 
would occur contemporaneously with a sea-level rise of 
38–114 cm thus greatly increasing the risks storm surges. 
Sea-level rise is projected to be higher at the Atlantic coast than 
at the Pacific coast. Sea-level rise off Valparaiso, for example, is 
projected at 0.35 m for a 2°C world and 0.55 m for a 4°C world 
(medium estimate). Recife sees projections of approximately 
0.39 m and 0.63 m respectively, with the upper estimates as 
high as 1.14 m in a 4°C world—the highest in the region.
• Extreme events will strongly affect the rural and urban poor 
who often reside in informal settlements in high-risk areas 
(e.g., flood plains and steep slopes). In 2005, the percentage 
of people living in informal settlements in Latin America was 
highest in Bolivia (50 percent) and in the Caribbean highest 
in Haiti (70 percent). The negative effects of extreme events 
Box 4: El Niño Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO)
The Latin America and the Caribbean region is particularly 
exposed to the effects of strong* El Niño and La Niña events, 
which are related to the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). In 
Central America, El Niño usually results in excessive rainfall along 
the Caribbean coasts, while the Pacific coasts remain dry. Rainfall 
increases and floods tend to occur on the coast of Ecuador, the 
northern part of Peru, and in the southern part of Brazil, Argentina, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay while drought appears in the Andean zones 
of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia and in north eastern Brazil. All these 
changes can substantially impair livelihoods through impacts on 
agricultural productivity, critical ecosystems, energy production, 
water supply, infrastructure, and public health in affected countries. 
For example, the extreme 1997–98 El Niño event resulted in many 
billions of dollars in economic damages, and tens of thousands 
of fatalities worldwide, including severe losses in Latin America. 
Substantial uncertainties remain regarding climate change impact 
projections on the intensity and frequency of extreme El Niño events. 
However, evidence of changes to ENSO-driven precipitation vari-
ability in response to global warming has emerged recently and 
represents an update to the assessment of ENSO projections in the 
IPCC AR5 report. Recent climate model inter-comparison studies 
suggest the likelihood of global warming leading to the occurrence of 
more frequent extreme El Niño events over the 21st century.
* “The Oceanic Niño Index (ONI) is the standard that NOAA uses for identify-
ing El Niño (warm) and La Niña (cool) events in the tropical Pacific. It is the 
running 3-month mean sea-surface temperature (SST) anomaly for the Niño 
3.4 region (i.e., 5oN–5oS, 120o–170oW). Events are defined as 5 consecutive 
overlapping 3-month periods at or above the +0.5o anomaly for warm (El 
Niño) events and at or below the –0.5 anomaly for cold (La Niña) events. The 
threshold is further broken down into Weak (with a 0.5 to 0.9 SST anomaly), 
Moderate (1.0 to 1.4) and Strong ( 1.5) events” [Source: http://ggweather
.com/enso/oni.htm]
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also affect rural communities as they strongly depend on their 
environment and its natural resource base.
• In the Caribbean, substantial adverse impacts on local criti-
cal ecosystems, agriculture, infrastructure, and the tourism 
industry can be expected in a 2°C world. This is due to loss 
and/or degradation of important assets from the combined effects 
of increasing sea levels and associated impacts of saline intru-
sion and storm surges, ocean acidification, bleaching of coral 
reefs, and loss of the physical protection afforded to coastlines 
from dead and degrading reefs. Impacts from these and other 
climatic changes can be expected to grow substantially with 
increasing warming, especially given the increasing likelihood 
of more frequent intense tropical cyclones. 
The Middle East and North Africa
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is one of the most 
diverse regions in the world in economic terms, with per-capita 
annual GDP ranging from $1,000 in Yemen to more than $20,000 
in the Arab Gulf States. Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, 
Morocco, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Yemen rank 4, 12, 27, 
130, 132, and 151 in GDP per capita on a list of 189 countries. In 
consequence, adaptive capacity and vulnerability to climate risks 
varies enormously within the region. 
The region’s population is projected to double by 2050, which 
together with projected climate impacts, puts the region under 
enormous pressure for water and other resources. The region 
is already highly dependent on food imports. Approximately 
50 percent of regional wheat and barley consumption, 40 percent 
of rice consumption, and nearly 70 percent of maize consump-
tion is met through imports. The region has coped with its water 
scarcity through a variety of means: abstraction of groundwater, 
desalinization, and local community coping strategies. Despite 
its extreme water scarcity, the Gulf countries use more water per 
capita than the global average, with Arab residential water and 
energy markets among the most heavily subsidized in the world. 
The region is very diverse in terms of socio-economic and political 
conditions. Thus, adaptive capacity and vulnerability to climate risks 
varies enormously within the region, especially between the Arab 
Gulf States and the other Middle East and North Africa countries.
The Middle East and North Africa region emerges as one of the 
hotspots for worsening extreme heat, drought, and aridity condi-
tions. Agriculture, where 70 percent is rain-fed, is highly exposed 
to changing climatic conditions. Warming of 0.2°C per decade has 
been observed in the region from the 1961–1990, and since then 
the region is warming at an even faster rate. Projections indicate 
that more than 90 percent of summers will have highly unusual 
heat extremes in a 4°C world compared to between 20–40 percent 
of summers in a 2°C world (Figure 3). 
Given its high import dependency, the region is vulnerable 
to effects beyond its borders. While societal responses to such 
changes remain hard to predict, it is clear that extreme impacts, 
such as a more than 45 percent decrease in annual water discharge 
projected for a 4°C world in parts of the region, would present 
unprecedented challenges to the social systems affected. Climate 
change might act as a threat multiplier to the security situation 
in the region by imposing additional pressures on already scarce 
resources and by reinforcing pre-existing threats connected to 
migration following forced displacement. Box 5 gives an overview 
of the key climate risks in the region.
Changing precipitation patterns and an increase 
in extreme heat pose high risks to agricultural 
production and regional food security.
Most agriculture in the region takes place in the semi-arid climate 
zone, either close to the coast or in the highlands, and is highly 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change. 
• Rainfall is predicted to decline by 20–40 percent in a 2°C 
world and by up to 60 percent in a 4°C world in parts of the 
region. Agricultural productivity is expected to drop in parts 
of the Middle East and North Africa region with increasing 
Figure 3: Multi-model mean of the percentage of boreal summer months (JJA), with highly unusual temperatures (normally 
unlikely to occur more than once in several hundred years) in a 2°C world (left) and a 4°C world (right) in 2071–2099 and relative to 
the 1951–1980 base line period.
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Box 5: Selected Climate Risks in the Middle East and North Africa Region
The region will be severely affected at 2°C and 4°C warming, particularly because of the large increase in projected heat extremes, the substantial 
reduction in water availability, and expected consequences for regional food security. High exposure to sea-level rise in the coming decades is linked to 
large populations and assets in coastal areas. In a 2°C world already low annual river discharge levels are projected to drop by more than 15 percent 
and highly unusual heat extremes are projected to affect about a third of the land. Crop yield declines coupled with impacts in other grain-producing 
regions could contribute to increasing food prices in the region. The growing food import dependency further exacerbates such risks. Deteriorating 
rural livelihoods may contribute to internal and international migration, adding further stress on particularly urban infrastructure, with associated risks for 
poor migrants. Migration and climate related pressure on resources (e.g. water) might increase the risk of conflict.
Data sources: Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University; United Nations Food and Agriculture Programme; and Centro Internacional 
de Agricultura Tropical—(2005). Gridded Population of the World, Version 3 (GPWv3): Population Count Grid. Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications 
Center (SEDAC). This map was reproduced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on 
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Maghreb
Strong warming reduction in annual 
precipitation, increased water stress and 
reduced agricultural productivity. Large 
coastal cities exposed to sea level rise.
Climate change risks will have severe 
implications on farmers’ livelihoods, country 
economy, and food security. Exposure of 
critical coastal assets would have impact 
on the economy, including tourism. There is 
risk for accelerated migration flows to urban 
areas and social conflict.  
Mashrek and Eastern Parts
Highly unusual heat and decrease in annual 
precipitation will increase aridity, decrease 
in snow water storage and river runoff for 
example in Jordon, Euphrates and Tigris. 
Adverse consequences for mostly rain-fed 
agricultural and food production.
Climate change risks will have severe 
implications on farmers’ livelihoods, country 
economy, and food security. There is a risk 
for accelerated migration flows to urban 
areas and social conflict. 
Arabian Peninsula 
Highly unusual heat extremes in central 
Arabian Peninsula. In southern parts 
relative increase in annual precipitation, but 
uncertain trend of annual precipitation in 
central part. Sea level rise in the Arabian 
Sea likely higher than in Mediterranean 
and Atlantic coasts with risk of storm 
surges and adverse consequences for 
infrastructure.
More heat extremes expected to increase 
thermal discomfort, posing risk to labor 
productivity and health. 
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water scarcity and higher temperatures which are expected to 
deviate more and more from the temperature optima of several 
crops (and possibly even exceed their heat tolerance levels).
• Crop yields in the region may decrease by up to 30 percent 
at 1.5–2°C warming in Jordan, Egypt, and Libya and by almost 
60 percent (for wheat) at 3–4°C warming in the Syrian Arab 
Republic. The strongest crop reductions are expected for legumes 
and maize as they are grown during the summer period. 
• With 70 percent of agricultural production being rain-fed, the 
sector is highly vulnerable to temperature and precipitation 
changes and the associated potential consequences for food, 
social security, and rural livelihoods. Forty-three percent of 
the population lives in rural areas and poor rural farmers are 
particularly vulnerable to hunger and malnutrition as a direct 
consequence of yield loss and high food prices. In combination 
with non-climatic pressures the decline in rural livelihood options 
could trigger further urban migration, potentially exacerbating 
urban vulnerability and intensifying the potential for conflict.
• The increase in demand for irrigation water will be dif-
ficult to meet due to the simultaneous decrease in water 
availability in the Middle East and North Africa countries 
which have traditionally invested in agriculture to improve 
the performance in the agriculture sector—about 30 percent of 
the agricultural land is irrigated whereas agriculture consumes 
60 to 90 percent of all water used in the region. 
• Rising food prices that often follow production shocks and 
long-term declines make the growing number of urban poor 
increasingly vulnerable to malnutrition, particularly against the 
background of increasing local food insecurity. Evidence suggests 
that child malnutrition could rise in the event of significant food 
price increases or sharp declines in yields. Child malnutrition is 
already high in parts of the Middle East and North Africa, with an 
average of 18 percent of children under age five developmentally 
stunted. Childhood stunting has been linked to lifelong adverse 
consequences, including lower economic productivity in adulthood. 
• With its high and growing import dependency the region is 
particularly vulnerable to worldwide and domestic agricul-
tural impacts and related spikes in food prices. For example, 
climatic and hydrological events (droughts and floods), together 
with global market forces, were contributing factors to high 
wheat prices in Egypt and affected the price of bread in 2008.
Heat extremes will pose a significant challenge 
for human health
People in the region face a variety of health risks, many of which 
are exacerbated by the hot and arid conditions and relative water 
scarcity that characterize the region. 
• A substantial rise in highly unusual heat extremes is expected 
in the coming decades. In a 2°C world, highly unusual heat 
extremes would occur on average in one of the summer 
months in each year from the 2040s onward. In a 4°C world, 
this frequency would be experienced as early as the 2030s, 
and would increase to two summer months by the 2060s and 
virtually all months by the end of the century. Unprecedented 
heat extremes are absent in a 2°C world and affect about half 
the summer months by the end of the century in a 4°C world. 
• The period of consecutive hot days is expected to increase, 
particularly in cities due to the urban heat island effect. For 
example, in a 2°C warmer world the number of consecutive hot 
days is projected to increase annually from four days to about 
two months in Amman, from eight days to about three months 
in Baghdad, and from one day to two months in Damascus. 
The number of hot days in Riyadh is expected to increase 
even more—from about three days to over four months. The 
number of hot days in a 4°C warmer world is projected to 
exceed the equivalent of four months in most capital cities. 
• Heat stress levels can approach the physiological limits of 
people working outdoors and severely undermine regional 
labor productivity, putting a burden on health infrastruc-
ture. High temperatures can cause heat-related illnesses (e.g., 
heat stress, heat exhaustion, and heat stroke) especially for 
the elderly, people with chronic diseases or obesity, and preg-
nant women, children, and people working outside. Climate 
change is expected to undermine human health in other ways 
as well. For instance, the relative risk of diarrheal disease as 
a consequence of climatic changes and deteriorating water 
quality is expected to increase 6–14 percent for the period 
2010–39 and 16–38 percent for the period 2070–99 in North 
Africa; and 6–15 percent and 17–41 percent, respectively, in 
the Middle East.
Sea-level rise will pose serious challenges to the 
region’s coastal population, infrastructure, and 
economic assets.
The dense concentration of people and assets in coastal cities 
translate into high exposure to the effects of sea-level rise. 
• Projections show that all coastlines are at risk from sea-level 
rise. Depending on the city, sea levels are projected to rise 
by 0.34–0.39 m in a 1.5°C world and 0.56–0.64 m in a 4°C 
world (medium estimate), with the highest estimate reaching 
1.04 m in Muscat. 
• The Maghreb countries of Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya 
have been identified as among the most exposed African 
countries in terms of total population affected by sea-level 
rise. In Morocco, for example, more than 60 percent of the 
population and over 90 percent of industry is located in key 
coastal cities. For example, Alexandria, Benghazi, and Algiers 
have been identified as particularly vulnerable to a sea-level 
rise of only 0.2 m by 2050. The United Arab Emirates also 
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ranks among the ten most vulnerable countries to sea-level 
rise worldwide. 
• Key impacts of climate change in coastal zones include 
inundation resulting from slow onset sea-level rise, flooding, 
and damages caused by extreme events (including storms, 
storm surges, and increased coastal erosion). The exposure 
of critical assets may cause other impacts to have repercus-
sions for the economy (e.g., where tourism infrastructure 
is exposed). In Egypt, for example, the ocean acidification 
and ocean warming threatens coral reefs and is expected to 
place the tourism industry—an important source of income 
revenue—under severe pressure. 
• Impacts on groundwater levels are significant, with poten-
tial negative repercussions on human health for local and 
migrant populations. The Nile Delta, home to more than 35 
million people and providing 63 percent of Egypt’s agricultural 
production, is especially vulnerable to salinization under chang-
ing climate conditions. These impacts will be exacerbated by 
land subsidence, especially in the eastern part of the delta, 
and by extensive landscape modification resulting from both 
coastal modification and changes in the Nile’s hydrogeology. 
Europe and Central Asia
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) in this report covers 12 countries9 
within Central Asia, the Western Balkans, and the Russian Federa-
tion. The analysis focuses on specific climate challenges related 
9 The World Bank Europe and Central Asia region in this report includes only the 
following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, the 
Russian Federation, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
to the agriculture-water-energy nexus in Central Asia; climate 
extreme in the Western Balkans, and the forests in Russia. While 
the economic and political profiles of the countries differ greatly, a 
common denominator is their transition from various types of closed, 
planned economies to open, market-based systems. The region is 
characterized by relatively low levels of per-capita annual GDP, 
ranging from $800 in Tajikistan to $14,000 in Russia. Agricultural 
production plays an important role in the national economies of 
the region, particularly those of Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Uzbekistan, and Albania. Large portions of the population in Cen-
tral Asia (60 percent) and the Western Balkans (45 percent) live in 
rural areas, making them dependent on natural resources for their 
livelihoods and thus particularly vulnerable to climate change.
The parts of the Europe and Central Asia region covered by 
this report are projected to experience greater warming than the 
global average. The region displays a clear pattern where areas 
in the southwest are becoming drier and areas further northeast, 
including most of Central Asia, are becoming wetter as the world 
warms toward 4°C. The projected temperature and precipitation 
changes translate into increased risks for freshwater supplies 
that not only jeopardizes the sustainability of hydropower and 
agricultural productivity but also negatively impacts ecosystem 
services such as carbon sequestration for most of the region. A 
selection of sub-regional impacts is provided in Box 6. 
Water resources in Central Asia increase during 
the first half of the century and decline thereafter, 
amplifying the challenge of accommodating 
competing water demands for agricultural 
production and hydropower generation.
Water resource systems in Central Asia (notably glaciers and 
snow pack) are sensitive to projected warming; with consequent 
impacts on water availability in the agriculture and energy sectors. 
Figure 4: Multi-model mean of the percentage of boreal summer months (JJA) with highly unusual temperatures (normally unlikely 
to occur more than once in several hundred years) in a 2°C world (left) and a 4°C world (right) in 2071–2099 and relative to the 
1951–1980 base line period.
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Box 6: Selected Climate Risks in the Europe and Central Asia Region
Increasing precipitation and glacial melt lead to increased water availability and flood risk in Central Asia in the coming decades. After mid-century 
and especially with warming leading to a 4°C world, unstable water availability poses a risk for agriculture and competing demands for hydropower 
generation. In the Western Balkans, extreme heat with a strong decrease in precipitation and water availability are projected to lead to large reduc-
tions in crop yields, adverse effects on human health, and increasing risks to energy generation for a 4°C world; but would already be present in a 
2°C world. The Russian forests store enormous amounts of carbon in biomass and soils. While their productivity may generally increase with warmer 
temperatures, large-scale forest dieback and the release of carbon resulting from interacting heat stress, insect spread and fire, have the potential to 
further affect boreal forests in the second half of the century.
Data sources: Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University; United Nations Food and Agriculture Programme; and Centro Internacional 
de Agricultura Tropical—(2005). Gridded Population of the World, Version 3 (GPWv3): Population Count Grid. Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications 
Center (SEDAC). This map was reproduced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on 
this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
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Balkans
R u s s i










Increase in droughts, unusual heat 
extremes and flooding. High risks for 
agriculture, human health and stable 
hydropower generation.
Risks for human health, food and energy 
security.
Central Asia
Increasing glacial melt alters river runoff. 
Risks of glacial lake outbursts, flooding 
and seasonal water shortages. Increasing 
competition for water resources due to 
rising agricultural water demand and 
demand for energy production.
Risks for poor through rising food prices 
particularly affecting women, children and 
the urban poor. Risks for human health 
due to spreading disease, heat waves and 
flooding. 
 Boreal Forests of the Russian 
Federation
Unusual heat extremes and annual 
precipitation increase, rising risks of forest 
fires and spread of pests leading to tree 
mortality and decreasing forest productivity. 
Possible northward shift of treeline and 
changes in species composition. Risks of 
permafrost melt and methane release.
Risk for timber production and ecosystem 
services, including carbon capture. Risks of 
substantial carbon and methane emissions.
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Central Asia is increasingly likely to be a hotspot for heat stress 
for agriculture and human settlements as warming proceeds to 
2°C and 4°C especially as temperatures are not moderated by 
oceanic winds. Since the beginning of the 20th century, Central 
Asian glaciers have already seen a one-third reduction in glacier 
volume. Glacier volume is projected to decline by about 50 percent 
in a 2oC world, concurrent with a 25 percent decrease in snow 
cover for the Northern Hemisphere, and by up to 80 percent in a 
4°C world. Reductions in water availability are predicted to occur 
contemporaneously with an increase in demand for irrigation water. 
• River runoff will increase in the coming decades due to 
enhanced glacial melt rates but flows are expected to 
decrease for the second half of the century. By the end of 
the 21st century a distinct decrease in the water volume of 
the Syr Darya, and an even more distinct decrease in the Amu 
Darya River, is expected because of declining glaciers that sup-
ply most of its flows. Critically, also the timing of high flow 
volumes changes. For example, available data for a headwater 
catchment (Panj) of the Amu Darya River reveal that the timing 
of peak flows is projected to shift toward spring, leading to 
a 25 percent reduction in discharge during the mid-summer 
(July-August) period in a 3°C world. As a result, less water 
will be available for agriculture during the crop-growing season 
while at the same time higher summer temperatures lead to 
higher water demand for plants. 
• Crop productivity is expected to be negatively impacted by 
increased heat extremes and variability of supply/demand 
for water that poses substantial risks to irrigated agricultural 
systems. Rain-fed agriculture is likely to be affected by uncer-
tain rainfall patterns and amounts, including where irrigation 
is important, and coupled with rising maximum temperatures 
can lead to the risk of heat stress and crop failure. 
• Rural populations that are especially dependent on agri-
culture for food are likely to be increasingly vulnerable to 
any reductions in agricultural yields and nutritional quality 
of their staple food grains. 
• Unstable water availability is likely to increase the chal-
lenge of competing requirements for hydropower genera-
tion and agricultural production at times of rising overall 
demand due to projected population and economic growth in 
Central Asia. The projected increase in highly unusual and 
unprecedented heat extremes during the summer months (see 
Figure 4) can be expected to simultaneously increase energy 
demand. As the efficiency of hydropower plants depends on 
inter- and intra-annually stable river runoff, the potential, for 
example, of installed hydropower plants for small catchments 
is projected to decrease by 13 percent in Turkmenistan and by 
19 percent in the Kyrgyz Republic at around 2°C warming by 
the 2050s, while an increase of nearly seven percent is projected 
for Kazakhstan. Overall, energy demand is projected to rise 
together with population and economic growth.
• Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, which are located upstream 
of the Syr Daria and Amu Darya, produce nearly 99 percent 
and 93 percent, respectively, of the total electricity consumed 
from hydropower. These upstream countries would have to 
manage the impact of climate change on their hydropower 
generation capacity, which is the backbone of their power 
systems; downstream countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and 
Turkmenistan), meanwhile, would be hit particularly hard by 
competing demands for agricultural and energy production. 
Climate extremes in the Western Balkans pose 
major risks to agricultural systems, energy and 
human health. 
The Western Balkans are particularly exposed to the effects of 
extreme events, including heat, droughts, and flooding. Heat 
extremes will be the new norm for the Western Balkans in a 4°C 
world. In a 2°C world, highly unusual heat extremes are projected 
for nearly a third of all summer months compared to virtually all 
summer months in a 4°C world. Unprecedented heat extremes are 
projected to occur for 5–10 percent of summer months in a 2°C world 
compared to about two-thirds of summer months in a 4°C world. 
• The risk of drought is high. Projections indicate a 20 per-
cent increase in the number of drought days and a decrease 
in precipitation of about 20–30 percent in a 4°C world. 
Projections for a 2°C world are uncertain. At the same time, 
projections suggest an increase in riverine flood risk, mainly 
in spring and winter, caused by more intense snow melt in 
spring and increased rainfall in the winter months (precipita-
tion projections are, however, particularly uncertain). 
• Most crops are rain-fed and very vulnerable to projected 
climate change. While there are no projections that encompass 
the entire region, and projections for individual countries remain 
uncertain, clear risks emerge. For example, projections for FYR 
Macedonia indicate potential yield losses of up to 50 percent 
for maize, wheat, vegetables, and grapes for around 2°C global 
warming by 2050. Pasture yields and grassland ecosystems for 
livestock grazing may be affected by sustained drought and 
heat, and decline over large parts of the Western Balkans. 
The effects of extreme events on agricultural production are 
mostly not included in assessments, but observations indicate 
high vulnerability. 
• Energy systems are very vulnerable to extreme events and 
changes in river water temperatures; changing seasonality 
of river flows can further impact hydropower production. 
Most countries in the Western Balkans depend on hydroelectric 
sources for at least one-fifth of their electricity production. 
Reductions in electricity production would be concurrent with 
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an increase in cooling demand which is projected to increase 
by 49 percent in a 4°C world.
• Extreme climate events and the appearance of new disease 
vectors pose serious risks to human health. The increased 
incidence and intensity of extreme heat events could cause 
the seasonality of temperature-related mortality to shift from 
winter to summer across continental Europe. Albania and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are considered 
particularly vulnerable to heat waves. The net total number 
of temperature-related deaths is projected to increase for the 
period 2050–2100 above 2°C warming levels. Further health 
risks are likely due to climate change resulting in favorable 
conditions for the insect vectors transmitting diseases, such 
as dengue fever and Chikungunya fever.
Impacts of projected warming on Russian boreal 
forests and the permafrost can have severe 
consequences for forest productivity and global 
carbon stocks. 
The boreal ecosystems of the Russian Federation that account for 
about 20 percent of the world´s forest cover large permafrost regions 
(carbon and methane-rich frozen soil layers) are likely to be quite 
sensitive to projected warming and heat extremes. Perturbations 
to the forest or permafrost could result in severe consequences for 
local ecosystem services and the global carbon budget. Although 
slightly warmer average temperatures may increase forest produc-
tivity, there is a risk of increasing disturbances, such as fires and 
pests, leading to widespread tree mortality. 
Above-average temperature rises and an overall increase in 
annual precipitation is projected. In a 2°C world, highly unusual 
heat extremes are projected to occur in 5–10 percent of summer 
months, increasing to 50 percent of all summer months in a 4oC 
world. Precipitation is expected to increase by 10–30 percent in a 
2°C world and by 20–60 percent in a 4°C world. Permafrost in the 
region is highly vulnerable to warming, with projected permafrost 
thawing rate of 10–15 percent over Russia by 2050 in a 2°C world.
• A northward shift of the tree line is projected in response 
to warming, causing boreal forests to spread into the northern 
tundra zone, temperate forests into the present boreal zone, 
and steppes (grassland plains) into temperate forests. In a 4°C 
world the Eurasian boreal forest area would reduce around 
19 percent and the temperate forest area increase by over 
250 percent. With warming limited to around 1.5°C, boreal 
forests would decrease by around two percent and the tem-
perate forest area would increase by 140 percent. This would 
lead to a net gain in total temperate and boreal forest area in 
Eurasia of seven percent in a 4°C world and 12 percent in a 
1.5°C world. The potential carbon gains from the expansion 
of boreal forests in the north are likely to be offset, however, 
by losses in the south. 
• At lower latitudes the forest is likely to give way to steppe 
ecosystems. If (partly uncertain) CO2 fertilization effects do 
not enhance water-use efficiency sufficiently, the risk of fire, 
particularly in southern Siberia and Central Yakutia, will increase 
and could lead to increased carbon emissions. Projections for 
this area indicate an increase in the annual number of high 
fire danger days of an average of 10 days in a 3°C world, and 
20–30 days in a 4°C world. The effects of heat waves promoting 
forest fires, and the increasing spread of pests and diseases, as 
well as the interaction of these factors, may lead to decreased 
productivity and even increased tree mortality.
• In a 2°C world, the thawing of the permafrost is projected 
to increase methane emissions by 20–30 percent. The 
projected perturbations to Russian forest ecosystems are of 
global importance. If pushed beyond critical thresholds and 
into positive feedback with regional and global warming, 
large carbon stocks in the boreal forests and methane in the 
permafrost zones may be released into the atmosphere—with 
major implications for the global carbon budget.
Consequences for Development
Climate change risks undermining development and 
poverty reduction for present and future generations
Climate change poses a substantial and escalating risk to develop-
ment progress that could undermine global efforts to eliminate 
extreme poverty and promote shared prosperity. Without strong, 
early action, warming could exceed 1.5–2°C and the resulting 
impacts could significantly worsen intra- and inter-generational 
poverty in multiple regions across the globe. 
Severe threats to development outlined in this report are 
beginning to occur across many sectors in all three regions. The 
analysis presented in this report reveals that amplified risks are 
emerging from multi-sectoral impacts in particular connected to 
food security due to projected large and severe crop yield losses 
for warming levels above 2°C. 
As warming approaches 4oC very severe impacts can be 
expected to trigger impact cascades crossing critical thresholds of 
environmental and human support systems. Climatic conditions, 
heat and other weather extremes considered highly unusual or 
unprecedented today would become the new climate normal—a 
world of increased risks and instability. 
Every effort must be made to cut greenhouse gas emissions 
from our cities, land use, and energy systems now and transition to 
a clean, low carbon pathway. Action is urgently needed on climate 
change, but it does not have to come at the expense of economic 
growth. Immediate steps are also needed to help countries build 
resilience and adapt to the climate impacts being felt today and 
the unavoidable consequences of a rapidly warming world over 
the coming decades.
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Box 7: Projected Impacts of Climate Change in Key Sectors in the Latin America 
and Caribbean Region
Warming levels are relative to pre-industrial temperatures. The impacts shown here are a subset of those summarized in Table 3.15 of the Main 
report. The arrows indicate solely the range of warming levels assessed in the underlying studies, but do not imply any graduation of risk unless 
noted explicitly. In addition, observed impacts or impacts occurring at lower or higher levels of warming that are not covered by the key studies high-
lighted here are not presented (e.g., coral bleaching already occurs earlier than 1.5°C warming but the studies presented here only start at 1.5°C). 
Adaptation measures are not assessed here although they can be crucial to alleviate impacts of climate change. The layout of the figure is adapted 
from Parry (2010). The lower-case superscript letters indicate the relevant references for each impact.10 If there is no letter, the results are based on 
additional analyses for this report.
The task of promoting human development, of ending pov-
erty, increasing global prosperity and reducing global inequality 
will be very challenging in a 2°C world, but in a 4°C world there 
is serious doubt whether it can be achieved at all. Many of the 
worst projected climate impacts outlined in this report could still 
be avoided by holding warming below 2°C. This will require 
substantial technological, economic, institutional and behavioral 
change. And, most of all, it will require leadership at every level 











      1°C   1.5°C            2°C       3°C   4°C       5°C 
Rice and sugarcane yields possibly increase but high yield declines for wheat and maize (i) 
10% 30% 30-40% 65% 90% 
Drought longer by(a) 
 l heatausunu ylhgih yb detceffa aera dnaL
 
1-4 days 2-8 days 8-17 days 
Tropical glacier volume loss(b) 78-94% 66-97% 91-100% 
Southern Andes glacier volume loss(b) 21-52% 27-59% 44-72% 
Beef cattle numbers in Paraguay(j) 
-16% -27% 
Sea level rise 0.27-0.39m, max 0.65m 0.46-0.66m, max 1.4m 
Fish catch potential(d) Up to +100% in South;  up to -50% in Caribbean  
Probability of annual coral reef bleaching in Caribbean (high risk of extinction)  (c) 
+5-13%     Risk of diarrheal diseases(k)       +14-36% 
Malaria increases in extra-tropics and highlands and decreases in the tropics (m) 
+12-22%   Increase in dengue (Mexico)(l) +40% 
Increasing biomass and carbon losses in Amazon(g) 
Increasing species range shifts/contractions and/or extinctions for mammals, marsupials, 
birds, plants, amphibians (h) 
20- 40% 60- 80%
  
10-30% decrease of mean runoff in Central America(e)  
Mean river discharge decreases in Northeast Brazil(f)  
10
10 a) Sillmann et al. (2013b); (b) Marzeion et al. (2012); Giesen and Oerlemans (2013); Radic et al. (2013); (c) Meissner et al. (2012); (d) Cheung et al. (2010); (e) 
Hidalgo et al. (2013); (f) Döll and Schmied (2012); (g) several studies without considering C02-fertilization, see Table 3.1; (h) several studies, see Table 3.1; (i) several 
studies, see Table 3.1; (j) ECLAC (2010); (k) Kolstad and Johansson (2011); (l) Colon-Gonzalez et al. (2013); (m) Beguin et al. (2011); Caminade et al. (2014); Van 
Lieshout et al. (2004).
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Box 8: Projected Impacts of Climate Change in Key Sectors in the Middle East 
and North Africa Region
Warming levels are relative to pre-industrial temperatures. The impacts shown here are a subset of those summarized in Table 4.10 of the Main 
Report. The arrows solely indicate the range of warming levels assessed in the underlying studies; but do not imply any graduation of risk unless 
noted explicitly. In addition, observed impacts or impacts occurring at lower or higher levels of warming that are not covered by the key studies 
highlighted here are not presented (e.g., increase in drought and aridity is already observed, but the respective study does not assess impacts below 
1.5°C). Adaptation measures are not assessed here although they can be crucial to alleviating the impacts of climate change. The layout of the figure 
is adapted from Parry (2010). The lower-case superscript letters indicate the relevant references for each impact.11 If there is no letter, the results are 
based on additional analyses for this report.
11
11 (a) Evans (2008); (b) several studies, see Table 4.1; (c) Bokurt and Sen (2013); (d) Samuels et al. (2010); (e) Giannakopoulos et al. (2013); (f) van Lieshout et al. 











      1°C   1.5°C            2°C       3°C   4°C       5°C 
up to 30% up to 57% 
20-34 million 
over 170,000 km 
Reduction in crop yields(b) 
Loss of rainfed agriculture land(a) 
More people exposed to risk of malaria(f) 
Sea level 
rise above 
present 0.20-0.64m 0.38-1.04m 
17% reduction in daily runoff for the tributaries of the Jordan River(d) 
Decrease in snow melt water affecting the 
Euphrates and Tigris basin(c) by 87% by 77-85% 
Moderate drought in 
Maghreb and Mashrek  < 0.5 months per year > 6 months per year ~ 1.5 months per year 






Egypt: 1.9 million 
Morocco: 1.8 million 
Egypt: 3.6 million 
Morocco: 2.1 million 
Loss of 25% of Nile Delta´s land area(i)
allmost all 25% 5% 
Area classified as hyper-arid or arid  
84% 87% 
over 8,500 km  
Increase in thermal discomfort by 35-70 days(e) 
39-62 million 
Risk for diarrheal disease increase by 16-41%(g) 
Risk for diarrheal disease 
increase by 6-15%(g) 
9099_CH00_FM.pdf   xxxiv 11/17/14   6:03 PM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
xxxv
Box 9: Projected Impacts of Climate Change in Key Sectors in the Europe and 
Central Asia Region
Warming levels are relative to pre–industrial temperatures. The impacts shown here are a subset of those summarized in Table 5.7 of the Main report. 
The arrows solely indicate the range of warming levels assessed in the underlying studies but do not imply any graduation of risk unless noted explic-
itly. In addition, observed impacts or impacts occurring at lower or higher levels of warming that are not covered by the key studies highlighted here 
are not presented (e.g., an increase in Tien Shan glacier melt is already observed, but the respective study does not assess the observed impacts). 
Adaptation measures are not assessed here, although they can be crucial to alleviating the impacts of climate change. The layout of the figure is 
adapted from Parry (2010). The lower-case superscript letters indicate the relevant references for each impact.12 If there is no letter, the results are 












      1°C   1.5°C            2°C       3°C   4°C       5°C 
Heat mortality increased 
to 1000 per million(m) 
Large decreases in timber harvest(q) 
31% of Tien Shan 
glaciers melting(a) 
Increased vulnerability of Western 
Balkans to dengue and 
chikungunya(l) 
Significant runoff formation 
decline in Central Asia(f) 
Soil desertification and salinization(g) 
Increase in timber 
harvest for larch and 
pine(q) 
30-60 days peak shifts in 
Syr Dara basin(a) 
5% 
Dramatic changes in vegetation(r) 
10% 15% 50% 85% 
Land area affected by highly unusual heat 
60% aridity increase in Western Balkans 
10-40% decrease up to 60% decrease 
Central Asian glacier mass loss 
50% (31-66%)(b) 57% (37-71%)(c) 67% (50-78%)(d) 
10 days increase 
in fire risk(r) 20-30 days increase in fire risk(r) 
45-75% increased water discharge in 
North-Eastern Russia(s) 
Strong river runoff 
reduction in the 
Balkans(e) 
Yield declines due to 
droughts and floods in 
Western Balkans(h) 





20% grape and 
olive yield losses 
in Albania(j) 
30% yield drop 
in Tajikistan(k) 
2.58% increase in hydropower 
potential in Central Asia(n) 
Tenfold increase in 
mudflow risk in 
Kazakhstan(m) 
6-19% less capacity of nuclear and 
fossil-fueled power plants in Europe(o) 35% decreased hydropower 
potential in Croatia(p) 
Balkans become suitable 
for dengue-transmitting 
mosquito(l) 
 :noitaredeF naissuR ni ytidirA
12
12 (a) Siegfried et al. (2012); (b) Marzeion et al. (2012); (c) Marzeion et al. (2012); Giesen and Oerlemans (2013); Radic et al. (2013); (d) Marzeion et al. (2012); Giesen 
and Oerlemans (2013); Radic et al. (2013); (e) Dimkic and Despotovic (2012); (f) Hagg et al. (2013); (g) Thurmann (2011); World Bank (2013f); World Bank (2013d); 
World Bank (2013a); (h) Maslac (2012); UNDP (2014); (i) Sutton et al. (2013a); Sommer et al. (2013); (j) Sutton et al. (2013a); (k) World Bank (2013m); (l) Caminade 
et al. (2012); (m) BMU and WHO-Europe (2009); (n) Hamududu and Killingtveit (2012); (o) van Vilet et al. (2012); (p) Pasicko et al. (2012); (q) Lutz et al. (2013b); 
(r) Tchebakova et al. (2009); (s) Schewe et al. (2013).
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$ United States Dollars 
AI Aridity Index
AOGCM Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Model
AR4  Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
AR5  Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change
BAU Business as Usual
CaCO3 Calcium Carbonate
CAT Climate Action Tracker
CMIP5 Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
DGVM Dynamic Global Vegetation Model
DIVA Dynamic Interactive Vulnerability Assessment
DJF December, January, and February (the winter 
season of the northern hemisphere)
ECA Europe and Central Asia
ECS Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity
ENSO El-Niño/Southern Oscillation 
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization 
FPU Food Productivity Units
GCM General Circulation Model
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GLOF Glacial Lake Outburst Flood
HCS Humboldt Current System 
IAM Integrated Assessment Model
IEA International Energy Agency
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISI-MIP Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison 
Project
ITCZ Intertropical Convergence Zone 
JJA June, July, and August (the summer season of the 
northern hemisphere; also known as the boreal 
summer) 
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
LDC Least Developed Countries
MAGICC  Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas 
Induced Climate Change
MCMA The Mexico City Metropolitan Area 
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MGIC Mountain Glaciers and Ice Caps
NAO North Atlantic Oscillation
NDVI Normalized Differenced Vegetation Index (used as 
a proxy for terrestrial gross primary production) 
NH Northern Hemisphere
NPP Net Primary Production 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development
PDSI Palmer Drought Severity Index
PgC Petagrams of Carbon (1 PgC = 1 billion tons of 
carbon) 
ppm Parts Per Million
PPP Purchasing Power Parity (a weighted currency 
based on the price of a basket of basic goods, 
typically given in US dollars)
RCM Regional Climate Model
RCP Representative Concentration Pathway 
SCM Simple Climate Model
SLR Sea-level Rise
SRES IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios
SREX IPCC Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme 
Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change 
Adaptation
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TgC Teragrams of Carbon (1 TgC = 1 million tons of 
carbon) 
UNCCD United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID United States Agency for International 
Development
WBG World Bank Group
WGI Working Group I (also WGII, WGIII)
WHO World Health Organization
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Glossary 
Aridity Index: The Aridity Index (AI) is an indicator designed for 
identifying structurally arid regions; that is, regions with a long-
term average precipitation deficit. AI is defined as total annual 
precipitation divided by potential evapotranspiration, with the 
latter a measure of the amount of water a representative crop type 
would need as a function of local conditions such as temperature, 
incoming radiation, and wind speed, over a year to grow, which 
is a standardized measure of water demand.
Biome: A biome is a large geographical area of distinct plant and 
animal groups, one of a limited set of major habitats classified 
by climatic and predominant vegetative types. Biomes include, 
for example, grasslands, deserts, evergreen or deciduous forests, 
and tundra. Many different ecosystems exist within each broadly 
defined biome, all of which share the limited range of climatic 
and environmental conditions within that biome.
C3/C4 plants: C3 and C4 refer to two types of photosynthetic 
biochemical pathways. C3 plants include more than 85 percent 
of plants (e.g., most trees, wheat, rice, yams, and potatoes) and 
respond well to moist conditions and to additional CO2 in the 
atmosphere. C4 plants (e.g., savanna grasses, maize, sorghum, 
millet, and sugarcane) are more efficient in water and energy use 
and outperform C3 plants in hot and dry conditions.
CAT: The Climate Action Tracker is an independent, science-
based assessment that tracks the emissions commitments of and 
actions by individual countries. The estimates of future emissions 
deducted from this assessment serve to analyze warming scenarios 
that could result from current policy: (i) CAT Reference BAU: a 
lower reference business-as-usual scenario that includes existing 
climate policies but not pledged emissions reductions; and (ii) CAT 
Current Pledges: a scenario additionally incorporating reductions 
currently pledged internationally by countries.
CO2 fertilization: The CO2 fertilization effect refers to the effect 
of increased levels of atmospheric CO2 on plant growth. It may 
increase the rate of photosynthesis mainly in C3 plants and increase 
water use efficiency, thereby causing increases in agricultural pro-
ductivity in grain mass and/or number. This effect may to some 
extent offset the negative impacts of climate change on crop yields, 
although grain protein content may decline. Long-term effects 
are uncertain as they heavily depend on a potential physiological 
long-term acclimation to elevated CO2 and other limiting factors, 
including soil nutrients, water, and light. (See also Box 2.4 on the 
CO2 fertilization effect on crop productivity.)
CMIP5: The Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 
(CMIP5) brought together 20 state-of-the-art GCM groups, which 
generated a large set of comparable climate-projection data. The 
project provided a framework for coordinated climate change experi-
ments and includes simulations for assessment in the IPCC AR5.
Development narratives: Development narratives highlight 
the implications of climate change impacts on regional devel-
opment. The Turn Down the Heat series, and in particular this 
report, discuss the potential climate change impacts on particu-
larly vulnerable groups along distinct storylines—the so called 
development narratives. These development narratives were 
developed for each region in close cooperation with regional 
World Bank specialists. They provide an integrated, often cross-
sectoral analysis of climate change impacts and development 
implications at the sub-regional or regional level. Furthermore, 
the development narratives add to the report by allowing the 
science-based evidence of physical and biophysical impacts to 
be drawn out into robust development storylines to characterize 
the plausible scenarios of risks and opportunities—showcasing 
how science and policy interface.
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GCM: A General Circulation Model is the most advanced type 
of climate model used for projecting changes in climate due to 
increasing greenhouse gas concentrations, aerosols, and external 
forcing (like changes in solar activity and volcanic eruptions). 
These models contain numerical representations of physical pro-
cesses in the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere, and land surface 
on a global three-dimensional grid, with the current generation 
of GCMs having a typical horizontal resolution of 100–300 km.
GDP: Gross Domestic Product is the sum of the gross value added 
by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes 
and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the product. 
It is calculated without deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.
GDP PPP: This is GDP on a purchasing power parity basis divided 
by population. Whereas PPP estimates for OECD countries are 
quite reliable, PPP estimates for developing countries are often 
rough approximations.
Highly unusual and Unprecedented: In this report, highly 
unusual and unprecedented heat extremes are defined using 
thresholds based on the historical variability of the current local 
climate. The absolute level of the threshold depends on the natural 
year-to-year variability in the base period (1951–1980), which is 
captured by the standard deviation (sigma). Highly unusual heat 
extremes are defined as 3-sigma events. For a normal distribution, 
3-sigma events have a return time of 740 years. The 2012 U.S. 
heat wave and the 2010 Russian heat wave classify as 3-sigma 
and thus highly unusual events. Unprecedented heat extremes 
are defined as 5-sigma events. They have a return time of several 
million years. Monthly temperature data do not necessarily fol-
low a normal distribution (for example, the distribution can have 
long tails, making warm events more likely) and the return times 
can be different from the ones expected in a normal distribution. 
Nevertheless, 3-sigma events are extremely unlikely and 5-sigma 
events have almost certainly never occurred over the lifetime of 
key ecosystems and human infrastructure.
Hyper-aridity: This refers to land areas with very low Aridity Index 
(AI) scores, generally coinciding with the great deserts. There is 
no universally standardized value for hyper-aridity, and values 
between 0 and 0.05 are classified in this report as hyper-arid.
IPCC AR4, AR5: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) is the leading body of global climate change assessments. 
It comprises hundreds of leading scientists worldwide and on a 
regular basis publishes assessment reports which provide a com-
prehensive overview of the most recent scientific, technical, and 
socioeconomic information on climate change and its implications. 
The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) was published in 2007. The 
Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) was published in 2013/2014.
ISI-MIP: The first Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison 
Project (ISI-MIP) is a community-driven modeling effort which 
provides cross-sectoral global impact assessments based on the 
newly developed climate Representative Concentration Pathways 
and socioeconomic scenarios. More than 30 models across five 
sectors (agriculture, water resources, biomes, health, and infra-
structure) were incorporated in this modeling exercise.
Pre-industrial Level (what it means to have present 0.8°C warm-
ing): Pre-industrial level refers to the level of warming before/at 
the onset of industrialization. The instrumental temperature records 
show that the 20-year average of global-mean, near-surface air 
temperature in 1986–2005 was about 0.6°C higher than the aver-
age over 1851–1879. There are, however, considerable year-to-year 
variations and uncertainties in the data. In addition, the 20-year 
average warming over 1986–2005 is not necessarily representa-
tive of present-day warming. Fitting a linear trend over the period 
1901–2010 gives a warming of 0.8°C since “early industrialization.” 
Global mean, near-surface air temperatures in the instrumental 
records of surface-air temperature have been assembled dating 
back to about 1850. The number of measurement stations in the 
early years is small and increases rapidly with time. Industrializa-
tion was well on its way by 1850 and 1900, which implies using 
1851–1879 as a base period, or 1901 as a start for linear trend 
analysis might lead to an underestimate of current and future 
warming. However, global greenhouse-gas emissions at the end of 
the 19th century were still small and uncertainties in temperature 
reconstructions before this time are considerably larger.
RCP: Representative Concentration Pathways are based on 
carefully selected scenarios for work on integrated assess-
ment modeling, climate modeling, and modeling and analysis 
of impacts. Nearly a decade of new economic data, informa-
tion about emerging technologies, and observations of such 
environmental factors as land use and land cover change are 
reflected in this work. Rather than starting with detailed socio-
economic storylines to generate emissions scenarios, the RCPs 
are consistent sets of projections of only the components of 
radiative forcing (the change in the balance between incoming 
and outgoing radiation to the atmosphere caused primarily by 
changes in atmospheric composition) that are meant to serve as 
inputs for climate modeling. These radiative forcing trajectories 
are not associated with unique socioeconomic or emissions 
scenarios; instead, they can result from different combina-
tions of economic, technological, demographic, policy, and 
institutional futures. RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6 and RCP8.5 refer, 
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respectively, to a radiative forcing of +2.6 W/m², +4.5 W/m², 
+6 W/m² and +8.5 W/m² in the year 2100 relative to pre-
industrial conditions.
RCP2.6: RCP2.6 refers to a scenario which is representative of the 
literature on mitigation scenarios aiming to limit the increase of 
global mean temperature to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. This 
emissions path is used by many studies that have been assessed 
for the IPCC 5th Assessment Report and is the underlying low 
emissions scenario for impacts assessed in other parts of this 
report. In this report, the RCP2.6 is referred to as a 2°C world 
(with the exception of sea-level rise, where the subset of model 
used actually leads to 1.5°C world—see Box 2.1, Definition of 
Warming Levels and Base Period in this Report).
RCP8.5: RCP8.5 refers to a scenario with a no-climate-policy base-
line with comparatively high greenhouse gas emissions which is 
used by many studies that have been assessed for the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report (AR5). This scenario is also the underlying 
high-emissions scenario for impacts assessed in other parts of this 
report. In this report, the RCP8.5 is referred to as a 4°C world 
above the pre-industrial baseline period.
Severe and extreme: These terms indicate uncommon (negative) 
consequences. These terms are often associated with an additional 
qualifier like “highly unusual” or “unprecedented” that has a 
specific quantified meaning. 
SRES: The Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, published by the 
IPCC in 2000, has provided the climate projections for the Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. The scenarios do not include mitigation assumptions. The 
SRES study included consideration of 40 different scenarios, each 
making different assumptions about the driving forces determining 
future greenhouse gas emissions. Scenarios were grouped into four 
families (A1FI, A2, B1 and B2), corresponding to a wide range of 
high- and low-emissions scenarios.
SREX: The IPCC published a special report on Managing the 
Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change 
Adaptation (SREX) in 2012. The report provides an assessment of 
the physical and social factors shaping vulnerability to climate-
related disasters and gives an overview of the potential for effective 
disaster risk management.
Tipping element: Following Lenton et al. (2008), the term tipping 
element describes large scale components of the Earth system pos-
sibly passing a tipping point. A tipping point “commonly refers to 
a critical threshold at which a tiny perturbation can qualitatively 
alter the state or development of a system” (Lenton et al. 2008). 
The consequences of such shifts for societies and ecosystems are 
likely to be severe.
Virtual water: A measure of the water resources used in the pro-
duction of agricultural commodities. International trade in such 
commodities thereby implies a transfer of virtual water resources 
from one country to another embedded in the products.
WGI, WGII, WG III: IPCC Working Group I assesses the physical 
scientific aspects of the climate system and climate change. IPCC 
Working Group II assesses the vulnerability of socio-economic 
and natural systems to climate change, negative and positive 
consequences of climate change, and options for adapting to it. 
IPCC Working Group III assesses the options for mitigating climate 
change through limiting or preventing greenhouse gas emissions 
and enhancing activities that remove them from the atmosphere. 
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This report describes the challenges for development and poverty reduction under anthropogenic climate change in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Europe and Central Asia (ECA). Climate change projections 
are presented for each region alongside an assessment of the most recent literature on climate change impacts that are expected 
in key sectors for different warming levels, from the current baseline of 0.8°C through to 2°C and 4°C above pre-industrial levels in 
2100. These impacts are then discussed in relation to existing social vulnerabilities to stress the implications of biophysical climate 
change impacts for development in the different regions. In order to provide a better understanding of how climate change and its 
expected impacts may affect development, storylines—referred to here as development narratives—are presented. These follow 
the chain of impacts from the physical to the biophysical and social level and specify how climate change could affect human well-
being. Attention is paid to the specific ways in which different population groups are affected. The development narratives stress 
plausible scenarios and plausible impacts rather than giving probability ranges for the impacts estimated. Following the chain of 
impacts, the assessment shows that climate change poses severe challenges for human wellbeing and development, with the 
poor and underprivileged often hardest hit.
The recent publications of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) show that 
greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase and in fact 
have accelerated toward the end of the 2000s (IPCC 2014a). Global 
mean temperature has already increased by 0.8°C from 1880–2012 
(IPCC 2013a), and climate change impacts are increasingly being 
experienced on all continents and across a range of human and 
natural systems (IPCC 2014b). More severe impacts are projected with 
further warming, and the resulting challenges for eradicating poverty 
and promoting human wellbeing could be immense. If efforts and 
achievements in reducing greenhouse gas emissions continue at the 
current pace, warming levels of higher than 4°C cannot be ruled out. 
Recent efforts to project the effects of current national poli-
cies indicate that there is about a 40 percent chance of exceeding 
4°C warming above pre-industrial levels by about 2100. Critically, 
timing is of the essence. With rising temperatures, the risks for 
human lives and development trajectories increase, and a number 
of impacts will soon be locked in for decades, if not for centuries 
to come. For example, if present temperatures were to be main-
tained, the world would be committed to around 2.3 m of sea-level 
rise over the next 2,000 years. However sea levels would rise to 
around 3.6 m under a 2°C warming scenario, and to around 8 m 
over the same period under a 4°C scenario (Levermann et al. 
2013). It is also important to note that greenhouse gas emissions 
and concentrations leading to a warming of 4°C by 2100 would 
commit the world to much higher warming levels exceeding 6°C 
or more in the long term (IPCC 2013b). 
This report takes as its starting point the IPCC´s 5th Assessment 
Reports. In addition it provides regional and sub-regional narratives 
on the implications of climate impacts on development. The report 
emphasizes topics that are of particular relevance for the focus 
regions and considers scientific studies published after the literature 
cutoff dates of the AR5. It thus takes up the guiding questions of the 
first two Turn Down the Heat reports (World Bank 2012a; 2013) by 
focusing on three previously not assessed regions and digging deeper 
into the social and development consequences of climate change 
for those affected. It does so along the following lines of inquiry: 
1. What are the key biophysical climate change impacts in the 
case study regions under different levels of warming (par-
ticularly 2°C and 4°C)?
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2. What are the crucial development impacts triggered by the bio-
physical impacts of climate change within and across sectors?
3. What are the implications of climate change impacts (physical, 
biophysical, and social) for (differential) social vulnerability 
within the case study regions?
Through extensive data analysis and literature review, this 
report shows that the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions 
that cause climate change, adaptation to the consequences, and 
coping with the unavoidable impacts, must be part and parcel of 
the fight against poverty if risks are to be minimized and benefits 
promoted. The biogeographic and development context of the 
three regions defines the nature and extent of climate impacts 
and the discussion of the development implications. For example:
• Latin America and the Caribbean is a highly heterogeneous 
region in terms of economic development and social and 
indigenous histories. The rural poor depend on their natural 
resource base, including subsistence agriculture and ecosystem 
services. In the Andean region, housing built on steep terrain 
is critically exposed to heavy precipitation events, landslides, 
and glacial lake outbursts associated with glacial melt. Coastal 
livelihoods, particularly in the Caribbean region, face the risks of 
degrading marine ecosystems and coastal flooding, concurrent 
with damage to critical infrastructure and freshwater supplies.
• The Middle East and Northern Africa relies heavily on agri-
culture as a source of food and income, not only in the his-
torically important fertile crescent of the Euphrates and Tigris 
region but also at the Mediterranean coast and along the Nile. 
At the same time, much of the region is covered by drylands 
and deserts. Seventy percent of the agricultural production is 
currently rain-fed, which leaves the region highly vulnerable 
to the consequences of changes in precipitation patterns and 
temperature changes—with associated consequences for food 
security, social security, and rural livelihoods. This, in com-
bination with social changes and strong urbanization rates, 
marks a very vulnerable future for the region, particularly for 
both the urban and rural poor. 
• Europe and Central Asia encompasses a wide terrain of 
geographic features ranging from the mountainous and partly 
coastal Western Balkans to the vast plains of Central Asia to 
the boreal forests of the Russian Federation. In climatic terms 
the region displays a clear dipole, whereby regions in the 
southwest are becoming drier and regions in the northeast 
are becoming wetter as the world warms toward 4°C. The 
most pronounced warming is expected to occur in two distinct 
regions: Northern Russia bordering the Barents-Kara Sea, and 
the Black Sea coastal region, including the Western Balkans. 
These changing conditions lead to a number of pronounced 
vulnerabilities, with a high risk of drought in the west and 
challenges for stable freshwater supplies in the east (where 
changes in precipitation combine with glacial melt to affect 
the seasonality of river discharge).
With a deliberate focus on the impacts of climate change, the 
report frames the critical need for adaptation, but an assessment 
of climate change adaptation options is outside the scope of this 
report. It is clear, however, from the evidence presented here that 
there are a range of low-hanging and no-regret adaptation options 
that could increase the resilience of natural and social systems 
across sectors. These include, among others, closing the yield gap 
between potential and actual agricultural yields through techno-
logical changes, climate-smart agriculture, and/or climate-smart 
urban development, as well as boosting health care systems in 
developing regions. The IPCC WGII provides a comprehensive 
review of these and other options (cf. IPCC 2014b).
Although adaptation is crucial to alleviate the impacts of climate 
change, the potential for additional adaptation, beyond current adapta-
tion, to reduce risks of climate change impacts to low levels is limited 
even in a 2°C world (IPCC 2014c). In a 4°C world, the effectiveness 
of adaptation measures is thought to be even more limited for many 
systems and sectors, which will not be able to minimize risks by 
simply doubling the effort to adapt to a 2°C world. For example, 
an increasing severity and frequency in extreme events is likely to 
severely undermine a population’s adaptive capacity for consecutive 
impacts (World Bank and GFDRR 2013). A 4°C world would also 
likely mean irreversible changes in the Earth system, with impacts 
materializing well after warming has stopped. It is thus clear that 
investments that boost the adaptive capacity of people are a must 
and it is also evident that climate change mitigation is required. The 
challenges that climate change poses are the focus of this report. 
1.1 Development Narratives
Recent work has fostered understanding of what climate change 
means for development (World Bank 2010a) and decision mak-
ing in the face of uncertainty (Hallegatte et al. 2012). The Turn 
Down the Heat series, and this report in particular, reports the 
potential impacts on particularly vulnerable groups along distinct 
storylines—the so-called development narratives. These develop-
ment narratives provide an integrated, often cross-sectoral analysis 
of climate change impacts and development implications at the 
sub-regional and regional scale. The development narratives 
also add to the report by allowing the science-based evidence 
of physical and biophysical impacts to be effectively drawn out 
into robust development storylines to characterize the plausible 
scenarios of risks and opportunities—showcasing how science and 
policy interact. It is widely accepted that climate change affects 
particular socioeconomic groups, such as the poor, the elderly, 
children, and women, the hardest (Leichenko and Silva 2014). This 
report includes a framework for assessing climate change impacts 
in light of existing social vulnerability (see Box 1.1). 
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development narratives present possible scenarios that are based on 
assumptions drawn from the scientific literature and shaped by the 
close cooperation with regional development specialists. As a result, 
it is not feasible to provide uncertainty ranges of the likelihood of 
the scenarios presented in the development narratives. Rather, a 
risk-based approach indicating plausible high-impact consequences 
under 2°C and 4°C global mean warming was chosen to form a 
basis of further policy and research.
1.3 Structure of the Report
The report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 explores the probability 
of warming reaching 4°C above pre-industrial levels and discusses 
the feasibility of significantly limiting global mean warming to 
below 2°C. It further provides an update on global climate impact 
projections for different levels of global warming. The updated 
analysis of the risks at the global level further complements the 
first two Turn Down the Heat reports (World Bank 2012a; 2013) 
and provides a framework for the regional case studies. Chapter 2 
also presents a framework for how social vulnerability and climate 
change interact. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present analyses of climate 
impacts and the development narratives for the Latin America and 
the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and Europe and 
Central Asia regions respectively.
Box 1.1: Social Vulnerability
Social vulnerability refers to the lack of capability of individuals, 
groups, or communities to cope with and adapt to external stresses 
placed on their livelihoods and wellbeing. This is determined by the 
availability of resources and by the entitlement of individuals and 
groups to call on these resources (Füssel 2012).
Social vulnerability, and how it differs according to socioeco-
nomic and demographic conditions, is a common denominator in 
all three regions in this report. Examples of past extreme events 
expose the uneven distribution of impacts among different popula-
tions (IPCC 2014c), such as the impact of Hurricane Katrina in the 
United States or glacial lake outburst floods in the Peruvian Andes. 
They show that factors such as socioeconomic class, race, gender, 
and ethnicity affect the magnitude with which impacts are experi-
enced. Such examples also show that it is the underprivileged in 
rich nations who bear high burden of climate impacts. In addition, 
such extremes as hurricanes, floods, and heat waves leave in their 
wake a trail of damage and human suffering which can extend well 
beyond the point of impact in terms of both time and space. Dam-
ages to supply chains can transmit impacts across an ever more 
globalized world and have long-lasting economic effects (Levermann 
2014). Already under present levels of warming, which have reached 
about 0.8°C above pre-industrial levels, the number of local record-
breaking monthly temperature extremes is around five times higher 
than would be expected if no warming had occurred (Coumou et al. 
2013). As the IPCC WGI AR5 (IPCC 2013b) has shown, and as it is 
outlined in this report, the likelihood of extreme events is projected 
to increase under rising temperatures. While large uncertainties exist 
about the magnitude of the poverty effects of climate change and 
the scientific debate surrounding the issue is far from settled, the 
evidence demonstrates a major reason for concern.
Box 1.2: Climate Change Projections, 
Impacts, and Uncertainty
In this report the projections of future climate change and its sectoral 
impacts are based, necessarily, on modeling exercises. The quantita-
tive results discussed take into account the inherent uncertainties 
of model projections. The analysis of temperature and precipitation 
changes, as well as heat extremes and aridity, is based on a selection 
of state-of-the-art Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 
(CMIP5) climate models. Following Hempel et al. (2013), precipitation 
data was bias-corrected, such that it reproduces the historical mean 
and variation in precipitation. Results are reported as the mean of the 
models and their variability. Where relevant, a measure of agreement/
disagreement of models on the sign of changes is indicated. The 
projections might therefore provide more robust and consistent trends 
than a random selection of model results, even at regional scales. 
Results reported from the literature are, in most cases, based 
on climate impact models and are likewise faced with issues about 
uncertainty. As with the case for climate projections, there are limita-
tions on the precision with which conclusions can be drawn. For 
this reason, where possible conclusions are drawn from multiple 
lines of evidence across a range of methods, models, and data 
sources, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
Fifth Assessment Report and the Special Report on Managing the 
Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change 
Adaptation (IPCC 2012).
1.2 Methodological Approach
The projections on changes in temperature, heat extremes, pre-
cipitation, aridity, and sea-level rise are based on original analysis 
of output from state-of-the-art General Circulation Models (GCM) 
(see Box 1.2 and Appendix). The development narratives combine 
knowledge that has been gained through large and small scale 
quantitative and qualitative research. The sectoral analysis for the 
three regions is based on existing literature. The literature review 
was almost exclusively conducted in the English language and it 
followed a prescribed hierarchy of sources: peer-reviewed scientific 
publications were given most weight, followed by peer-reviewed 
reports. Where these sources were lacking and additional infor-
mation was obtainable from other sources, those were used (but 
least weight was given to them). As the studies assessed were not 
conducted within an integrated framework, their integration does 
not allow for a coherent analysis of overall impacts and human 
consequences. Rather, the causal pathways mapped out in the 
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The Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the IPCC provides a very comprehensive analysis of the physical science basis and the 
observed and projected impacts of climate change as well as of the economics of climate change mitigation. The following chapter 
should be read as an addition to the AR5, with emphasis on topics that are of particular relevance for the focus regions of this 
report and where scientific studies published after the literature cutoff dates of the AR5 led to an update of the findings from IPCC 
for specific issues. 
The IPCC projections always draw on the largest model ensemble 
available (which differs significantly in size ranging from less than 
10 to more than 30 climate models). This report restricts most of 
the projections presented in this chapter and throughout to five 
state-of-the-art CMIP5 models that are bias-corrected and used in 
the ISI-MIP framework (see Appendix). Although the robustness 
of projections based on smaller ensembles is generally lower, this 
approach allows for direct comparison between different impacts 
in an impact cascade (e.g., of changes in precipitation patterns, 
river discharge, and agricultural impacts). 
2.1 How Likely is a 4°C World?
The previous Turn Down the Heat reports estimated that current 
emissions reductions pledges by countries worldwide, if fully 
implemented, would lead to warming exceeding 3°C before 2100. 
New assessments of business-as-usual emissions in the absence 
of strong climate mitigation policies, as well as recent reevalua-
tions of the likely emissions consequences of pledges and targets 
adopted by countries, point to a considerable likelihood of warm-
ing reaching 4°C above pre-industrial levels within this century. 
• Assessments of recent trends and “current policies” in the 
world’s energy system analyzed by the International Energy 
Agency in its World Energy Outlook 2012 indicate global-mean 
warming above pre-industrial levels would approach 3.8°C 
by 2100. Another assessment, by Climate Action Tracker, of 
these trends and policies leads to a warming of 3.7°C, about 
0.6°C higher than the median estimate of the effect of the 
Copenhagen pledges in this assessment.12 As a consequence, 
it is projected on the basis of these assessments that under 
recent trends and current policies there is about a 40 percent 
chance of exceeding 4°C by 2100 and a 10 percent risk of 
exceeding 5°C.
• Based on a sample of 114 energy-economic model scenarios 
estimating emissions in the absence of further substantial policy 
action (baseline scenarios), climate-model projections reach 
a warming of 4.0–5.2°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100 
(95 percent range of scenarios—grey shaded area Figure 2.1) 
(Blanford et al. 2014; Kriegler et al. 2013; Kriegler, Tavoni et al. 
2014; Kriegler, Weyant et al. 2014; Luderer et al. 2013; Riahi 
et al. 2013; Tavoni et al. 2014). Only under extreme assump-
tions regarding autonomous improvements leading to large 
decreases in energy intensity and an energy demand by 2100 
(e.g., 35–40 percent lower than under default assumptions) 
(Blanford et al. 2014; Kriegler, Weyant et al. 2014) does the 
lower end of the baselines’ 95 percent range decrease to below 
4°C (3.5°C) in 2100.
• The IPCC Working Group III Fifth Assessment Report assess-
ment of baseline scenarios leads to a warming of 3.7–4.8°C 
by 2100 (80 percent range of scenarios; 2.5–7.8°C including 
climate-system uncertainty), which includes the scenarios with 
assumptions on autonomous improvements in energy intensity. 
12 http://climateactiontracker.org/news/151/In-talks-for-a-new-climate-treaty-a-race-
to-the-bottom.html.
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• In relation to the effects of pledges, the updated UNEP Emis-
sions Gap Assessment 2013 (UNEP 2013) assessed present 
emissions trends and pledges. Global emissions estimated for 
2020 are consistent with emissions pathways that reach warm-
ing in the range of 3–5°C by 2100,13,14 and are closest to levels 
consistent with pathways leading to 3.5–4°C warming by 2100.
On average, the RCP8.5 is illustrative of a range of business-as-
usual scenarios,15 reaching a global-mean warming level of about 
4°C above pre-industrial levels by the 2080s, and gives a median 
warming of about 5°C by 2100 (Figure 2.1). The IPCC AR5 WGI 
noted that 62 percent of high-complexity climate models exceed 
4°C for RCP8.5 by the 2080s,16 and all model runs exceed 3°C 
13 The Climate Action Tracker projections of the effects of pledges if fully implemented 
is about 3.1°C warming by 2100 (median estimate)—i.e., at the lower end of this range.
14 This applies to the “unconditional pledges, strict rules” case.
15 Not including those with extreme assumptions on autonomous improvements in 
energy intensity.
16 A probability of >66 percent is labeled “likely” in IPCC’s uncertainty guidelines 
adopted here.
(IPCC 2013b). These AR5 model runs were designed to take into 
account a fixed pathway of concentrations and do not, therefore, 
include the effects of carbon-cycle feedbacks on the response of 
the climate system to CO2 emissions. Including these feedbacks 
raises the median estimate of warming in RCP8.5 from 4.3 to 4.5°C 
by the 2080s and widens the total uncertainty, in particular at the 
high-temperature end, from 3.2–5.3°C to 3.1–6.2°C by that time, 
relative to pre-industrial levels (Collins et al. 2013). 
2.1.1 Can Warming be Held Below 2°C?
Climate policy has not to date succeeded in curbing global green-
house gas emissions, and emissions are steadily rising (Peters et al. 
2013). However, recent high-emissions trends do not imply a 
lock-in to a high-emitting pathway (van Vuuren and Riahi 2008) 
if there is a move toward rapid, technically and economically 
feasible mitigation. As was confirmed in the 2013 UNEP Emissions 
Gap Report (UNEP 2013) and in successive International Energy 
Agency Assessments (International Energy Agency 2013), there are 
many measures that could close the gap between estimated global 
Figure 2.1: Projections for surface-air temperature increase, showing the scenarios assessed in this report in the context of 
baseline projections (no further substantial climate policy from the recent energy-economic model literature).
The medium-dark-grey shaded area (bar on right-hand side indicates year-2100 range) indicates the 90 percent uncertainty range over 114 baseline sce-
narios from the literature, excluding a class of variants that assume very high autonomous improvements in energy intensity. The dark-grey range on the 
right-hand side indicates the broadening of the 90 percent scenario range, if one includes these variants. For comparison, the light-grey area indicates the 
80 percent range over all scenarios, as assessed in IPCC WGIII AR5 (2014d). The climate model underlying these calculations is the same as applied for 
all emissions scenarios in the IPCC WGIII AR5 (2014d). The climate-system uncertainty derived from such modeling is depicted for RCP2.6 as the blue-
shaded area (66 percent uncertainty). Note that the estimates here are comparable to the full CMIP5 model range, which are slightly cooler at the end of 
the 21st century than the ISI-MIP subset of CMIP5 models used for most projections in this report (see Appendix). In this subset, the RCP 2.6 scenario 
represents a 1.8°C warming and the RCP 8.5 represents a 4.6°C warming above pre-industrial levels for the period 2081–2099.
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2070 [2060 to 2080]. The lowest published emissions scenarios in 
recent literature (Luderer et al. 2013; Rogelj et al. 2013a; Rogelj et 
al. 2013b) lead to warming projected to peak at around 1.5°C and 
decline to a median level of 1.3°C above pre-industrial by 2100. 
2.2 Climate Sensitivity and Projected 
Warming
Although the past decade has been the warmest on record glob-
ally, observations suggest that the rate of warming during the 
last decade has been slower than earlier decades. This has led to 
discussions of a so-called “warming hiatus”, for example in the 
IPCC AR5 WGI:
“In summary, the observed recent warming hiatus, defined 
as the reduction in GMST trend during 1998–2012 as 
compared to the trend during 1951–2012, is attributable 
in roughly equal measure to a cooling contribution from 
internal variability and a reduced trend in external forcing 
(expert judgment, medium confidence).” (Stocker et al. 
2013, Box TS.3)
greenhouse gas emissions levels by 2020 and levels consistent with 
pathways that keep warming below 2°C. The required emission 
reductions over the 21st century, were estimated by IPCC WGIII 
AR5 to lead to an annualized reduction in consumption growth 
limited to 0.04–0.14 percentage points, relative to baseline growth 
of 1.6–3 percent per year (IPCC 2014d). This does not include 
the co-benefits, including for example hea lth and environmental 
benefits from reduced co-emited air pollutants, fuel poverty reduc-
tions and net employment gains (IPCC 2014d). Delaying additional 
mitigation increases mitigation costs in the medium- to long-term.
The recent IPCC AR5 WGI (summary for policymakers) showed 
that “warming is unlikely to exceed 2°C for RCP2.6” and “likely 
to exceed 1.5°C . . . for all RCP scenarios except RCP2.6” (IPCC 
2013a). The energy-economic modeling behind the RCP2.6 emis-
sions scenario (van Vuuren et al. 2011) shows that large-scale 
transformations in the energy system are feasible to achieve the low 
emissions levels of RCP2.6 and net-negative global energy-related 
CO2 emissions by the 2070s. The IPCC WGIII AR5 showed that there 
is a broad category of low-emissions mitigation scenarios that reach 
emissions levels comparable to or lower than RCP2.6 (IPCC 2014d). 
On average, these scenarios also reach net-zero CO2 emissions by 
Box 2.1: Definition of Warming Levels and Base Period in This Report
This report and the previous Turn Down the Heat reports reference future global warming levels against the pre-industrial period 1850–1900 consis-
tent with the IPCC WGI AR5.
To study the impacts of climate change at different levels of global mean warming in this report, the literature and present climate impacts for 
different warming levels above the pre-industrial period were reviewed using the following classification:
WARMING 
CATEGORY OBSERVED 1°C 1.5°C 2°C 3°C 4°C
Range [°C] <0.8 0.8–1.25 1.25–1.75 1.75–2.25 2.25–3.5 >3.5
Given the diversity of different base periods for projections, emissions scenarios, and models or model ensembles used, this report adopts a 
standardized approach to convert any given warming level with any given base period to its corresponding warming level relative to the pre-industrial 
period (see Appendix). This allows, within limits, for a classification of climate impacts independent of the underlying emissions scenario and model 
or model ensemble used. This stringent approach of classifying warming levels is new in this Turn Down the Heat report and allows for a consistent 
comparison of climate change impacts across studies and sectors.
Median warming for the full CMIP5 model ensemble under the RCP2.6 is about 1.6°C (and therefore on the border between the 1.5° and 2°C 
warming categories presented above); 22 percent of the models nonetheless projecting a warming above 2°C. For the estimation of heat extremes, 
precipitation, and aridity, this report uses a subset of the CMIP5 models (as in the ISI-MIP project) showing a median warming of 1.8°C above pre-
industrial levels by 2081–2100 for the RCP 2.6 scenario. As in the earlier reports, impacts in a “2°C world” refer to the impacts assigned to the 2°C 
warming category. Where the results of the ISI-MIP ensemble for RCP 2.6 are used to describe a 2°C world, readers need to be aware that this is at 
the low end of the 2°C impact category. Sea-level rise projections presented in this report are based on a larger model ensemble with an ensemble 
mean warming of less than 1.75°C; as a result, end-of-century sea-level rise in RCP2.6 is classified as 1.5° warming.
The “4°C world” refers to impacts assigned to the 4°C category as described above. The median warming of the RCP8.5 CMIP5 ensemble for 
the period 2081–2100 is 4.3°C, whereas the projected warming for the ISI-MIP ensemble (used to project heat extremes, precipitation, and aridity) 
is 4.6°C above pre-industrial levels (and thus at the high end of the 4°C warming category). Impacts shown in tables refer to the exact warming 
category above pre-industrial levels, as they allow for more detail than the stylistic futures drawn at 2°C and 4°C global mean warming.  
The terms “2°C world” and “4°C world” always refer to end-of-21st-century impacts’ for impacts referring to earlier time periods the convention 
of “2°C warming by 20xx” is chosen.
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Slower and faster decades of warming occur regularly, related 
to variations in forcing (e.g., volcanic eruptions, solar activity) 
and to internal redistribution of heat in the oceans driven by 
large-scale patterns of climate variability (including the El Niño/La 
Niña-Southern-Oscillation—see also Section 2.3.2) causing natural 
variations of surface warming (Balmaseda et al. 2013; England 
et al. 2014; Foster and Rahmstorf 2011).17 An additional factor is 
data uncertainty. Without taking data uncertainties or the physical 
explanation of a remaining “hiatus” into account, the recent slower 
warming has led to media attention that suggests the sensitivity of 
the climate system to anthropogenic emissions might be smaller 
than estimated previously. IPCC AR5 WGI estimated equilibrium 
climate sensitivity (ECS) at 1.5–4.5°C, which has a lower low-end 
estimate than the IPCC AR4 at 2–4.5°C. On the contrary, values 
substantially higher than 4.5°C still cannot be ruled out.
Climate projections for the 21st century are, however, not highly 
sensitive to equilibrium warming estimates. Rogelj et al. (2014) 
evaluated the implications of both AR4 and AR5 assessments of 
ECS in a climate-model framework. While the uncertainty ranges 
of global-mean temperature increases by 2100 for RCP2.6 and 
RCP8.5 are slightly wider for the AR5 than for the AR4 model 
version, the difference is small and the median estimates are 
virtually unaffected (Figure 2.2). Hence, a change in estimated 
equilibrium climate sensitivity, among others informed by a recent 
warming hiatus, has no significant effect on the climate projections 
presented in this report.
2.3 Patterns of Climate Change
This report gives an update of the projected patterns of climate 
change presented in the earlier Turn Down the Heat reports with 
a particular focus on temperature and precipitation extremes as 
well as changes in droughts and river runoff. 
17 This can be explained by natural external forcings, like those of solar and volcanic 
origin, and physical mechanisms within the climate system itself. This includes a 
large role played by the El Niño/La Niña-Southern-Oscillation, a pattern of natural 
fluctuations in heat transfer between the ocean’s surface and deeper layers. If such 
fluctuations are filtered out of the observations, a robust continued warming signal 
emerges over the past three decades. It is this signal that should be compared to the 
average warming of climate models, because the latter exhibit the same upswings 
and downswings of warming as the observational signal, but at different times, due 
to the natural chaotic nature of the climate system. Taking an average from many 
models filters out these random variations; hence, this must also be done with 
observational datasets before comparing with model results.
2.3.1 Observed Trends in Extreme Events 
Since the 1960s, a robust increase in the number and magnitude 
of hot temperature extremes is observed globally that is consistent 
with the increase in global mean temperature over the same time 
period (Donat, Alexander et al. 2013; Seneviratne et al. 2012). 
Consequently, the recent IPCC AR5 assesses a human contribution 
to this trend as very likely (IPCC 2013a). Coumou et al. (2013) 
find that new record-breaking monthly mean temperatures can be 
attributed to climate change with an 80 percent probability. Despite 
a decade of slowed-down global mean temperature increase, the 
number of observed hot temperature extremes is continuously on 
the rise—with a trend that is strongest for the most extreme events 
(Seneviratne et al. 2014; Sillmann et al. 2014). At the same time, 
an increase in frequency and duration of heat waves has been 
Figure 2.2: Climate-model projections of global-mean surface-
air temperature for RCP2.6 (lower curves) and RCP8.5 (top 
curves).
Lines indicate median estimates, grey shaded areas 66 percent uncertainty 
ranges, consistent with the AR4 assessment of equilibrium climate sensi-
tivity (2–4.5°C). On the right-hand side, the increases averaged over the 
years 2081–2100 are shown for both the model version constrained by 
a representation of the AR4 assessment and the AR5 (blue) assessment 
(1.5–4.5°C). Bold right-hand side columns show a 66 percent uncertainty 
range, thin columns a 90 percent range, diamonds median estimate, circles 
mean estimates (higher than the median, because of skewed probability 
distributions due to significant likelihood of very high climate sensitivity 
values). Source: Rogelj et al. (2014).
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observed globally, although trends differ strongly among regions 
(Donat, Alexander et al. 2013; IPCC 2013a, Table SPM.1).1819
Unlike the patterns of change for extreme temperature indices, 
changes in extreme precipitation appear to be more heterogeneous. 
Significant increases both in frequency and intensity of heavy pre-
cipitation events are observed over eastern North America, large 
parts of Eastern Europe, Asia, and South America; a decrease is 
reported for the Mediterranean, South East Asia, and the northwest-
ern part of North America (Donat, Alexander et al. 2013). While 
being spatially heterogeneous, most areas of the globe experience 
an increase in precipitation extremes—and a human contribution 
to this increase can be clearly identified (IPCC 2013a, Table SPM.1; 
Min et al. 2011). The median intensity of extreme precipitation is 
found to increase by about 6–8 percent per degree rise in global 
mean temperature (Kharin et al. 2013; Trenberth 2011; Westra et 
18 EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. Available at www
.emdat.be.
19 Following NOAA guidelines, the index is derived based on running-mean 3-month 
SST anomalies in the Niño 3.4 region (5°N–5°S, 120°–170°W)]. At least five con-
secutive overlapping 3-month periods above 0.5°C (below –0.5°C) are identified 
as El Niño (La Niña) events. El Niño events are classified as weak (moderate) if 
at least three consecutive overlapping 3-month periods exceed 0.5°C (1°C) and as 
strong if they exceed 1.5°C. La Niña events are similarly classified. Source: NOAA, 
Oceanic Niño Index (ONI).
al. 2013). Figure 2.3 illustrates the increase in precipitation-related 
disasters recorded in the EM-DAT database since the 1960s.
While the observed changes in heavy precipitation are sta-
tistically robust and the level of agreement between different 
studies and datasets is high for most world regions (Donat et al. 
2014), this is not the case for dry spells and droughts (Dai 2012; 
Donat, Alexander et al. 2013; Sheffield et al. 2012; Trenberth et al. 
2014). Although global trends remain uncertain, robust dry-
ing signals emerge from the observational record (e.g., for the 
Mediterranean) (Donat, Peterson et al. 2013; Hoerling et al. 2012; 
Sousa et al. 2011). Additionally, a strengthening in the seasonal 
cycle and regional contrast has been observed, meaning that the 
strongest increase in heavy precipitation events has been found 
during wet seasons of already wet regions, while the strongest 
drying signals emerge during the dry season of already dry areas 
(Chou et al. 2013); this further amplifies flood and drought risks 
in the respective regions.
Despite a substantial increase in meteorological disasters 
recorded in the EM-DAT database (compare Figure 2.3) that are 
related to tropical and extra-tropical storms, confidence in large-
scale trends in meteorological indices remains low for extra-tropical 
storms and tropical cyclones as well as for such small-scale meteo-
rological events as hail and thunderstorms (Stocker et al. 2013, 
TS.2.7.1). For tropical cyclones, however, a robust global trend in 
poleward migration is observed (Kossin et al. 2014). At the same 
time, the frequency and intensity of the strongest tropical cyclones 
have increased significantly in the North Atlantic since the 1970s 
(Grinsted et al. 2012; IPCC 2013a, Table SPM.1; Kossin et al. 2013) 
with profound consequences for the Caribbean, Central America, 
and southeastern-North America. 
A steep rise in climate-related disasters by one order of mag-
nitude from about 30 in the early 1960s to more than 300 in the 
early 21st century (trend: approximately 70 events per decade from 
1960–2014) is apparent from the EM-DAT database (see Figure 2.3). 
The absolute values of this increase should be interpreted with 
caution, since this signal is distorted by an increase in climate-
related disaster reporting over the same time frame that is very 
difficult to quantify. Still, this increase in climate-related disaster 
reporting is assumed to have happened predominantly before the 
mid-1990s (and the advent of modern information technology); 
while the number of disasters counted nearly doubled between 
the mid-1990s and 2010–2014. 
Although not necessarily as strong as for climate-related disas-
ters, such an increase in reporting is also assumed to be responsible 
for the observed increase in geophysical disasters (volcanic eruptions 
and earthquakes). This trend, however, is an order of magnitude 
smaller than what has been observed for climate-related extremes 
(about 6.5 events per decade over 1960–2014). A robust trend also 
Figure 2.3: ENSO and extreme events.
Upper panel: Number of climate-related disasters from 1960–2013 (based 
on the EM-DAT database18). A robust increase in all types of climate-related 
disasters is observed. Lower panel: El Niño and La Niña events identified 
on the basis of the Niño 3.4 sea-surface temperature index.19 
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emerges from the analysis for severe climatological disasters, for 
which a reporting bias can be assumed to be absent. Thus, the 
increase in climate-related disasters in the EM-DAT database can 
be attributed in part to climate change, but the exact influence 
of increased reporting cannot be quantified. The lower panel of 
Figure 2.3 depicts the time series of the El Niño Southern Oscilla-
tion index highlighting low, moderate, and strong El Niño and La 
Niña events that have a profound imprint on the tropical climate 
regime and extreme events statistics globally. 
2.3.2 El-Niño/Southern Oscillation
One of the largest sources of climate variability in terms of scale 
and impact is the El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO). ENSO is 
a coupled atmosphere-ocean phenomenon in the tropical Pacific 
region and the dominant global mode of variability on an inter-
annual timescale. Although substantial uncertainties remain 
with respect to how ENSO will respond to rising atmospheric 
temperature, recent model intercomparison studies suggest a trend 
toward more extreme El Niño events over the 21st century (Cai et 
al. 2014; Power et al. 2013). 
During El Niño events, the heat that is stored in the ocean 
is released into the atmosphere, leading to changes in the tropi-
cal atmospheric circulation (see Box 2.2) and, consequently, to 
variations in weather patterns around the world. Anomalous El 
Niño-type conditions are related to disastrous flooding events 
in Latin America and droughts in Australia and large areas 
of South East Asia, and can have far-reaching effects on the 
Atlantic hurricane activity and the global monsoon system (e.g. 
Donnelly and Woodruff (2007); Kumar et al. (2006)). All these 
changes can substantially impair livelihoods (e.g., through 
impacts on agricultural productivity, infrastructure, and public 
health) (Kovats et al. 2003; Wilhite et al. 1987). For example, 
the extreme El Niño of 1997–98 resulted in billions of dollars of 
economic damages and tens of thousands of fatalities worldwide, 
with severe losses in Latin America in particular (McPhaden et al. 
2006; Vos et al. 1999). Recent research has also suggested an 
ENSO influence on the risk of civil conflict around the world 
(Hsiang et al. 2011). 
2.3.2.1 Observed Changes in ENSO
It seems unlikely that a complex system consisting of numerous 
feedback mechanisms would not be affected by anthropogenic 
global warming (Collins et al. 2010). The amplitude, frequency, 
seasonal timing, and spatial pattern of ENSO events, as well as 
their links to weather patterns around the world, might all be 
altered in what could potentially be one of the most prominent 
manifestations of climate change (Guilyardi et al. 2012; Vecchi 
and Wittenberg 2010). But the instrumental record is short and so 
far yields no clear indication of a climate change effect on ENSO, 
even though such an effect may already be occurring but obscured 
by natural inter-decadal variability (Christensen et al. 2013; Latif 
and Keenlyside 2009; Stevenson et al. 2012; Wittenberg 2009). 
A tree-ring-based reconstruction of ENSO strength suggests that 
ENSO over the past 700 years has never been as variable as dur-
ing the last few decades, and that the ENSO cycle thus may have 
intensified due to global warming (Jinbao et al. 2013). 
2.3.2.2 ENSO Projections
Despite model uncertainties, there is high confidence that the mean 
climate in the tropical Pacific will change under global warming. 
It is likely that these changes will affect ENSO through one or 
several of the associated atmospheric or oceanic feedbacks; but 
models disagree on the exact nature of the ENSO changes (Col-
lins et al. 2010; Guilyardi et al. 2012; Latif and Keenlyside 2009; 
Power et al. 2013).
Some robust evidence of changes to ENSO-driven precipitation 
variability in response to global warming has emerged recently, and 
it represents an update to the assessment of ENSO projections in 
the IPCC AR5. A majority of GCMs shows that the rainfall anoma-
lies associated with El Niño events in the tropical Pacific (i.e., dry 
conditions in the west and more abundant rainfall in the central 
and eastern Pacific) will become stronger (Power et al. 2013) and 
impacts of El Niño thus more intense. This result is consistent 
with another study showing a major increase in the frequency of 
extreme El Niño events (Cai et al. 2014). These particularly strong 
events have caused devastating impacts (recent examples include 
the 1982–83 and the 1997–98 El Niño events) and GCMs that are 
able to simulate such events project approximately a doubling in 
frequency in a 4°C world (Cai et al. 2014).
2.3.3 Projected Changes in Extreme 
Temperatures 
Figure 2.5 depicts projected regional boreal summer (JJA) warm-
ing by 2071–2099 for a 4°C world (RCP8.5) and a 2°C world 
(RCP2.6). The upper panels show the northern hemisphere sum-
mer temperature anomalies relative to the 1951–1980 base period 
for the 4°C world (RCP8.5) and the 2°C world (RCP2.6). In a 2°C 
world, summer warming anomalies exceed 2°C for large areas 
of the Northern Hemisphere; this regional warming is enhanced 
disproportionally for some regions in a 4°C world, where up to 
8°C boreal summer warming is reached in northern central Russia 
and in the western United States. In addition, the Mediterranean 
appears as a warming hotspot; so do Northern Africa and Central 
Asia, which is likely due to regional amplification as a result of a 
drying trend in these regions. 
The lower panels of Figure 2.5 illustrate the projected warming 
in terms of regional climate variability relative to the 1951–1980 
base period (Hansen et al. 2012). The local absolute warming is 
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 Box 2.2: Mechanisms Behind the El-Niño/Southern Oscillation
In simple terms, the oceanic part of ENSO is characterized by the movement of a pool of warm surface water in an east-west direction along the 
equator. In the mean state, this warm pool is confined to the western tropical Pacific, whereas in the Eastern Pacific, sea surface temperatures (SST) 
are much cooler and the surface water layer, separated from the cold, deep ocean by the so-called thermocline, is shallower (see Figure 2.4 a). In 
the west, the warm surface water facilitates strong atmospheric convection and resulting precipitation; together with sinking motion over the colder 
East Pacific and easterly surface winds that follow the SST gradient an overturning movement of air is formed—the so-called Walker circulation. This 
wind pattern, in turn, drives upwelling of cold deep water in the East Pacific and reinforces the concentration of warm surface water in the west.
This positive feedback between oceanic and atmospheric processes renders the mean state unstable. Small fluctuations in a part of the system 
are amplified into oscillations of the entire system. Every couple of years, when the easterly surface winds weaken and the warm water from the 
West Pacific extends so far to the east that it approaches the American coast, it creates an El Niño event, with a characteristic pattern of positive 
SST anomalies in the central and eastern tropical Pacific (see Figure 2.4 b). In some years the pendulum swings the other way, and easterly winds 
strengthen and the warm water pool gets concentrated further in west than on average. This is called a La Niña event. Both El Niño and La Niña 
events occur every 2–7 years and with varying magnitudes. 
Figure 2.4: Idealized schematic showing atmospheric and oceanic conditions of the tropical Pacific region and their 
interactions during normal conditions, El Niño conditions, and in a warmer world.
(a), Mean climate conditions in the tropical Pacific, indicating sea-surface temperatures (SSTs), surface winds and the associated Walker circulation; 
the mean position of atmospheric convection over the Western tropical Pacific; the mean oceanic upwelling in the Eastern tropical Pacific; and the 
position of the oceanic thermocline separating surface and cooler nutrient rich deep ocean waters. (b), Typical conditions during an El Niño event. 
SSTs are anomalously warm in the east; convection moves into the central Pacific; the trade winds weaken in the east and the Walker circulation is 
disrupted; the thermocline flattens; and the upwelling is reduced. Source: Collins et al. (2010).
divided (normalized) by the standard deviation (sigma) of the 
local monthly temperature dataset over the reference period, 
which represents the normal year-to-year changes in monthly 
temperature because of natural variability (see Box 2.3). Since 
ecosystems and humans are adapted to local climatic conditions 
and infrastructure is designed with local climatic conditions and 
its historic variations in mind, this approach helps to highlight 
regions most vulnerable to warming.
A 3-sigma deviation (see Box 2.3) would be considered a very 
rare extreme month under present conditions and a deviation by 
five sigma (or more) unprecedented. Since natural variability is 
lower in the tropics, the same change in absolute temperature is 
much stronger relative to natural variability in this region, posing 
a potential threat to ecosystems even under low levels or warm-
ing. Under a 4°C warming scenario (RCP8.5), about 50 percent of 
the global land surface is projected to be covered on average by 
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Figure 2.5: Multi-model mean global temperature anomaly for RCP2.6 for (2°C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4°C world, right) for the 
boreal summer months (JJA).  
Temperature anomalies in degree Celsius (top row) are averaged over the time period 2071–1999 relative to 1951–1980. The bottom row offers a different 
perspective on these changes by depicting them relative to a measure of currently normal variations in monthly temperature (standard deviation)–a factor of 2 
indicates that projected changes in boreal summer temperature are twice as large as currently occurring variations in summer temperatures across different years.
Box 2.3: Heat Extremes
This report defines two types of monthly temperature extremes using thresholds based on the historical variability of the current local climate (similar 
to Hansen et al. 2012). The absolute level of the threshold thus depends on the natural year-to-year variability in the base period (1951–1980), which 
is captured by the standard deviation (sigma). While there is a range of impact relevant temperature extreme measures on a daily or multi-daily basis, 
this report focuses on monthly data.
3-sigma Events—Three Standard Deviations Outside the Normal
• Highly Unusual at present
• Extreme monthly heat
• Projected to become the norm over most continental areas by the end of the 21st century
5-sigma Events—Five Standard Deviations Outside the Normal
• Essentially absent at present
• Unprecedented monthly heat: new class of monthly heat extremes
• Projected to become common, especially in the tropics and in the Northern Hemisphere mid-latitudes during summertime
Assuming a normal distribution, 3-sigma events would have a return time of 740 years. The 2012 U.S. heat wave and the 2010 Russian heat 
wave classify as 3-sigma events (Coumou and Robinson 2013). 5-sigma events have a return time of several million years. Monthly temperature 
data do not necessarily follow a normal distribution (for example, the distribution can have long tails, making warm events more likely) and the return 
times can be different from the ones expected in a normal distribution. Nevertheless, 3-sigma events are extremely unlikely and 5-sigma events have 
almost certainly never occurred over the lifetime of key ecosystems and human infrastructure.
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highly unusual heat extremes by 2050; this number increases to 
90 percent by the end of the century. The departure from the his-
torical climate regime (which means that the coldest month will be 
warmer than the warmest month during the 1860–2005 reference 
period) for large parts of the tropics is projected to happen by the 
2050s–2060s under such a scenario (Mora et al. 2013). Also in a 
4°C world, about 60 percent of the global land surface is projected 
to be covered on average by unprecedented heat extremes by the 
end of the century. This implies a completely new climatic regime 
posing immense pressure globally on natural and human systems. 20 
In a 2°C world (RCP2.6), the projected land area experiencing 
highly unusual heat extremes is limited to about 20 percent and 
20 The basis for the gridded population estimates is the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration GPWv3 y-2010 gridded population dataset, which is linearly 
scaled up on a country basis to match the SSP projections, thus neglecting population 
redistribution within countries. The SSP2 population estimates on country basis with 
5-year time steps were obtained from the SSP database as in Schewe et al. (2013).
constrained to the tropical areas of South America, Africa, and 
South East Asia—with unprecedented heat extremes being rare. 
Using population estimates from the intermediate Shared Socio-
economic Pathway 2 (SSP2), the population affected by extreme 
heat can be approximated over the 21st century. It is important to 
highlight that these population estimates are based on a range of 
assumptions about societal development that cannot be constrained. 
Unlike physically based projections (e.g., temperature projections), 
these population estimates should be interpreted merely as a pos-
sible future, not claiming any kind of predictive skill. 
The policy choices made with respect to a pathway toward 
a 4°C or 2°C world will make a fundamental difference in terms 
of the population affected by heat extremes in the 2020s and 
thereafter. In 2025, about 17 percent of the world's population 
is estimated to experience highly unusual monthly summer 
temperatures for a 4°C world (and 11 percent of the population 
for a 2°C world), mostly located in tropical regions (compare 
Figure 2.6, upper panel). Heading toward a 4°C world (RCP8.5), 
Figure 2.6: Estimates of world population experiencing highly unusual monthly boreal summer temperatures (JJA, averaged 
over centered 20-year time intervals) for the RCP2.6 (2°C world, left panel) and the RCP8.5 (4°C world, right panel). Population 
estimates are based on the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 2 (SSP2) and shown in terms of population density.20
9099_CH02.pdf   13 11/17/14   5:58 PM
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CONFRONTING THE NEW CLIMATE NORMAL
14
the affected population increases to about 50 percent in 2040, 
including some of the most densely populated areas in South East 
Asia, the Americas, and the Mediterranean. By 2080, 96 percent 
of the global population is projected to experience highly unusual 
summer temperatures and 71 percent to experience unprecedented 
extreme temperatures (meaning that this would be the new norm 
for more than two-thirds of global population). Estimates are con-
siderably lower for a 2°C world (RCP2.6), where highly unusual 
summer temperatures are projected to affect about 25 percent 
of the global population in 2080 and unprecedented summer 
temperatures would be very rare. 
2.3.4 Projected Changes in Extreme 
Precipitation
A warming of the lower atmosphere is expected to strengthen the 
hydrological cycle. The increase in extreme precipitation event inten-
sity over the 21st century is found to be about six percent per °C 
for the CMIP5 model ensemble and thus about three times stronger 
than the increase in mean precipitation of about 1.5–2.5 percent 
per °C (Kharin et al. 2013). A widely used indicator for persistent 
heavy rain conditions (and, as such, for potential flood risk) is 
the annual maximum 5-day precipitation accumulation (RX5day). 
The RX5day is found to intensify by about six percent for RCP2.6, 
but the change exceeds 20 percent for RCP8.5 for the 2080–2100 
period. While heavy precipitation events become more intense, 
they are also projected to increase in frequency. 
Kharin et al. (2013) find that annual extremes of daily precipi-
tation that are estimated to have a return time of 20 years during 
1986–2005 will be about 3–4 times as common by the end of 
the 21st century in a 4°C world. In a 2°C world, such events are 
projected to occur 25 percent more often.
2.3.5 Aridity and Water Scarcity 
As mean precipitation over large regions of land is increasing, so 
is evaporation, since higher temperatures provide more energy for 
evaporation. Under a changing climate, the land surface warming 
will be particularly pronounced and the saturated water vapor 
concentration will increase in the lower atmosphere over land 
surface. If this saturated water vapor concentration exceeds the 
growth in actual water vapor concentration, this may result in a 
drying trend even though absolute precipitation increases.
A drying trend over land has been observed globally; this is 
strongly heterogeneous, however, with some regions experienc-
ing profound wetting. This is in agreement with Feng and Fu 
(2013), who report an increase in global dry land area of about 
10 percent in a 4°C world by the end of the century relative to 
the 1961–1990 baseline. The patterns emerging from the analysis 
in this report are broadly consistent with the overall “wet gets 
wetter” and “dry gets drier” trend under climate change noted 
in the previous Turn Down the Heat reports. The subtropical 
regions, particularly those in the northern hemisphere, stick out 
as aridity hotspots. This broad global trend does not apply to all 
regions equally, however. One notable exception is the Amazon, 
which is projected to experience drying despite its very humid 
present-day climate; another exception is East Africa, where wet-
ting is projected. Southern Europe, especially the Balkans and the 
eastern Mediterranean, are expected to experience aridity index 
(AI) changes of up to –60 percent in a 2°C world; an AI increase 
of about 30 percent is projected for large parts of Siberia. These 
trends are strongly amplified in a 4°C world. While regional pre-
cipitation projections are very sensitive to the underlying model 
ensemble, the subtropical drying trend and the Siberian wetting 
trend are consistently found in a wide range of climate models 
and model generations (Knutti and Sedlácˇek 2012).
These trends in aridity also lead to changes in annual water 
discharge that can be taken as a first-order approximation of the 
water resources available to humans. Figure 2.7 shows the relative 
changes in annual water discharge for a 2°C versus a 4°C world 
based on Schewe et al. (2013). Profound changes in river runoff 
are already evident for a 2°C world. A robust reduction in dis-
charge in the subtropical regions (including Meso-America and the 
Caribbean, parts of central and southern South America, Southern 
Africa, Western Australia, and the Mediterranean) between 15–45 
percent relative to the 1986–2005 reference period is projected. On 
the contrary, an increase in water availability is projected for the 
high northern latitudes, parts of South and South East Asia (due 
to an intensification of the Indian Monsoon system), and parts of 
central and eastern Africa. However, some of the strongest relative 
increases are plotted relative to a very low baseline precipitation 
(e.g., the Sahara desert or the Arabian Peninsula), which means 
that these regions will remain very dry. 
The changes in projected precipitation patterns for a 4°C world 
are not simply a linear extrapolation of the patterns observed for 
a 2°C world. While, for a 2°C scenario, discharge changes for 
central and Eastern Europe and North America are inconclusive, 
a robust drying of 15–45 percent is projected for a 4°C world for 
the southeast, west, and north central North America and for most 
parts of central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Interestingly, 
only a slight increase or even decrease in discharge is projected 
for central and eastern Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, with 
some countries (e.g., Pakistan) exhibiting a robust increase in 
discharge under a 2°C warming scenario that is reduced to zero 
or even negative in a 4°C world.
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Figure 2.7: Relative change in annual water discharge for a 2°C world and a 4°C world. 
Relative to the 1986–2006 period based on an ISI-MIP model intercomparison using climate projections by CMIP5 GCMs as an input for global hydrology 
models (GHMs)21 (adjusted from Schewe et al. 2013). Colors indicate the multi-model mean change, whereas the saturation indicates the agreement in 
sign of change over the ensemble of GCM—GHM combinations.
Other features present already for a 2°C world (e.g., the sub-
tropical drying trend) get more pronounced, reaching reductions in 
annual mean discharge of up to 75 percent in the Mediterranean. 
In addition, the high-latitude discharge is robustly projected to 
increase further for a 4°C world, dominated by an increase in 
winter precipitation. A warming of about 3°C is found to lead 
to an increase in the number of people living under absolute 
water scarcity (which means less <500 m3 per capita per year); 
40 percent higher than projected due to population growth alone 
(Schewe et al. 2013).21
2.3.6 Droughts
While an upward trend for extreme temperature and heavy pre-
cipitation events can be clearly deduced from the observational 
record, there is still considerable debate as to whether or not 
there is a trend in global drought in recent decades (Dai 2012; 
Sheffield et al. 2012). Drought projections depend strongly on the 
underlying methodology, the applied indicators, and the reference 
periods used (Trenberth et al. 2014). In accordance with the overall 
drying trend in several world regions, an increase in intensity and 
duration of droughts is estimated to be likely by the end of the 
21st century (IPCC 2013a, Table SPM.1). 
21 Please note that not all models of the ISI-MIP ensemble reach 4°C in the 21st cen-
tury, which is why these projections are just based on three CMIP5 GCMS, namely 
HadGEM2-ES, IPSL-CM5A-LR, MIROC-ESM-CHEM. As in Schewe et al. (2013), these 
GCM projections are then combined with 11 global hydrology models.
Figure 2.8 shows the relative increase in the number of days under 
drought conditions for a 4°C world relative to the 1976–2005 baseline 
(Prudhomme et al. 2013). The subtropical and tropical regions in the 
Mediterranean, Meso-America, Caribbean, southern South America, 
and Australia are projected to experience the strongest increase in 
Figure 2.8: Percentile change in the occurrence of days under 
drought conditions by the end of the 21st century (2070–2099) 
in a 4°C world relative to the 1976–2005 baseline.
White regions: Hyper-arid regions for which runoff is equal to zero more 
than 90 percent of the time in the reference and future periods. Reprinted 
from Prudhomme et al. (2013).
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days under drought conditions. In fact, more than six months per 
year on average is projected under at least moderate drought con-
ditions for the Mediterranean over the 2080–2100 period in a 4°C 
world compared to less than a month in a 2°C world (Orlowsky 
and Seneviratne 2013). Substantial drought risk also emerges for 
large parts of South America, including the Amazon (representing a 
considerable threat to the Amazonian rainforest (see chapter 3.4.5)). 
2.3.7 Agricultural Yields
The impacts of climate change on agricultural production have 
been observed for different crops. The recent IPCC AR5 Working 
Group II report states with medium confidence that wheat and 
maize production has been affected negatively in many regions 
and at a globally aggregated level (IPCC 2014c). 
Even though projected warming and drying trends present a 
major threat to agriculture, in particular in tropical and sub-tropical 
regions, there remains substantial uncertainty in the projections 
of agricultural yields over the 21st century. This is due to uncer-
tainties in climatological forcing as well as in the response of the 
agricultural models used and their representation of carbon diox-
ide, nitrogen, and high temperature-related effects on agricultural 
yields (Asseng et al. 2013; Rosenzweig et al. 2013b; see Box 2.4 
for a discussion of the CO2 fertilization effect). 
Recent model intercomparison projects and the meta-analysis 
studies which provide the basis for the analysis in this report 
provide a clearer picture of agricultural impacts and risks than 
was previously possible. Figure 2.9 shows end of 21st century 
(2070–2099) changes in yield projections relative to the 1980–2010 
base period from the AgMIP project (Rosenzweig et al. 2013a) for 
models that explicitly account for CO2 and nitrogen effects, thus 
including the most important processes influencing yield dynam-
ics (although the magnitude and the interplay of these effects are 
highly uncertain) (see Box 2.4).
While gains in agricultural yields are projected for the high 
latitudes, substantial losses are projected for the tropical and sub-
tropical regions and all major crop types. For wheat and maize, 
losses may even exceed 50 percent on average for large parts of 
the tropical land area. This is consistent with a meta-analysis of 
more than 1,700 published studies on agricultural yield changes 
under climate change that found robust indications for a reduc-
tion in wheat, rice, and maize production for a local warming of 
2°C in both temperate and tropical regions without adaptation 
(Challinor et al. 2014). All studies show a downward trend at 
local warming levels of 1°–3°C for both temperate and tropical 
regions if no adaptation is taken into account. The strongest 
results (40 percent yield decreases under 5°C local warming) 
were found for wheat in tropical areas. Notably, this decrease is 
still projected to be about 30 percent for wheat in tropical regions 
when adaptation measures are considered. The results indicate 
significant negative aggregate impacts of 4.9 percent yield losses 
per degree of warming. 
Figure 2.9: Median yield changes (%) for major crop types in a 4°C world relative to the 1980–2010 baseline from the AgMIP 
(Rosenzweig et al. 2013a). Please note that this projection only considers global gridded crop models that explicitly account for 
CO2 effects and nitrogen stress. 
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Box 2.4: The CO2 Fertilization Effect
Increasing carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere lead not only to higher air temperatures due to the greenhouse effect but also affect 
plant productivity and vegetative matter (Ackerman and Stanton 2013). Higher CO2 concentrations also lead to improved water use efficiency in 
plants through reducing transpiration by decreasing the plant’s stomatal conductance (Hatfield et al. 2011).
Plants can be categorized as C3 and C4 plants according to their photosynthetic pathways. Maize, sorghum, sugar cane and other C4 plants 
use atmospheric CO2 more efficiently, which means that C4 plants do not benefit as much as C3 plants from increasing CO2 concentrations except 
during drought stress (Leakey 2009). C3 plants, including wheat, rice, and soybeans, use atmospheric CO2 less efficiently and therefore profit from 
increasing CO2 concentrations (Ackerman and Stanton 2013; Leakey 2009); this possibly attenuates the negative effects of climate change for C3 
plants. 
The degree to which the CO2 fertilization effect will increase crop yields and compensate for negative effects is uncertain, as differing experi-
mental designs have shown. For example, Free-Air CO2 Enrichment (FACE) experiments suggested a 50-percent lower CO2 fertilization effect than 
enclosure studies (Ackerman and Stanton 2013; Long et al. 2006).* Moreover, the yield response to elevated CO2 concentrations seems to be plant 
and genotype specific and depends on the availability of water and nutrients (Porter et al. 2014). It seems certain, however, that water-stressed 
crops benefit stronger from elevated CO2 concentrations, and thus rain-fed cropping systems could benefit more than irrigated systems (Porter et al. 
2014). A debate is ongoing over whether results from FACE experiments, laboratory experiments, or modeling approaches are closest to reality 
and results among the different approaches differ greatly (Ainsworth et al. 2008; Long et al. 2006; Tubiello, Amthor et al. 2007). For this reason, 
many climate impact studies include a scenario with the CO2 fertilization effect and one scenario without considering the fertilization effect. Elevated 
CO2 concentrations are thought to positively influence future food security through faster plant growth, but they could also have a negative impact 
through a change in the grain’s protein concentration (Pleijel and Uddling 2012; Porter et al. 2014). This change comes about when the increased 
biomass accumulation happens faster than the corresponding nitrogen or nitrate uptake, leading to increasing yields but reduced protein concen-
tration; this is also known as growth dilution (Bloom et al. 2010; Pleijel and Uddling 2012). This decrease in grain protein concentration, which in 
experiments with wheat ranged from 4–13 percent (and 7.9 percent in FACE experiments), and with barley ranged from 11–13 percent, is assumed 
to have negative effects on the nutritional quality of grains (Bloom et al. 2010; Erbs et al. 2010; Högy et al. 2013; Pleijel and Uddling 2012; Porter et al. 
2014). In addition, elevated CO2 concentrations are associated with significant decreases in the concentrations of zinc and iron in C3 grasses and 
legumes (Myers et al. 2014).
*The study by Long et al. (2006) triggered a debate and resulted in a critical response by Tubiello et al. (2007) which in turn was answered by the original authors 
in Ainsworth et al. (2008).
Figure 2.10: Global ocean acidification as expressed by a gradual decrease of ocean surface pH (indicating a higher 
concentration of hydrogen ions—or acidity).
Projections for scenarios in this figure are produced by a simple model (bold lines) derived from one of the complex models that is included in the range of 
projections from IPCC AR5 WGI (shaded ranges). Also indicated is a local historical measurement series at Aloha normalized to (global) model levels. Source: 
Methodology in Bernie et al. (2010) combined with climate projections as in Figure 2.1; IPCC data WGI IPCC (2013); observed data Dore et al. (2009).
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Although crop-level adaptation is found to increase simulated 
yields by 7–15 percent, there are still substantial climate-related 
threats to regional and global crop production. These threats 
represent a major reason for concern about global food security, 
particularly given population (and food demand) increases. 
2.3.8 Ocean Acidification
Rising atmospheric CO2 concentrations not only cause land surface 
and sea-surface temperatures to rise but also leave their imprint 
on ocean chemistry. In order to restore the balance between the 
atmosphere’s and the ocean’s CO2 concentration, the oceans absorb 
additional CO2 as atmospheric concentrations rise. The oceans have 
taken up approximately 25 percent of anthropogenic CO2 emis-
sions in the period 2000–06 (Canadell et al. 2007). CO2 dissolves 
in seawater and eventually forms a weak acid—a process known 
as ocean acidification (Caldeira and Wickett 2003). 
The increase in CO2 concentrations to the present-day value of 
396 ppm has caused the ocean surface pH to drop by 0.1 from pre-
industrial days (Raven 2005), equivalent to a 30 percent increase 
in ocean acidity. In fact, current rates of ocean acidification appear 
unprecedented over the last 300 million years (WMO 2014). A 
4°C or higher warming scenario by 2100 corresponds to a CO2 
concentration above 800 ppm and will lead to a further decrease 
of pH by another 0.3, equivalent to a 150 percent acidity increase 
over pre-industrial levels (World Bank 2012a). Such changes in 
ocean chemistry will induce dramatic, though uncertain biological 
responses. A recent meta-analysis of biological responses suggests 
that the effects are likely to interact with other changes, including 
rising temperatures (Harvey et al. 2013). 
An important effect of the reaction of CO2 with seawater is 
the reduction of carbonate ions available for skeleton- and shell-
forming organisms in the form of calcium carbonate (CaCO3). 
Surface waters are usually super-saturated with aragonite, which 
is a mineral form of CaCO3. In the case of coral reefs, decreasing 
availability of carbonate ions is expected to increase vulnerability 
to the effects of rising temperatures and to hinder recovery fol-
lowing hurricanes and other extreme events (Dove et al. 2013).
In combination with warming waters and other anthropogenic 
stresses, including overfishing and pollution, ocean acidification 
poses severe threats to marine ecosystems. Section 3.4.6 provides 
an overview of some of the most recent scientific publications on 
the expected impacts. While those impact projections are focused on 
Latin America and the Caribbean, this does not imply that they are not 
expected to occur in other regions. In fact, the levels of acidification 
are projected to be above average in cold waters at higher latitudes. 
2.4 Sea-Level Rise
Sea-level rise is one of the main consequences of global warming 
with direct and fundamental impacts on coastal regions. Many 
low-lying coastal regions are particularly densely populated and are 
expected to experience further population increases. The density 
of people living in flood prone, coastal zones and megacities may 
increase by about 25 percent until 2050 (Aerts et al. 2014). Since 
the potential impacts of fast-rising seas will be severe for both the 
built and natural environments in these regions, avoiding sea-level 
rise is a strong reason to engage in mitigation efforts. 
Paleo-reconstructions show that sea levels were significantly 
higher during warmer periods of earth history. The rate of sea-level 
rise increased from tenths of mm per year in the stable climate of 
the last 5,000 years to 1.7 mm per year during the 20th century—
and 3.2 mm per year from 1993–2010 (Church et al. 2013). The present 
rate of sea level rise is the highest in recent history, i.e. higher than 
all rates within the past 6,000 years as inferred from proxy records 
(Lambeck et al. 2014). Sea-level rise is the result of the thermal 
expansion of sea water and melting of land ice from glaciers and ice 
sheets, with an increasing contribution from the latter in the past 20 
years. In its latest assessment report, the IPCC projects rates of up to 
16 mm per year by the end of the 21st century (Church et al. 2013).
Projections of global and regional sea-level rise in this report are 
draw upon the IPCC AR5 WGI report (Masson-Delmotte et al. 
2013) and more recent estimates of the Antarctic contribution 
(Bindschadler et al. 2013; Hinkel et al. 2014; Levermann et al. 
2014) (see methods in Appendix). This report follows a process-
based approach based on the outcome of physical models. This 
differs from the earlier Turn Down the Heat reports (World Bank 
2012a, 2013), where semi-empirical methods (Rahmstorf 2007; 
Schaeffer et al. 2012) were applied due to the lack of sufficient 
progress at the time in developing and validating process-based 
models. The adoption of process-based estimates in this report 
is the result of recent advances in modeling and the narrowing 
gap between process-based estimates and observations (Church 
et al. 2013; Gregory et al. 2013). Compared to the IPCC AR5, the 
projections for Antarctica in this report are scenario-dependent 
and yield higher upper bounds (up to about 0.2 m higher) as 
they explicitly account for different levels of ocean warming and 
resulting ice sheet melt (see discussion in Appendix). 
It is important to note that large uncertainties remain in predict-
ing future sea-level rise and, in particular, the contribution from 
potentially unstable regions of marine ice in Antarctica (Church 
et al. 2013). The results in this report incorporate the direct effect 
of Southern Ocean warming on ice-shelf basal melting and related 
ice stream acceleration in Antarctica; as in the IPCC AR5, however, 
they do not include amplifying feedbacks responsible for marine 
ice sheet instability. In light of model shortcomings and increasing 
evidence of marine ice sheet instability, this report cannot provide 
a very likely range for sea-level rise from Antarctica. This report 
thus follows the IPCC AR5 approach and assesses the model-based, 
90 percent range as a likely (67 percent) range only. This applies 
not only to Antarctica but to all sea-level rise contributions (see 
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methods in Appendix). The lower and upper bounds can thus be 
interpreted as likely ranges. Note also that sea-level rise contri-
butions not related to climate warming, such as resulting from 
groundwater mining, are not included and should be added on 
top of our global projections.
This report projects 0.58 m of globally averaged sea-level rise 
in a 4°C world (RCP8.5) for the period 2081–2100 compared to 
the reference period 1986–2005,22 with the low and high bounds 
being 0.40 and 1.01 m (Figure 2.11). 
For the scenario RCP2.6 (classified as a 1.5°C world for the 
model ensemble used here, see Box 2.1) this report projects 0.36 m 
of sea-level rise (0.20 m–0.60 m) for the same period, a reduc-
tion of almost 40 percent compared to RCP8.5. This potential for 
sea-level rise mitigation is broadly consistent with median IPCC 
AR5 estimates and emphasizes a larger benefit than previously 
estimated from emissions reductions.23 
Even when global mean temperatures stabilize, as in the 
RCP2.6 scenario, sea level is projected to continue to rise beyond 
22 The 1986–2005 baseline period is about 0.2 m higher than pre-industrial times.
23 The likely range (67 percent) is computed from the model-based 90-percent range.
2100. The slow response of sea levels also explains the small dif-
ference between the RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 sea-level rise estimates 
in 2100 relative to the seemingly much larger divergence in global 
mean temperature projections (Table 2.1). The effect of a large 
proportion of 21st century emissions on sea-level rise will only 
become visible in the decades and centuries beyond 2100, when 
sea level projections diverge more strongly between the RCP2.6 
and RCP8.5 scenarios (Church et al. 2013).
The future divergence is foreshadowed by the difference in the 
rates of sea-level rise toward the end of the century. For RCP2.6, 
this report projects a rate of 3.9 (1.3–7.2) mm per year as the 
mean over the 2081–2100 period, which is comparable with the 
present-day rate of 3 mm per year. This is in strong contrast to 
the report’s projections for RCP 8.5, where the rate of sea-level 
rise, at 10.8 (7.5–21.9) mm per year, is two to three times higher. 
In addition, this report projects the risk of a rate of sea-level rise 
higher than 20 mm per year in a 4°C world toward the end of 
the century. Sea-level rise is projected to continue for centuries 
to millennia to come. Based on paleo-evidence as well as model 
results, Levermann et al. (2013) estimate the sea-level commitment 
over the next 2000 years to be about 2.3 m per degree of global 
mean temperature warming.24
24 The likely range (67 percent) is computed from the model-based 90-percent range.
Figure 2.11: Global mean sea-level rise projection within the 
21st century.
Time series for sea-level rise for the two scenarios RCP2.6 (1.5°C world, 
blue) and RCP8.5 (4°C world, green). Median estimates are given as lines 
and the lower and upper bound given as shading (likely range23). The esti-
mate includes contributions from thermal expansion, glaciers and ice caps, 
and the Greenland and the Antarctic ice sheet, but not from anthropogenic 
groundwater mining (estimated to 0.04 +/– 0.05 m by the IPCC AR5 over 
the projection period). The estimates are skewed toward high values mainly 
because of a possible, yet less probable, large Antarctic contribution to 
sea-level rise. The sea-level rise baseline is 1986–2005, which represents 
a sea level of about 0.2 m higher than pre-industrial levels.
Table 2.1: Sea-level rise projections to 2081-2100 above the 






Steric 0.13 (0.1, 0.18) 0.27 (0.2, 0.32)
Glacier 0.12 (0.07, 0.17) 0.18 (0.13, 0.27)
Greenland 0.07 (0.02, 0.12) 0.11 (0.06, 0.21)
Antarctica 0.04 (–0.01, 0.19) 0.04 (–0.03, 0.3)
SLR in 2081–2100 0.36 (0.20, 0.60) 0.58 (0.40, 1.01)
SLR in 2046–2065 0.22 (0.14, 0.35) 0.27 (0.19, 0.43)
SLR in 2100 0.4 (0.21, 0.67) 0.68 (0.48, 1.23)
Rate of SLR in 2046–2065 
(mm/yr)
4.2 (2.2, 7.8) 7.1 (5.3, 12.9)
Rate of SLR in 2081–2100 
(mm/yr)
3.9 (1.3, 7.2) 10.8 (7.5, 21.9)
The lower and upper bounds are shown in parentheses (likely range24). 
The sum of median contributions is not exactly equal to the total due to 
rounding. The upper and lower bounds of the total sea-level rise (SLR) are 
smaller than the sum of each contribution’s upper and lower bound because 
errors are not necessarily correlated (see methods in Appendix). Note that 
the land-water contribution is not included.
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2.4.1 Marine Ice Sheet Instability
Post-IPCC literature provides further evidence of marine ice sheet 
instability (Mercer 1978; Oppenheimer 1998) in both West and 
East Antarctica (Joughin et al. 2014; Mengel and Levermann 2014). 
Marine ice sheets predominantly rest on solid rock below sea level. 
Rapid disintegration of the ice sheets can be triggered by oceanic 
melting underneath the floating ice shelves surrounding the ice 
sheets and is associated with a self-enforcing dynamic feedback 
mechanism, where the retreat of the grounding line25 being exposed 
to warming waters accelerates poleward on downward-sloping 
bedrock. This rapid retreat of the grounding line is currently being 
observed for several large glacier systems in West Antarctica, includ-
ing the Pine Island and Thwaites glacier (Rignot et al. 2014), and 
numerical models indicate that a collapse of these glaciers might 
already be underway (Favier et al. 2014; Joughin et al. 2014). If 
this proves to be true, it would result in an irreversible additional 
sea-level rise of about one meter on multi-centennial time scales 
with the potential for a destabilization of the entire West Antarctic 
ice sheet (containing ice that is equivalent to about 4 m of sea-level 
rise). In East Antarctica, Mengel and Levermann (2014) identified 
a potential marine ice sheet instability of the Wilkes basin (3–4 m 
sea-level equivalent). 
The potential of warm water intrusion has been shown for at 
least one large ice shelf cavity (Hellmer et al. 2012). However, the 
skill of climate models in predicting the oceanic dynamics sur-
rounding the ice sheets is still low; as a result, it is very uncertain 
how and at what levels of global warming disintegration of this ice 
sheet could be triggered. At the same time, new insights into the 
bed topography of the Greenland ice sheet reveal deeply incised 
submarine glacial valleys that control about 88 percent of total ice 
discharge from Greenland into the ocean; this indicates a much 
greater sensitivity of the ice sheet to oceanic melt than previously 
thought (Morlighem et al. 2014). 
2.4.2 Regional Distribution of Sea-Level Rise
Sea-level rise is not distributed equally across the globe. This is 
clearly visible in satellite observations (Meyssignac and Cazenave 
2012) and tide-gauge reconstructions (Church and White 2011), 
and this inequality is projected to be amplified under future sea-
level rise (Perrette et al. 2013; Slangen et al. 2011). Recent sea level 
trend patterns have been dominated by thermal expansion of the 
25 The point at where the ice sheet is grounded on solid rock, marking the transition 
from the floating part that already contributes to global sea levels (ice shelf) to the 
grounded ice sheet that does not.
oceans (Lombard et al. 2009), where additional heat from global 
warming is not stored equally. Associated density changes (steric 
changes) are further modulated by salinity changes, for example 
freshening in high latitudes from increased precipitation, runoff, 
and ice melt (Bamber et al. 2012; Durack et al. 2012; Pardaens 
et al. 2011). 
Wind patterns are also critical in redistributing the heat and 
shaping the sea surface (Timmermann et al. 2010). They are 
responsible for strong natural, cyclical variability such as related 
to the Pacific Decadal Oscillation, where high sea levels in the 
Eastern Pacific occur along with low sea levels in the Western 
Pacific (e.g. Bromirski et al. 2011), and inversely. Sustained 
changes in wind-induced sea level trends are also expected as the 
climate warms. The ocean dynamical response to changing density 
and atmospheric conditions is complex and GCMs show a large 
spread (Pardaens et al. 2011; Yin 2012). A well-known example 
of dynamic-steric sea-level rise is a projected 10–30 cm additional 
rise in the northeastern coast of the United States associated with 
a slowing down of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation 
(Schleussner et al. 2011; Yin and Goddard 2013; Yin et al. 2009). 
Signs of such an accelerated sea-level rise at this coastline are 
already visible in the tide gauge record (Sallenger et al. 2012). 
In addition to ocean circulation and density changes, melting 
glaciers and ice sheets induce a redistribution of mass as melt 
water spreads into the oceans, reducing the gravitational pull of 
the formerly glaciated regions and potentially causing local land 
uplift (Bamber et al. 2009; Mitrovica et al. 2001). This results in 
above-average sea levels far away from melting ice masses and 
below-average rise or even relative drops in sea levels drop in 
their proximity.
In the projections in this report, these processes are accounted 
for by analyzing steric-dynamic GCM outputs and combining projec-
tions for glacier and ice sheet contributions with regional fingerprints 
(see Appendix). This is similar to previous Turn Down the Heat 
reports. This report focuses on long-term changes and thus does 
not attempt to predict natural, up to multi-decadal, variability in sea 
levels. Consistent with the previous Turn Down the Heat reports, 
this report only includes climate-related contributions to sea-level 
rise and omits such other, more local contributions as ongoing 
glacial isostatic adjustment since the last glacial ice age (Peltier 
and Andrews 1976), sediment transport—especially in river deltas 
(Syvitski et al. 2009), and local mining (Poland and Davis 1969). 
These local factors may provoke vertical land movement and 
contribute to enhanced (in case of subsidence) or reduced (in 
case of uplift) relative sea-level rise at the coasts. They should 
be accounted for by local planners, for example by using Global 
Positioning System measurements (Wöppelmann and Marcos 
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2012). Another limitation of the projections in this report results 
from the poor skills of global models at representing local oce-
anic processes, especially in semi-enclosed basins such as the 
Mediterranean Sea.
Regional sea-level rise is projected to exceed the global mean 
at low latitudes (Figure 2.12). Since the ice sheets are concentrated 
near the poles and melting is projected to increase significantly 
toward the end of the century, their decreasing gravitational 
pull piles up water in the low latitudes (Figure 2.13, bottom). 
This effect is stronger than freshening-induced steric rise in the 
Arctic (Figure 2.13, middle). Due to the large contribution of the 
Antarctic ice sheet in this report’s high estimate, sea-level rise at 
low latitudes will exceed the global average (Figure 2.12, right 
column). Therefore, large ice sheet melt should have strongest 
impacts at the tropical coastlines. 
Figure 2.12: Patterns of regional sea-level rise.
Median (left column) and upper range (right column) of projected regional sea-level rise for the RCP2.6 scenario (1.5°C world, top row) and the RCP8.5 
scenario (4°C world, bottom row) for the period 2081–2100 relative to the reference period 1986–2005. Associated global mean rise are indicated in the 
panel titles, consistent with Table 2.1.
Near-polar regions are projected to experience sea-level 
rise below the mean, with sea-level fall occurring at the coasts 
very close to the mass losses of the big ice sheets. A map of 
regional anomalies from the global mean rise shows that, in 
most coastal areas away from the poles, sea-level rise tends to 
remain within +/– 10 cm of the global mean rise of 0.58 m 
(Figure 2.13, top). In these areas, uncertainty in global mean 
sea-level rise dominates the total uncertainty (excluding local, 
non-climatic processes). It is also clear from Figure 2.12 that 
global sea level uncertainty is comparable in magnitude to dif-
ferences between emissions scenarios, but both the “medium” 
and “high” scenarios in this report indicate a mitigation poten-
tial of about 40 percent in sea-level rise between RCP8.5 and 
RCP2.6. A more detailed analysis is conducted for each region 
covered in this report.
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2.5 Social Vulnerability to Climate 
Change
People’s vulnerability to climate change, their capacity to adapt, 
and their resilience in the face of its impacts reflect a combina-
tion of geographical exposure to hazards and varied demographic, 
socioeconomic, and political factors (Beck 2010; Hewitt 1997; 
Ribot 2010; Wisner et al. 2004). For the first time, the most 
recent report of the IPCC WGII includes a chapter on the liveli-
hoods and poverty dimensions of climate change (Olsson et al. 
2014). Figure 2.14 presents a framework for understanding key 
factors leading to social vulnerability to climate change, based 
on an extensive literature review in the three focus regions and 
beyond (see Appendix, Summary of Evidence Concerning Social 
Vulnerability, and Table 2.2). Chapters 3–5 draw on elements of 
this framework as they highlight the potential social impacts of 
climate change in the three focus regions.
2.5.1 Interaction of Key Current and Future 
Development Trends with Climate Change
Looking toward the late 21st century and the possible consequences 
of up to 4°C global warming, changes in demographic, economic, 
technological, sociocultural, and political conditions are likely 
to profoundly shape the vulnerability and adaptive capacity of 
societies and particular social groups (Hallegatte et al. 2011). Key 
development trends include population dynamics, migration, and 
urbanization; overall economic development, which will influ-
ence both patterns of emissions and the resources at different 
social groups’ disposal to respond to threats to their livelihoods 
and wellbeing; and the availability of and demand for natural 
resources. Adaptation and mitigation policies will also significantly 
influence different social groups’ vulnerability to the effects of 
climate change. These trends will both affect and be affected by 
the impacts of climate change. 
2.5.2 Understanding Vulnerability, Adaptive 
Capacity, and Resilience
How different groups experience climate change is strongly influ-
enced by their capacity to adapt, which itself depends largely on 
access to resources (Moser et al. 2010; Wisner et al. 2012)—economic 
assets and incomes, natural and physical resources, social networks, 
cultural knowledge, and access to political power (Chambers and 
Conway 1991). Processes underpinning inequality and social exclu-
sion (related for example, to ethnicity or class) frequently lead to 
increased exposure to hazards and prevent certain groups from 
acquiring the resources needed to protect themselves and recover 
from shocks (i.e., to become resilient to climate change). The typol-
ogy developed by Moser et al. (2010) defines three key elements 
of vulnerability: spatial and physical vulnerability, socioeconomic 
vulnerability, and political/legal vulnerability.
2.5.3 Spatial and Physical Vulnerability
Coasts and deltas, tropical forests, mountainous regions, arid and 
semi-arid areas and the Arctic are all identified as geographical 
regions particularly sensitive to climate change (IPCC 2014a; World 
Bank 2012a). Within these regions, vulnerabilities vary consider-
ably.  Typically people living in areas that are prone to hazards, 
Figure 2.13: Regional anomaly pattern and its contributions in 
the median RCP8.5 scenario (4°C world).
Total sea-level rise (top), steric-dynamic (middle), and land-ice (bottom) 
contributions to sea-level rise, shown as anomalies with respect to the 
global mean sea-level rise. Global mean contributions to be added on top 
of the spatial anomalies are indicated in the panel titles (see also Table 2.1).
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such as flooding, landslides or cyclones, and in areas affected by 
drought or heat extremes are most likely to be negatively affected 
by climate change. Loss of ecosystem services, related for example 
to loss of forest cover, reduction in overall water supply or increased 
salinity, is likely to put increasing stress on livelihoods and wellbe-
ing in affected areas, such as, for example, growing pressures on 
water availability in many Latin American cities. There is a strong 
(but not complete) overlap between geographical and economic 
vulnerability—with a growing risk of people being ‘trapped’ in 
climatically stressed areas because they lack the financial capital or 
social connections to move, and are unable to diversify into more 
resilient livelihood activities (Black et al. 2011). Likewise, poorer 
people often have no choice but to live in hazard-prone locations, 
where housing is cheaper (Winchester 2000). For example, many 
of the victims of  Saudi Arabia’s 2009 floods were migrant workers 
who lived in poorly constructed, informal shanty houses in the 
wadi (natural drainage) area (Verner 2012).
Figure 2.14: Framework for understanding social vulnerability to climate change
• Rising air and sea
surface temperatures
• Sea level rise
• Changing precipitation
• Extreme weather events
Expected climate change:
• Population dynamics (growth, migration, urbanisation)
• Globalisation and economic processes
• Demand for and availability of natural resources
• Mitigation policies
Current/future development trends:
• Loss of biodiversity




• Depletion of fish stocks
• Glacier retreat
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• Limited access to formal education
Political-legal vulnerability
• Lack of adequate policies
• Unequal power structures






















Social inequalities on the basis of:
Source: Adapted from Verner (2010).
2.5.4 Socioeconomic Vulnerability
2.5.4.1 Poverty
Economically and socially marginalized people’s access to resources 
to adapt to anticipated environmental stresses such as slow-onset 
climatic change, and to cope with extreme events, is often impeded 
because their needs are overlooked or due to discrimination (Wisner 
et al. 2012; Tanner and Mitchell 2009). Economic and social mar-
ginalization, in turn, reinforces geographical vulnerability. Thus, for 
example, over one million people live in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas that 
sprawl over the slopes of the Tijuca mountain range, making them 
particularly at risk from mudslides (Hardoy and Pandiella 2009). 
Poorer people often take longer to bounce back after such 
shocks as flooding and cyclones, reflecting their more limited 
physical, financial, human, and social assets. After Hurricane 
Mitch in Honduras, for example, many poor people took 2–3 years 
longer than better-off people to rebuild their livelihoods (Carter et 
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al. 2007). In Mexico, meanwhile, Hurricanes Stan and Wilma had 
much longer-lasting effects in Chiapas (a poorer state) than the 
similarly affected but better off Yucatan (Rossing and Rubin 2010).
Poorer people’s livelihoods often depend on sectors such as 
agriculture, forestry, fishing, and pastoralism that are particularly 
sensitive to the effects of slow-onset climatic changes (Leichenko 
and Silva 2014). Poor people’s adaptive capacity is often under-
mined by lower education levels, limited alternative livelihood 
options, discriminatory social norms that affect their access to 
labor markets and decent work, and a lack of long-term institu-
tional planning, policy, and programmatic support for resilience-
strengthening activities (UNISDR 2009). Although significant 
reductions in extreme poverty are projected by 2030–50,26 up to 
325 million extremely poor people will be living in the 45 coun-
tries most exposed to drought, extreme temperatures, and flood 
hazards in 2030. Most of these people will reside in isolated rural 
areas in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central America and 
the Caribbean (Shepherd et al. 2013). As a result, poverty and 
geographical exposure to climate change are likely to continue to 
reinforce one another in the medium term.
2.5.4.2 Gender Dimensions of Vulnerability
Different gender roles and norms mean that men, women, girls, and 
boys are likely to be affected in different ways by climate change 
(Demetriades and Esplen 2009; Denton 2002). For example, water 
scarcity can lead to particular challenges for women and girls, who 
in many cultures have primary responsibility for obtaining water 
for domestic use, and for cooking, laundry, and bathing of young 
children. In contexts where much subsistence farming is carried 
out by men, and social norms concerning masculinity frame men 
as breadwinners, boys and men are more likely to migrate for work 
if climate-related stresses on agriculture undermine livelihoods.
Rural women’s access to land, property rights, financial 
resources, and representation in decision-making processes is also 
often restricted compared to men’s access (Agarwal 1994; Brody 
et al. 2008). This constrains women’s capacity to diversify into 
alternative livelihoods in the event of climate or other stresses 
(Demetriades and Esplen 2009; Verner 2012) and to anticipate and 
prepare for disasters and environmental stresses (Enarson 2003; 
Fordham 2012). Furthermore, in some contexts (e.g., in parts of 
the Middle East and North Africa, and in areas of Latin America) 
social norms restrict girls from learning important survival skills 
(e.g., swimming). This is one reason why women are typically 
more likely than men to die as a result of climate related disasters. 
26 This is expected to be a result of growth in emerging economies (Dadush and 
Stancil 2010; Edward and Sumner 2013), but these projections do not typically take 
into account the effects of climate change. As a result, they may underestimate 
climate-change-related impoverishment.
Where gender relations are more egalitarian, differentials in 
disaster mortality are much lower. In some contexts, however, 
norms of masculinity that mandate heroic behavior can lead to 
greater death rates among men. This was seen, for example, in 
Central America after Hurricane Mitch (Neumayer and Plumper 
2007; Bradshaw and Fordham 2013). Both disasters and daily pres-
sures can increase the work needed to ensure basic survival, which 
can disproportionately affect women if household tasks become 
more time consuming. Additionally, they can also exacerbate stress 
factors and may increase violence against women and girls (Azad 
et al. 2014; Brody et al. 2008; Enarson 2003). 
There is increasing evidence that promoting gender equality 
is an important component of an effective strategy for developing 
resilience to climate change, since gender differentials in educa-
tion, access to and control of assets, access to information and 
social networks can all limit disadvantaged women’s adaptive 
capacity (Ahmad 2012; Verner 2012; World Bank 2011), and thus 
undermine overall resilience. 
2.5.4.3 Vulnerability Related to Age and Disability
Age greatly influences people’s ability to face climate-related 
threats. During extreme climatic events, older people’s reduced 
mobility, strength, and health; impaired eyesight and hearing; 
and greater vulnerability to heat and cold can restrict their ability 
both to cope and to escape danger (HelpAge International 2012). 
Thus, for example, the European heat wave of 2003 (Vandentor-
ren et al. 2006) and the 2013 heat wave in Pudong, China (Sun et al. 
2014) led to disproportionate death rates among older people. 
In both cases, people over 80 were among the most affected. In 
France, both older people from poorer socioeconomic groups and 
people with more limited social networks were disproportionately 
affected (Vandentorren et al. 2006). Similarly death rates during 
Chicago’s 1995 heat wave were lower in more socially connected 
neighborhoods (Klinenberg 2002).  
Poorer older people face particular challenges in adapting 
their housing to cope with changing climates; in the absence of 
effective social protection systems they may also be unable to 
afford to purchase food, fuel, and water as prices rise. This can 
make them reliant on farming and ecosystem services, and con-
sequently even more vulnerable to climate change (Wang et al. 
2013). Globally, the number of older people is expected to triple 
by 2050, accounting for one-third of the population in developed 
regions and one-fifth of the population in developing countries 
(UN 2010). The combination of aging and urbanization could lead 
to a significant increase in the number of people vulnerable to 
climate-related stresses.
Disabled people, are often more dependent on household and 
community members to fulfill their daily basic needs; they are 
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thus at higher risk if supportive infrastructures and social relation-
ships are strained or limited. Disabled people are over-represented 
among the very poor in low-income countries and face greater risk 
of death, injury, discrimination, and loss of autonomy (Priestley 
and Hemingway 2006). Moreover, they are often ignored in pre-
paredness, recovery and adaptation planning.
Children are also disproportionately affected by climate change 
(O’Brien et al. 2008; UNICEF 2008). Food insecurity can have 
particularly negative effects on their development (Bartlett 2008; 
Shepherd et al. 2013). Children are also at greater risk than adults 
of mortality and morbidity from malnutrition, disasters and their 
consequences, and from diseases (e.g., malaria and waterborne 
diseases) that may become more widespread as a result of climate 
change. An additional challenge is that some family coping strate-
gies, such as withdrawing children from school or marrying off 
daughters to reduce the number of mouths to feed (or to being 
new assets into the household) end up jeopardizing the wellbeing 
of children (Brown et al. 2012). 
Lost human development opportunities in childhood can have 
lifetime consequences. Evidence from Zimbabwe, for example, 
indicates that children affected by drought and food insecurity 
in infancy never catch up on lost growth (Hoddinott and Kinsey 
2001). If these negative consequences (e.g., increased rates of 
malnutrition, lost educational opportunities) become more com-
mon, climate change could lead to an increase in intergenerational 
poverty cycles (Harper et al. 2003)—thus compounding vulner-
ability to climate change. 
2.5.4.4 Ethnicity and Belonging to Minority Groups
Indigenous and minority groups disproportionately live in areas 
already affected by climate change where livelihoods are increas-
ingly undermined—including the Amazon (Kronik and Verner 
2010), the Andes (Hoffman and Grigera 2013), and dryland areas 
(Macchi et al. 2008). They are typically more likely than majority 
groups to be poor and to have limited access to public services, 
employment, education, and health care (UNPFII 2009; Care 2013; 
World Bank 2014). In addition, indigenous and minority groups 
often have less access to early warning systems; likewise, they 
are often excluded from or underrepresented in decision-making 
processes (Abramovitz 2011; Salick and Ross 2009; Vásquez-
Léon 2009). Research with Aymara villagers in Bolivia found, for 
example, that stresses related to the impact of the retreat of the 
Mururata glacier on water supply were accompanied by historical 
marginalization due to a lack of official identity cards, land titles, 
and access to bilingual basic education (McDowell and Hess 2012). 
Another challenge for indigenous and minority groups in 
many countries is that migrant laborers (often members of ethnic 
minorities) are more likely to work outdoors, in sectors such as 
agriculture and construction, where they are vulnerable to heat 
stress and to unfavorable weather conditions (Lowry et al. 2010). 
This is seen, for example, in the Gulf States (Verner 2012). In 
addition, migrant workers are often neglected when it comes to 
disaster recovery. This is often compounded where migrants lack 
the legal status to apply for support (Abramovitz 2011).
2.5.4.5 Political/Legal Vulnerability
Social status, discrimination patterns, and access to resources are 
almost always determined by political processes and the distribution 
of power (Mascarenhas and Wisner 2012). The most vulnerable 
groups are often the least vocal, mobilized, and empowered in 
decision-making processes, and they often suffer disproportion-
ately from weak local institutions. As a result, they are frequently 
deprioritized for infrastructure investments (such as storm drains) 
that would reduce their vulnerability to extreme events (Hardoy 
and Pandiella, 2009) and for services like training and education 
that could help them build adaptive capacity (Rossing and Rubin 
2011). Vulnerable groups are also less likely to be able to influence 
disaster risk reduction planning (Douglas et al. 2008; Tacoli 2009) 
and to get adequate relief after disasters (Ruth and Ibarran 2009). 
After the cyclone that hit Orissa, India, in 1990, for example, more 
than 80 percent of disabled persons faced food shortages due to 
a lack of clear information on the location of relief supplies and 
how to access them (Handicap International 2008).
Weaker institutions in areas primarily populated by marginal-
ized groups increases their vulnerability to the effects of disasters 
(Kahn 2005)—possibly because building codes and zoning controls 
are less well enforced where institutions are weak. Marginalized 
groups are also often powerless to prevent processes of adaptation 
or development that increase their vulnerability (e.g., capture of 
water resources by better-off groups and/or large-scale businesses 
in some parts of the Caribbean and the Andes (Buytaert and De 
Bièvre 2012; Cashman et al, 2010)); they also lack the political clout 
to ensure that mitigation strategies (such as REDD+) take their 
interests into account. Where marginalized groups are involved 
in adaptation planning, however, measures to reduce the risk of 
disasters can be much more effective. In St Lucia, for example, 
participatory planning in a low-income urban community involv-
ing both local people and engineers led to the identification of 
effective ways to stabilize slopes and a reduction in vulnerability 
to rain-induced landslides (Arnold et al. 2014). Likewise, where 
disadvantaged groups organize for development purposes, these 
can enable individuals and communities to implement natural 
resource management measures that enhance resilience, as India’s 
self-help group experience shows (Arnold et al. 2014).
Political/legal vulnerability also involves a lack of recogni-
tion of rights. For example, many poor people’s vulnerability is 
9099_CH02.pdf   25 11/17/14   5:58 PM
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CONFRONTING THE NEW CLIMATE NORMAL
26
compounded by an insecurity regarding tenure rights to housing 
and land. This can lead to people being forced to live on marginal 
land that is highly vulnerable to flooding; it can also limit incen-
tives to invest in hazard-proofing housing where land rights are 
unclear and people can be evicted at any time (Moser et al. 2010). 
Effective public policies can play an important role in reduc-
ing vulnerability and boosting adaptive capacity. Social protec-
tion measures range from disaster risk preparedness and rescue 
to cash transfers and insurance to protect assets and livelihoods 
(Kuriakose et al. 2012). Finally, the extent to which effective 
adaptation or mitigation policies, climate-sensitive social protec-
tions, and disaster risk reduction measures are institutionalized 
reflects, at least in part, a government’s political orientation and 
institutional capacity as both factors contribute to increasing or 
reducing the vulnerability of exposed groups to climate change 
(Cannon 2000; Hewitt 1997). 
2.5.5 Evidence of the Social Implications 
of Climate Change
The framework outlined in Figure 2.14 focuses on five main areas 
of the social dimensions of climate change: food security and 
nutrition, income/consumption poverty, human health, migra-
tion, and social cohesion (i.e. the issues in the central orange 
box). Table 2.2 below provides a summary assessment of the 
state of evidence on the social implications of climate change 
in these areas, drawing both on literature concerning the three 
regions of focus in this report and the wider literature from other 
parts of the globe covered in the previous Turn Down the Heat 
reports. Table 2.2 follows IPCC Working Group II judgments on 
the strength of evidence made in the 5th Assessment Report, with 
author assessments on issues not covered by the IPCC.27 A more 
detailed summary of available evidence of social vulnerability to 
27 On issues where there are no assessments in the IPCC Working Group II 5th Assess-
ment Report, this report has used the following criteria for assessing the strength of 
evidence: a strong evidence base denotes a consensus among studies, and/or eight 
or more studies with similar findings; a moderate evidence base denotes mixed 
findings, or 4–7 studies with similar findings; a limited evidence base indicates 
inconclusive findings or fewer than three studies. These relatively small numbers 
reflect the limited evidence base on many aspects of social vulnerability. 
climate change impacts is provided in Appendix, Summary of 
Evidence Concerning Social Vulnerability.
As Table 2.2 shows, the strongest evidence of the likely social 
impacts of climate change relates to impacts on human health: 
there is clear evidence of the negative effects of increasing tem-
peratures and of the spread of some vector- and water-borne 
diseases. There is also clear evidence of impacts on some sectors 
(and livelihoods), such as fisheries and crop production, as well 
as moderate evidence of negative impacts on many other areas of 
food security, leading to projections of increased poverty among 
small-scale producers and low-income urban consumers. 
There is also moderate evidence that climate change is likely 
to lead to increased migration, as people move to try to develop 
more climate-resilient livelihoods or as a result of disaster-related 
displacement. While many studies have probed whether climate 
change is likely to be associated with reduced social cohesion 
and increased future conflict, there is no overall consensus; 
the studies generally agree, however, that the risk of increased 
tensions and violence cannot be ruled out. Two areas that are 
increasingly flagged in the literature on social vulnerability, but 
for which there is as yet limited evidence, are the impacts of 
climate change on mental health and its relation to incidences 
of domestic violence. 
Overall, the literature reviewed suggests that helping vulnerable 
people build stronger, more climate-resilient lives and livelihoods 
is critical for reducing social vulnerability to climate change. Devel-
opment investments that reduce poverty by enabling people to 
build assets of all types (including stronger physical and financial 
assets) is a vital component of this; so is much greater investment 
in disaster risk reduction and response capacity. Focused efforts 
to combat the drivers of social exclusion and systemic inequali-
ties (such as gender inequalities) that underlie vulnerability will 
also be necessary. Effective poverty reduction and disaster risk 
management require investments in governance: to build strong 
institutions that are capable of planning and implementing policies 
and programs, and to ensure that the voices of affected or likely-to-
be-affected people (including those of women, young people, and 
other socially excluded groups) are much more strongly taken into 
account in both disaster preparedness and longer-term planning 
and management of climate resilience activities.
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Table 2.2: Evidence Summary—Social Vulnerability to Climate Change. 
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF 
INTERACTING CLIMATE CHANGE 





EXAMPLES OF AFFECTED REGIONS, 
SECTORS, AND AREAS 
EXAMPLES OF AFFECTED SOCIAL 
GROUPS 
Food Security and Nutrition
Reduction of land available suitable for crops 
and ecosystems 
MENA : Israel, Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran
Small scale farmers and marginalized groups 
likely to be displaced by competition for land
Indigenous communities and small-scale 
farmers who lack land entitlements 
Reduction in crop productivity especially 
for wheat and maize and negative yields 
impacts for nuts and fruit trees
Tropical and subtropical regions 




Low income urban consumers
Groups reliant on glacial melt water
Reduction in affordability of food and/or 
variability of food prices 
Low-income and food-importing countries 
Africa 




Low-income people in rural and urban areas
Children at risk of malnutrition
Increased livestock vulnerability and  
mortality 
Arid and semi-arid regions
Europe and North America
Agro-pastoralists and pastoralists
Disruption to fishery  and shellfishery 
production, including fish migrations
      Tropical developing countries 
Decrease in fishery catch potential at the 
Caribbean coasts, the Amazon estuaries, 
and the Rio de la Plata
Increase in fishery production at higher 
latitudes
Artisanal fishermen
People engaged in fish processing and trading
Small coastal communities




Small coastal communities relying on coral 
ecosystems
People engaged in fish processing and trading
Poverty Impacts
Increase in poverty headcount rate and 
risk of chronic poverty in different warming 
scenarios
Sub-Saharan Africa (Malawi, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia), Bangladesh, and Mexico
Urban poor groups and urban wage laborers
Residents of informal settlements
Dwellers in rural hotspots where hunger is 
expected to become prevalent
Increase in disaster related impoverishment 
and destruction of assets; risk of chronic 
poverty  compounded by limited access to 
disaster relief
Exposed areas globally (e.g., low-lying 
coastal areas, flood-prone land, mountain 
slopes)
Low-income groups
Children and adolescents (stunting and missing 
education)
Self-employed urban groups
Coping strategies with negative social 
impacts
Exposed areas globally Low-income groups
Children (e.g. child labor, removal from school)
Girls/young women (e.g., forced marriage)
Strained social cohesion and decline in 
reciprocity
Exposed areas globally Low-income groups, groups experiencing 
sudden impoverishment and competition for 
resources
 Strong Evidence      Moderate Evidence      Limited Evidence
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POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF 
INTERACTING CLIMATE CHANGE 





EXAMPLES OF AFFECTED REGIONS, 
SECTORS, AND AREAS 
EXAMPLES OF AFFECTED SOCIAL 
GROUPS 
Worsening poverty as a result of mitigation 
strategies
Tropical forests globally and farmland in Sub-
Saharan Africa used for biofuels
Groups with limited land rights and socially 
excluded (indigenous groups, women, 
smallholders without formal tenure)
Migration
Migration as a means for securing livelihoods 
in the face of slow-onset climatic stress
Coastal cities and fertile deltas likely to 
attract more migrants
Small islands and coastal plains likely to see 
out-migration at higher levels of sea rise 
(e.g., Caribbean and Mediterranean Coast 
countries)
Maghreb countries serving as receiving and 
transit countries for Sahelian and other Sub-
Saharan African migrants
Russian Arctic likely to experience flooding, 
subsidence and emigration, as well as some 
in-migration to exploit emerging farming and 
extractive opportunities
People with few or no land holdings are more 
likely to migrate
Men are more likely to migrate but this 
depends on local social norms and labor 
market opportunities; women left behind will 
face additional work burdens
Displacement (as a result of extreme events) Areas prone and vulnerable to hazards Elderly and poorest are less likely to leave, and 
when they leave, they are at greater risk of 
permanent displacement
Displaced women sometimes find it more 
difficult to generate a livelihood (discriminatory 
labor markets)
Health 
Increase in malaria Highland areas
MENA and Colombia (LAC)
People who lack immunity 
Children in poverty affected areas
Migrants
Low-income groups 
Increase in dengue fever Tropical cities Low-income groups 




Children in poverty affected areas
Elderly populations
Low-income groups
Increase in respiratory diseases Globally Older people and children 
Women at risk from indoor air pollution
Low-income groups
Increase in food borne infectious diseases Globally Low-income groups 
Older people
Children
 Strong Evidence      Moderate Evidence      Limited Evidence
Table 2.2: Continued.
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POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF 
INTERACTING CLIMATE CHANGE 





EXAMPLES OF AFFECTED REGIONS, 
SECTORS, AND AREAS 
EXAMPLES OF AFFECTED SOCIAL 
GROUPS 
Reduction in availability of clean water and 
sanitation
Coastal zones with low lying populations 
(e.g., Caribbean)
Cities reliant on highland or on declining 
ground water sources (e.g., the Andes, parts 
of Central Asia)
Low-income groups 
Women and children (increased workloads and 
higher violence risks)
Poor children are especially vulnerable to 
disease
Increase in heat-related illnesses and 
reduced labor productivity
Globally 
Densely populated large cities 
MENA, the Arabian peninsula
Elderly 
Manual laborers and those working outdoors 
(more exposed to heat stress)
Overweight people
Displaced people living in shelters
Low-income groups
Residents of urban heat islands
Increased mortality rates from extreme 
weather events and disasters
Low elevated coastal zones and land prone 
to flooding and landslides in all three regions
Women and girls at increased risk (if social 
norms prevent them from acquiring survival 
skills)
Men/ older boys (if expected to risk their lives 
to rescue others)
Children and older people 
Low income households
Increase in mental illnesses Globally (areas exposed to extreme events or 
affected by slow-onset change)
Low-income groups
Displaced people
Increasing malnutrition Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Central 
America, and MENA
Children (especially infants) 
Subsistence farmers (in low rainfall areas)
Urban poor
Women (particularly in South Asia)
Potential for increased risk of domestic and 
sexual violence
Globally (areas exposed to extreme events or 
affected by slow-onset change)
Women and children
Conflict and Security
Risk of land and water scarcity (or excess of 
water) contributing to  conflict/tensions
Countries already affected by conflict (e.g., 
North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa)
Countries where there are tensions between 
the mining industry and farmers/indigenous 






Extreme weather events or sudden disasters 
leading to conflict/social unrest
More common where governance is weak or 
visibly inequitable
Low-income people and children 
Protests related to increased food or fuel 
prices 
More common where governance is weak or 
visibly inequitable
Low-income urban groups
Increased risk of conflict through climate/
extreme event-induced displacement 
Countries where resources are scarce/or 
physically vulnerable to climate change with 
inequalities along ethnic/regional lines
Low-income groups
People who lack political recognition
 Strong Evidence      Moderate Evidence      Limited Evidence
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 La tin America and the Caribbean
The Latin America and the Caribbean region encompasses a huge diversity of landscapes and ecosystems. The region is highly 
heterogeneous in terms of economic development and social and indigenous history. It is also o ne of the most urbanized regions in 
the world. In Latin America and the Caribbean, temperature and precipitation changes, heat extremes, and the melting of glaciers 
will have adverse effects on agricultural productivity, hydrological regimes, and biodiversity. In Brazil, without additional adaptation, 
crop yields could decrease by 30–70 percent for soybean and up to 50 percent for wheat at 2°C warming. Ocean acidification, 
sea level rise, and more intense tropical cyclones will affect coastal livelihoods and food and water security, particularly in the 
Caribbean. Local food security is also seriously threatened by the projected decrease in fishery catch potential. Reductions and 
shifts in water availability would be particularly severe for Andean cities. The Amazon rainforest may be at risk of large‐scale forest 
degradation that contributes to increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration and local and regional hydrological changes.
3.1 Regional Summary
The Latin America and Caribbean region is highly heterogeneous 
in terms of economic development and social and indigenous 
history with a population of 588 million (2013), of which almost 
80 percent is urban. The current GDP is estimated at $5.655 
trillion (2013) with a per capita GNI of $9,314 in 2013. In 2012, 
approximately 25 percent of the population was living in poverty 
and 12 percent in extreme poverty, representing a clear decrease 
compared to earlier years. Undernourishment in the region, for 
example, declined from 14.6 percent in 1990 to 8.3 percent in 2012. 
Despite considerable economic and social development progress 
in past decades, income inequality in the region remains high.
The region is highly susceptible to tropical cyclones and strong 
El Niño events, as well as to rising sea levels, melting Andean 
glaciers, rising temperatures and changing rainfall patterns. The 
rural poor who depend on a natural resource base are particularly 
vulnerable to climate impacts on subsistence agriculture and 
ecosystem services; the urban poor living along coasts, in flood 
plains, and on steep slopes are particularly vulnerable to extreme 
precipitation events and the health impacts of heat extremes. The 
intensive grain-producing cropping systems in the southern part 
of the region are mainly rain-fed and, as a result, susceptible to 
variable rainfall and temperatures. In the Andean regions, houses 
built on the often steep terrain are critically exposed to storm 
surface flows, glacial lake outbursts, and landslides. Coastal 
residents, particularly in the Caribbean region, face the risks of 
loss of ecosystem services and livelihoods from degrading marine 
ecosystems, loss of physical protection from degrading reefs, and 
coastal flooding, as well as from damages to critical infrastructure 
(especially in the beach front tourism sector) and threats to fresh-
water from sea water intrusion due to sea level rise.
3.1.1 Regional Patterns of Climate Change
3.1.1.1 Temperatures and Heat Extremes
By 2100, summer temperatures over the region will increase by 
approximately 1.5°C under the low-emissions scenario (a 2°C 
world) and by about 5.5o C under the high-emissions scenario 
(a 4°C world) compared to the 1951–1980 baseline (Figure 3.1). 
Along the Atlantic coast of Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina, the 
warming is projected to be less than the global average, ranging 
between 0.5–1.5°C in a 2°C world and 2–4°C in a 4°C world. 
In the central South American region of Paraguay, in northern 
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Argentina, and in southern Bolivia, warming is likely to be more 
pronounced, up to 2.5°C in a 2°C world and up to 6°C in a 4°C 
world by 2071–2099. Similar levels of warming are projected for 
the equatorial region, including eastern Colombia and southern 
Venezuela. Projections indicate that in a 4°C world almost all 
land area (approximately 90 percent) will be affected by highly 
unusual,28 and more than half of the land area (approximately 
70 percent) by unprecedented, summer heat extremes. 
3.1.1.2 Precipitation, Drought, and Aridity
In general, in a 2°C world, precipitation changes are relatively small 
(+/–10 percent) and models exhibit substantial disagreement on 
the direction of change over most land regions. In a 4°C world, 
the models converge in their projections over most regions, but 
inter-model uncertainty remains over some areas (such as north-
ern Argentina and Paraguay) (Figure 3.2). Tropical countries on 
the Pacific coast (Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia) are projected to 
see an increase in annual mean precipitation of about 30 percent. 
Similarly, Uruguay on the Atlantic coast (and bordering regions 
in Brazil and Argentina) will get wetter. Regions which are pro-
jected to become drier include Patagonia (southern Argentina and 
Chile), Mexico, and central Brazil. These patterns indicate that, 
28 In this report, highly unusual heat extremes refer to 3-sigma events and unprec-
edented heat extremes to 5-sigma events (see Appendix). 
under climate change, most dry regions will get drier and most 
wet regions will get wetter. The exception is central Brazil. The 
annual mean precipitation here is projected to drop by 20 percent 
in a 4°C world by the end of the century. In general, more intense 
and frequent extreme precipitation events also become more likely.
In a 4°C world, the Amazon basin, the full land area of Brazil 
except the southern coast, southern Chile, the Caribbean, Central 
America, and northern Mexico, are expected to be under severe to 
extreme drought conditions relative to the present climate by the end 
of the 21st century. The total area of land classified as hyper-arid, arid, 
or semi-arid is projected to grow from about 33 percent in 1951–1980 
to 36 percent in a 2°C world, and to 41 percent in a 4°C world.
3.1.1.3 Tropical Cyclones
Observations over the last 20–30 years show positive trends in 
tropical cyclone frequency and strength over the North Atlantic 
but not over the eastern North Pacific. While Atlantic tropical 
cyclones are suppressed by the El Niño phase of ENSO, they are 
enhanced in the eastern North Pacific. Under further anthropogenic 
climate change, the frequency of high-intensity tropical cyclones 
is generally projected to increase over the western North Atlantic 
by 40 percent for 1.5–2.5°C global warming and by 80 percent in 
a 4°C world. Global warming of around 3°C is associated with 
an average 10 percent increase in rainfall intensity averaged over 
a 200 km radius from a tropical cyclone’s center. Although there 
Figure 3.1: Multi-model mean temperature anomaly for Latin America and the Caribbean for RCP2.6 (2°C world, left) and RCP8.5 
(4°C world, right) for the austral summer months (DJF).
Temperature anomalies in degrees Celsius are averaged over the time period 2071–2099 relative to 1951–1980.
9099_CH03.pdf   32 11/17/14   6:15 PM
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
33
Figure 3.2: Multi-model mean of the percentage change in the aridity index under RCP2.6 (2°C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4°C 
world, right) for Latin America and the Caribbean by 2071–2099 relative to 1951–1980.
Hatched areas indicate uncertain results, with two or more out of five models disagreeing on the direction of change. Note that a negative change cor-
responds to a shift to more arid conditions.29 
is some evidence from multiple-model studies for a projected 
increase in frequency of tropical cyclones along the Pacific coast 
of Central America, overall projections in this region are currently 
inconclusive. Despite these inconclusive projections, however, any 
increase in Pacific and Atlantic storms (not necessarily cyclones) 
making landfall simultaneously would potentially entail more 
damaging impacts than increasing frequency of any individual 
Pacific or Atlantic cyclone.29
3.1.2 Regional Sea-Level Rise
Sea-level rise is projected to be higher at the Atlantic coast than at the 
Pacific coast. Valparaiso (median estimate: 0.55 m for a 4°C world) 
is projected to benefit from southeasterly trade wind intensification 
over the Southern Pacific and associated upwelling of cold water 
leading to below-average thermosteric (due to ocean temperature 
rise) sea-level rise. In contrast, the Atlantic coast of Brazil is projected 
29 Some individual grid cells have noticeably different values than their direct neigh-
bors (e.g., on the border between Peru and Bolivia). This is due to the fact that the 
Aridity index is defined as a fraction of total annual precipitation divided by potential 
evapotranspiration (see Appendix). It therefore behaves in a strongly non-linear way, 
and thus year-to-year fluctuations can be large. Since averages are calculated over a 
relatively small number of model simulations, this can result in these local jumps.
to experience above-average sea-level rise (Recife: median estimate: 
0.63 m, low estimate: 0.41 m, high estimate: 1.14 m; Rio de Janeiro: 
median estimate: 0.62 m, low estimate: 0.46 m, high estimate: 
1.11 m). Sea-level rise is exacerbated at low latitudes due to both 
increased ocean heat uptake and the gravity-induced pattern of ice 
sheets and glaciers. As an example, Guayaquil on the Pacific Coast 
of Ecuador is projected to experience 0.62 m (low estimate: 0.46 m, 
high estimate: 1.04 m) of sea-level rise in a 4°C world. In contrast, 
Puerto Williams (Chile) at the southern tip of the South American 
continent is projected to experience only 0.46 m (low estimate: 
0.38 m; high estimate: 0.65 m). Port-Au-Prince (Haiti) is projected 
to experience 0.61 m (low estimate: 0.41 m, high estimate: 1.04 m) 
of sea-level rise in a 4°C world (Figure 3.11); it serves as a typical 
example for sea-level rise in other Caribbean islands. 
3.1.3 Sector-based and Thematic Impacts
3.1.3.1 Glaciers and Snowpack Changes
Glacial recession in South America has been significant. The 
tropical glaciers in the Central Andes in particular have lost major 
portions of their volume in the course of the 20th century. A clear 
trend of glacial retreat is also visible for glaciers in the southern 
Andes, which have lost about 20 percent of their volume. 
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The recession of the tropical glaciers in the Central Andes will 
continue as rapidly as it has in recent decades. Even for low or 
intermediate emissions scenarios inducing a global warming of 
2–3°C above pre-industrial levels, two comprehensive studies con-
sistently project a glacial volume loss of 78–97 percent. Both studies 
predict an almost complete deglaciation (93–100 percent) for a 4°C 
world. Other studies are slightly less dramatic; irrespective of the 
temperature evolution in the next decades, however, large parts of 
the glaciers of the tropical Andes will be gone long before the end of 
the century. In the Southern Andes, the model spread for the 2–3°C 
global warming ranges from 22–59 percent glacier volume loss; a 
comparison for individual scenarios is difficult. In a 4°C world, 
models project a glacier volume retreat of 44–74 percent by 2100.
Monitoring of snow cover in the high altitudes of Chile and 
Argentina since 1950 shows no significant trend (possible trends 
are hard to identify in the records, since the inter-annual variabil-
ity is large and clearly modulated by ENSO). The lack of reliable 
projections for snowpack and snow cover changes in the Andes 
is an important research gap.
3.1.3.2 Water Resources, Water Security, and Floods
Although the magnitude of the change varies, there is a high 
agreement on decreasing mean annual runoff and discharge in 
Central America. Water stress may increase, especially in arid 
areas with high population densities and during the dry season. 
In the Caribbean, runoff projections are of low confidence due to 
lack of data. However, freshwater availability may decrease for 
several reasons, such as sea-level rise leading to an intrusion of 
sea water into coastal aquifers. Regionally, the risk of flooding 
and mudslides with high mortality rates is high. Although floods 
often seem to be associated with land-use change, more severe 
flooding events may also occur in the context of climate change.
Higher variability of seasonal discharge is projected for the 
Tropical Andes. Decreased streamflow during the dry season has 
already been observed, and may decrease further as a result of 
ongoing glacier retreat. However, streamflow during the wet sea-
son may increase. The Andean region could experience a higher 
flood risk in a 4°C world (e.g. due to accelerated glacier melting). 
In the Amazon Basin, runoff and discharge projections for most 
parts of the Amazon basin are diverging. For the western part of 
the basin a likely increase in streamflow, runoff, flood zone, and 
inundation time are projected. In southern most South America, 
a decrease in mean runoff is projected.
Although the Latin America and Caribbean region has an 
abundance of freshwater resources, many cities depend on local 
rivers, aquifers, lakes, and glaciers that may be affected by climate 
change—and freshwater supplies might not be enough to meet 
demand. For example, Guadalajara (Mexico) and many Andean 
cities are expected to face increasing water stress and, if the current 
demand continues, low-income groups who already lack adequate 
access to water will face more challenges. 
3.1.3.3 Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture, 
Livestock, and Food Security
The results of the climate change impact projections on crop yields 
differ among studies, but most authors agree that climate change 
will very likely decrease agricultural yields of important food 
crops in the Latin America and Caribbean region. An exception 
is the projected increase in yield of irrigated/flooded rice in some 
regions. The few available studies on climate change impacts on 
livestock indicate that beef and dairy cattle production will decline 
under increasing temperatures, as heat stress is a major influenc-
ing factor of cattle productivity. Sheep seem to cope better with 
warmer and drier conditions than cattle and pigs.
3.1.3.4 Climate Change Impacts on Biodiversity
Climate change-induced negative effects on biodiversity, from 
range contractions to extinctions, are very likely in a warmer than 
2°C world. As the adaptive capacity of affected species and eco-
systems is hard to project or quantify, models need to use simpli-
fied approaches as implemented in bioclimatic envelope models, 
species-distribution models, and dynamic global vegetation models.
One clear trend regarding future warming levels is that the 
more temperature is projected to increase, the more species diver-
sity is affected. Mountainous regions in the tropics (e.g., cloud 
forests) are projected to become very vulnerable due to the high 
number of endemic and highly specialized species which might 
face mountaintop extinction. Most models do not take biotic 
interactions (e.g., food-web interactions, species competition) or 
resource limitations into account. Therefore, the realized ecological 
niche of species within an ecosystem might become much smaller 
than what is potentially possible according to climatic and other 
environmental conditions, leading to shifts in ecological zones. 
3.1.3.5 Amazon Rainforest Degradation, Dieback, 
and Tipping Point
Overall, the most recent studies suggest that the Amazon dieback is an 
unlikely, but possible, future for the Amazon region. Projected future 
precipitation and the effects of CO2 fertilization on tropical tree growth 
remain the processes with the highest uncertainty. Climate-driven 
changes in dry season length and recurrence of extreme drought 
years, as well as the impact of fires on forest degradation, add to 
the list of unknowns for which combined effects still remain to be 
investigated in an integrative study across the Amazon. A critical 
tipping point has been identified at around 40 percent deforesta-
tion, when altered water and energy feedbacks between remaining 
tropical forest and climate may lead to a decrease in precipitation. 
A basin-wide Amazon forest dieback caused by feedbacks 
between climate and the global carbon cycle is a potential tipping 
point of high impact if regional temperatures increase by more 
than 4°C and global mean temperatures increase by more than 
3°C toward the end of the 21st century. Recent analyses have, how-
ever, downgraded this probability from 21 percent to 0.24 percent 
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for the 4°C regional warming level when coupled carbon-cycle 
climate models are adjusted to better represent the inter-annual 
variability of tropical temperatures and related CO2 emissions. 
This holds true, however, only when the CO2 fertilization effect is 
realized as implemented in current vegetation models. Moreover, 
large-scale forest degradation as a result of increasing drought may 
impair ecosystem services and functions, including the regional 
hydrological cycle, even without a forest dieback.
3.1.3.6 Fisheries and Coral Reefs
Together with ocean acidification and hypoxia, which are very likely 
to become more pronounced under high-emissions scenarios, the 
possibility of more extreme El Niño events poses substantial risks 
to the world’s richest fishery grounds. Irrespective of single events, 
the gradual warming of ocean waters has been observed and is 
further expected to affect fisheries (particularly at a local scale).
Generally, fish populations are migrating poleward toward 
colder waters. Projections indicate an increase in catch potential 
of up to 100 percent in the south of Latin America. Off the coast of 
Uruguay, the southern tip of Baja California, and southern Brazil 
the maximum catch potential is projected to decrease by more than 
50 percent. Caribbean waters and parts of the Atlantic coast of Central 
America may see declines in the range of 5–50 percent. Along the 
coasts of Peru and Chile, fish catches are projected to decrease by 
up to 30°percent, but there are increases expected toward the south.
Irrespective of the sensitivity threshold chosen, and irrespective 
of the emissions scenario, by the year 2040, Caribbean coral reefs 
are expected to experience annual bleaching events. While some 
species and particular locations appear to be more resilient to such 
events, it is clear that the marine ecosystems of the Caribbean 
are facing large-scale changes with far-reaching consequences for 
associated livelihood activities as well as for the coastal protection 
provided by healthy coral reefs.
3.1.3.7 Health
The Latin America and Caribbean region faces increased risks of 
morbidity and mortality caused by infectious diseases and extreme 
weather events. Observed patterns of disease transmission associ-
ated with different parts of the ENSO cycle offer clues as to how 
changes in temperature and precipitation might affect the incidence 
of a particular disease in a particular location. Projections of how 
malaria incidence in the region could be affected by climate change 
over the rest of the century are somewhat inconsistent, with some 
studies pointing to increased incidence and others to decreased 
incidence. Such uncertainty also characterizes studies of the rela-
tionship between climate change and malaria globally and reflects 
the complexity of the environmental factors influencing the disease. 
3.1.3.8 Migration and Security
While migration is not a new phenomenon in the region, it is 
expected to accelerate under climate change. There are many areas 
in the Latin America and Caribbean Region prone to extreme events, 
including droughts, floods, landslides, and tropical cyclones; all 
of these extreme events can induce migration.
Examples indicate that drought-induced migration is already 
occurring in some regions. The largest level of climate migration 
is likely to occur in areas where non-environmental factors (e.g., 
poor governance, political persecution, population pressures, and 
poverty) are already present and putting migratory pressures on 
local populations. 
The region is considered to be at low risk of armed conflict. 
However, in the context of high social and economic inequality 
and migration flows across countries, disputes regarding access to 
resources, land, and wealth are persistent. Climate change could 
increase the risk of conflict in the region through more resource 
scarcity, more migration, increasing instability, and increasing 
frequency and intensity of natural disasters. 
3.1.3.9 Coastal Infrastructure
By 2050, coastal flooding with a sea-level rise of 20 cm could 
generate approximately $940 million of mean annual losses in 
the 22 largest coastal cities in the Latin America and Caribbean 
region, and about $1.2 billion with a sea-level rise of 40 cm. The 
Caribbean region is particularly vulnerable to climate change due 
to its low-lying areas and the population’s dependence on coastal 
and marine economic activity. In a scenario leading to a 4°C world 
and featuring 0.89–1.4 m of sea-level rise, tropical cyclones in 
the Caribbean alone could generate an extra $22 billion by 2050 
(and $46 billion by 2100) in storm and infrastructure damages and 
tourism losses, compared to a scenario leading to a 2°C world. 
The potential increase in tropical cyclone intensity may increase 
port downtime for ships and, therefore, increase shipping costs. 
Beach tourism is particularly exposed to direct and indirect climate 
change stressors, including sea-level rise, modified tropical storm 
patterns, heightened storm surges, and coastal erosion. Coastal 
tourist resorts are potentially two-to-three times more exposed 
to climate change-related stressors than inland touristic resorts. 
3.1.3.10 Energy
The assessment of the current literature on climate change impacts 
on energy in Latin America and the Caribbean shows that there 
are only a few studies, most of which make strong assumptions 
about such key issues as seasonality of water supply for hydro-
power. These studies are more qualitative than quantitative and 
important gaps remain. There is also a lack of studies with respect 
to the impacts of climate change impacts on renewable energies. 
In general, the impacts of climate change on energy demand 
are less well studied than those on energy supply—and, yet, 
demand and supply interact in a dynamic way. For example, the 
concomitant increase in energy demand during heat extremes 
and the decrease in energy supply through reduced river flow and 
low efficiencies may put existing energy systems under increasing 
pressure in the future.
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3.1.4 Overview of Regional Development 
Narratives
The development narratives build on the climate change impacts ana-
lyzed in this report (see Table 3.15: Synthesis table of climate change 
impacts in LAC under different warming levels) and are presented 
in more detail in Section 3.5. Climate change impacts have manifold 
direct and indirect implications for development in the region. These 
impacts occur on a continuum from rural to urban; not only are 
there many climate impacts directly affecting rural spaces leading for 
example to reduced agricultural productivity or altered hydrological 
regimes, but these impacts also affect urban areas through changing 
ecosystem services, migration flows, and so forth. Development will 
likewise be impacted as the challenges of a changing climate mount 
and interact with socioeconomic factors. In particular, glacial melt and 
changing river flows, extreme events, and risks to food production 
systems will put human livelihoods under pressure.
Climate change impacts are and will continue to affect devel-
opment across the region in several ways. First, changes to the 
hydrological cycle endanger the stability of freshwater supplies and 
ecosystem services. An altered hydrological system due to changing 
runoff, glacial melt, and snowpack changes will affect the ecosystem 
services that the rural population depends on, freshwater supplies in 
cities, and such major economic activities as mining and hydropower. 
Second, climate change places at risk both large-scale agricultural 
production for export and small-scale agriculture for regional food 
production. Third, a stronger prevalence of extreme events affects 
both rural and urban communities, particularly in coastal regions. 
At the sub-regional level, the following climate-development 
interactions are particularly important. In Central America and 
the Caribbean, extreme events threaten livelihoods and damage 
infrastructure. In the Andes, changes in water resource availability 
challenge the rural and urban poor. In the Amazon, the risks of 
a tipping point, forest degradation, and biodiversity loss threaten 
local communities. Hydrological changes may affect the wider 
region. The Southern Cone faces risks to export commodities from 
loss of production from intensive agriculture. In the Mexican dry 
subtropical regions and northeastern Brazil, increasing drought 
stress threatens rural livelihoods and health.
3.2 Introduction
This report defines Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) as 
the region encompassing the South American continent, Central 
America,30 the Caribbean islands, and Mexico. It is constituted 
by the following countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, the 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
30 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, St Kitts and Nevis, 
St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
The region is very large and has a very diverse range of distrib-
uted ecosystems from the Andean mountains that stretch for about 
8,850 kilometers, to mountain glaciers, vast rainforests, savannas, 
grasslands, wetlands, islands, deserts and a coastline that is over 
72,000 kilometers long. There are broad differences in development 
levels both within and among countries (Table 3.1); these factors 
influence the social vulnerability of the population. In addition, cur-
rent and projected climate change impacts vary strongly within the 
region, with some key impacts relating to changing temperatures and 
precipitation. Changes in extreme events (e.g., heatwaves, droughts, 
tropical cyclones, and changing ENSO patterns) (see Section 2.3.2, 
El-Niño/Southern Oscillation) and sea-level rise are also projected to 
vary across the region. These physical risk factors trigger biophysical 
impacts on hydrological flows, agricultural productivity, biodiversity 
in general, and forest dynamics in the Amazon in particular, coral 
reefs, and fisheries, as well as social impacts on human health, 
security, energy systems, and coastal infrastructure.
This report analyses these physical, biophysical, and social 
impacts in an integrated way using data analysis, model projec-
tions, and an intensive review of the scientific literature. Wherever 
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US$ % OF GDP YEARS
YEAR 2012 2012 2012 2012 2011 2011
ID SP.POP.TOTL
SP.URB.TOTL 
.IN.ZS SP.URB.GROW NY.GDP.PCAP.CD NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS SP.DYN.LE00.IN
Argentina 41.1 92.6 1.03 11.6 10.7 75.8
Antigua and Barbuda 0.1 29.9 1.01 12.7 2.5 75.5
Bahamas, The 0.4 84.4 1.75 21.9 2.3 74.8
Belize 0.3 44.6 2.01 – 13.1 73.5
Bolivia 10.5 67.2 2.27 2.6 12.5 66.6
Brazil 198.7 84.9 1.19 11.3 5.5 73.3
Barbados 0.3 44.9 1.65 14.9 1.5 75.0
Chile 17.5 89.3 1.13 15.5 3.7 79.3
Colombia 47.7 75.6 1.68 7.7 6.9 73.6
Costa Rica 4.8 65.1 2.12 9.4 6.5 79.5
Cuba 11.3 75.2 –0.07 0.0 5.0 78.9
Dominica 0.1 67.3 0.57 6.7 13.5 –
Dominican Republic 10.3 70.2 2.07 5.7 6.0 73.0
Ecuador 15.5 68.0 2.43 5.4 10.4 75.9
Grenada 0.1 39.5 1.25 7.3 5.3 72.5
Guatemala 15.1 50.2 3.43 3.3 11.8 71.3
Guyana 0.8 28.5 0.88 3.6 21.3 65.9
Honduras 7.9 52.7 3.12 2.3 15.3 73.2
Haiti 10.2 54.6 3.85 0.8 – 62.3
Jamaica 2.7 52.2 0.36 5.4 6.6 73.1
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.1 32.1 1.41 14.3 1.8 –
St. Lucia 0.2 17.0 –3.03 6.8 3.3 74.6
Mexico 120.8 78.4 1.60 9.7 3.4 76.9
Nicaragua 6.0 57.9 1.98 1.8 19.7 74.1
Panama 3.8 75.8 2.42 9.5 4.1 77.2
Peru 30.0 77.6 1.68 6.8 7.0 74.2
Puerto Rico 3.7 99.0 –0.64 27.7 0.7 78.4
Paraguay 6.7 62.4 2.58 3.8 21.4 72.1
El Salvador 6.3 65.2 1.40 3.8 12.5 71.9
Suriname 0.5 70.1 1.47 9.4 10.0 70.6
Trinidad and Tobago 1.3 14.0 2.26 17.4 0.5 69.7
Uruguay 3.4 92.6 0.45 14.7 9.4 76.8
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
0.1 49.7 0.80 6.5 6.4 72.3
Venezuela, RB 30.0 93.7 1.73 12.7 – 74.3
Note: 1Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1–5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net 
output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion 
and degradation of natural resources.
2Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout 
its life. Source: World Bank (2013b).
9099_CH03.pdf   37 11/17/14   6:15 PM
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CONFRONTING THE NEW CLIMATE NORMAL
38
3.2.1 Social, Economic and Demographic 
Profile of the Latin America and Caribbean 
Region
The Latin America and Caribbean Region comprises a population 
of 588 million (in 2013) of which almost 80 percent is urban. The 
current GDP is estimated at US$ 5.655 trillion (in 2013) with a GNI 
per capita of US$ 9,314 in 2013. In 2012, approximately 28.2 per-
cent of the population were living in poverty and 11.3 percent 
in extreme poverty or deprivation (ECLAC 2014). These figures 
represent a decrease of about 1.4 percent in the poverty rate with 
respect to 2011 (ECLAC 2014). Although the number of people 
living in poverty in the region has been going down slowly, in 
absolute terms, this means that 164 million people were poor—of 
whom 66 million were extremely poor (ECLAC 2014). 
Despite progress in the past decade and a growing middle 
class now surpassing the number of poor, inequality in the region 
remains high, and may be stagnating. Thirty eight percent of 
the population live just above the poverty line on an income of 
$4–10 per day (Fereira et al. 2013). 
Income inequalities in the region affect vulnerability to cli-
mate change, as the poor are more likely to be exposed to both 
climate and economic shocks and limited ability to prepare for or 
mitigate impacts. Haldén (2007) notes that disparities and divi-
sions could impede growth and undermine adaptation strategies, 
with the additional risk that substantial inequality might also 
destabilize societies and increase the likelihood of conflict in the 
light of climate change and variability (see Section 2.5, Social 
Vulnerability to Climate Change). These income inequalities are 
further exacerbated by gender, spatial, and ethnic inequalities. 
Ethnicity correlates closely with poverty. In seven countries for 
which data are available, the poverty rate is 1.2–3.4 times higher 
for indigenous and afrodescendent groups than for the rest of the 
population (ECLAC and UNFPA 2009). Furthermore, while indig-
enous peoples in LAC represent 10 percent of the population, their 
income levels and human development indicators (e.g., education 
and health status) have consistently fallen behind those of the 
rest of the population (Hall and Patrinos 2005).
The region’s population is expected to rise to 622 million in 
2015 and to 700 million by 2030. The distribution of the population 
is increasingly urban. In 2010, the urban population accounted for 
78.8 percent of the total; this number is projected to rise to 83.4 per-
cent by 2030 (ECLAC 2014). The concentration of poverty in urban 
settlements is a central determinant of vulnerability to climate 
change. In addition, differences in fertility levels of social groups in 
Latin America and the Caribbean show that the poor segments of the 
urban population contribute most to urban growth, exacerbating the 
contribution of predominantly poor rural-urban migrants. Residents 
in densely populated low-income settlements (Ravallion et al. 2008) 
are more likely to be adversely affected by climate extremes.
3.2.2 Vulnerabilities to Climate Change in the 
Latin America and the Caribbean Region
In the LAC region, climate change is expected to accentuate pre-
existing socioeconomic vulnerabilities. People living in low-lying 
coastal areas, slums (Douglas et al. 2008), and certain popula-
tion groups (such as poor (Ahmed et al. 2009; Hertel et al. 2010) 
and women-led households (Kumar and Quisumbing 2011)), are 
particularly exposed to shocks and future climate change risks. 
Several socioeconomic and physical factors can contribute to 
increasing the vulnerability of populations to climate change. For 
example, poverty hinders households’ adaptive capacity (Kelly and 
Adger 2000). According to Calvo (2013), the following character-
istics of the population in the LAC region increase the exposure 
to climate change impacts and the likelihood of being affected by 
economic shocks: (1) one third of the population can be classified 
as poor or extremely poor, so that any shock can push them into 
further poverty; (2) there are more children in poor and extremely 
poor households given the higher fertility rates amongst the poor, 
so that shocks can have particularly adverse consequences for 
children, given that they are at a stage of life with greater needs 
and dependency; and (3) poor households have members with 
fewer years of formal education, which can limit their capacity 
to adapt to climate change impacts or macroeconomic shocks.
3.2.3 Vulnerabilities Faced by Rural Populations
Even though urban and rural areas have both experienced poverty 
reduction, the gap between the rural and urban experience is still 
wide. In 2010, the rural poverty rate was twice as high as that 
of urban areas; when considering extreme poverty, it was four 
times as high (IFAD 2013). Close to 60 percent of the population 
in extreme poverty lives in rural areas (RIMISP 2011). Many rural 
people in the region continue to live on less than $2 per day and 
have poor access to financial services, markets, training, and 
other opportunities. The rural poor are thus more likely to feel the 
impacts of climate change and variability given their dependency on 
small-hold, rain-fed agriculture and other environmental resources 
that are particularly susceptible to the effects of climate change 
(Hoffman and Grigera 2013). Moreover, these populations have 
limited political influence and are less able to leverage govern-
ment support to help curb the effects of climate change (Hardoy 
and Pandiella 2009). The dependence of the rural population on 
land as a source of food and income, coupled with lack of physi-
cal and financial adaptive capacity, means that poor farmers are 
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also at increased risk of harm from slow-onset change (Rossing 
and Rubin 2011). 
3.2.4 Urban Settlements and Marginalized 
Populations
In addition to high levels of urbanization, in many countries in 
the region a high proportion of the urban population lives in a 
few very large cities. National economies, employment patterns, 
and government capacities—many of which are highly centralized—
are also very dependent on these large cities. This makes them 
extremely vulnerable (Hardoy and Pandiella 2009). Based on two 
global model studies, Ahmed et al. (2009), Hertel et al. (2010), and 
Skoufias et al. (2011) estimate that urban salaried workers will be 
the most affected by climate change given the increase in prices 
of food resulting from reduced agricultural production. Increasing 
pressure on rural economic activities induced by droughts, heat 
waves, or floods—also driven by future climate change impacts—
could result in a greater rural exodus and add further pressure on 
human and economic development in cities (Marengo et al. 2012, 
2013; Vörösmarty et al. 2002).
Spatial vulnerability within urban centers is a major source of 
risk. There are particularly hazardous areas within Latin American 
cities where settlements have been built, including flood plains 
(Calvo 2013). These settlements already face infrastructural 
problems that affect water supplies, sanitation, and solid waste 
management as they were built for less populated cities. This leaves 
these areas at greater risk of flooding and other disasters (Hardoy 
and Pandiella 2009) (Box 3.1). In 2004, for example, 14 percent of 
the population in the LAC region (more than 125 million people) 
did not have access to improved sanitation, and an even-higher 
percentage lacked good quality sanitation and drainage. Limited 
access to sanitation and freshwater sources is also a key source of 
vulnerability as this increases the risk of the spread of water-borne 
diseases (McMichael and Lindgren 2011; McMichael et al. 2012). 
Houses in informal settlements are built incrementally with 
deficient materials and no attention to building or zoning regula-
tions. As a result, a significant share of the population is exposed 
to flooding, contamination of groundwater by salt water, and 
constraints on the availability and quality of drinking water, as 
well as to a rising sea level (Magrin et al. 2007). In addition, the 
impacts of extreme weather events are more severe in areas that 
have been previously affected and have not yet been able to recover 
properly, with cumulative effects that are difficult to overcome. 
Limited disaster preparation and a lack of planning compound 
the problems (Martí 2006). 
A great deal of urban expansion in the region has taken 
place over floodplains, on mountain slopes, and in other zones 
Box 3.1: Hurricane Mitch’s Impact 
in Urban Areas
In 1998, Hurricane Mitch cut a swath across Central America, hitting 
Honduras especially hard. Overall, 30 percent of the central district of 
Honduras, including the cities of Tegucigalpa, was destroyed. Most of 
the damage was concentrated around the four rivers that cross the 
cities; as a result, 78 percent of Tegucigalpa’s drinking water supply 
pipelines were destroyed. Factors that increased the vulnerability of 
the city included obsolete and inadequate infrastructure, especially 
regarding water, sanitation, and drainage; a lack of zoning codes; 
concentration of services and infrastructure in only a few areas; a lack 
of official prevention and mitigation strategies; and inappropriate man-
agement of the river basins. Source: Hardoy and Pandiella (2009).
ill-suited to settlement, such as areas prone to flooding or affected 
by seasonal storms, sea surges, and other weather-related risks. 
Such land is cheap or is state-owned land and relatively easy for 
low-income groups to occupy. In most cases, the poor have no 
formal tenure of the land and face not only environmental risks 
but also the risk of eviction. Left with few options, low-income 
groups live in overcrowded houses in neighborhoods with high 
population densities (Hardoy and Pandiella 2009). All these factors 
contribute to a high level of vulnerability to floods and landslides.
In most LAC cities there are concentrations of low-income 
households at high risk from extreme weather (Hardoy et al. 2001). 
For example, an estimated 1.1 million people live in the favelas of 
Rio de Janeiro that stretch over the slopes of the Tijuca mountain 
range (Hardoy and Pandiella 2009). Most low-income groups live 
in housing without air-conditioning or adequate insulation; dur-
ing heat waves, the very young, the elderly, and people in poor 
health are particularly at risk (Bartlett 2008; see also Section 3.4.7, 
Human Health). In northern Mexico, for example, heat waves have 
been correlated with increases in mortality rates; in Buenos Aires, 
10 percent of summer deaths are associated with heat strain; and 
records show increases in the incidence of diarrhea in Peru (Mata 
and Nobre 2006). 
Although LAC has an abundance of freshwater resources, 
many cities depend on local rivers, underground water, lakes, and 
glaciers that may be affected by climate change (see Section 3.4.1, 
Glacial Retreat and Snowpack Changes and Section 3.4.2, Water 
Resources, Water Security, and Floods). Considering city growth, 
environmental deterioration, and possible climate change impacts, 
the supply of fresh water might not be enough to meet demand. 
Guadalajara in Mexico (Von Bertrab and Wester 2005) and many 
Andean cities may face increasing water stress and, if the current 
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situation continues, low-income groups who already lack adequate 
access to water will be even less likely to obtain it. Quito is likely 
to face water shortages as a result of glacier retreat (Hardoy and 
Pandiella 2009). In Santiago de Chile, an estimated 40 percent 
reduction in precipitation would impact water supply in a city that 
is expecting a 30 percent population growth by 2030 (Heinrichs 
and Krellenberg 2011). A similar situation exists in Sao Paulo, 
where the local catchment of Alto Tiete provides just 10 percent 
of the water supply for 11 million people and where urban areas 
are expanding over agricultural and natural areas; this is impact-
ing the area’s storm-water retention capacity, thereby making the 
city more prone to flood events (Heinrichs and Krellenberg 2011). 
3.2.4.1 Gender and Age-specific Vulnerabilities
In the context of a male-dominated, patriarchal society, gender and 
age are important aspects of vulnerability in the LAC region. Many 
women and children are particularly vulnerable to the effects of 
climate change as they have limited access to resources and fewer 
capabilities and opportunities for participating in decision and 
policy making (Hardoy and Pandiella 2009). The most vulnerable 
groups seldom have an influential voice with regard to disaster 
preparedness or response, and their needs receive little attention. 
Economic dependency places women and children in a 
particularly disadvantaged situation, and climate change could 
exacerbate the problem. According to ECLAC and UNFPA (2009), 
poverty is 1.7 times higher among minors under 15 than in adults, 
and 1.15 times greater among women than men. For example, in 
Uruguay poverty is 3.1 times higher among children than adults; 
in Chile, it is 1.8 times greater; and, in Nicaragua, it is 1.3 times 
greater. Sudden-onset disasters or a worsening of drought condi-
tions have the potential to trigger severe acute malnutrition with 
greater effects on women and children (see Section 2.5, Social 
Vulnerability to Climate Change).
There are various ways in which women can be affected by 
climate change differently than men. One way is through the rise 
in domestic violence in the context of environmental disasters. 
Gender-based violence is already a significant problem for women 
in LAC, where most studies estimate that prevalent physical vio-
lence between intimate partners affects between 20–50 percent of 
women. While there are important differences in the estimates, 
studies similarly find that 8–26 percent of women and girls report 
having been sexually abused (Morrison et al. 2004). Moser and 
Rogers (2005) indicate that rapid socioeconomic changes—such 
as those that can occur as a result of climate shocks—might have 
destabilizing effects within families, leading to an increased risk 
of domestic violence. Although evidence of the effects of climate-
induced disasters in the region remains mixed and limited, accounts 
of gender-based violence have been found in Nicaragua after Hur-
ricane Mitch, in the Dominican Republic after Tropical Storm Noel, 
and in Guatemala after Tropical Storm Agatha (Bizzarri 2012). 
Some groups of indigenous women are also particularly 
vulnerable given their involvement in specific activities. Within 
indigenous populations in the Colombian Amazon, for example, 
impacts on horticulture would affect mainly women as they are 
traditionally in charge of this activity (Kronik and Verner 2010). 
However, not all gender differences are necessarily worse for 
women and children. For example, in the case of indigenous 
Box 3.2: The Case of Mexico City
Mexico City provides a good case study for examining the potential 
future impacts of climate change on urban areas in the region. 
The main climate-related risk factors in Mexico City stem from 
increased dry-spell periods and heat waves (see Section 3.3.2, 
Heat Extremes).
Greater Mexico City, with about 20 million inhabitants, is among 
the most highly populated cities on the planet. Despite a very high 
GDP per capita, the city exhibits a very large income inequality, 
with about 13 percent of the population lacking enough money to 
meet minimum food needs and approximately 23 percent unable to 
access education or affordable health care (Ibarrarán 2011). 
According to UN-Habitat, Mexico City is already exposed 
to several environmental challenges: The urban region is rapidly 
expanding, increasing the demand for space, infrastructure, water, 
and energy. This taxes already-deficient water supplies and an inad-
equate sewage system. Waste management is similarly challenging, 
as collection, transportation, and adequate final disposal are limited 
compared to the daily volume of waste produced by the 20 million 
inhabitants of the city. 
In addition to these preexisting socioeconomic and environmen-
tal vulnerabilities, climate change stressors are projected to increase 
Mexico City’s overall vulnerability. Four principal climate-related 
stressors are projected to affect Mexico City: (1) the higher fre-
quency of heat waves and hotter days; (2) the decreased instance of 
cooler days; (3) the increased occurrence of flash floods; and (4) the 
extension of summer droughts (Ibarrarán 2011). An increase in the 
frequency of heat waves could have two potential consequences 
in Mexico City. First, the steadily growing elderly population will be 
particularly exposed as they are more sensitive to heat extremes 
than the rest of the population (Gasparrini and Armstrong 2011). 
Second, in response to heat waves, the population could purchase 
more air conditioning and cooling systems. This may put power 
plants under severe stress, particularly as they work less efficiently 
under higher temperatures. The extension of the summer droughts 
is projected to increase Mexico City’s water stress situation (Novelo 
and Tapia 2011; Romero Lankao 2010). Furthermore, the increased 
occurrence and extension of summer droughts may disproportion-
ately impact the rural population, who may then be more inclined to 
migrate to cities to find less climate-dependent economic activities 
(Ibarrarán 2011). As a consequence, the population of Mexico’s 
urban areas is expected to grow, putting more pressure on the 
urban environments and resources.
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groups, impacts in the availability of fish and game will affect 
mainly young men (Kronik and Verner 2010).
Changes in migration patterns as a result of climate change are 
also likely to have important effects on women. While traditionally 
it is young males who have migrated domestically or abroad, over 
the past two decades rural indigenous women have also started 
migrating, generally with the support of their social and family 
networks. Studies indicate that the experiences of migrant indig-
enous women tend to be less favorable, however, as they become 
vulnerable and disadvantaged by discrimination, lack of previous 
crosscultural experiences, illiteracy, and language barriers. Because 
of these barriers, their only option for work tends to be low-wage 
employment in the informal sector (Andersen et al. 2010).
3.2.4.2 Indigenous People
There are about 40 million indigenous people within the LAC 
region, with the majority located in the cooler high regions of 
the Andes and in Mesoamerica (Kronik and Verner 2010). The 
indigenous population is made up of about 400 indigenous 
groups (Del Popolo and Oyarce 2005), of which about 30 percent 
are afrodescendant (Rangel 2006). Bolivia is the country with 
the highest share of indigenous people (66 percent) and Mexico 
has the highest absolute number (Table 3.2). When compared to 
non-indigenous groups, the profile of indigenous peoples shows 
that they have higher levels of poverty and infant and maternal 
mortality, lower levels of life expectancy, income, and schooling, 
and less access to water and sanitation; together, this highlights 
the exclusion of and discrimination against these groups (Del 
Popolo and Oyarce 2005; World Bank 2014). As a response to 
urbanization, indigenous populations in LAC are found both in 
urban and rural areas (Del Popolo and Oyarce 2005). Popolo et 
al. (2009) found that on average 40 percent of the indigenous 
population in 11 countries in Latin America were living in urban 
areas in 2000/2001. Whereas the ratio varies from country to 
country, recent census information highlights that 21.4 percent of 
indigenous peoples in Colombia (Paz 2012), 54 percent in Bolivia 
(Molina Barrios et al. 2005), 55.8 percent in Peru (Ribotta 2011), 
64.8 percent in Chile, (Ribotta 2012a), and 82 percent in Argentina 
(Ribotta 2012b) are currently living in towns and cities. 
Understanding the climate change impacts on indigenous 
populations requires an understanding of the cultural dimension 
of their livelihood strategies and the social institutions that sup-
port them (Kronik and Verner 2010). In rural areas, indigenous 
groups are particularly vulnerable to climate change because of 
their reliance on natural resources, traditional knowledge systems, 
and culture (Kronik and Verner 2010) and due to poor access to 
infrastructure and technology (Feldt 2011). Indigenous popula-
tions with greater territorial autonomy, and with their livelihoods 
more intertwined with forest and water resources, are therefore 
more affected by climate change when compared to indigenous 
populations with restricted territorial autonomy (whose livelihoods 
are more diversified, and include wage labor, tourism, and other 
income-generating activities) (Kronik and Verner 2010). Indig-
enous groups with territorial autonomy are normally located in 
the Amazon region whereas those without are more likely to be 
found in the Andes (Kronik and Verner 2010). 
Kronik and Verner (2010) studied the impacts of climate change 
on indigenous populations in the LAC region, in particular on those 








POPULATION RECOGNIZED PEOPLES GROUPS
Bolivia (2001) 8,090,732 5,358,107 66.2 36 groups (49.5% Quechua, 40% Aymara)
Brazil (2000) 169,872,856 734,127 0.4 241 groups
Costa Rica (2000) 3,810,179 65,548 1.7
Chile (2002) 15,116,435 692,192 4.6 9 groups (83% Mapuche)
Ecuador (2001) 12,156,608 830,418 6.8
Guatemala (2002) 11,237,196 4,433,218 39.5 21 groups (all Maya)
Honduras (2001) 6,076,885 440,313 7.2
Mexico (2000) 97,014,867 7,618,990 7.9 62 groups
Panama (2000) 2,839,177 285,231 10.0 3 groups (Ngöbe-Buglé, Kuna, and 
Embera-Wounan)
Paraguay (2002) 5,183,074 87,568 1.7
Please note that data are from 2000 but used here to provide a comprehensive overview of the share of indigenous population. Sources: Del Popolo and Oyarce (2005); 
Rangel (2006).
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living in the Amazon, the Andes, the Caribbean, and in Central 
America. In the Colombian Amazon, they found the biggest direct 
impacts related to changes in the seasonal cycle (i.e., floods, 
and dry and rainy periods): river flooding affects fish and turtle 
reproduction, thereby impacting the food security of indigenous 
populations; changes in periods during which important local 
fruits ripen and the succession of dry and rainy seasons affect the 
harvests of wild fruits; and changes in the length of the dry season 
affects agriculture productivity, particularly in alluvial plateaus gar-
dens. Increases in temperature and changes in precipitation affect 
mainly horticulture, favoring specific crops such as cassava but 
threatening harvest diversity (Echeverri 2009). Climate change and 
climate variability is also apparent in the ‘decoupling’ of ecological 
markers from seasonal changes (whereby seasons appear to occur 
significantly late or early), affecting livelihood decision-making in 
particular for indigenous peoples. This may affect the credibility 
of elders and traditional leaders, as their authority to predict the 
natural seasonality is challenged (Kronik and Verner 2010).
In the indigenous Andes, rising temperatures can increase 
demand for water. At the same time, higher evapotranspiration 
rates and glacial retreat are expected to reduce the water supply; 
restricting pasture land availability in the dry season, and poten-
tially provoking conflict over land use (Kronik and Verner 2010). 
In the Bolivian Altiplano, however, Aymara communities have 
declared that high-elevation zones have now become productive, 
as changing climatic conditions have turned the area into arable 
land (Kronik and Verner 2010). 
Indigenous populations in the Andes are not only subjected to 
biophysical vulnerability. In the rural Andes, social marginalization 
and social determinants that limit the ability to improve terms of 
labor, education and access to technical assistance, undermine 
the adaptive capacity of the indigenous population (McDowell 
and Hess 2012). In Palca (Bolivia), for example, farmers are not 
only vulnerable due to the retreat of the Mururata glacier and the 
resulting impact on water supply but also to historical margin-
alization due to the lack of official identity cards, land titles, or 
access to bilingual (Aymara-Spanish) basic education (McDowell 
and Hess 2012). 
In the Caribbean and Central America, an increase in the 
frequency of some natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes) could limit 
the access of indigenous populations to key crop, forest, and fish 
resources (Kronik and Verner 2010); slow onset changes, meanwhile, 
could decrease the productivity of traditional varieties of maize, 
generating pressure to switch to more commercial varieties (Kronik 
and Verner 2010). Given that rural areas are mainly populated by 
indigenous groups—especially those that are most remote—means 
that they are the most likely to be affected. This is exacerbated by 
the strong dependence of indigenous groups on natural resources 
as well as by their reliance on traditional farming techniques. 
In contrast to the situation of rural indigenous populations, the 
vulnerability of indigenous groups living in urban areas is more 
related to the social conditions they face (e.g., discrimination and 
social exclusion) than linked to their livelihoods. 
3.2.4.3 Risk for Populations in Coastal Areas
Coastal communities in the region are particularly exposed to 
climate change extremes and sea-level rise (Trab Nielsen 2010). 
The region’s 64,000 km coastline is one of the most densely 
populated in the world (Sale et al. 2008). Coastal states have more 
than 521 million residents, of whom two-thirds (348 million) live 
within 200 km of the coastline. More than 8.4 million people in 
LAC live in the path of hurricanes, and roughly 29 million live in 
low-elevation coastal zones where they are highly vulnerable to 
sea-level rise, storm surges, and coastal flooding (McGranahan et al. 
2007; UNEP 2007). For example, several countries have a large 
section of their urban population living in areas where elevation 
is below five meters above sea level (CIESIN 2011). In Belize, the 
Bahamas, Antigua and Barbuda, and Suriname, between 15 and 
62 percent of the urban population live below five meters above 
sea level (Table 3.3). This low elevation significantly increases the 
urban population’s exposure to sea-level rise, storm surges, and 
modified tropical storm patterns.
Furthermore, human activities such as overfishing, marine 
pollution, and coastal development have eroded the ecosystems 
in many coastal areas to a level where they no longer provide 
buffers to climate extremes. Climate change and variability are 
likely to compound the damage to ecosystems and to human 
settlements, directly through more intense and frequent storms 
and sea-level rise and indirectly through the further degradation 
of the ecosystems (Trab Nielsen 2010).
Coastal communities at greatest risk from climate change 
and variability are generally those that rely on natural resources 
for a living, occupy marginal lands, and have limited access to 
the livelihood assets that are necessary for building resilience to 
climate change. They include communities that rely on coastal 
tourism and on fisheries. They also include much of the region’s 
large population of urban slum dwellers (Trab Nielsen 2010).
More than 50 percent of the Caribbean population lives along 
the coastline, and around 70 percent live in coastal cities (Mimura 
et al. 2007; UNEP 2008). Many economic activities (e.g., tourism) 
are also concentrated in coastal areas (UNEP 2008). Pressures 
arise on the islands over limited land resources as people are 
dependent on these natural resources for economic development 
and their livelihoods. The GDP of the region is generated mainly 
from two sectors—tourism and agriculture. Both are highly vul-
nerable to climate-induced hazards, including flooding, sea-level 
rise, storms, and coastal erosion (Karmalkar et al. 2013). Small 
islands are especially vulnerable to extreme events (UNEP 2008). 
The east coast of Mexico and Central America, and the 
Caribbean, are strongly affected by wind storms and cyclones 
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Table 3.3: Percentage of Latin American and Caribbean Population Living in Urban Areas and Below Five Meters of Elevation. 
COUNTRIES
URBAN POPULATION 





LIVING IN INFORMAL 
SETTLEMENTS (2005)
PERCENTAGE OF 
LAND AREA BELOW 
5 METERS OF 
ELEVATION
PERCENTAGE OF URBAN 
POPULATION LIVING 
BELOW 5 METERS OF 
ELEVATION (2010) 
Caribbean Countries
Antigua and Barbuda 29.87 47.9 10.30 15.50
Bahamas, The 84.45 – 1.61 23.55
Barbados 44.91 – 0.92 0.92
Belize 44.59 47.3 0.56 17.36
Cuba 75.17 – 0.38 2.66
Dominica 67.30 – 1.39 3.05
Dominican Republic 70.21 17.6 0.20 0.90
Grenada 39.49 59.0 1.77 1.92
Haiti 54.64 70.1 0.20 2.44
Jamaica 52.16 60.5 2.05 3.08
St. Kitts and Nevis 32.11 – 9.25 9.46
St. Lucia 16.97 11.9 0.76 0.84
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 49.70 – 0.00 0.00
Trinidad and Tobago 13.98 24.7 1.68 2.85
Latin American Countries
Argentina 92.64 26.2 0.07 3.29
Bolivia 67.22 50.4 0.00 0.00
Brazil 84.87 28.9 0.06 3.04
Chile 89.35 9.0 0.02 0.65
Colombia 75.57 17.9 0.09 1.35
Costa Rica 65.10 10.9 0.08 0.26
Ecuador 67.98 21.5 0.29 4.68
El Salvador 65.25 28.9 0.10 0.11
Guatemala 50.24 42.9 0.02 0.04
Guyana 28.49 33.7 0.22 11.81
Honduras 52.73 34.9 0.05 0.49
Nicaragua 57.86 45.5 0.03 0.31
Panama 75.78 23.0 0.13 1.90
Paraguay 62.44 17.6 0.00 0.00
Peru 77.58 36.1 0.02 0.81
Suriname 70.12 38.9 0.27 62.04
Uruguay 92.64 – 0.14 3.65
Venezuela, RB 93.70 32.0 0.16 2.63
Mexico 78.39 14.4 0.15 1.30
Source: Data from CIESIN (2011); UN-HABITAT (2013); and World Bank (2013b).
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(Maynard-Ford et al. 2008). Coastal areas are prone to storm surge 
floods and sea-level rise (Woodruff et al. 2013). Floods and hur-
ricanes present both a high risk of death (Dilley et al. 2005) and a 
threat to regional development and economic stability in Central 
America and the Caribbean (Mimura et al. 2007).
3.3 Regional Patterns of Climate Change
3.3.1 Projected Temperature Changes
Figure 3.3 shows projected austral summer (December, January, Feb-
ruary—or DJF) temperatures for the LAC land area (see Appendix). 
By 2100, summer temperatures over the LAC land area will increase 
by ~1.5°C under the low-emissions scenario (a 2°C world) and by 
~5.5°C under the high-emissions scenario (a 4°C world) compared 
to the 1951–1980 baseline. This is about 0.5°C less than the projected 
global mean land warming which is typical for the Southern Hemi-
sphere (see Figure 2.5 in World Bank 2013). in a 2°C world, warming 
of 1.5°C (multi-model mean) is reached by mid-century. Summer 
temperatures will continue to increase beyond mid-century under the 
high-emissions scenario, causing the multi-model mean warming for 
the 2071–2099 period to be about 4.5°C (Figure 3.3. and Figure 3.4).
The regional maps (Figure 3.5) show rather uniform patterns 
of summer warming, with regions in the interior of the continent 
generally projected to see a somewhat stronger temperature increase. 
Along the Atlantic coast of Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina, the 
warming remains limited, with about 0.5–1.5°C in a 2°C world 
and 2–4°C in a 4°C world. The central South American region 
of Paraguay, northern Argentina, and southern Bolivia will see 
more pronounced warming, up to 2.5°C in a 2°C world and up to 
6°C in a 4°C world by 2071–2099. Similar levels of warming are 
projected for eastern Colombia and southern Venezuela.
The normalized warming (that is, the warming expressed in 
terms of the local year-to-year natural variability—see Appendix) is 
plotted in the lower panels of Figure 3.4. The normalized warming 
indicates how unusual the projected warming is compared to the 
natural fluctuations a particular region has experienced in the past, 
here the period 1951–1980 (Coumou and Robinson 2013; Hansen 
et al. 2012; Mora and Frazier et al. 2013). The tropics will see the 
strongest increase in normalized monthly summer temperatures 
since historic year-to-year fluctuations are relatively small. In the 
eastern part of the equatorial region between 15°S and 15°N, monthly 
temperatures will shift by 3–4 standard deviations in a 2°C world 
and by 6–7 standard deviations in a 4°C world. A shift of 3–4 stan-
dard deviations implies that an average monthly temperature in the 
future will be as warm as the most extreme monthly temperatures 
experienced today (i.e., events in the tail of the current distribution). 
A shift twice as large (i.e., 6–7 standard deviations) implies that 
extremely cold summer months by the end of the 21st century will 
be warmer than the warmest months today. Thus, in a 4°C world, 
monthly summer temperatures in tropical South America will move 
to a new climatic regime by the end of the century. Subtropical 
regions in the south (northern Argentina) and the north (Mexico) 
are expected to see a much less pronounced shift. Nevertheless, 
a shift by at least 1-sigma (in a 2°C world) or 2-sigma (in a 4°C 
world) is projected to occur here over the 21st century. 
3.3.2 Heat Extremes
Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 show a strong increase in the frequency 
of austral summer months (DJF) warmer than 3-sigma and 5-sigma 
(see Appendix) over LAC by the end of the century (2071–2099). The 
tropics, which are characterized by relatively small natural variability, 
will see the largest increase in such threshold-exceeding extremes. 
Especially along the tropical coasts, including Peru, Ecuador, and 
Colombia, summer month heat extremes will become much more 
frequent, consistent with the large shift in the normalized temperature 
distribution here (see Figure 3.5). The 5-sigma events, which are 
absent under present-day climate conditions, will emerge in these 
countries even in a 2°C world, and are projected to occur in roughly 
20 percent of summer months. At the same time, 3-sigma events, 
which are extremely rare today, will become the new norm (i.e., this 
threshold will be exceeded in roughly half of the summer months 
during 2071–2099). In a 4°C world, almost all summer months will 
be warmer than 3-sigma and, in fact, most will be warmer than 
5-sigma as well (70 percent). Thus, under this scenario, the climate 
in tropical South America will have shifted to a new hot regime. 
Compared to the tropics, the subtropical regions in the north 
(Mexico) and south (Uruguay, Argentina, and southern Chile) 
Figure 3.3: Temperature projections for the Latin American 
and Caribbean land area  compared to the 1951–1980 
baseline for the multi-model mean (thick line) and individual 
models (thin lines) under RCP2.6 (2°C world) and RCP8.5 (4°C 
world) for the months of DJF.
The multi-model mean has been smoothed to give the climatological trend. 
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Figure 3.4: Multi-model mean temperature anomaly for Latin America and the Caribbean for RCP2.6 (2°C world, left) and RCP8.5 
(4°C world, right) for the austral summer months (DJF). Temperature anomalies in degrees Celsius (top row) are averaged over the 
time period 2071–2099 relative to 1951–1980, and normalized by the local standard deviation (bottom row). 
are projected to see a more moderate increase in the frequency 
of threshold exceeding extremes. In fact, in a 2°C world, 5-sigma 
events will remain absent and 3-sigma events will still be rare (less 
than 10 percent of summer months). In a 4°C world, however, a 
substantial increase in frequency is projected. In most subtropi-
cal regions, at least half of all summer months are expected to be 
warmer than 3-sigma by 2071–2099 (i.e., this will have become 
the new norm). Furthermore, 5-sigma events will also emerge 
and occur typically in about 20 percent of summer months over 
subtropical regions.
The strong increase in frequency of summer months warmer 
than 3- and 5-sigma in the tropics, as reported here, is quantitatively 
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Figure 3.5: Multi-model mean of the percentage of austral summer months (DJF) in the time period 2071–2099 with temperatures 
greater than 3-sigma (top row) and 5-sigma (bottom row) for scenario RCP2.6 (2°C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4°C world, right) over 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
consistent with published results from analyses using the full 
CMIP5 dataset of climate projections (Coumou and Robinson 2013; 
Sillmann et al. 2013a; b). In addition, minimum night-time and 
maximum day-time temperatures in the summer are projected to 
increase by 1–2°C in a 2°C world and by 5–6°C in a 4°C world 
(Sillmann et al. 2013b), in good agreement with the projected 
seasonal mean temperatures in Figure 3.3. 
The duration of warm spells is projected to increase most in the 
tropics—already by 60–90 days in a 2°C world and by 250–300 days 
in a 4°C world. In the tropics, temperatures experienced during the 
10 percent warmest summer nights of the 1961–1990 period will 
occur most nights (50–70 percent) in a 2°C world and almost all 
nights (90–100 percent) in a 4°C world by the end of the century 
(Sillmann et al. 2013b).
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Figure 3.6: Multi-model mean and individual models of 
the percentage of Latin American and Caribbean land area 
warmer than 3-sigma (top) and 5-sigma (bottom) during 
austral summer months (DJF) for scenarios RCP2.6 (2°C 
world) and RCP8.5 (4°C world).
Changes in heat extremes in subtropical regions are less dramatic 
but nevertheless pronounced. In the Southern Hemisphere subtrop-
ics, the length of warm spells increases by roughly 0–15 days (2°C 
world) or 30–90 days (4°C world). In the Northern Hemisphere 
subtropics (Mexico) these values roughly double, but they are still 
less than the increase in the tropics (Sillmann et al. 2013b). Night-
time temperatures experienced during the 10 percent warmest austral 
summer nights in 1961–1990 will occur in roughly 30 percent of 
nights (2°C world) and 65 percent of nights (4°C world).
3.3.3 Regional Precipitation Projections
Projected changes in annual and seasonal precipitation (see Appen-
dix) are plotted in Figure 3.7 for the LAC region for 2071–2099 
relative to 1951–1980. Note that projections are given as percent-
age changes compared to the 1951–1980 climatology and thus, 
especially over dry regions, large relative changes do not neces-
sarily reflect large absolute changes. In general, in a 2°C world 
these changes are relatively small (+/–10 percent) and models 
exhibit substantial disagreement on the direction of change over 
most land regions. With a more pronounced climatic signal (i.e., a 
4°C world, RCP8.5), the models converge in their projections over 
most regions, but inter-model uncertainty remains over some areas 
(hatched shading in the maps). Nevertheless, a well-defined pat-
tern of change in annual precipitation can be extracted for defined 
sub regions. For example, tropical countries on the Pacific coast 
(Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia) are projected to see an increase 
in annual mean precipitation of about 30 percent. This enhanced 
rainfall occurs year-round and can be detected in both the austral 
winter and summer seasons. Similarly, Uruguay on the Atlantic 
coast (and bordering regions in Brazil and Argentina) are projected 
to get wetter. Again, this increase in annual rainfall is year-round, 
though it is most pronounced during the summer (DJF). Regions 
which are projected to become drier include Patagonia (southern 
Argentina and Chile), Mexico, and central Brazil. These patterns 
indicate that, under climate change, most dry regions may get 
drier and most wet regions may get wetter in the future (but see 
Greve et al. 2014 for a discussion of this concept for past climate). 
The exception is central Brazil (i.e. the region from 0–20°S and 
50–65°W), which contains the southeastern part of the Amazon 
rainforest. The annual mean precipitation here is projected to drop 
by 20 percent in a 4°C world by the end of the century. This drop 
in annual rainfall is entirely due to a strong and robust decrease 
in winter (JJA) precipitation (–50 percent), with essentially no 
change in summer (DJF) precipitation. In fact, this reduction in 
winter precipitation appears already in a 2°C world. 
These projected changes in annual and seasonal temperatures 
generally agree well with those provided by the IPCC AR5 based 
on the full set of CMIP5 climate models (Collins et al. 2013). 
However, there is one important difference in that the full set of 
CMIP5 models shows significant JJA Amazon drying over northern 
Brazil only. Over central Brazil, the multi-model mean of the full 
set of CMIP5 models projects drying, as also seen in Figure 3.7, 
but the magnitude of change is small. Instead, significant drying 
over the full Amazon region primarily occurs during austral spring 
(September-October-November). 
3.3.4 Extreme Precipitation and Droughts
Analysis of the observational record since the 1950s indicates a 
robust increase in overall precipitation and in intensity of extreme 
precipitation events for South America, particularly over southern 
South America and the Amazon region (Skansi et al. 2013). Long-
term trends in meteorological droughts are not statistically robust 
over 1950–2010. Over the recent decade, however, two severe 
droughts (2005 and 2010) have affected the Amazon, likely con-
nected to an anomalous warm tropical North Atlantic (Marengo 
et al. 2011; Zeng et al. 2008). 
Dai (2012) finds a statistical significant increase in drought 
conditions for Central America and the Caribbean for the 1950–2010 
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Figure 3.7: Multi-model mean of the percentage change in austral summer (DJF, top), winter (JJA, middle) and annual (bottom) 
precipitation for RCP2.6 (2°C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4°C world, right) for Latin America and the Caribbean by 2071–2099 relative 
to 1951–1980.
Hatched areas indicate uncertain results, with two or more out of five models disagreeing on the direction of change. 
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period, although the significance of this trend depends on the refer-
ence period and the formulation of the underlying drought index 
(Trenberth et al. 2014). Fu et al. (2013) report a significant increase 
in the length of the dry season over southern Amazonia since 1979.
Using an ensemble of CMIP5 models, Kharin et al. (2013) inves-
tigated extreme precipitation events based on annual maximum 
daily precipitation with 20-year return values. In a 4°C world, 
these events are found to intensify by about 25 percent over LAC 
with a large uncertainty range.31 In addition, the return time of a 
20-year extreme precipitation event from the 1985–2005 period 
would reduce to about 6 years by the end of the 21st century 
(2081–2100) in a 4°C world (Kharin et al. 2013).
These increases are not, however, homogeneous over the full 
continent. This is consistent with the variable seasonal precipita-
tion projections in Figure 3.7. While little-to-not statistically sig-
nificant, an increase in frequency is projected for the Caribbean, 
Meso-America, Southern Argentina, and Chile, and hotspots with 
extreme precipitation increases of more than 30 percent are pro-
jected in the Serra do Espinhaco in Brazil, the Pampas region in 
Argentina, and the Pacific coastline of Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia 
(Kharin et al. 2013). The latter may be related to an increase in 
frequency of future extreme El Niño events (Cai et al. 2014; Power 
et al. 2013). These regions are also found to show the strongest 
rise in compound maximum 5-day precipitation (which is most 
relevant for flooding events) by the end of the 21st century in a 4°C 
world (Sillmann et al. 2013b). Increases in extreme precipitation 
in southern Brazil and northern Argentina are in line with results 
from regional climate models (Marengo et al. 2009) and might 
be dominated by intensification of the South American monsoon 
system (Jones and Carvalho 2013). Projections of extreme precipi-
tation for Meso-America and the Caribbean discussed above do 
not comprehensively account for the risk of extreme precipitation 
related to tropical cyclones (that are discussed in Section 3.3.6, 
Tropical Cyclones/Hurricanes). In a 2°world, changes in heavy 
precipitation would be greatly reduced and barely significant over 
most parts of the continent. 
While an increase in extreme precipitation represents a poten-
tial threat for some regions, increase in duration and intensity of 
droughts might represent the bigger threat over all of Latin America 
and the Caribbean. An increase and intensification in meteorological 
droughts is projected for large parts of South and Central America 
in a 4°C world (Sillmann et al. 2013b), although large model 
uncertainties remain in particular for Central America (Orlowsky 
and Seneviratne 2013). A more comprehensive analysis of future 
droughts accounting for the effects of runoff and evaporation as 
well as local soil and vegetation properties was undertaken by Dai 
(2012). He found that the Amazon basin, the full land area of Brazil 
31 The lower and upper limits of the central 50 percent inter-model range are 14 and 
42 percent respectively.
except the southern coast, southern Chile, and Central America, 
and in particular northern Mexico, is expected to be under severe 
to extreme drought conditions relative to the present climate by 
the end of the 21st century under the RCP4.5. These results are 
confirmed by a multi-model impact analysis under a 4°C scenario 
that also reveals a strong increase in drought risk in the Caribbean, 
although uncertainties remain substantial (Prudhomme et al. 2013).
The increase in future drought risk in Central America and the 
Caribbean is generally related to an extension and intensification 
of the so-called midsummer drought period (Rauscher et al. 2008). 
While an overall reduction in precipitation during the dry season is 
robustly projected by regional and global models alike (Campbell 
et al. 2011; Karmalkar et al. 2013; Taylor et al. 2013), it is not clear 
if this will lead to an increase in meteorological drought conditions 
(e.g., an increase in the number of consecutive dry days) (Hall 
et al. 2012). This illustrates the added value of a comprehensive 
impact model analysis, as undertaken by Prudhomme et al. (2013), 
that accounts for the full change in the regional water cycle in 
investigating future drought risk. 
Changes over the Amazon basin and eastern Brazil are found 
to be particularly pronounced during the dry season (from July to 
September), which amplifies the risk of large-scale forest degradation; 
this contrasts with Central America, Venezuela and southern Chile, 
where the drought risk is projected to increase during the austral sum-
mer (Prudhomme et al. 2013). Drought risks are found to be strongly 
scenario-dependent and to be much less pronounced in a 2°C world, 
in particular for Meso-America and the Caribbean; a substantial risk 
remains for South America under this scenario (Prudhomme et al. 2013).
In the Amazon region, climate change is not the only anthropo-
genic interference expected over the decades to come; deforestation 
will be at least equally important. The link between large-scale 
deforestation and reduced precipitation is well established (e.g., 
Davidson et al. 2012; Medvigy et al. 2011; Runyan 2012), and Bagley 
et al. (2014) used a regional climate model to demonstrate that 
deforestation might have amplified the severe droughts over the last 
decade. However, none of the projections given above accounts for 
the possible adverse effects of deforestation and forest degradation on 
the climate of the Amazon region, which, in the presence of possible 
self-amplifying feedbacks between reduced forest cover and extreme 
droughts, represent a substantial risk of large-scale Amazon dieback 
(see Section 3.4.5, Amazon Rainforest Dieback and Tipping Point).
3.3.5 Aridity
Apart from a reduction in precipitation, warming can also cause 
a region to shift toward more arid conditions as enhanced surface 
temperatures trigger more evapotranspiration—thereby drying the 
soil. This long-term balance between water supply and demand is 
captured by the aridity index (AI), which is shown in Figure 3.9 for 
the Latin American region. The AI is defined as the total annual 
precipitation divided by the annual potential evapotranspiration 
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(see Appendix); it fundamentally determines whether ecosystems 
and agricultural systems are able to thrive in a certain area. A 
decrease in the value of the AI thus indicates that water becomes 
more scarce (i.e., more arid conditions), with areas classified as 
hyper-arid, arid, semi-arid, and sub-humid as specified in Table 3.4. 
Potential evapotranspiration is a measure of the amount of water 
a representative crop type would need over a year to grow, (i.e. 
a standardized measure of water demand; see Appendix). Under 
most circumstances, changes in potential evaporation are governed 
by changes in temperature. 
Changes in annual-mean potential evapotranspiration (Fig-
ure 3.8) broadly follow those of absolute warming (Figure 3.4), 
with regions in the continental interior generally experiencing 
the strongest increase. Thus, though potential evapotranspiration 
depends on several meteorological variables, it seems primarily 
driven by future temperature changes. The signal is weak in a 2°C 
world, with relative changes in potential evapotranspiration smaller 
than 20 percent everywhere except for some isolated regions in the 
continental interior. In a 4°C world, changes become much more 
pronounced, with countries like Paraguay and Bolivia projected to 
see an increase in potential evapotranspiration of up to 50 percent. 
Consistent with this result, these regions are also projected to see 
the strongest absolute warming (Figure 3.4). 
Over almost all of the LAC land area, the multi-model mean 
projects more arid conditions under future climate change. Still, 
over extended areas, notably near the equator, at the Pacific tropical 
coast (Peru), and at the sub-tropical Atlantic coast (southern Brazil, 
Uruguay, and northern Argentina), the AI changes little and mod-
els disagree on the direction of change. Thus, there is substantial 
model uncertainty in these regions and no robust statements can 
be made about whether conditions will become more or less arid. A 
prime reason for this is that both annual precipitation and potential 
evapotranspiration in these regions have upward trends, and it is 
the relative magnitude of these trends which determines whether 
a region becomes more or less arid. In other words, it is unclear 
whether or not warming-driven drying outpaces the increase in 
annual precipitation projected for these regions.
Outside these uncertain regions, the LAC land area is projected to 
become more arid other than for an isolated region in the southern 
tip of Chile. Again three major drying regions can be identified: 
(1) Northern Hemisphere subtropics (Mexico); (2) the interior of 
the South American continent (southern Amazonia, Bolivia, and 
Paraguay); and (3) central Chile and Patagonia. Over the first two 
regions, the AI is projected to decrease by up to 20 percent in a 2°C 
world and up to 40 percent in a 4°C world. For the third region, 
the decrease in AI is especially pronounced in a 4°C world, drop-
ping up to 60 percent (note that this region is already arid today).
The shift in AI in Figure 3.9 causes some regions to be clas-
sified in a different aridity class (see Table 3.4). The total area of 
land classified as either hyper-arid, arid, or semi-arid is projected 
to grow from about 33 percent in 1951–1980 to 36 percent in a 2°C 
world (i.e., an increase of nearly 10 percent) and to 41 percent in 
a 4°C world (i.e., an increase of nearly 25 percent).
3.3.6 Tropical Cyclones/Hurricanes
In Central America and the Caribbean, tropical cyclones occur 
regularly and have severe impacts, especially when making landfall; 
Figure 3.8: Multi-model mean of the percentage change in the annual-mean of monthly potential evapotranspiration for RCP2.6 
(2°C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4°C world, right) for Latin America and the Caribbean by 2071–2099 relative to 1951–1980.
                               
Hatched areas indicate uncertainty regions with two or more out of five models disagreeing on the direction of change. 
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the impacts on marine ecosystems, transport, and infrastructure 
can also be severe. Strobl (2012), for instance, derived an average 
0.83 percent drop in economic output after tropical cyclones strikes 
in this region, with big variations between countries.32 
The energy of tropical cyclones is derived from the ocean surface 
and lower atmosphere. Warming, along with increased greenhouse 
32 Some individual grid cells have noticeably different values than their direct neighbors 
(e.g., on the border between Peru and Bolivia). This is due to the fact that the Aridity 
index is defined as a fraction of total annual precipitation divided by potential evapo-
transpiration (see Appendix). It therefore behaves in a strongly non-linear fashion, 
and thus year-to-year fluctuations can be large. Since averages are calculated over a 
relatively small number of model simulations, this can result in these local jumps.
gas concentrations and/or aerosol concentrations, increases the 
amount of heat that is absorbed by the atmosphere and can increase 
the potential for tropical cyclones to form. Changes in the frequency 
and intensity of tropical storms are modulated, however, by other 
factors, including vertical wind shear and humidity. Of particular 
importance is the vertical wind shear (i.e., the difference between 
wind speeds near the surface and higher up in the troposphere). 
High wind shear disrupts the process of tropical cyclone forma-
tion and intensification, so that increases in wind shear counter 
increases in sea surface temperature—impacting tropical cyclone 
formation and intensity. El Niño events (see Section 2.3.2, El-Niño/
Southern Oscillation) tend to enhance wind shear over the Gulf of 
Mexico and the Caribbean Sea and thus suppress Atlantic tropical 
cyclones (Aiyyer and Thorncroft 2011; Arndt et al. 2010; Kim et al. 
2011). On the other hand, El Niño events have been shown to 
increase tropical cyclone activity in the eastern North Pacific 
(Kim et al. 2011; Martinez-Sanchez and Cavazos 2014). Obser-
vational evidence, however, suggests atmospheric patterns tend 
to steer tropical cyclones away from the Mexican coast during 
El Niño years (and toward the coast in La Niña years), so that 
the net effect on the Pacific coastlines of the Americas remains 
unclear. In both regions, changes in the El-Niño/Southern-
Oscillation (ENSO) due to climate change and the associated 
uncertainties affect tropical cyclone projections. In addition to 
such dynamic changes, thermodynamic processes alone can also 
work to suppress tropical cyclone formation and intensification 
(Mallard et al. 2013).
Figure 3.9: Multi-model mean of the percentage change in the aridity index under RCP2.6 (2°C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4°C 
world, right) for Latin America and the Caribbean by 2071–2099 relative to 1951–1980.
                               
Hatched areas indicate uncertain results, with two or more out of five models disagreeing on the direction of change. Note that a negative change cor-
responds to a shift to more arid conditions.32 
Table 3.4: Multi-model mean of the percentage of land area 
in Latin America and the Caribbean which is classified as 
hyper-arid, arid, semi-arid and sub-humid for 1951–1980 and 
2071–2099 for both the low (2°C world, RCP2.6) and high (4°C 






Hyper-Arid 8.6 10.1 12.8
Arid 10.3 11.2 12.7
Semi-Arid 14.3 14.8 15.9
Sub-Humid 5.5 5.8 6.0
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These factors make projecting changes in tropical cyclone 
frequency and intensity difficult. The recent IPCC WGI AR5 report 
found in relation to observed changes that “there is low confidence 
in attribution of changes in tropical cyclone activity to human influ-
ence owing to insufficient observational evidence, lack of physical 
understanding of the links between anthropogenic drivers of cli-
mate and tropical cyclone activity, and the low level of agreement 
between studies as to the relative importance of internal variability, 
and anthropogenic and natural forcings” (Bindoff et al. 2013).
Observational records show little or no historical global trend 
in tropical cyclone frequency or intensity, in particular in light of 
uncertainties resulting from the potential undercounting of tropical 
cyclones in early parts of the record predating satellite observations 
(before about 1970). The North Atlantic, however, is an exception. 
Tropical cyclone frequency has increased in the North Atlantic 
sharply over the past 20–30 years, but uncertainty is large over 
longer time-periods (Bindoff et al. 2013). Emanuel (2008) noted an 
increase in the Power Dissipation Index (a combination of frequency 
and intensity) of North Atlantic tropical cyclones over a 1949–2004 
observational period. Using a new record of observations, Kossin 
et al. (2013) showed a strong and statistically significant increase 
in lifetime maximum intensity of tropical cyclones over the North 
Atlantic of 8 m.s–1 per decade, over the period 1979–2010, particu-
larly for mid- to high-intensity storms. This can be compared to the 
median lifetime maximum intensity of around 50 m.s–1 of tropical 
cyclones across the region in this historical time series. Such observed 
changes were shown to be linked to both anthropogenic climate 
change and internal climate variability (Camargo et al. 2012; Villarini 
and Vecchi 2013; Wang and Wu 2013). Differential warming of the 
tropical Atlantic, with historically observed warming higher than 
average for the tropics, tends to enhance tropical cyclone intensi-
fication in this region (Knutson et al. 2013). No significant trends 
have been observed over the Eastern North Pacific (Kossin et al. 
2013). In general however, tropical cyclones haven been observed 
to migrate polewards (Kossin et al. 2014).
In the long term, model simulations from a range of models 
lead to the expectation that tropical cyclone frequency will not 
be affected much by continued global warming but that mean 
intensity, as well as the frequency of the most intense tropical 
cyclones, are projected to increase (Knutson et al. 2010; Tory et al. 
2013). IPCC AR5 WGI found that:
“Projections for the 21st century indicate that it is likely 
that the global frequency of tropical cyclones will either 
decrease or remain essentially unchanged, concurrent 
with a likely increase in both global mean tropical cyclone 
maximum wind speed and rain rates . . . The influence of 
future climate change on tropical cyclones is likely to vary 
by region, but there is low confidence in region-specific 
projections. The frequency of the most intense storms 
will more likely than not increase substantially in some 
basins.” (Stocker et al. 2013)
Short-term variability in tropical cyclones is large and GCM 
resolution too low to resolve high-intensity tropical cyclone struc-
tures. Projections therefore rely on proxies of tropical cyclone char-
acteristics, or a cascade of low- to high-resolution models. Using 
CMIP5 models (50 percent uncertainty range across 17 GCMs), 
Villarini and Vecchi (2013) projected that the Power Dissipation 
Index would increase by 100–150 percent in a 2°C world over the 
North Atlantic. A considerably larger increase and a much wider 
range of about 125–275 percent were projected for a 4°C world. 
Bender et al. (2010) used a variety of models to initialize a very 
high-resolution operational hurricane-prediction model, noting an 
increase of 80 percent in the frequency of the strongest category 4 
and 5 Atlantic tropical cyclones in a 4°C world (compared to the 
present.) Knutson et al. (2013) also found an 80 percent increase 
in the strongest category tropical cyclones for the same scenario 
and class of models and around a 40 percent increase for a lower 
emissions scenario and for the most recent generation of global 
models included in IPCC AR5 (2013b) at roughly 1.5–2.5°C warm-
ing (early and late 21st century RCP4.5). The largest increase (see 
Figure 3.10) occurred in the Western Atlantic, north of 20°N (i.e., 
to the north of Haiti), a pattern confirmed by Emanuel (2013). 
Using a very different statistical downscaling method, Grinsted et al. 
(2013) projected a twofold to sevenfold increase in the frequency 
of “Katrina magnitude events” regarding storm surge (not wind 
speed) for a 1°C rise in global temperature. For context: in terms 
of wind speeds, the 2005 Gulf of Mexico tropical cyclone Katrina 
was a class 5 tropical cyclone.
The eastern North Pacific is less well represented in the scien-
tific literature. Based on variations of one high-resolution model, 
Murakami et al. (2012, 2011) projected no significant trends for 
this region under future climate change. By contrast, Emanuel 
(2013), using an ensemble of 6 different CMIP5 models, projected 
an increase in frequency of tropical cyclones along the Pacific coast 
of Central America (particularly large near the coast of southeast 
Mexico); the author notes, however, that the method does not 
capture well the currently observed storm frequency in this region.
With projected increased intensity and frequency of the most 
intense storms, and increased atmospheric moisture content, 
Knutson et al. (2013) estimated an increase of 10 percent in the 
rainfall intensity averaged over a 200 km radius from the tropical 
cyclone center for the Atlantic, and an increase of 20–30 percent 
for the tropical cyclone’s inner core, by the end of the 21st century 
for roughly 2.5–3.5°C global warming. This confirms the earlier 
results of Knutson et al. (2010) reported in IPCC AR5 WGI (2013b). 
This effect would greatly increase the risk of freshwater flooding 
from tropical cyclones making landfall.
The projections above focus on changes in frequency of tropi-
cal cyclones and wind and rainfall intensity. Colbert et al. (2013) 
projected a shift in tropical cyclone migration tracks in the tropi-
cal North Atlantic, with more frequent ocean recurving tropical 
cyclones and fewer cyclones moving straight westward toward land. 
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Figure 3.10: Change in average rate of occurrence of Category 4 and 5 tropical cyclones per hurricane season (August–October) 
at about 2.5°C warming globally above pre-industrial levels by the end of the 21st century compared to the present-day.
Source: Knutson et al. (2013). © American Meteorological Society. Used with permission.
Together with changes in genesis area, but assuming constant tropi-
cal cyclone frequency, this lead to a projected increase in tropical 
cyclones per season in the central Atlantic and a decrease in the 
Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. Murakami and Wang (2010), 
however, found no change in trajectories. Current literature does 
not provide evidence for a (change in) risk of synchronized landfall 
of different tropical cyclones (e.g., in Central America from both 
the Pacific and the Atlantic). While individual tropical cyclones 
may not be strong, their compound impact may be more severe. 
Moreover, any increase in trend of Pacific and Atlantic storms 
(not necessarily cyclones) making landfall simultaneously would 
potentially entail more damaging impacts than increasing frequency 
of any individual Pacific or Atlantic cyclone alone.
In summary, observations show historical positive trends in 
tropical cyclone frequency and strength over the North Atlantic 
but not over the eastern North Pacific. While Atlantic tropical 
cyclones are suppressed by the El Niño phase of ENSO, they are 
enhanced in the eastern North Pacific. Under further anthropogenic 
climate change, the frequency of high-intensity tropical cyclones 
is generally projected to increase over the western North Atlantic 
by 40 percent for 1.5–2.5°C global warming and by 80 percent in 
a 4°C world. Global warming around 3°C is associated with an 
average 10 percent increase in rainfall intensity averaged over a 
200 km radius from the tropical cyclone center. Although there is 
some evidence from multiple-model studies for a projected increase 
in frequency of tropical cyclones along the Pacific coast of Central 
America, overall projections in this region are currently inconclusive. 
3.3.7 Regional Sea-level Rise
Regional sea-level rise will vary in a large and geographically diverse 
region such as Latin America and the Caribbean, and will depend 
on the climate-driven factors of local heat uptake of the ocean, 
ocean current changes, and the far-reaching influence of changing 
gravity from the ice sheets. In LAC, regional sea-level rise largely 
reflects the rise in global mean sea level. Still, consistent regional 
features exist across both the 1.5°C and 4°C world scenarios in 
both the median and high estimate (Figure 3.11, Table 3.5). These 
features are more pronounced for stronger overall sea-level rise. 
Table 3.5: Sea-level rise between 1986–2005 and 2081–2100 
for the RCP2.6 (1.5°C world) and RCP8.5 (4°C world) in 
selected locations of the LAC region (in meters).
RCP2.6 (1.5°C WORLD) RCP8.5 (4°C WORLD)
Acapulco 0.38 (0.23, 0.61) 0.6 (0.42, 1.01)
Antofagasta 0.37 (0.22, 0.58) 0.58 (0.42, 0.98)
Barranquilla 0.39 (0.22, 0.65) 0.65 (0.43, 1.12)
Buenos Aires 0.34 (0.24, 0.52) 0.56 (0.45, 0.97)
Cristobal 0.39 (0.22, 0.65) 0.66 (0.44, 1.07)
Guayaquil 0.39 (0.25, 0.62) 0.62 (0.46, 1.04)
Lima 0.38 (0.24, 0.61) 0.6 (0.45, 1.02)
Port-au-Prince 0.38 (0.21, 0.61)   0.61 (0.41, 1.04)
Puerto Williams 0.27 (0.19, 0.37) 0.46 (0.38, 0.65)
Recife 0.39 (0.23, 0.65) 0.63 (0.41, 1.14)
Rio de Janeiro 0.37 (0.24, 0.61) 0.62 (0.46, 1.11)
Tumaco 0.38 (0.24, 0.6) 0.61 (0.44, 1.01)
Valparaiso 0.35 (0.21, 0.54) 0.55 (0.41, 0.91)
Numbers in parentheses indicate low and high bounds (see Section 6.2, 
Sea-Level Rise Projections for an explanation of the 1.5° world).
9099_CH03.pdf   53 11/18/14   9:00 AM
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CONFRONTING THE NEW CLIMATE NORMAL
54
Sea-level rise is projected to be higher at the Atlantic coast 
than at the Pacific coast. Valparaiso is projected to benefit from 
this effect (median estimate: 0.55 m for a 4°C world), where 
southeasterly trade wind intensification over the Southern Pacific 
and associated upwelling of cold water (Merrifield and Maltrud 
2011; Timmermann et al. 2010) lead to below-average thermoste-
ric sea-level rise (Figure 3.13). In contrast, Recife on the Atlantic 
coast of Brazil is projected to experience above-average sea-level 
rise (median estimate: 0.63 m for a 4°C world). A similar rise 
is projected for the Rio de Janeiro region (Figure 3.11) (median 
Figure 3.11: Patterns of regional sea-level rise.
Median (left column) and high (right column) estimates of projected regional sea-level rise for the RCP2.6 scenario (1.5°C world, top row) and the RCP8.5 
scenario (4°C world, bottom row) for the period 2081–2100 relative to the reference period 1986–2005. Associated global mean rise is indicated in the 
panel titles. Representative cities are denoted by black dots and discussed in the text with numbers provided in Table 3.5. 
estimate: 0.62 m for a 4°C world), where a large number of people 
are at risk (Nicoldi and Mueller Petermann 2010).
Sea-level rise is enhanced at low latitudes due to both increased 
ocean heat uptake in the region (Figure 3.12; middle) and the 
gravity-induced pattern of ice sheets and glaciers (Figure 3.12 bot-
tom). As an example, Guayaquil on the Pacific Coast of Ecuador is 
projected to experience a sea-level rise of 0.62 m (median estimate; 
low estimate: 0.46 m; high estimate: 1.04 m) of sea-level rise in 
a 4°C world (Figure 3.13). Guayaquil is among the most vulner-
able coastal cities in terms of relative GDP losses (Hallegatte et al. 
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Figure 3.12: Regional anomaly pattern and its contributions in 
the median RCP8.5 scenario (4°C world).
Total sea-level rise (top), steric-dynamic (middle), and land-ice (bottom) 
contributions to sea-level rise, shown as anomalies with respect to the 
global mean sea-level rise. Global mean contributions to be added on top 
of the spatial anomalies are indicated in the panel titles.
2013). In contrast, Puerto Williams (Chile) at the southern tip 
of the South American continent is projected to experience only 
0.46 m (median estimate for a a 4°C world) (low estimate: 0.38 m; 
high estimate: 0.65 m). The upper bound differs between the 
two locations since it is largely determined by the risk of high 
ice-sheet-driven sea-level rise.
Port-Au-Prince (Haiti) is projected to experience 0.61 m (low 
estimate: 0.41 m, high estimate: 1.04 m) of sea-level rise in a 4°C 
world (Figure 3.13); it serves as a typical example for sea-level 
rise in other Caribbean islands. The sea-level rise at the conti-
nental Caribbean Coast exceeds the projection for the Caribbean 
islands (Barranquilla, median estimate: 0.65; low estimate: 0.43; 
and high estimate: 1.12 in a 4°C world). The difference may be 
linked to a weakening of the Caribbean Current that is connected 
to the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation33  (Pardaens et al. 
2011). The high upper bounds are due to the strong influence of 
the Antarctic ice sheet.
The ocean is predicted to warm, with high rates in the Southern 
Ocean off Buenos Aires (Kuhlbrodt and Gregory 2012). The coastal 
waters are, however, dominated by the cold Malvinas Current, a 
branch of the Antarctic Circumpolar Current (ACC). Since minor 
warming is projected for the ACC and the Malvinas Current, the 
strong warming signal in the Southern Ocean does not lead to 
additional sea-level rise at the Rio de la Plata estuary—which is 
projected to rise slower than the global mean (Buenos Aires, median 
estimate: 0.56 m; low estimate: 0.42 m; and high estimate: 1.03 m 
in a 4°C world). Sea-level rise in the region will be influenced by 
the future strength of the Brazil and Malvinas Currents and the 
position of their confluence zone (Lumpkin and Garzoli 2011).
3.4 Regional Impacts
3.4.1 Glacial Retreat and Snowpack Changes
3.4.1.1 Topography of Glaciers in the Andes
The Andes are the longest continental mountain range in the world, 
stretching about 7,000 km along the coast of South America. There 
are major ice masses in the Patagonian Andes and on Terra del 
Fuego in the Southern Andes. A much smaller amount of ice (about 
217 Gt), covering an area of about 4,900 km2, is stored in the Cen-
tral Andes; this region hosts more than 99 percent of the world’s 
glaciers that are located in tropical latitudes (Tropical Andes). 
These glaciers exist at high altitudes between 4,000 and 6,500 m 
above sea level and are of crucial importance for the livelihood of 
the local populations as they act as critical buffers against highly 
seasonal precipitation and provide water during the dry season for 
33 This ocean current system transports a substantial amount of heat energy from 
the tropics and Southern Hemisphere toward the North Atlantic, where the heat is 
then transferred to the atmosphere. Changes in this ocean circulation could have a 
profound impact on many aspects of the global climate system.
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Figure 3.13: Sea level projections for selected cities.
Time series for sea-level rise for the two scenarios, RCP2.6 (1.5°C world, blue) and RCP8.5 (4°C world, green). Median estimates are given as full thick 
lines and the lower and upper bound given as shading. Full thin lines are global median sea-level rise with dashed lines as lower and upper bound. Vertical 
and horizontal black lines indicate the reference period and reference (zero) level. 
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domestic, agricultural, and industrial use. In addition, the water 
and energy supplies (see Section 3.4.11) of the capital cities of 
Lima (Peru), La Paz (Bolivia), and Quito (Ecuador) depend on 
the glacial melt water (see Section 3.4.2, Water Resources, Water 
Security, and Floods). Andean snowpack is also a crucial natural 
water resource, particularly in the semi-arid regions of Southern 
South America (Masiokas et al. 2012, 2013).
3.4.1.2 Current Situation and Observed Changes
Characteristics of Tropical Glaciers
Tropical glaciers are particularly threatened by climate change due 
to their high altitude, the high level of radiation, and the tropical 
climate dynamics. Observations have shown that the variability 
of the surface temperature of the Pacific Ocean is the govern-
ing factor, explaining the dramatic glacier recession of the 20th 
century, although the precipitation trend has not been significant 
during that period. The impact of the ENSO phenomenon (see 
Section 2.3.2, El-Niño/Southern Oscillation) on the inter-annual 
mass balance is consequently high in the tropical glacier zone, 
with low temperatures, high precipitation, high wind speeds, high 
albedo, and a nearly balanced or positive mass balance during La 
Niña events and a strongly negative mass balance during El Niño 
events (Chevallier et al. 2011). 
Observed Glacier Recession
As a general trend, the Andean glaciers are shrinking. This is caused 
by increased melt rates, decreased accumulation, changes in the 
ice dynamics, and/or a combination of all these factors. For the 
period 1980–2011, Giesen and Oerlemans (2013) calculated, for the 
tropical glaciers, a relative volume change of 7.3 percent (39 Gt) 
with respect to a total glaciated area of 4,940 km2 (99 percent 
of which is located in the Central Andes). Over a much longer 
historical period (1901–2009) and for a larger region (account-
ing for 82 percent of all tropical glaciers), Marzeion et al. (2012) 
estimated an area reduction of glaciers of about 79±2 percent 
(15,900±500 km2), which corresponds to a volumetric ice loss 
of 90 percent (1,740 Gt). The Southern Andes contain a much 
larger ice mass of 11,430 Gt (1980) extending over a glaciated 
area of 33,700 km2. This huge ice mass decreased in volume by 
6.1 percent (695 Gt) between 1980–2011 (Giesen and Oerlemans 
2013). Over the 20th century (1901–2009), Marzeion et al. (2012) 
infer a reduction of about 32 percent in area (15,500±200 km2), 
which can be associated with a volume loss of 22±5 percent 
(1,340±290 Gt).
These global projections, however, rely on coarse resolution 
models that cannot adequately simulate glacier dynamics in the 
steep topography of the narrow mountain chain of the Andes. In 
particular, the strong recession rate of the comparably small tropical 
glaciers is likely overestimated by the global-scale methodology. 
Regional models, in contrast, can provide more comprehensive 
analyses with resolutions of up to a few hundred meters.
Rabatel et al. (2013) reviewed the various studies on the current 
state of Tropical Andes’ glaciers, considering a variety of different 
measurement techniques (e.g., monitoring of the mass balance, 
aerial photography, and remote sensing). Generally, a clear change 
in glacier evolution can be seen after the late 1970s, accelerating in 
the mid-1990s and again in the early 2000s (Figure 3.14). This is 
different from the glaciers located at mid or high latitudes, where 
accelerated melting started in the 1990s. The glaciers in the tropi-
cal Andes appear to have had more negative mass balances than 
glaciers monitored worldwide. 
In the Peruvian Andes, glacial areas have been well documented 
and multiple reports found on average a retreat of 20–35 percent 
between the 1960s and the 2000s; most of that retreat occurred 
after 1985 (Vergara et al. 2011). A similar pattern of glacial reces-
sion is found in the Bolivian Andes. A rapid decline has also been 
reported for the Ecuadorian Andes, where glaciers on Chimborazo 
shrunk by 57 percent during the period 1962–1997, while glaciers 
on the Cotopaxi and Antisana volcanoes shrunk in area during the 
period 1979–2007 by 37 percent and 33 percent respectively. For 
the Andes of Colombia, a moderate glacier area loss of 11 percent 
has been documented in the period of the 1950s to the 1990s, with 
a fourfold acceleration in retreat during the period of the 1990s to 
2000s. In Venezuela, glacial retreat has been even more dramatic, 
with a loss of about 87 percent between 1953–2003. 
Figure 3.14: Compilation of mean annual area loss rates for 
different time periods for glaciated areas between Venezuela 
and Bolivia.
The grey box around the average represents the uncertainty corresponding 
to ±1 standard deviation. Source: Rabatel et al. (2013), Figure 4.
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Although the conditions in the Southern Andes are very dif-
ferent (e.g., in terms of climate or sun angle) the trend in glacier 
retreat is obvious here as well (Figure 3.15). Lopez et al. (2010) 
investigated changes in glacier length in 72 glaciers in the Chilean 
Southern Andes (Northern and Southern Patagonian Ice Field 
and Cordillera Darwin Ice Field) between 1945–2005, based on 
aerial photographs and satellite images (ASTER, Landsat). They 
concluded that the observed general trend in glacial retreat is 
likely controlled by atmospheric warming. In the Northern Pata-
gonian Ice Field, glaciers retreated in length by 4–36 percent, in 
the Southern Patagonian Ice Field by 0–27 percent, and further 
south in the Cordillera Darwin Ice Field by 3–38 percent. However, 
glacial length fluctuations provide only limited insight into the 
imbalance of glaciers, and the large heterogeneity of glacial retreat 
is very much influenced by such local conditions as exposition, 
basin geometry, glacier dynamics, and response times. 
A different way of measuring glacier mass loss rates is by 
space gravimetry (GRACE)—by measuring the changing gravity 
field from satellites in regions with large continuous ice extent (a 
method available since 2003). For the large ice caps of Northern 
and Southern Patagonia, Ivins et al. (2011) inferred ice loss rates 
of 26±6 Gt per year between 2003–2009, which explains a total 
loss of about 154±36 Gt over six years. Jacob et al. (2012) reached 
similar estimates using the same technique, with mass balance rates 
for the period 2003–2011 of 23±9 Gt per year in the Patagonian 
glaciers and of 6±12 Gt per year in the rest of South America 
(including the tropical glaciers). However, the spatial resolution 
of about 300 km is extremely coarse and difficulties arise in dis-
tinguishing signals from hydrological storage and glacial isostatic 
adjustment (Gardner et al. 2013).
Snowpack and Snow Cover Changes
In the tropical glacier region, due to the high solar radiance, with the 
sun close to the zenith, albedo appears to be a major determinant 
in attenuating the melting process. Consequently, the frequency 
and intensity of snowfall plays a major role in determining the net 
radiation over the entire year, modulated by wet and dry seasons 
(Rabatel et al. 2013). In the subtropical Andes of Chile and western 
Argentina, where snowpack has been monitored for more than 
50 years (1951–2004), there is no significant trend over this period 
(Masiokas et al. 2006, 2012). However, the data display a marked 
inter-annual variability ranging from 6–257 percent around the 
1966–2004 mean, with a clear influence from the warm phases 
of ENSO (El Niño).
Studies about snowpack in the Southern Andes are rare. It 
can generally be stated that changes in snowpack extent magnify 
changes in the seasonality of the water availability by a reduction 
of the flows in dry season and an increase in flows in wet seasons 
(Vicuña et al. 2013).
3.4.1.3 Projections of Glacial Change
As the IPCC confirms with high confidence, glaciers worldwide 
are out of balance with current climatic conditions. Furthermore, 
it is very likely that anthropogenic forcing played a statistically 
significant role in the acceleration of the global glacier loss in the 
last decades of the 20th century (Bindoff et al. 2013). 
Various model projections for different future emissions sce-
narios indicate that glaciers will continue to shrink in the future, 
even without further temperature increases. Confidence in these 
models is supported by their ability to reproduce past observed 
glacier changes using corresponding climate observations as forc-
ing. Model validation is challenging, however, due to the scarcity 
of independent observations (currently available for only a small 
fraction of well-observed glaciers). 
In a 2°C world, Marzeion et al. (2012) expect a reduction in ice 
volume of tropical glaciers by 78–94 percent based on the period 
1986–2005. This signal is less drastic in the Southern Andes, with 
an expected 21–52 percent volume reduction of the 4,700 Gt ice 
mass by 2100 for the same warming level. Marzeion et al. (2012) 
project the amount of tropical glaciers to be lost in a 3°C world 
at 82–97 percent, very similar to the 2°C world scenario. For the 
Figure 3.15: Ice loss from outlet glaciers on the Patagonian 
Ice Field in southern South America since the Little Ice Age.
Source: Glasser et al. (2011), Figure 1.
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much larger glaciers in the Southern Andes, the same study expects 
a loss of 33–59 percent in a 3°C world. For the 21st century, with 
a warming of 3°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100, Giesen and 
Oerlemans (2013) estimate a volumetric loss of 66 percent in the 
tropical glaciers (325 Gt) and of 27 percent in the Southern Andes 
(2,930 Gt). Marzeion et al. (2012) estimate an almost complete 
deglaciation (91–100 percent) of the remaining 280 Gt tropical 
glaciers in a 4°C world (Figure 3.16.) This signal is less drastic 
in the Southern Andes, where a 44–72 percent deglaciation is 
estimated. An almost complete deglaciation for the 195 Gt tropi-
cal glaciers (93–100 percent) in a 4°C world is also projected by 
Radic´ et al. (2013). However, for the Southern Andes, the response 
is much slower, and Radic´ et al. (2013) expect 50 percent glacial 
losses (3,080 Gt). All these models use a scaling methodology 
which may overestimate the recession of the small remnant tropi-
cal glaciers. Regarding the Patagonian ice fields in the Southern 
Andes, Schaefer et al. (2013) estimate a glacial volume loss for 
the Northern Patagonian Ice Field of 590±50 Gt with 4°C global 
warming with respect to pre-industrial levels. Their projections 
of the future surface mass balance of the Northern Patagonian Ice 
Field predict a strong increase in ablation (refers to all processes 
that remove snow, ice, or water from a glacier or snowfield) from 
2050 onward and a decrease in accumulation from 2080, both due 
to increasing temperatures.
The accelerated melting will lead to increasing runoff; when 
the glacier reservoirs disappear, runoff will tend to decrease, par-
ticularly in the dry season (see Section 3.4.2, Water Resources, 
Water Security, and Floods). Following the trend in the tropical 
Andes (Poveda and Pineda 2010), this peak is expected within the 
next 50 years (Chevallier et al. 2011) if it has not already occurred 
(Baraer et al. 2012). 
3.4.1.4 Glacial Hazards
Glacier hazards are a serious risk to populations in mountain 
regions worldwide, where a general trend of glacial retreat has 
supported the formation of glacial lakes that were precariously 
dammed behind the moraines of the last maximum extent of the 
Little Ice Age in the mid-1800s. Carey et al. (2012) performed an 
interdisciplinary case study on a glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF), 
which happened in Peru’s Cordillera Blanca mountain range in 
2010. Based on their analysis, they provide advice for effective 
glacier hazard management. Hazard management is of high con-
cern, as projected warming will continue to promote glacial lake 
formation (see Box 3.4: Glacial Lake Outbursts).
3.4.1.5 Synthesis
This section indicates that glacial recession in South America 
has been significant. The tropical glaciers in the Central Andes in 
particular have lost major portions of their volume in the course 
of the 20th century. Regional studies show that the retreat has 
accelerated, with the strongest recession rates after 1985. A clear 
trend of glacial retreat is also visible for glaciers in the southern 
Andes, which have lost about 20 percent of their volume. Regional 
studies highlight that the individual recession rate is very much 
influenced by local conditions, which cause a large heterogeneity of 
rates. Space gravimetry (GRACE) confirms that the declining trend 
in glacier volume has continued in the last decade. Monitoring 
of snow cover in the high altitudes of Chile and Argentina since 
1950 shows no significant trend (i.e., possible trends are hard to 
identify in the records, since the inter-annual variability is large, 
and clearly modulated by ENSO).
The recession of the tropical glaciers in the Central Andes 
will continue as rapidly as it has in recent decades. Even for low 
or intermediate emissions scenarios inducing a global warming 
of 2–3°C above pre-industrial levels, two comprehensive stud-
ies consistently project a glacial volume loss of 78–97 percent 
(Marzeion et al. 2012; Radic´ et al. 2013). Both studies predict an 
almost complete deglaciation (93–100 percent) for a 4°C world. 
In contrast, Giesen and Oerlemans (2013) project a loss of only 
66 percent of the glacial volume of the year 2000 in the Central 
Andes with a global warming of about 3°C by 2100. Thus, irre-
spective of the temperature evolution in the next decades, large 
parts of the glaciers of the tropical Andes will be gone before the 
end of the century. In the Southern Andes, the model spread for 
the 2–3°C global warming ranges from 22–59 percent; a com-
parison for individual scenarios is difficult. In a 4°C world, three 
models project a glacier volume retreat of 44–74 percent by 2100. 
An important research gap is the lack of reliable projections for 
snowpack and snow cover changes in the Andes.
3.4.2 Water Resources, Water Security, 
and Floods
LAC has abundant overall water resources, but their distribution 
is temporally and regionally unequal (Magrin et al. 2007). ENSO-
related rainfall anomalies play a major role in many areas and 
determine much of the inter-annual discharge variability (Baraer 
Figure 3.16: Cumulative regional surface mass balance 
relative to the 1986–2005 mean from the model forced with 
CMIP5 projections up to the year 2100. SLE = Sea-level 
equivalent
Source: Modified after Marzeion et al. (2012), Figure 21. 
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et al. 2012; Cortés et al. 2011; Krol and Bronstert 2007; Mata et al. 
2001; Poveda 2004; Ronchail et al. 2005; Shi et al. 2013; Vicuña 
et al. 2010; Vuille et al. 2008). Large parts of the region are char-
acterized by inter-annual/seasonal rainfall variability through the 
oscillation of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (Garreaud et al. 
2009). Due to the unreliable rainfall, groundwater resources and 
water from glacier and snowmelt play a crucial role in supply-
ing local water (Chevallier et al. 2011; Hirata and Conicelli 2012; 
Vuille et al. 2008). 
LAC suffers from widespread floods and landslides (Maynard-
Ford et al. 2008) which result from different origins (Dilley et al. 
2005). Heavy precipitation events in the context of ENSO or tropical 
cyclones can lead to disastrous floods, especially in regions with 
steep terrains such as in the Andes and Central America (IPCC 2012; 
Mata et al. 2001; Mimura et al. 2007; Poveda et al. 2001). Coastal 
areas in the Caribbean and Central America suffer from flooding 
as a result of storm surges and tropical cyclones (Dilley et al. 2005; 
Woodruff et al. 2013). In the Andes, glacial lake outbursts pres-
ent a permanent hazard for Andean cities (Chevallier et al. 2011).
In many parts of the region there is no clear trend in future 
discharges due to the uncertainties in rainfall projections in different 
GCMs (see also Section 3.3.3, Regional Precipitation Projections) 
and the diverging results of different impact models (Bravo et al. 
2013; Davie et al. 2013; Döll and Schmied 2012; Hidalgo et al. 2013; 
Imbach et al. 2012; Krol and Bronstert 2007; Malhi et al. 2009; 
Rowell 2011; Schewe et al. 2013). 
3.4.2.1 Central America and Mexico
Milly et al. (2005) modeled a decrease in river runoff for Central 
America of up to 10 percent for the 20th century. Hidalgo et al. (2013) 
projected mean annual runoff to decrease by 10–30 percent by the 
end of the 21st century with a median of 3°C regional warming. The 
same tendencies were shown in Imbach et al. (2012), who found 
decreases in annual runoff in 61–71 percent of the area (notably in 
central Yucatan Peninsula, the mountains of Nicaragua, Honduras, 
and Guatemala) in a 2°C warmer world, depending on the sub-
region and the emissions scenario. Increases were projected only 
for just one percent of the area, mainly along the southern edge. 
Evapotranspiration was projected to increase more than 20 percent 
in more humid areas (e.g., Costa Rica, Panama) whereas northern 
areas were projected to experience no change. Fabrega et al. (2013) 
found precipitation increases by 5 percent or more for most regions 
of Panama—but with no statistically significant changes in total 
runoff in a 3°C world. Maurer et al. (2009) modeled the inflow of 
two reservoirs in the Rio Lempa basin. They found decreases of 
13 percent in total annual reservoir inflow in a 2°C world and of 
24 percent in a 4°C world, implying potential reductions in hydro-
power capacities. Low flow years might occur more frequently, 
especially under a higher warming (Maurer et al. 2009).
Global studies mostly confirm this picture. Milly et al. (2005) 
projected a decrease in river runoff in Central America of 5–20 per-
cent for the middle of the 21st century with 3°C global warming. 
Nakaegawa et al. (2013) also found that the total annual runoff 
decreases for Mexico and Central America from 2075–2099 with 3°C 
warming. For the Rio Grande, annual discharge decreases by more 
than 20 percent. In a 3°C world, Mesoamerica also experiences a 
strong decrease in discharge in the study of Schewe et al. (2013). 
Portmann et al. (2013) reported a mean decrease across several 
GCMs of more than 10 percent in groundwater recharge in a 4°C 
world for Central America. The projected changes were much 
less pronounced when assuming lower global mean temperature 
increases of 2–3°C.
3.4.2.2 Caribbean
The assessment of water resources in the Caribbean relies more on 
assumptions and extrapolations from climatological data than on 
long-term hydrometric measurements, especially for the smaller 
islands (Cashman 2013; FAO 2003). Water provisioning is espe-
cially difficult on islands which rely mainly on a single source of 
water (such as groundwater in Barbados, Bahamas, Antigua and 
Box 3.3: Water Security in the Mexico 
City Metropolitan Area
The Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA) faces frequent climate-
related hazards. These include extremes of water and heat, with 
floods on the one side and heat waves and droughts on the other. 
The most common extreme events from 1980–2006 were floods 
resulting from heavy precipitation events (Romero Lankao 2010). 
Up to 42 percent of the population in MCMA was estimated to be 
vulnerable to climate change and natural hazards. Forty percent of 
those live in so-called “high-risk areas” which are characterized by 
very steep slopes of over 15 degrees where landslides can occur 
after heavy precipitation events (Baker 2012). Exponential popula-
tion growth in MCMA during the 20th century also contributed to the 
high vulnerability to flooding and water shortages (Brun 2007).
Currently water is provided from the Mexico City basin aquifer, 
with one-third transferred from external water basins (Romero 
Lankao 2010). Overextraction of groundwater in combination with 
locally unfavorable soil conditions (heavily saturated clay) have 
caused parts of the city to subside and thus suffer more frequent 
flooding (Baker 2012; Romero Lankao 2010). Another problem for 
long-term water security is related to groundwater contamination of 
the Mexico City basin aquifer, most probably due to surface waste-
water (Brun 2007)
The projection of temperature increases, more frequent and 
prolonged dry spells, and a (probable) precipitation decrease will 
harm water security and increase water dependencies in the grow-
ing MCMA. The water security of the water-providing external areas 
will also be affected (Magrin et al. 2007; Romero Lankao 2010; 
Sosa-Rodriguez 2013).
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Barbuda, and Jamaica, or surface water in Trinidad and Tobago, 
Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Dominica, 
and elsewhere)(Cashman 2013; Gencer 2013). 
The lack of long-term measured stream flows in the Caribbean 
renders the evaluation of hydrological models in the region dif-
ficult, and future projections of runoff have only low confidence 
(Hidalgo et al. 2013). A combination of lower precipitation, high 
abstraction rates, and sea-level rise may lead to intrusion of saline 
sea water into coastal groundwater aquifers (Cashman et al. 2010; 
Cashman 2013). Another hydrological hazard regarding climate 
change is more severe flooding events related to tropical cyclones 
(Cashman et al. 2010).
3.4.2.3 Northern South America (Colombia)
Restrepo et al. (2014) found significant discharge increases for the 
Mulatos, Magdalena (at Calamar), Canal del Dique, and Fundación 
rivers, especially from 2000 to 2010. Regional studies of climate-
related hydrologic impacts are limited, as access to and quantity of 
observational climate data is limited (Hoyos et al. 2013). Reanalysis 
or simulated/reconstructed datasets have been used, but Hoyos 
et al. (2013) reported substantial differences between climatologi-
cal datasets and observed values. Nakaegawa and Vergara (2010) 
found a trend of decreasing mean annual river discharge due to 
increased evapotranspiration in the Magdalena Basin in a 3°C 
world. Monthly mean river discharge decreased significantly in 
April, October, and November at Puerto Berrio. It is important, 
however, to note that mean precipitation was overestimated by 
about 35 percent for the GCMs used.
3.4.2.4 Andes
In mountainous regions, winter precipitation accumulated as snow 
and ice, similar to groundwater reserves, helps to buffer water short-
ages resulting from little or seasonal rainfall (Masiokas et al. 2006; 
Viviroli et al. 2011; Vuille et al. 2008). Downstream regions with 
low summer precipitation in particular benefit from this temporal 
water storage (Masiokas et al. 2013; Viviroli et al. 2011). Glacier 
retreat thus endangers water security in these areas (Vuille et al. 
2008). Current accelerated melting rates, however, imply a short-
term local surge in water—and higher river flow peaks can cause 
landslides and floods. Massive flood events have been associated 
with glacial lake outburst (Chevallier et al. 2011) (see Box 3.4).
3.4.2.5 Tropical Andes
Baraer et al. (2012) analyzed historical streamflow records for the 
Cordillera Blanca over the period 1990–2009; they showed that 
discharge was decreasing annually and during the dry season. 
The trends were attributed to glacier retreat. Meltwater contrib-
utes 10–20 percent to the total annual discharge of the Río Santa 
(Cordillera Blanca), but may rise to over 40 percent during the 
dry season (Baraer et al. 2012). In the period from 1990–2009, the 
overall glaciered area was decreasing by 0.81 percent annually; 
this is around 30 percent higher than what was measured during 
the 1930–2009 period (Baraer et al. 2012). 
Kinouchi et al. (2013) simulated the glacier melt and runoff 
in a headwater catchment of the Cordillera Real in Bolivia. They 
applied different 1–1.5°C temperature increase scenarios by 2050 
and found only small changes in annual runoff. The seasonal 
variation was, however, modified significantly. Under their projec-
tions, streamflow during the dry and early wet season was reduced 
(e.g., because of snowmelt decrease, and during the wet season 
it increased, especially in January and February). Baraer et al.(2012) 
projected that once the glaciers have melted, the average dry season 
discharge may decrease more than 60 percent in Parón and Llanga-
nuco and up to 70 percent at La Balsa—with serious implications 
for water supplies during the dry season. Juen et al. (2007) found 
little changes in total annual discharge by 2050 and 2080 in the 
Llanganuco catchment, but they did find a bigger amplitude of 
discharge seasonality (with a risk of very low flows during the 
dry season). They concluded that a smaller glacier size causes 
decreasing glacier melting, but that this decrease is supplemented 
by an increase in direct runoff from non-glaciered areas. Wet sea-
son discharge was projected to increase from 10–26 percent and 
dry season discharge to decrease from 11–23 percent for warming 
>1.5°C in 2050 and >2°C in 2080 depending on the emissions 
scenario and timeframe (see Figure 3.17). For the northern half 
of the Andes, a very likely increase in flood frequency in a 4°C 
world was projected (Hirabayashi et al. 2013).
3.4.2.6 Central Andes
The Andes in Central Chile and central western Argentina are 
characterized by a direct relationship between the amount of 
snow accumulated in winter and river discharge released during 
spring-summer (Masiokas et al. 2006), and around 85 percent of 
the observed river flow variance over 60 years in the area can 
be explained by snowpack records (Masiokas et al. 2010, 2013).
The inter-annual variability of snowpack extent is enormous, 
varying from zero percent to over 400 percent of the long-term 
mean (Masiokas et al. 2006, 2010, 2013). Freshwater availability 
is thus strongly dependent on mountain snowpack. In very dry 
Box 3.4: Glacial Lake Outbursts
Glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs) originate from various causes. 
First, increasing glacier melting raises the water levels of lakes, 
eventually resulting in an overflow of water or the breaking of dams. 
Second, ice instability may cause an avalanche of seracs into a lake, 
leading to suddenly higher water levels and the breaking of dams. 
Ice instability might increase with increasing temperatures. Third, 
glacier retreat may trigger major rock slides. It is important to note 
that the Andes belong to a region of high seismic activity, which can 
contribute to GLOFs. (Chevallier et al. 2011; Kaser et al. 2003).
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years, with no or little solid precipitation in the upper water-
shed, glacier melting gains in importance, although there is little 
information about the contribution of ice masses to river flow 
(Masiokas et al. 2013). 
Cortés et al. (2011) found that, for the period 1961–2006, river 
regimes in the dry north were driven by snowmelt whereas those 
further south were more rainfall-dominated. The southern river 
systems (to the south of 35°) have displayed consistently earlier 
timing in peak annual flow rates. Vicuña et al. (2013) found indica-
tions of a shift in the last 30 years to an earlier annual snowmelt 
season of around 15 days for the Mataguito basin. 
More high-flow discharges were also observed during the last 
10 years. They occurred mostly during autumn months when high 
rainfall and high minimum temperatures decreased the fraction 
of precipitation falling as snow and cause a faster rainfall-runoff 
response (Vicuña et al. 2013). Annual low-flow levels during 
spring and summer decreased significantly in the Mataguito basin 
(Vicuña et al. 2013) and for some stations in the Limay River 
Basin (Seoane and López 2007). This trend in river flow variability 
might endanger electrical power generation in the region, as the 
Limay River basin contains many hydropower stations which yield 
around 26 percent of Argentina’s total electrical power generation 
(Seoane and López 2007).  
Projections of the mean number of snowy days decrease by 
about 9 percent in a 2°C world, and 26 percent in a 4°C world, in 
the Mataguito basin (Demaria et al. 2013). In addition, the center 
timing of mass of annual flow was projected to occur earlier, by 
12 days in a >1.5°C world and by 16 days in a >3°C world. In 
the Limarí basin, reductions in annual streamflow are probably 
intensified by increased evapotranspiration because a 19 percent 
rainfall decrease resulted in a 21 percent streamflow decrease in 
a 4°C world (Vicuña et al. 2010). Vicuña et al. (2010) also found 
increasing winter flows (28.8–108.4 percent), decreasing summer 
flows (–16.5 to –57.8 percent), and earlier center timing of mass 
of annual flows for different sub-basins of the Limarí basin in a 
>3°C world. For northeastern Chile, Arnell and Gosling (2013) 
Box 3.5: Water Security in Quito, La 
Paz, Bogotá, and Lima
Precipitation patterns are different throughout the tropical Andes. 
The Pacific slopes in Colombia receive on average more than 
8000 mm per year of rainfall, whereas large parts of the highlands of 
Bolivia and the Peruvian coast get less than 100 mm per year. Water 
security is a pressing issue because the capital cities experienced 
population growth rates of 11.9 percent in Quito and 20.6 percent in 
La Paz for the period 2000–2010. 
Bogotá and Quito are situated on steep mountain terrain at 
2650 m and 2850 m above sea level respectively. High popula-
tion densities provoke local water stresses, and both cities require 
inter-basin water transfers from the wet Amazonian slopes to meet 
their water demand. Sixty-two percent of Quito’s water is currently 
provided by the Amazonian basin. Lima, meanwhile, is the second-
largest desert city in the world and its water is supplied almost 
solely by the western slope of the Andes. Competition exists with 
other water users, including the agricultural sector (Buytaert and De 
Bièvre 2012). 
Figure 3.17: Changes in seasonal total runoff in 4 IPCC 
climate-change scenarios with respect to the 1961–1990 
mean monthly runoff.
Source: Juen et al. (2007). 
Box 3.6: Water from the Cordillera 
Blanca
The arid coastal area of Peru is home to approximately half of the 
country’s population. Water is provided mainly by rivers coming 
down from the western slopes of the Cordillera of the Andes. Con-
tributors to runoff during the rainy season are rainfall, groundwater, 
and glacier melt. In contrast, during the dry season rivers are fed by 
groundwater and glacier melting at higher than 5000 m (Chevallier 
et al. 2011). 
The water from the Cordillera Blanca supports human activities 
at different altitudes. Irrigated agriculture is practiced between 
2000–4000 m and at the foot of the Andes. Below 2000 m, 
electricity is generated (Chevallier et al. 2011; Kaser et al. 2003). 
To maintain the full capacity of electricity production, a discharge 
of 60 m3 per second is required. As the minimum flow of the Río 
Santa usually falls below that level, water management is needed to 
guarantee the minimum discharge. 
The population of the Andes area is increasing. Due to this 
population trend, and to the possibility of expanding cultivation into 
higher areas of the Andes under increasing temperatures, water 
demand is expected to increase. This might lead to conflicts with 
hydroelectric power generation (Juen et al. 2007; Mark et al. 2005).
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simulated a decreasing mean annual runoff for warming higher 
than 1°C over 21 GCMs. Projections by Döll (2009) also showed 
a reduced groundwater recharge for the central Andes region by 
the 2050s with 2°C warming.
3.4.2.7 Amazon Basin
Espinoza Villar et al. (2009) found significant decreasing mean and 
minimum annual runoffs from 1990–2005 for southern Andean 
rivers (Peru, Bolivia) and increasing mean and maximum annual 
runoffs for northern Andean Rivers (Ecuador) draining into the 
Amazon. For the southern Amazon, Li et al. (2008) found more 
dry events during 1970–1999. Espinoza Villar et al. (2009) reported 
decreasing mean annual discharge and monthly minimum dis-
charge from 1974–2004 for Tapajós in the southeastern Amazon, 
the Peruvian Amazon Rivers, and the upstream Madeira. 
Guimberteau et al. (2013) analyzed the impacts of climate change on 
extreme streamflow over several Amazonian sub-basins by the middle 
of this century for a 2°C global warming scenario. They found that low 
flows would become more pronounced. The trend is significant at the 
Madeira and Xingu rivers, with JJA precipitation decreases of 9 percent 
and 22 percent respectively. At Porto Velho, the decrease in median 
low flows is about 30 percent; at Altamira, it is about 50 percent. In 
addition, Tosiyuki Nakaegawa et al. (2013) found total annual runoff 
decreases in the southern half of the Amazon River in a 3°C world. 
Average annual runoff varied from –72 percent to +6 percent in a 3°C 
world for the Bolivian part of the Amazon (Alto Beni), assuming no 
land use change (Fry et al. 2012). Nevertheless the projected ground-
water recharge was consistently negative (–96 percent to –27 percent) 
because potential evapotranspiration increases.
Malhi et al.(2009) found an increase in dry-season intensity 
in eastern Amazonia in a 3° world and seasonal increased water 
stress because of climate change and deforestation. Langerwisch 
et al. (2013) found shifts in flood patterns in a 3° world. The 
duration of flooding at the end of the 21st century was projected 
to be 0.5–1 months shorter than for 1961–1990. The probability of 
three successive extreme wet years decreased by up to 30 percent 
(Langerwisch et al. 2013). 
Median high flows in the western part of the Amazon basin 
increase by 5–25 percent by the middle of this century for a warming 
of 2°C; this trend is not, however, significant (Guimberteau et al. 
2013). In a 2°C world, the increase in high flow was projected to 
be lower than in a warmer than 3°C world; low flows increase 
10–30 percent under a 4° warming scenario (Guimberteau et al. 
2013). The flood zone is consistently projected to increase with a 
2–3 month longer inundation time in a 3°C world over several GCMs 
(Langerwisch et al. 2013). The average runoff and the maximum 
runoff increased in two subcatchments of the Paute basin for a 2°C 
global warming scenario from 2045–65 (Mora and Campozano et al. 
2013). Exbrayat et al. (2014) also found increases in annual runoff 
for a catchment in the Ecuadorian Andes by 2100; they also showed 
a high variability of runoff projections depending on the choice of 
GCM, emissions scenario, and hydrological model. Similarly, Buytaert 
et al. (2009) showed that, due to the wide range of GCM projections, 
the projected average monthly discharges diverge considerably in 
the Paute River system in Ecuador under a 1°C increase by 2030. 
Box 3.7: Water Security in the 
Central Andes
In the Andes, between latitudes 30 and 37° lie two major cities, 
Santiago de Chile (Chile) and Mendoza (Argentina). Human activi-
ties in these cities are almost completely dependent on meltwater, 
especially in the drier Argentinean foothills which receive only around 
200 mm of annual precipitation (Masiokas et al. 2013). 
Snowmelt is very important for water supply, hydroelectric 
generation, and viniculture in large parts of Chile (Demaria et al. 
2013). The central valley of Chile contains the majority of the coun-
try’s reservoir storage and supplies water to several large towns. 
Water demand results as well from agriculture, as 75 percent of 
the irrigated area in Chile is located here (Demaria et al. 2013). The 
Central Valley suffers from high inter-annual rainfall variability, with 
conditions being wetter during El Niño years and drier during El 
Niña years (Cortés et al. 2011). In years with above-average rainfall, 
farmers irrigate annual crops (e.g., orchards, vineyards) with surface 
water, whereas in below-average rainfall years they are forced to use 
groundwater. The use of groundwater has recently reached unsus-
tainable levels, and the Chilean water authorities have therefore 
restricted water extraction. Decreasing annual rainfall as a result of 
climate change would put even more pressure on agriculture and 
water resources (Arumí et al. 2013).
Box 3.8: Water Security and Glacial 
Melt in La Paz and El Alto, Bolivia
La Paz and El Alto receive 80 percent of their water from the Tuni 
Condoriri range. The contribution of glacier ice melt could be from 
30–40 percent (World Bank 2008) up to 60 percent (Painter 2007). 
Since water demand has risen in recent years, the water manage-
ment of both cities is very much challenged (Jeschke et al. 2012; 
Shi et al. 2013). Almost the entire energy supply of La Paz is sup-
plied by hydroelectric power which comes mainly from two glacier 
ranges—in the Zongo valley and Charquiri (Painter 2007). The 
glaciers of the Cordillera Real encompass 55 percent of the Bolivian 
glaciers. Between 1963–2006 they lost more than 40 percent of 
their volume (Soruco et al. 2009) and they are further declining (Liu 
et al. 2013). It has been postulated that water demand might soon 
surpass water supply in El Alto (Shi et al. 2013). Future water and 
energy supply will be increasingly critical due to rising demand, in 
combination with decreasing tropical glacier volumes (Rabatel et al. 
2013; Vuille et al. 2008).
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For the northernmost Amazon and the river mouth region, 
river flow and runoff coefficients decrease with a global warm-
ing of 2°C in 2045–2065 (Guimberteau et al. 2013). In the same 
study, median low flows decrease by 20 percent for the Japura 
and Negro river and 55 percent at the Río Branco. 
At the main stem of the Amazon River the runoff coefficient 
is projected to slightly decrease at Óbidos (the last station of the 
Amazon before the mouth) with a warming of 2°C by 2050 
(Guimberteau et al. 2013). Median low flow is projected to decrease 
by 10 percent, but this trend is uncertain. In a 4°C world, Guim-
berteau et al. (2013) projected that low flows and high flows would 
each increase by five percent at Óbidos. Döll and Schmied (2012), 
however, projected the mean river discharge of the downstream 
part of the Amazon to increase for under a 2°C warming by 2050 
in one GCM but decrease in another GCM. 
3.4.2.8 Northeast Brazil
Krol and Bronstert (2007) found that a decrease in precipitation 
by the end of the 21st century would significantly decrease the 
runoff of the Jaguaribe River and the stored volume in the Ceará 
reservoir. In contrast, an increase of precipitation by 50 percent did 
not significantly increase river runoff because of an accompany-
ing increase in water demand. Döll and Schmied (2012) projected 
the seasonality of river discharge in northeastern Brazil to remain 
stable but also that mean river discharge would decrease by the 
middle of the 21st century under a 2°C global warming scenario. 
Due to uncertainty in the GCM projections, there is no clear 
signal about the relative change of annual discharge for northeastern 
South America under 2°C warming (Schewe et al. 2013). Portmann 
et al. (2013) projected both strong decreases and increases in mean 
groundwater discharge for northeastern Brazil in a 4°C world 
depending on the GCM. Assuming different warming scenarios 
with varying levels of decreasing rainfall, Montenegro and Ragab 
(2010) projected strong decreases in groundwater recharge of up 
to 77 percent and streamflows of up to 72 percent for a subcatch-
ment of the Sao Francisco River Basin.
3.4.2.9 Río de la Plata
The Río de la Plata region experienced a 10–30 percent increase 
in river runoff during the 20th century (García and Vargas 1998; 
Jaime and Menéndez 2002; Menéndez and Berbery 2005; Milly 
et al. 2005). There is no consensus, however, among river runoff 
projections for the Río de la Plata and its tributaries because the 
projected direction of rainfall trend varies among GCMs. Milly 
et al. (2005) modeled an increase in mean relative runoff for the 
Rio de la Plata region of 20–50 percent for the middle of the 21st 
century and using a 3°C warming scenario. River flow projec-
tions in the upper Paraguay River basin varied from ±10 percent 
by 2030 for a 1.5° warming scenario and by ±20 percent by 
2070 for a 2°C warming scenario (Bravo et al. 2013). For a 3°C 
world, Nakaegawa et al. (2013) projected increasing discharge 
from January–May at Corrientes on the Paraná River—but not at 
Posadas which lies further upstream. Nóbrega et al. (2011) found 
that for the Río Grande, a tributary of the Paraná, for every 1°C 
temperature rise annual flow increased by 8–9 percent in relation 
to 1961–1990. Assuming 2°C warming, mean river flow ranged 
from –20 percent to +18 percent.
Camilloni et al. (2013) projected an increase in frequency and 
duration of river flooding in a >3°C world in the Uruguay and 
Paraná basins. Hirabayashi et al. (2013) showed a decrease in the 
20th century 100-year return period for floods for the Parana in a 
4°C world, but there was little consistency across the 11 GCMs used. 
Besides river floods, storm surge floods present a major hazard 
for Buenos Aires. Barros et al. (2005; 2008) found a greater inland 
reach of recurrent storm surge floods by 2070 under a 3°C global 
warming scenario. Assuming no changes in population distribu-
tion, permanent coastal flooding due to sea-level rise will play a 
minor role and will affect rather sparsely populated areas at the 
coast of Buenos Aires and its surroundings. In contrast, Pousa et al. 
(2013) projected that sea-level rise could aggravate the impact of 
storm surge floods in Buenos Aires.
3.4.2.10 Southernmost South America
Milly et al. (2005) simulated a decrease in mean relative runoff of 
up to 10 percent, which is in agreement with observed 20th century 
trends for southernmost South America. They projected a decrease 
in mean relative runoff of 10–30 percent for southernmost South 
America for the middle of the 21st century with 3°C global warm-
ing. Schewe et al. (2013) found similar results for a >2°C world.
3.4.2.11 Synthesis
ENSO-related rainfall anomalies play a major role in many areas 
in LAC and determine much of the inter-annual discharge variabil-
ity. In Central America, there is a high agreement on decreasing 
mean annual runoff and discharge, although the magnitude of 
the change varies (Arnell and Gosling 2013; Hidalgo et al. 2013; 
Imbach et al. 2012; Maurer et al. 2009; Milly et al. 2005; Nakae-
gawa et al. 2013; Schewe et al. 2013). The trend seems to be more 
pronounced for the northern than for the southern part of Central 
America (Hidalgo et al. 2013; Imbach et al. 2012). Therefore, water 
stress may increase, especially in arid areas with high population 
densities and during the dry season. 
The Caribbean lacks long-term measured stream flow data. 
Runoff projections are therefore of low confidence (Cashman 2013; 
FAO 2003; Hidalgo et al. 2013). However, freshwater availability 
may decrease for several reasons. Sea-level rise (Mimura et al. 
2007) may lead to an intrusion of sea water into coastal aquifers 
(Cashman et al. 2010; Cashman 2013) and summer precipitation 
is projected to decrease (Mimura et al. 2007). Regionally the 
risk of flooding and mudslides with high mortality rates is high 
(Cashman 2013; Edwards 2011; Williams 2010). Although floods 
often seem to be associated with land-use change, more severe 
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flooding events may also occur in the context of climate change 
(Cashman et al. 2010; IPCC 2012). 
In Northern South America (Colombia), there are only a 
limited number of regional hydrological impact studies available 
for northern South America, and rainfall projections are uncertain. 
Conclusions about projected hydrological impacts are therefore 
of low confidence. 
In the Andes, higher discharge seasonality is projected for the 
Tropical Andes. Streamflows during the dry season may decrease 
because of ongoing glacier retreat (Baraer et al. 2012; Juen et al. 
2007; Kinouchi et al. 2013). Lower dry season discharge has already 
been observed during the past two decades (Baraer et al. 2012). 
However, streamflow during the wet season may increase (Juen 
et al. 2007; Kinouchi et al. 2013). The region has a high flood risk 
(e.g., due to accelerated glacier melting; see Box 3.4: Glacial Lake 
Outbursts) (Carey 2005; Hirabayashi et al. 2013). For the Central 
Andes, more streamflow was observed and projected to occur at 
earlier dates locally (Cortés et al. 2011; Vicuña et al. 2013; Demaria 
et al. 2013). Lower dry season discharges may cause significant 
water supply problems in urban areas. 
Amazon Basin: Runoff and discharge projections for most parts 
of the Amazon basin are diverging, especially for the southern 
and eastern areas. The main reasons for this are the high vari-
ability of rainfall projections using different GCMs and uncertain-
ties introduced by hydrological impact models. However, for the 
western part of the basin a likely increase in streamflow, runoff, 
flood zone, and inundation time was projected (Guimberteau et al. 
2013; Langerwisch et al. 2013; Mora and Campozano et al. 2013).
Northeast Brazil: The direction of discharge and groundwater 
recharge trends vary due to diverging rainfall projections under 
different GCMs (Döll and Schmied 2012; Krol and Bronstert 2007; 
Portmann et al. 2013; Schewe et al. 2013). 
Río de la Plata: There are no consistent river runoff projections 
for the basin because the directions of rainfall projections vary 
among the GCMs (Bravo et al. 2013; Milly et al. 2005; Nakaegawa 
et al. 2013; Nóbrega et al. 2011).
Southernmost South America: A decrease of mean runoff 
was projected with a high confidence (Milly et al. 2005; Schewe 
et al. 2013).
3.4.3 Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture
3.4.3.1 Temperature Sensitivity Crop Thresholds
Agriculture is one of the most climate dependent human activities, 
and the development and growth of plants is affected to a very 
large extent by temperature. Every plant has a range between a 
maximum and minimum temperature in which the plant can exist 
and an optimum temperature at which growth is at its optimal rate 
(Hatfield et al. 2011). Crops often require different temperatures 
in their numerous development stages and are very sensitive to 
temperatures above the optimum, especially during the pollination 
phase (Hatfield et al. 2011). Generally, warmer temperatures act 
to decrease the development phase of perennial crops, resulting 
in earlier crop flowering and reduced seed sets (Craufurd and 
Wheeler 2009). When temperatures increase above the maximum, 
plant growth and yields can be drastically reduced (Ackerman and 
Stanton 2013; Berg et al. 2013; Luo 2011). 
The optimum seasonal average temperature for maximum 
grain yield is 15°C for wheat, 18°C for maize, 22°C for soybeans, 
and 23°C for rice (Hatfield et al. 2011; Lobell and Gourdji 2012). 
Hatfield et al. (2011) also identified average temperatures leading 
to a total crop failure: 34°C for wheat, 35°C for maize, 39°C for 
soybeans, and 35°C for rice. Short intervals of a few days above the 
optimum average temperature can lead to strong yield decreases 
(Ackerman and Stanton 2013). Teixeira et al. (2013) project an 
increasing occurrence of heat stress for maize, rice, and soybeans 
in Latin America. Lobell and Gourdji (2012) estimate global yield 
declines of 3–8 percent per °C of temperature increase based on 
a literature review. It is, however, important to note that there 
are numerous knowledge gaps concerning plant reactions to tem-
peratures above their optimum averages (Craufurd and Wheeler 
2009; Porter et al. 2014). Moreover, plants are somewhat capable 
of adapting to changing climatic conditions—and it is unclear if 
climate change will alter growing conditions too fast for crops to 
adapt on their own (Ackerman and Stanton 2013).
3.4.3.2 Plant Diseases
How pests and diseases will spread under future climate condi-
tions, and how severe the effects will be on yields and production 
quantities, is unclear. Already today crop diseases are respon-
sible for losses of 10 percent or more of global food production 
(Chakraborty and Newton 2011; Ghini et al. 2011; Luck et al. 2011). 
Climate change is expected to alter the geographic distribution 
of insects and diseases in much of the world (Porter et al. 2014). 
The knowledge on climate change and plant diseases, however, is 
still very limited (Ghini et al. 2011; Luck et al. 2011). The impacts 
differ greatly between crops and pathogens as do the interactions 
among hosts, pathogens, microorganisms, and the climate (Ghini 
et al. 2011; Bebber et al. 2014). The existing knowledge base is 
inadequate to make generalizations about the behavior of crop 
diseases under a changing climate (Luck et al. 2011). Factors that 
are most likely to influence the development of plant diseases are 
increasing atmospheric CO2, increasing winter temperatures, and 
increasing humidity (Luck et al. 2011). 
One recent example of the impact of plant diseases on agricul-
ture in the LAC region is the outbreak of coffee leaf rust (Hemileia 
vastratix), considered the most destructive coffee disease, in Central 
America during the 2012–13 growing season. Around 50 percent of 
the roughly one million ha under coffee production in the region 
were affected by the disease, reducing the production quantity 
by an estimated 17 percent in comparison to the previous year 
(Ghini et al. 2011; ICO 2013). The outbreak devastated small holder 
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coffee growers and possibly contributed to rising coffee prices 
globally (NYT 2014). Coffee leaf rust, together with soybean rust 
(Phakopsora pachyrhizi), are expected to move further south and 
affect South American countries with global temperatures increas-
ing by approximately 3.5°C by 2080 compared to pre-industrial 
levels (Alves et al. 2011). 
3.4.3.3 Projected Changes in Crop Yields
Climate change impacts on crop yields vary depending on crop 
type and location. Fernandes et al. (2012) projected changes in 
crop yields in 2050 (compared to 1989–2010) under global warming 
scenarios of between 1.7°C and 2.3°C. Table 3.6 and Figure 3.18 
present some of their key results. It is important to note that, 
when considering adaptation measures, yield declines are less 
pronounced but still negative for wheat, soybeans, and maize. 
Yield projections for rice show a different picture. With the 
exception of Brazil, Mexico, and the Caribbean, where temperatures 
are already high, rice yields could increase by up to 12 percent 
by 2020 and by 17 percent by 2050 as average conditions for rice 
photosynthesis would improve with increasing temperatures 
(Fernandes et al. 2012).
Nelson, Rosegrant and Koo et al. (2010) project yield changes 
for different crops in LAC with a 1.8–2.5°C global temperature 
increase by 2050. Their key results, shown in Table 3.6, show that 
yields generally decline without CO2 fertilization; this is most pro-
nounced for irrigated maize, soybeans, and wheat. CO2 fertilization 
increases yields for rice, soybean, and maize by over 10 percent 
besides irrigated maize (Nelson, Rosegrant, Koo et al. 2010). 
In Chile, even when including the CO2 fertilization effect, 
yields could be reduced by 2050 by 5–10 percent for maize and 
10–20 percent for wheat in comparison to 1971–2000 levels with 
2.7°C global warming if no adaptation measures are implemented 
(Meza and Silva 2009). In Argentina, yields for wheat, maize, and 
soybeans are projected to decline by 16, 24, and 25 percent respec-
tively by 2080 under a 3.5°C global warming scenario without 
CO2 fertilization (ECLAC 2010). Yield declines are less pronounced 
with only 2.7°C global warming, with declines of 11 percent for 
wheat, 15 percent for maize, and 14 percent for soybeans; includ-
ing CO2 fertilization increases yields slightly (ECLAC 2010). In 
southern Brazil, bean and maize productivity would decline by 
15–30 percent in comparison to 1971–2000 levels under a global 
mean warming of 2°C by 2050 and by 30–45 percent with 4°C 
warming by 2080 without CO2 fertilization but with technological 
progress (Costa et al. 2009). Including CO2 fertilization for beans 
leads to productivity increases of up to 15 percent (Costa et al. 
2009). Because maize is a C4 crop, including CO2 fertilization has 
only a limited impact and productivity keeps decreasing (Costa et al. 
2009). Rain-fed sugarcane yields could increase by 15–59 percent 
with global warming of 1.5–2.3°C by 2050, including CO2 fertil-
ization and technological improvement (Marin et al. 2012). In 
the Brazilian Amazon, soybean yields decline by 44 percent with 
4°C mean global warming by 2050 and by 1.8 percent with a 2°C 
temperature increase (Lapola et al. 2011). On average and over all 
analyzed crop types, yields are projected to decline by 31 percent 
when temperatures increase by 4°C without CO2 fertilization and 
increase by 14 percent when temperatures increase by 2°C with 
CO2 fertilization (Lapola et al. 2011). 
In Ecuador, ECLAC (2010) projects yield declines of 53 percent 
for maize, 9 percent for beans, 41 percent for bananas, 36 percent 
for sugarcane, 23 percent for coffee, and 21 percent for cocoa; 
ECLAC also projects yield increases of up to 37 percent for rice for 
the year 2080 with 3.5°C warming. Colombian agriculture, mean-
while, is projected to be severely impacted by climate change. Up 
to 80 percent of agricultural crops currently cultivated in Colombia 
in 60 percent of the cultivation areas of the country would be nega-
tively affected by 2–2.5°C global temperature increases by 2050 if 
no adaptation measures are introduced (Ramirez-Villegas et al. 
2012). Perennial crops (notably such high-value crops as tropical 
fruit, cocoa, bananas, and coffee) could be particularly affected by 
climate change (Ramirez-Villegas et al. 2012). Coffee farming might 
have to migrate to higher altitudes or other cultivation regions to 
maintain present yields, a problem also relevant in other parts of 
Latin America (Camargo 2010; Laderach et al. 2011; Zullo et al. 2011). 
In Panama, yield changes for maize range from –0.8 to 
+2.4 percent for global warming of 1.7–1.9°C in 2055, and from 
+1.5 to +4.5 percent for global warming of 2.2–3.3°C in 2085 
including CO2 fertilization (Ruane et al. 2013). Accelerated crop 
development helps to complete the grain-filling phase before the 
Box 3.9: Surface Ozone Concentrations
Surface ozone concentrations have negative impacts on agricultural 
yields. The impact on crop yields strongly depends on the seasonal 
and regional distribution of surface ozone, as it is not distributed 
evenly in the atmosphere (Teixeira et al. 2011). Declines in yield 
levels currently range from 7–125 percent for wheat, from 6–16 per-
cent for soybeans, from 3–4 percent for rice, and from 3–5 percent 
for maize; wheat and soybeans are especially sensitive to surface 
ozone (Van Dingenen et al. 2009; Teixeira et al. 2011). Jaggard et 
al. (2010) noted that the impact of ozone on crop yields has been 
neglected in many climate impact projections and found that the 
benefits of the CO2 fertilization effect (see Box 2.4) could be offset by 
the negative effect of increased ozone concentrations on C3 plants 
(and even lead to a yield reduction of five percent in C4 plants). By 
2030, increasing surface ozone could lead to yield declines in Latin 
America by up to 7.8 percent for wheat, 2.9 percent for maize, and 
7.5 percent for soybeans depending on the emissions levels of 
ozone precursors (Avnery et al. 2011).
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beginning of dry periods with high levels of water stress (Ruane 
et al. 2013). In Mexico, wheat yields decline with global tempera-
tures rising between 1.6–2.1°C by 2050 across several crop models 
and GCMs (Rosenzweig et al. 2013b). Yield declines are more 
pronounced with stronger warming, but they remain relatively 
small because CO2 fertilization reduces the negative yield effect 
in the crop models (Rosenzweig et al. 2013b).
A meta-analysis of the impacts of climate change on crop yields 
for the LAC region (see Section 6.3, Meta-analysis of Crop Yield 
Changes with Climate Change,) reveals no significant influence of 
temperature increase over crop yields across all available studies. 
A significant positive relationship between crop yield change and 
temperature is revealed, however, when CO2 fertilization is con-
sidered (see Table 3.7 and Figure 3.19), although the beneficial 
effects of CO2 fertilization are highly uncertain (Ainsworth et al. 
2008)(see Box 2.4) The interpretation of these results therefore 
requires some caution, as model assumptions made regarding 
CO2 fertilization may not hold in an actual crop production envi-
ronment. If the effects of CO2 fertilization are not considered, 
the relationship remains significant but becomes negative, with 
increasing temperature leading to considerable yield declines (see 
Figure 3.19). 
Table 3.6: Projected Changes in Yields and Productivity Induced by Climate Change. 
SOURCE SCENARIO TIME HORIZON REGION CROP
YIELD OR 
PRODUCTIVITY EFFECT
Fernandes et al. (2012) A1B / B1 2050 Brazil Soybeans –30 to –70 %
Brazil, Ecuador, Maize up to –60 %
Brazil Wheat –13 to –50 %
LAC Rice up to +17 %
Meza and Silva (2009) A1F1 2050 Chile Maize –5 to –10 %
Wheat –10 to –20 %
Costa et al. (2009) A2 2050 Brazil Beans –15 to –30 %
Maize –15 to –30 %
Ruane et al. (2013) A2 / B1 2050 Panama Maize –0.8 to +2.4 %
A2 /B1 2080 Panama Maize +1.5 to +4.5 %
Lapola et al. (2011) A2 2050 Brazilian Amazon Soybeans –1.8 to –44 %
Marin et al. (2013) A2 / B2 2050 Southern Brazil Sugarcane +15 to +59 %







A2 / B2 Argentina Wheat –11 to –16 %
Maize –15 to –24 %
Soybeans –14 to –25 %
Nelson et al. (2010) A2 2050 LAC Maize –3.0 to +2.2 %
Rice –6.4 to +12.7 %
Soybeans –2.5 to +19.5 %
Wheat –5.6 to +12.2 %
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Figure 3.19: Meta-analysis of crop yield reductions.
Best-fit line for LAC studies not considering the effects of adaptation mea-
sures or those of CO2 fertilization (blue line) and for studies considering the 
effects of CO2 fertilization (but no adaptation, orange) and their 95 percent 
confidence intervals of regressions consistent with the data based on 500 
bootstrap samples (patches).
Table 3.7: Summary of Crop Yield Responses to Climate 
Change, Adaptation Measures, and CO2 Fertilization.
SLOPE R2 T-STAT P-VALUE
Full dataset 0.0023 0 0.1255 0.9
Crop yield change with 
effect of CO2 fertilization
0.07 0.266 2.81 0.009**
Studies not considering 
the effects of adaptation 
measures or CO2 
fertilization
–0.065 0.24 –2.65 0.0145*
Results of a general linear model applied to all studies with reported values 
for changes in yield and changes in temperature, to studies considering 
the effect of CO2 fertilization, and to studies not considering the effects 
of adaptation measures nor those of CO2 fertilization. Significance levels: 
*P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001.
Figure 3.18: Aggregate impacts on crop yields in the LAC region with adaptation, computed by the AZS-BioMA platform under 
2020 and 2050 NCAR GCM for A1B scenario.
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Source: Fernandes et al. (2012), Figure 4.1. 
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To conclude, the possible effects of climate change on crop 
yields in the region are very diverse. Yield impacts differ among 
regions and crops and also among different GCMs, emissions sce-
narios, and crop models (see Table 3.6) (Berg et al. 2013). Most of 
the effects of rising temperatures are expected to be negative, even 
if lessened CO2 fertilization (which introduces large uncertainties 
into the impact projections). For some crops, however, increasing 
temperatures might have positive effects, such as increasing yields 
for rice and sugarcane.
3.4.3.4 Climate Change Impacts on Livestock
The livestock sector in the LAC region is of high economic 
importance, especially in major livestock producing and export-
ing countries Brazil and Argentina (ECLAC et al. 2012), and the 
impacts of climate change on livestock systems in developing 
countries are diverse (Thornton et al. 2009). Climate change can 
severely impact the quantity and quality of feed, as rising tem-
peratures, increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations, and changes 
in precipitation patterns influence the availability of nutrients, 
the productivity of grasslands, and the composition of pastures. 
Furthermore, heat stress directly affects livestock productivity. 
Cattle, in particular, are susceptible to high temperatures. Heat 
stress is known to reduce food intake and milk production and 
also to affect reproduction, growth, and cattle mortality rates 
(Porter et al. 2014). Higher temperatures are also closely linked to 
growing water demand for livestock, increasing the competition 
and demand for water in water-scarce regions. More scientific 
research is needed, meanwhile, on the effects of climate change 
on livestock diseases and livestock biodiversity.
3.4.3.5 Projected Impacts on Livestock
With a 2.7°C warming by 2060, livestock species choice (i.e., the 
adoption of new livestock) is projected to decline across Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela 
by 3.2 percent for beef cattle; by 2.3 percent for dairy cattle; by 
0.9 percent for chicken; and by 0.5 percent for pigs. Meanwhile, 
the adoption of sheep species is projected to increase by an aver-
age of 7 percent across the region, and by more in Colombia 
(11.3 percent), Chile (14.45 percent), and Ecuador (19.27 percent) 
(Seo et al. 2010). 
With a lower warming of 1.3–2.3°C by 2060, the pattern of 
declining livestock species choice for beef cattle, dairy cattle, 
chicken, and pigs, and the increasing choice of sheep, remains the 
same but is less pronounced (Seo et al. 2010). According to Seo et al. 
(2010), the choice of sheep increases with increasing temperatures 
and decreasing precipitation because sheep are better adapted to 
these conditions than other livestock species. In Paraguay, beef 
cattle production is projected to increase by 4.4 percent by 2020, 
but then decline by 7.4 percent by 2050 and 27.1 percent by 2080 
in a scenario leading to 3.5°C regional warming (ECLAC 2010). 
Beef cattle production is projected to decline by 1.5 percent by 
2020, by 16.2 percent by2050, and by 22.1 percent by 2080 with 
2.9°C regional warming (ECLAC 2010).
3.4.3.6 Climate Change Impacts on Food Security
Nelson, Rosegrant and Koo et al. (2010) project that international 
crop prices will increase significantly even when ignoring climate 
change—mainly driven by population growth, income growth, 
and demand for biofuels. The price of wheat is projected to 
increase by 39 percent, rice by 62 percent, maize by 63 percent, 
and soybeans by 72 percent. Including climate change with global 
mean temperature increasing by 2.5 °C by 2050, and without CO2 
fertilization, would accelerate price increases by an additional 
94–111 percent for wheat, 32–37 percent for rice, 52–55 percent for 
maize, and 11–14 percent for soybeans. Including CO2 fertilization 
would lead to less severe price increases by 2050 (Nelson, Rose-
grant, Koo et al. 2010). These results are confirmed by the IPCC 
AR5 report: Increasing food prices as a consequence of changing 
climatic conditions are to be expected by 2050 without taking the 
CO2 fertilization effect into account; including elevated CO2 will 
temper price increases (Porter et al. 2014). 
Climate change poses great risks to the economic develop-
ment of Latin America and the Caribbean; it not only threatens 
economic growth but also poverty reduction and food security 
(ECLAC 2010). Without climate change, calorie availability would 
be expected to increase by 3.7 percent, up to 2,985 calories per 
capita in 2050 in LAC (Nelson, Rosegrant, Koo et al. 2010). How-
ever, with climate change and without CO2 fertilization, per capita 
calorie availability in 2050 is expected to drop below the value 
for the year 2000 (2,879 calories per capita) (Nelson, Rosegrant, 
Koo et al. 2010). These projections show that climate change 
threatens food security, especially for people with low incomes, 
as access to food is highly dependent on income (FAO 2013). The 
cascading impacts of warming that reduce productivity in other 
sectors apart from agriculture can further reduce economic output 
and negatively affect incomes (Porter et al. 2014). Results from 
a Brazilian study (Assad et al. 2013) on climate change impacts 
on agriculture to 2030 project that Brazil could face a reduction 
of approximately 11 million hectares of high quality agricultural 
land as a result of climate change with the South Region (current 
grain belt) being the worst impacted losing ~5 million ha of ‘low 
climate risk’ crop land. The increase in climate risk in the south 
could be partially offset by transferring grain production to the 
central region currently occupied by low productivity pastures 
(sub regional reallocation). Intensification of livestock and pasture 
systems will also offset projected losses due to climate change. 
In general, however, the production declines can be expected to 
impact prices, domestic demand, and net exports of most crops/
livestock products. Simulations from this study across all the 
climate change scenarios suggest that rising staple and export 
crop and beef prices could double the agricultural contribution 
to Brazil’s economy. 
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3.4.3.7 Synthesis
The results of the climate change impact projections on crop yields 
differ among studies, but most authors agree that climate change 
will very likely decrease agricultural yields of important food 
crops in LAC (see Table 3.6) (ECLAC 2010; Fernandes et al. 2012; 
Nelson, Rosegrant, Koo et al. 2010). An exception is the possible 
yield development of rice in some regions (ECLAC 2010; Fernandes 
et al. 2012; Nelson, Rosegrant, Koo et al. 2010). Although studies 
on climate change impacts on livestock are scarce (Thornton et al. 
2009), the few studies that are available indicate that beef and 
dairy cattle production will decline under increasing temperatures, 
as heat stress is a major influencing factor of cattle productivity 
(Seo et al. 2010; Thornton et al. 2009). Sheep production could 
become more important in the future, as sheep are better adapted to 
warmer and drier conditions than cattle and pigs (Seo et al. 2010).
3.4.4 Climate Change Impacts on Biodiversity
3.4.4.1 Current Status and Current Threats 
to Biodiversity
Biodiversity, the diversity of genes, populations, species, communi-
ties, ecosystems, and biomes, is the foundation for all ecosystem 
processes (MEA 2005). Climate change is a major threat to biodi-
versity, as species have evolved to live within specific temperature 
ranges that may be surpassed faster than species are able to adapt. 
South America is a biodiversity hotspot, particularly due to 
the large extent of tropical rainforests (MEA 2005; Myers et al. 
2000) and the continent’s long geographical isolation until approxi-
mately 3 million years ago—which together have nurtured a high 
number of endemic species. Habitat destruction and fragmenta-
tion by land-use change as well as the commercial exploitation 
of species groups are currently larger threats to biodiversity than 
climate change (e.g., Hof et al. 2011). Land-use change is expected 
to have a greater impact on plants than climate change by 2050, 
after which climate change becomes increasingly important for 
species loss (MEA 2005; Vuuren et al. 2006).
3.4.4.2 Impacts of Future Climate Change 
on Biodiversity
Forecasts of future changes in biodiversity are generally alarming 
(e.g., Bellard et al. 2012; Foden et al. 2013). Using a global meta-
analysis, MacLean and Wilson (2011) found a mean extinction 
probability of 10 percent by 2100 across taxa, regions, and warm-
ing levels. Warren et al. (2013) found that, globally, 57 percent of 
plants and 34 percent of animals will lose greater than 50 percent 
of their habitat in a 4°C world. 
A comparative review of different model predictions across taxa 
and regions revealed a large variability in the predicted ranges of 
biodiversity loss, especially at the local level (Bellard et al. 2012). 
One reason for this variability is that there is still high uncertainty 
about the capacity of species to buffer the effects of climate change 
(Moritz and Agudo 2013). Nonetheless, Scholes et al. (2014) state 
that there is “high confidence that climate change will contribute 
to increased extinction risk for terrestrial and freshwater species 
over the coming century.”
3.4.4.3 Projections of Potential Future Shifts 
in Ecosystems and Ecoregions
The G200 ecoregions (Olson and Dinerstein 2002) located in 
Latin America and the Caribbean may experience severe climate 
change in the future (Beaumont et al. 2010). Li et al. (2013) found 
strong local climatic changes in the ecoregions Coastal Venezuela 
Montane Forests, Amazon River and Flooded Forests, and Atlantic 
Dry Forests for 2–4°C global warming. Further, 38.4 percent of the 
surface of the biodiversity hotspot of Tumbes-Choco-Magdalena 
and 11.5 percent of the Mesoamerican biodiversity hotspot will be 
experiencing no-analogue climates in a warmer than 2°C world 
(Garcia-Lopez et al. 2013). 
Heyder et al. (2011) find a range of small to severe eco-
system changes for the whole South American continent in 
their projections for a 2°C and warmer world. In a 4°C world, 
results of one dynamic vegetation model show severe ecosystem 
changes for more than 33 percent of the area in 21 out of 26 
distinct biogeographic regions in South America (Gerten et al.
2013). Warszawski et al. (2013), meanwhile, projected such 
severe ecosystem changes in a 3°C world in South America 
(notably in Amazon, Guyana moist forests, and Brazilian Cer-
rado) when applying an ensemble of seven dynamic vegeta-
tion models. Imbach et al. (2012) projected that such severe 
ecosystem changes at global mean warming levels greater than 
3°C would lead to a considerable decrease in tree cover, indi-
cated by a change in leaf area index of more than 20 percent 
across 77–89 percent of the area. Bellard et al. (2014) projected 
that out of 723 Caribbean islands, 63 and 356 of them will be 
entirely submerged under one and six meters of sea-level rise, 
Box 3.10: Critical Ecosystem 
Services of High Andean Mountain 
Ecosystems
A highly critical ecosystem service provided by the LAC region is 
that of carbon storage. For example the ecosystems of the Andean 
mountains, including tropical montane cloud forests, the high-alti-
tude wetlands, and the páramos ecosystem, store large amounts of 
carbon. Despite the fact that they cover a mere 3 percent of global 
land area they store about 30 percent of the global carbon stock of 
terrestrial ecosystems (Peñ a et al. 2011). Further, numerous large 
cities (such as Quito, Bogota or La Paz) extract part of their water 
supply from páramos areas.
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respectively. They also found that 165 of the islands will be at 
least half-submerged (i.e., having lost more than 50 percent of 
their area) under one meter of sea-level rise, and 533 under 
six meters of sea-level rise. While a six meter sea-level rise is 
not realistically expected to happen within this century, a one 
meter sea-level rise is within the range of sea-level rise projected 
under a global mean warming of 4°C at the end of this century 
(see Section 3.3.7, Regional Sea-level Rise). 
3.4.4.4 Projections of Habitat Changes, Species 
Range and Distribution Shifts, and Extinction Risks 
for Species and Species Groups
Microorganisms
Little is known about the consequences of future climate change on 
microbial biodiversity due to the complex microbial feedback loops 
within the climate system (Singh et al. 2010). The ratio between 
heterotrophic soil bacteria and fungi will likely be affected (Rinnan 
et al. 2007). Generally, temperature increase stimulates microbial 
growth and accelerates decomposition, which leads to an increase 
in heterotrophic respiration (Davidson and Janssens 2006). 
Invertebrates 
Insects act as pollinators to ensure plant fertilization, but they may also 
emerge as pests. Climate change affects temperature-driven reproductive 
cycles of many insect populations. In a 4°C world, Deutsch et al. (2008) 
projected a range contraction of 20 percent for tropical insects, because 
tropical insects will face near-lethal temperatures much faster than 
those in temperate climates. Estay et al. (2009) projected an increase 
in insect population densities of grain pests in Chile of 10–14 percent 
in a 3°C world and 12–22 percent in a 4°C world. 
Amphibians and Reptiles
Due to the difficulties in entangling the relative contributions 
of climate versus land use change, Scholes et al. (2014) stated 
that “due to low agreement among studies, there is only medium 
confidence in detection of extinctions and attribution of Central 
American amphibian extinctions to climate change.” Amphibians 
are particularly vulnerable because, due to their permeable skin, 
they depend on constant water availability at least during some 
periods of their life cycle. Loyola et al. (2013) found that most of the 
444 amphibian species in the Atlantic Forest Biodiversity hotspot 
in Brazil could increase their range, while 160 species would face 
range contractions with 1.9°C global warming in 2050. A more 
recent projection for 2050 includes different dispersal scenarios for 
the amphibians in this region and projects a majority of the 430 
amphibian species would face range contractions accompanied 
by an overall species loss with 1.9°C global warming (Lemes et 
al. 2014). Already in a 2°C world, 85–95 percent of species face 
net loss in range size, and 13–15 percent of species would lose 
100 percent of their current range depending on the modeled 
dispersal limitation (Lawler et al. 2009). In a 4°C world, most 
ecoregions are projected to experience at least 30 percent species 
turnover, and many in western South America and Central America 
to experience at least 50 percent species turnover, so that future 
communities would bear little resemblance to the currently estab-
lished ones (Lawler et al. 2009). In a greater than 3°C world, the 
entire LAC region would experience high bioclimatic unsuitability 
for amphibians in general (many grid cells between 50–80 percent 
loss). In the Northern Andes, 166 frog species (73 percent of local 
frog fauna) and, in Central America, 211 species (66 percent of 
local salamander fauna), would lose their local climatic suitability 
between 2070–2099 (Hof et al. 2011).
Based on historical data, Sinervo et al. (2010) assume that if the 
rate of change in maximum air temperature at 99 Mexican weather 
stations continues unabated by 2080, 56 percent of the viviparous 
lizard species would go extinct by 2050 and 66 percent by 2080; of the 
oviparous species, 46 percent would go extinct by 2050 and 61 percent 
by 2080. By 2080, the predicted loss of suitable areas for the royal 
ground snake (Liophis reginae) is 30 percent (Mesquita et al. 2013). 
Sea-level rise will affect the reproductive behavior of sea turtles, 
which return to the same nesting sites every breeding season and 
therefore rely on relatively constant shorelines for laying their eggs. 
Fish et al. (2005) predict a 14/31/50 percent habitat loss of nest-
ing sites for endangered sea turtles by 2050 under 0.2/0.5/0.9 m 
sea-level rise respectively on Bonaire Island. Narrow and shallow 
beaches are predicted to be most vulnerable, but turtles seem to 
prefer steep slopes which might to some extent alleviate climate 
change impacts at their preferred nesting sites. 
Birds
Birds are most diverse in the tropics where they typically have smaller 
home ranges than migratory birds in temperate zones (Jetz et al. 
2007). This renders tropical bird diversity especially vulnerable to 
extinctions caused by climate change and accompanying habitat 
destruction. Anciaes et al. (2006) projected that 50 percent of 49 
neotropical manakin (passerine bird) species will have lost more 
than 80 percent of their current habitat by around 2055 with mean 
global warming of 2°C. For a similar time frame and warming sce-
nario, Souza et al. (2011) projected that 44 of 51 endemic Brazilian 
Atlantic forest bird species would lose their distribution area by 2050, 
which corresponds to a habitat reduction of 45 percent of the original 
area. The study assumes that the entire area of the Atlantic forest 
is suitable for these bird species. However, about 80 percent of the 
Atlantic forest is already deforested, and most remaining forest areas 
are fragmented and isolated. Twenty-six Cerrado bird species face 
14–80 percent range contractions under a no-dispersal scenario, and 
they face a 5 percent range increase to a 74 percent range decrease 
under a full-dispersal scenario in a 3°C world (Marini et al. 2009). 
Marsupials
Most of the 55 marsupial species found in Brazil inhabit forested 
areas and are therefore exposed to both climate change and 
land use change caused by deforestation. Loyola et al. (2012) 
found that marsupial species in Brazil face range contractions of 
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67 percent of their original habitat with mean global warming of 
approximately 2°C by 2050. 
Mammals
Schloss et al. (2012) projected that up to 39 percent of the mammals 
in the Neotropics would be unable to keep pace with climate-change 
velocity due to their limited dispersal abilities in a 4°C world. 
Torres, Jayat and Pacheco (2012) projected an at least 33 percent 
habitat loss for the maned wolf (Chrysocyon brachyurus) in Central 
South America with 2°C global warming by 2050.
Plant Species
Plants are especially vulnerable to climate change because indi-
vidual plants cannot migrate to avoid thermal stress. As a result, 
their dispersal mode will largely determine to what extent they 
may be able to adapt to changing climatic conditions. Moreover, 
plants directly respond to elevated atmospheric CO2 levels (see 
Box 2.4)—but the degree to which some plant species may ben-
efit from rising CO2 levels is still being debated (Cox et al. 2013; 
Rammig et al. 2010).
Brazil is the country with the largest number of vascular plant 
species (>50,000) on Earth (ICSU-LAC 2010, p.57). Most future 
projections paint a bleak picture for plant biodiversity, mostly due 
to land-use change as a result of deforestation and, increasingly, the 
impacts of climate change. Simon et al (2013) projected a reduction 
in geographic distribution of 78 percent (±7 percent) in a >2°C 
world for 110 Brazilian Cerrado plant species. Feeley et al (2012) 
projected a loss of suitable habitat area in the Amazon region of 
between 8.2–81.5 percent in a 2°C world and 11.6–98.7 percent 
in a 4°C world, and a change in plant species richness between 
–4.1 percent to –89.8 percent in a 2°C world and –25.0 percent to 
complete loss for the studied species in a 4°C world. In Mexico, 
even common species are under threat, and great differences in 
species response (0.1–64 percent loss) to regional warming above 
1.5°C in 2050 even among related tree species (e.g., oak trees) are 
being projected (Gómez-Mendoza and Arriaga 2007).
Species Groups
Most studies on range contractions focus on single species or spe-
cies groups; fewer studies have attempted to project the impact 
of future climate change at the community or biome level. Rojas-
Soto et al. (2012) projected a reduction of 54–76 percent in the 
extent of the Mexican cloud forest with 2°C global warming by 
2050. They concluded that this reduction forces tree communities 
to move about 200 m to higher elevations. Similarly, Ponce-Reyes 
et al. (2012) projected a 68 percent loss of suitable area for cloud 
forests in Mexico with a global warming of 3°C by 2080. Alarm-
ingly, 90 percent of the cloud forest that is currently protected 
will not be climatically suitable for this ecosystem by 2080. As a 
consequence, climate change may lead to the extinction of 9 of 
the 37 vertebrate species restricted to Mexican cloud forests. With 
an increase of global mean temperature of 0.8–1.7°C by 2050, 
2–5 percent of mammal species, 2–4 percent of bird species, and 
1–7 percent of butterfly species in Mexico, as well as 38–66 per-
cent of plant species in the Brazilian Cerrado, would go extinct 
(Thomas et al. 2004). At a warming of 1.8–2.0°C, these values 
increase to 2–8 percent, 3–5 percent, and 3–7 percent respectively. 
With an increase in global mean temperature of greater than 2°C, 
44–79 percent of plant species in Amazonia are projected to go 
extinct (Thomas et al. 2004). 
Synthesis
Climate change induced negative effects on biodiversity, from 
range contractions to extinctions, are very likely in a warmer 
than 2°C world. Climate change impacts on local biodiversity by 
2100 will depend on the balance between the number of species 
abandoning an area and those facing local extinctions versus the 
number of species invading that same area due to thermal stress. 
Species and species communities are possibly threatened by range 
contractions, extinctions, predator/prey disruptions, and phenology 
changes due to climate and land use changes. Their opportunity 
to survive in this changing environment lies in their capacity to 
adapt to these new conditions or to migrate to avoid them. As the 
adaptive capacity of affected species and ecosystems is hard to 
project or quantify, models need to use simplified approaches as 
implemented in bioclimatic envelope models, species-distribution 
models, and dynamic global vegetation models. 
One clear trend regarding future warming levels is that the 
more temperatures are projected to increase, the more species 
diversity is affected. Mountainous regions in the tropics (e.g., cloud 
forests) are projected to become very vulnerable due to their high 
number of endemic and highly specialized species which might 
face mountaintop extinctions. Most models do not take biotic 
interactions (e.g., food-web interactions, species competition) and 
resource limitations into account. Therefore, the realized ecologi-
cal niche of species within an ecosystem might be much smaller 
than what is potentially possible according to climatic and other 
environmental conditions leading to shifts in ecological zones. 
3.4.5 Amazon Rainforest Dieback 
and Tipping Point
Old-growth rainforests in the Amazon basin store approximately 
100 billion tons of carbon in their biomass (Malhi et al. 2006; 
Saatchi et al. 2011). Through evapotranspiration, Amazon rainfor-
ests recycle 28–48 percent of precipitation and contribute to local 
rainfall (van der Ent et al. 2010). A loss of these forest ecosystems 
due to climate change would release an enormous amount of 
carbon into the atmosphere and reduce their evapotranspiration 
potential (thereby reducing  atmospheric moisture); this would lead 
to strong climate feedbacks (Betts et al. 2004; Costa and Pires 2010; 
Cox et al. 2004). These climate feedbacks, in combination with 
large-scale deforestation, put the Amazon rainforest on the list of 
potential tipping elments in the Earth system (Lenton et al. 2008). 
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Factors Leading to Forest Dieback 
and Potential Feedbacks
Observations of the Current Period
Current observations show that forests in Amazonia are adapted 
to seasonal drought (Davidson et al. 2012) mainly due to the 
ability to access deep soil water through deep rooting systems 
(Nepstad et al. 1994). It has been long debated, however, whether 
the productivity of tropical rainforests during the dry season is 
more limited by precipitation or by cloud cover. Depending on the 
method used, remote sensing or modeling, seasonal droughts were 
thought to enhance productivity either by more light entering the 
canopy through reduced cloud cover, or by the combined effects 
of several interconnected processes (Brando et al. 2010; Huete et al. 
2006). These findings have been challenged by remote sensing 
experts who ascribe greening effects to saturation of the satellite 
sensor used (Samanta et al. 2011) or to changes in the optical 
constellation of the sensor (near-infrared reflectance) (Morton 
et al. 2014). Recent evidence from a large-scale and long-term 
experiment suggests that the feedbacks between climatic extreme 
events such as droughts and forest fires increase the likelihood of 
an Amazon dieback (Brando et al. 2014).
Extreme weather events in the Amazon may have several causes. 
The drought events in 2005 and 2010 were not related to El Niño 
but rather to high Atlantic sea-surface temperatures (Marengo et al. 
2011). Cox et al. (2008) found the gradient between northern and 
southern tropical Atlantic lead to a warmer and drier atmosphere 
over the Amazon. Atypically low rainfall inflicted water stress on 
1.9 million km² (2005) and 3.0 million km² (2010) of forest area 
(Lewis et al. 2011). As a result, approximately 2.5 million km² 
(2005) and 3.2 million km² (2010) of forest area were affected by 
increased tree mortality and reduced tree growth due to water 
stress (Lewis et al. 2011). These two droughts are thought to have 
reversed the currently assumed role of the intact forest as a carbon 
sink and lead to decreased carbon storage of approximately 1.6 Pg 
carbon (2005) and 2.2 Pg carbon (2010) compared to non-drought 
years (Lewis et al. 2011; Phillips et al. 2009).34  The 2005 drought 
reversed a long-term carbon sink in 136 permanent measurement 
plots (Phillips et al. 2009). 
Two multi-year rainfall exclusion experiments in Caxiuanã and 
Tapajós National Forest generated remarkably similar results of 
drought-induced tree mortality. These experiments demonstrated 
that once deep soil water is depleted, wood production is reduced 
by up to 62 percent, aboveground net primary productivity declines 
by 41 percent, and mortality rates for trees almost double (Brando 
et al. 2008; Costa and Pires 2010; Nepstad et al. 2007). Thus, an 
increase in extreme droughts in the Amazon region (medium con-
fidence for Central South America in the IPCC SREX)(IPCC 2012) 
or a prolonged dry season (Fu et al. 2013) may have the potential 
34 The combination of reduced uptake of carbon due to the drought and loss of carbon 
due to drought induced tree mortality and decomposition committed over several years.
to cause large-scale forest dieback and to increase atmospheric 
CO2 concentrations.
Extreme drought events in combination with land use changes 
lead to an increased frequency in forest fires because the flamma-
bility of forests increases with a more open forest canopy (i.e., as 
it allows more radiation to dry out the forest surface and enhance 
fire spread) (Ray et al. 2005). Fires were twice as frequent in 2005 
as during the average of the previous seven years and they were 
spatially concentrated in the arc of deforestation in the southern 
Amazon (Zeng et al. 2008). Increasing fires resulting from defor-
estation, pasture renewal, and other land-use-related activities 
increase the vulnerability of the Amazon rainforest to fire and 
cause changes in forest composition and productivity (Brando et al. 
2012; Morton et al. 2013). This interplay of factors is thought to 
initiate a positive bidirectional feedback loop between fire and 
forest which could initialize forest transformation into savannahs 
and contribute to the Amazon tipping point (Nepstad et al. 2001, 
2008). Basin-wide measurements show that the combined effects 
of fire and drought can change the Amazon into a carbon source 
(e.g., with 0.48 PgC emitted in 2010); it remains carbon-neutral, 
meanwhile, during wet years (Gatti et al. 2014). 
Deforestation is feared to influence the lateral moisture transport 
from coastal to inland areas because convective precipitation is 
responsible for recycling precipitation locally. Walker et al. (2009) 
showed that the current distribution of conservation areas in the 
Amazon basin, which cover approximately 37 percent of the area, 
would be sufficient to maintain regional moisture transport and 
recycling of precipitation when considering different deforesta-
tion rates. Influences of dynamic vegetation on water fluxes and 
eventual carbon-climate feedbacks were not part of this study.
Future Projections
Water Stress
The Maximum Climatological Water Deficit (MCWD) (Aragão et 
al. 2007) is an indicator for drought intensity and plant water stress 
and correlates to tree mortality. For the period 2070–2099, 17 out 
of 19 GCMs project increased water stress for Amazon rainforests 
in a 3°C world (which implies a mean regional warming of 5°C) 
(Malhi et al. 2009). Ten of 19 GCM projections passed the 
approximate bioclimatic threshold from rainforest to seasonal forest 
(MCWD<–200 mm). Similarly, Zelazowski et al. (2011) projected water 
stress for forests to increase from 1980–2100 with an increase in global 
mean temperature of 2–4°C above pre-industrial levels. They found 
that humid tropical forests of Amazonia would retreat by 80 percent 
for two out of 17 GCMs. Seven other models projected at least a 
10 percent contraction of the current extent of humid tropical forest.
Changes in Forest Cover 
Hirota et al. (2010) simulated potential changes in Amazon for-
est cover. At a regional temperature increase of 2°C, forest cover 
decreased by 11 percent along with a 20 percent reduction in 
precipitation in the Western Amazon forest (66°W). At a regional 
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temperature increase of 4°C, forest cover loss was 80 percent 
independent of precipitation reduction. With fire included, tree 
cover was even further reduced. 
Cook and Vizy (2008) projected a 69 percent reduction in 
rainforest cover extent in a 4°C world. Cook et al. (2012) showed 
that, with a regional warming of 3–4°C (which corresponds to 
a mean global warming of 3°C), soil moisture was reduced by 
eight percent, leaf area index (i.e., corresponds to forest cover) 
decreased by 12.6 percent, and the land-atmosphere carbon flux 
increased by about 27.2 percent due to fire from 2070–2099 com-
pared to 1961–1990. Cox et al. (2004) showed that a 4°C world 
could lead to a forest cover decrease of 10–80 percent. This find-
ing was recently challenged by Good et al. (2013), who showed 
that an improved version of the Hadley model (HadGEM2-ES) 
projected only minimal changes in the Amazon forest extent due 
to forests surviving better in warmer and drier climates than pre-
viously thought. However, about 40 percent of the difference in 
forest dieback projections was associated with differences in the 
projected changes in dry-season length in the new simulations, 
as a result of improvements in the simulated autotrophic plant 
respiration, the soil moisture component, and a reduced gradient in 
the tropical Atlantic sea surface temperatures. This does not mean 
that the forest became more resilient in the updated model, but 
rather that the improved vegetation-climate feedback mechanisms 
impose less stress on the simulated forests so that tree mortality 
is reduced under warmer and drier climates (Good et al. 2013). In 
line with this, Cox et al. (2013) quantified a smaller risk (between 
1–21 percent) of Amazon dieback when constraining projections 
based on current observations of the atmospheric CO2 growth rate 
and assuming that the CO2 fertilization effect is large. 
Biomass Loss
Huntingford et al. (2013) showed that Amazon rainforest vegeta-
tion carbon generally increases in a 4°C world (and with regional 
temperature increases of up to 10°C). They conclude that there is 
evidence for forest resilience despite considerable uncertainties.
Previous studies, however, projected considerable losses in 
biomass. In a 4°C world, Huntingford et al. (2008) found that 
with a regional temperature increase of approximately 10°C from 
1860–2100, vegetation carbon was reduced by about 7 kgC per m2. 
Similarly, Fisher et al. (2010) simulated decreasing carbon stocks 
of 15–20 kgC per m2 in 1950, 2.6–27 kgC per m2 in 2050, and 
1–10 kgC per m2 in 2100 with a regional temperature increase of 
about 2–5°C from 1900–2100. Galbraith et al. (2010) found that 
vegetation carbon may either decrease or increase depending on 
the emissions scenario and vegetation model. In their simulations, 
vegetation carbon changed by –10 to +35 percent relative to 
1983–2002 with a regional warming of 4–8°C from 2003 to 2100.
Rammig et al. (2010) showed that including the CO2 fertiliza-
tion effect resulted in an increase in biomass in Eastern Ama-
zonia (EA) of 5.5–6.4 kgC per m2, in Northwestern Amazonia 
(NWA) of 2.9–5.5 kgC per m2, and in Southern Amazonia (SA) of 
2.1–4.3 kgC per m2  in a 3°C world (see also Vergara and Scholz 
2010). The probability of a dieback was zero percent for all regions 
in this case. In contrast, climate-only effects without the buffering 
CO2 fertilization effect resulted in biomass reduction in EA (–1.8 
to –0.6 kgC per m2), NWA (–1.2 to 0.6 kgC per m2), and SA (–3.3 
to –2.6 kgC per m2) (Figure 3.20). The probability of biomass 
loss without CO2 fertilization was projected to 86.4 percent (EA), 
85.9 percent (NWA), and 100 percent (SA). The probability of a 
dieback (>25 percent biomass loss) was projected to be 15.7 percent 
Figure 3.20: Simulated precipitation changes in Eastern Amazonia from the 24 IPCC-AR4 GCMs with regional warming levels of 
2–4.5 K (left panel). Simulated changes in biomass from LPJmL forced by the 24 IPCC-AR4 climate scenarios assuming strong 
CO2 fertilization effects (middle panel, CLIM+CO2) and no CO2 fertilization effects (CLIM only, right panel).
Source: Calculated from Rammig et al. (2010).
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(EA), 1.1 percent (NWA), and 61 percent (SA) (Rammig et al. 2010). 
These results imply that understanding the still uncertain strength 
of the CO2 fertilization effect is critical for an accurate prediction 
of the Amazon tipping point; it therefore urgently requires further 
empirical verification by experimental data from the Amazon region.
Deforestation and forest degradation, for example from selec-
tive logging (Asner et al. 2005), are also factors which crucially 
influence future changes in vegetation carbon. Gumpenberger et 
al. (2010) found relative changes in carbon stocks of –35 percent 
to +40 percent in a protection scenario without deforestation and 
–55 percent to –5 percent with 50 percent deforestation in a 4°C 
world. Poulter et al. (2010) found a 24.5 percent agreement of 
projections for a decrease in biomass in simulations with 9 GCMs 
in a 4°C world. 
Large-Scale Moisture Transport
Several studies show that changes in moisture transport and regional 
precipitation are strongly linked to deforestation. Costa and Pires 
(2010) found in simulation runs with a coupled climate-vegetation 
model that precipitation was reduced in 9–11 of 12 months under 
different deforestation scenarios (based on Soares-Filho et al. 2006). 
Sampaio et al. (2007) performed simulations with a coupled climate-
vegetation model for different agricultural regimes and deforesta-
tion scenarios of 20–100 percent for the Amazon basin (based on 
Soares-Filho et al. 2006). When replacing forest with pasture, they 
projected a 0.8°C increase in regional temperature and a 0.2 percent 
reduction in precipitation at 20 percent deforestation levels. At 40 per-
cent deforestation levels, regional temperatures increased by 1.7°C 
and precipitation was reduced by –2.2 percent. At 50–80 percent 
deforestation, regional temperatures increased by 1.8–2–1°C and 
precipitation decreased by 5.8–14.9 percent. When replacing forest 
with soybeans at 50 percent deforestation, regional temperatures 
increased by 2.9°C and precipitation decreased by 4.6 percent. At 
80–100 percent deforestation, regional temperatures increased by 
3.7–4.2°C and precipitation decreased by 19.2–25.8 percent.
Fire
Studies projecting future fires in the Amazon are still scarce. Fires 
are projected to increase along major roads in the southern and 
southwestern part of Amazonia with a 1.8°C global warming by 
2040–2050 (Silvestrini et al. 2011; Soares-Filho et al. 2012). High 
rates of deforestation would contribute to an increasing fire occur-
rence of 19 percent by 2050, whereas climate change alone would 
account for a 12 percent increase (Silvestrini et al. 2011). Drought 
and anthropogenic fire incidences could significantly increase the 
risk of future fires especially at the southern margin of the Amazon 
(Brando et al. 2014). If deforestation can be excluded in protected 
areas, future fire risk would be evenly reduced, emphasizing the 
management option to increase carbon storage when avoiding or 
reducing forest degradation (Silvestrini et al. 2011; Soares-Filho 
et al. 2012).
3.4.5.1 Synthesis
Intensive research efforts over the past decades have enormously 
improved the understanding and interaction of processes linking 
climate, vegetation dynamics, land-use change, and fire in the 
Amazon. However, the identification of the processes and the 
quantification of thresholds at which an irreversible approach 
toward a tipping point is triggered (e.g., a potential transition 
from forest to savannah) are still incomplete. 
Overall, the most recent studies suggest that the Amazon dieback 
is an unlikely, but possible, future for the Amazon region (Good 
et al. 2013). Projected future precipitation and the effects of CO2 
fertilization on tropical tree growth remain the processes with the 
highest uncertainty. Climate-driven changes in dry season length 
and recurrence of extreme drought years, as well as the impact of 
fires on forest degradation, add to the list of unknowns for which 
combined effects still remain to be investigated in an integrative 
study across the Amazon. A critical tipping point has been identified 
at around 40 percent deforestation, when altered water and energy 
feedbacks between remaining tropical forest and climate may lead 
to a decrease in precipitation (Sampaio et al. 2007). 
A basin-wide Amazon forest dieback caused by feedbacks 
between climate and the global carbon cycle is a potential tipping 
point of high impact. Such a climate impact has been proposed 
if regional temperatures increase by more than 4°C and global 
mean temperatures increase by more than 3°C toward the end of 
the 21st century. Recent analyses have, however, downgraded the 
probability from 21 percent to 0.24 percent for the 4°C regional 
warming level when coupled carbon-cycle climate models are 
adjusted to better represent the inter-annual variability of tropical 
temperatures and related CO2 emissions (Cox et al. 2013). This 
holds true, however, only when the CO2 fertilization effect is 
realized as implemented in current vegetation models (Rammig 
et al. 2010). Moreover, large-scale forest degradation as a result 
of increasing drought may already impair ecosystem services and 
functions without a forest dieback necessarily to occur.
3.4.6 Fisheries and Coral Reefs
3.4.6.1 Vulnerability to Climate Change
Significant impacts of human origin, such as changes in tempera-
ture, salinity, oxygen content, and pH levels, have been observed 
for the oceans over the past 60 years (Pörtner et al. 2014). Such 
changes can have direct and indirect impacts on fishery resources 
and food security (for example, as fish prey reacts sensitively to 
ocean acidification or habitat is lost due to coral reef degradation) 
(Turley and Boot 2010). 
The Humboldt Current System off the coast of Peru and Chile 
sustains one of the richest fisheries grounds in the world and 
is highly sensitive to climate variability such as that resulting 
from ENSO. The Eastern Pacific region’s fishery is dominated by 
catches of small pelagic fish which respond sensitively to changes 
9099_CH03.pdf   75 11/17/14   6:16 PM
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CONFRONTING THE NEW CLIMATE NORMAL
76
in oceanographic conditions. Peru and Colombia are among the 
eight countries whose fisheries are most vulnerable to climate 
change (Allison et al. 2009; Magrin et al. 2014).
The Caribbean Sea and parts of the South Atlantic, in contrast 
to the Eastern Pacific, sustain vast coral reefs (see Section 3.4.6.2, 
Coral Reefs). The Caribbean Sea sustains a more diverse but less 
productive fishery (UBC 2011). 
Uncertain Climate Change Effects on the 
Intensity of Coastal Upwelling
Several effects of climate change on upwelling and related ecosystem 
functioning have been hypothesized—and they point in opposite 
directions. One hypothesis is that a decrease in productivity may be 
driven by a globally warmer ocean in the future, as observed under 
El Niño conditions. However, sea-surface temperatures have not 
been observed to increase in the Humboldt Current System over the 
last 60 years (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2014). The hypothesis is further 
contradicted by data indicating higher productivity during warm inter-
glacial periods (Chavez and Messié 2009) and a projected weakening 
of trade winds and associated El Niño events (Bakun et al. 2010). 
However, particularly the latter projections are highly uncertain. As 
described in Section 2.3.2, El-Niño/Southern Oscillation, projections 
on the frequency and intensity of future El Niño events are uncertain. 
An increase in productivity, in turn, has been hypothesized to 
occur due to a stronger land-sea temperature gradient—the land 
surface warms faster than the ocean waters—leading to stronger 
winds driving stronger upwelling (Bakun 1990; Chavez and Messié 
2009). However, analysis has been unable to determine whether 
or not the recorded intensification of winds at the eastern sides 
of the world’s oceans is due to inconsistencies in measurement 
techniques over long time scales. Comparison with non-upwelling 
regions, however, indicates that the wind intensification is more 
pronounced in upwelling regions (Bakun et al. 2010). Analysis of 
changes in coastal biomass shows an upward trend of waters within 
the Humboldt Current System for 1998–2007, particularly for the 
Peruvian coast. In contrast, the southern part of the California Cur-
rent System (south of 30°N off the coast of Baja California) shows 
a negative trend (Demarcq 2009). Moreover, whether increased 
upwelling would lead to higher productivity depends on nutrient 
availability—and changing physical conditions may disturb the 
natural food web structure.
Physiological Effects of Ocean Acidification 
on Marine Species
The IPCC states with high confidence that rising CO2 levels will 
increasingly affect marine organisms (Pörtner et al. 2014). A meta-
analysis of 228 studies revealed overall negative impacts of ocean 
acidification not only on calcification but also on survival, growth, 
development, and abundance (Kroeker et al. 2013). Wittmann and 
Pörtner (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of existing studies to 
determine responses for a range of future CO2 concentrations. The 
ranges include 500–600 µatm, which is associated with warming 
of more than 2°C in 2100 and 851–1,370 µatm, which is associated 
with 4°C warming. They found differential responses for coral 
species, with 38 percent and 44 percent of all species studied 
exhibiting sensitivity to both scenarios. Echinoderms and mollusks 
both exhibit high sensitivity to ocean acidification as they have 
low metabolic rates and depend on calcium carbonate for shell 
formation. Wittmann and Pörtner (2013) stated that most species 
studied will be affected in a 4°C world, but that the effects will be 
visible before that. In fact, nearly 50 percent of all species studied 
show sensitivity to a 2°C warming. While crustaceans appear 
to be relatively resilient, with about a third of species affected 
in a 4°C scenario, the effects on fish are already significant in a 
relatively low CO2 concentration scenario; more than 40 percent 
of species are affected. This figure nearly doubles for the high 
scenario. However, Wittmann and Pörtner (2013) stress that their 
investigation into fish species´ sensitivity is biased toward reef fish. 
Species Interaction and Ecosystem Effects
It is important to note that the effects of ocean acidification do not 
act in isolation; rather, they act in concert with such changes as 
rising sea-surface temperatures, changes in salinity, and decreas-
ing nutrient availability due to enhanced stratification. These 
further interact with non-climatic pressures such as pollution and 
overfishing (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2014). For example, increasing 
temperatures may lead to a drastic narrowing of species’ thermal 
tolerance window—with effects such as delayed spawning migra-
tion or mortality (Pörtner and Farrell 2008). 
Sensitivity to ocean acidification can further narrow this toler-
ance window (Wittmann and Pörtner 2013). Such combined effects 
are to date little understood and knowledge remains limited due to 
limits on experimental settings and the limited ability to discern 
anthropogenic effects in a setting of high natural variability such 
as the Humboldt Current System (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2014). The 
expected synergistic effects of multiple pressures mean, however, 
that assessments remain conservative for a single or a subset of 
pressures (Wittmann and Pörtner 2013). 
A further potential risk factor for biological productivity and 
fisheries is the effect of climate-induced changes on species interac-
tion, which can occur due to the differential responses of species 
to changing environmental cues. For example, phytoplankton and 
zooplankton biomass changes may affect fish biomass (Taylor et al. 
2012b). Different sensitivities to increasing CO2 concentration 
may lead to remarkable shifts in species composition (Turley and 
Gattuso 2012). Similarly, asynchronous responses to warming 
may lead to mismatches in the predator-prey relationship. Such 
effects have been detected to modify species interactions at five 
trophic levels (Pörtner et al. 2014). For the Humboldt Current 
System, changes in the intensity of coastal upwelling add yet 
another factor that may endanger the balance of various species 
interactions. It has been hypothesized that the predator-prey 
relationship between phyto- and zooplankton could be disrupted 
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due to excessive offshore transportation of zooplankton. If in such 
a scenario overfishing would not allow for small pelagic fish to 
control phytoplankton growth, sedimentation of organic matter 
may contribute to hypoxia, red tides, and the accumulation of 
methane (Bakun et al. 2010). 
Projections of Changes to Coastal Upwelling
The direction and magnitude of upwelling changes remains 
uncertain, particularly for the Humboldt Current System. Wang 
et al. (2010) showed that results diverge for different models. 
With approximately 1.5°C global warming in 2030–2039, projec-
tions show an overall increase in the decadal averaged upwell-
ing index (July) for the California Current when compared to 
1980–1989 for most of the GCMs analyzed. For the Humboldt 
Current System, however, there is very little agreement among 
models both in terms of direction and magnitude of change. 
Wang et al. (2010) observed that the factors driving coastal 
upwelling systems are too local to be captured by the coarse 
resolution of global models. 
Projected Changes to Fisheries Catch Potential 
In response to changing oceanic conditions, including seawater 
temperature and salinity, fish stocks have been observed in, and 
are further expected to shift to, higher latitudes (Perry et al. 2005). 
This ultimately affects local fisheries in the tropics and subtropics. 
A further climate impact on the productivity of fisheries is the 
reduction in productivity at the base of the food chain due to the 
stronger stratification of warming waters (Behrenfeld et al. 2006). 
In fact, primary productivity has been shown to have declined by 
6 percent since the early 1980s (Gregg 2003). Declining pH levels 
and increasing hypoxia may further negatively impact fisheries 
(Cheung et al. 2011). 
No regional projections of future fishery catches appear to 
exist. A global study that considers the habitat preference of 
1,066 commercially caught species and projects changes to pri-
mary productivity computes the expected changes in fish species 
distribution and regional patterns of maximum catch potential by 
2055 in a scenario leading to warming of approximately 2°C in 
2050 (and 4°C by 2100) (Cheung et al. 2010). 
Results of Cheung et al. (2010) for LAC indicate a mixed picture 
(see Figure 3.21). Concurrent with the expectation of fish popula-
tions migrating poleward into colder waters, the waters further 
offshore of the southern part of the Latin American continent are 
expected to see an up to 100 percent increase in catch potential. 
Catch potentials are expected to decrease by 15–50 percent along 
the Caribbean coasts and by more than 50 percent off the Ama-
zonas estuary and the Rio de la Plata. Furthermore, the Caribbean 
waters and parts of the Atlantic coast of Central America are 
expected to see declines in the range of 5–50 percent, with the 
waters around Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto 
Rico, as well as Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia, and Barbados, 
particularly severely affected. Along the coasts of Peru and Chile, 
fish catch is projected to decrease by up to 30°percent, but there 
are also increases towards the south.
There are, however, inherent uncertainties in the projections 
presented here. Cheung et al (2010) pointed out that important 
factors, such as expected declines in ocean pH (ocean acidifica-
tion), direct human pressures, and local processes which escape 
the coarse resolution of global models, are not taken into account. 
Incorporating the effects of decreasing ocean pH and reduced oxygen 
availability in the northeast Atlantic yields catch potentials that 
are 20–30 percent lower relative to simulations not considering 
these factors (Cheung et al. 2011). 
Taking into consideration the effects of species interaction 
on redistribution and abundance, Fernandes et al. (2013) report 
latitudinal shifts in the North Atlantic to be 20 percent lower than 
reported by the bioclimatic envelope model developed by Cheung 
et al. (2010). A further limitation of the studies is that results are 
given as 10-year averages and consequently do not take into con-
sideration abrupt transitions as observed under El Niño conditions. 
It should also be noted that not all captured species are included 
in these calculations, with small-scale fisheries possibly not taken 
into account (Estrella Arellano and Swartzman 2010). Finally, it 
needs to be taken into account that local changes in fish population 
distribution are likely to affect the small-scale sector most severely, 
as artisanal fishers will not have the means to capture the benefits 
of higher productivity at higher latitudes further offshore. 
For the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Humboldt Current 
System, Blanchard et al. (2012) projected a 35 percent decline in 
Box 3.11: Freshwater Fisheries—
Vulnerability Factors to Climate 
Change
The freshwater fishery of the Amazon River is an important source 
of protein for the local population. According to the FAO, annual per 
capita fish consumption in the Amazon basin may exceed 30 kg, 
which is significantly higher than in areas remote from freshwater 
sources where consumption has been estimated at around 9 kg per 
person per year (FAO 2010). As such, the river and its hydrological 
network provide an important source of proteins and minerals for 
the local population. 
Those resources may be under threat from climate change 
(Ficke et al. 2007) as rising water temperatures may exceed species’ 
temperature tolerance window. In addition, warmer waters are asso-
ciated with higher toxicity of common pollutants (e.g., heavy metals) 
and lower oxygen solubility; this may negatively affect exposed 
organisms. In addition, “blackwaters” such as the Amazon varzèa 
lakes, depend on seasonal flooding for nutrient replenishment and 
for toxins to be flushed out. Reduced river flow and a reduced size 
of the flood plain may further lead to a reduced habitat for spawning 
(Ficke et al. 2007).
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phytoplankton and zooplankton density and similar magnitudes 
of change in the overall biomass of fish under 2°C global warming 
by 2050. Comparing the impacts of climate change with fishing 
pressure shows that climate impacts drive ecosystem change under 
low fishing rates (0.2yr–1); under heavy fishing pressure (0.8yr–1), 
climate effects become secondary. 
Fisheries are in many cases at risk due to high fishing pressure, 
with many commercially caught species already showing signs of 
overexploitation. Climate change, by locally limiting productivity, 
has the potential to further aggravate this situation. While sustain-
able fisheries management can significantly reduce the risks of 
fisheries collapse, the uncertainty of climate impacts adds to the 
challenge of establishing the quantity of fish that can be caught 
at sustainable levels (maximum sustainable yield). 
3.4.6.2 Coral Reefs
Coral reefs provide ecosystem services which are particularly 
important at the local level for subsistence fisheries and tourism 
sector income (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2007). Healthy coral reefs 
also help to dampen the impact of coastal storm surges through 
the reduction of wave energy (Villanoy et al. 2012). In the face 
of rising sea-surface temperatures and declining pH-levels (see 
Section 2.3.8) as well as in concert with local stressors such as 
pollution, coral reefs and the services they provide are particularly 
vulnerable to climate change.
Vulnerability of Coral Reefs to Climate Change
Coral reefs are particularly vulnerable to the double effects of 
climate change on the oceans: rising temperatures and declin-
ing pH levels. This vulnerability is particularly visible in events 
of coral bleaching, where external stresses cause corals to expel 
their symbiotic algae (Hoegh-Guldberg 1999). Severe or prolonged 
bleaching events are often followed by disease outbreaks and can 
cause coral mortality (Eakin et al. 2010). Bleaching events on a 
large scale (“mass bleaching”) have been linked to unusually 
high sea-surface temperatures, which exceed the temperature 
threshold of affected species. Other factors exerting stresses on 
coral reef systems which have been identified as causes for coral 
bleaching include pollution, overfishing, and the related shift in 
species composition (De’ath et al. 2012). 
A prolonged period of unusually high sea-surface temperatures 
across the Caribbean reefs for more than seven months in 2005 
caused the most extensive and most severe bleaching event recorded 
to date. Analyzing the concurrently high hurricane season during 
that period, Trenberth and Shea (2006) found that about half of the 
observed sea-surface temperature anomaly was linked to global 
warming. Following the warming events, bleaching continued in 
2006 and was accompanied by disease and mortality. Mortality 
reached 50 percent in a number of locations, with the strongest 
effects recorded in the northern and central Lesser Antilles and 
less severe cases in the waters of Venezuela. 
Figure 3.21: Change in maximum catch potential for Latin American and Caribbean waters.
Source: Cheung et al. (2010), Figure 1a. 
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Hurricanes, while posing a direct threat to coral reef structures, 
have also been found to cool the surrounding waters and thereby 
reduce the warming signal and the risk of severe bleaching (Eakin 
et al. 2010). The effect of hurricanes on coral reefs may thus be 
positive in the sense that vertical mixing and upwelling caused 
by tropical cyclones may reduce heat stress for coral reefs. This 
effect was reconstructed for the 2005 anomaly, for which Carrigan 
and Puotinen (2014) found that nearly 75 percent of the assessed 
area experienced cooling from tropical cyclones. They estimated 
that this lead to around a quarter of reefs not experiencing stresses 
above critical thresholds, outweighing the negative effects of direct 
damage (e.g., through breakage). While they pointed out that the 
relatively frequent occurrence of tropical cyclones may have sup-
ported the development of relatively resistant coral reef species, it 
remains unclear whether such resistance will persist in the face 
of a projected increase in the intensity and frequency of tropical 
cyclones, particularly as such developments would be concur-
rent with changes to ocean chemistry deleterious to coral reefs. 
Dove et al. (2013) point out that expected reductions in reef net 
calcification, associated with changes in ocean chemistry under a 
high atmospheric CO2 concentration, will significantly hinder the 
recovery of coral reefs after damages related to extreme events.
Projections of Climate Change Impacts on Coral Reefs
Based on observations and laboratory experiments, thresholds 
have been identified which enable the projection of risk of 
bleaching events in the future. The decrease in calcium carbon-
ate  saturation and concurrent pH levels poses another threat to 
reef-building corals (see Section 2.3.8). Taking into consideration 
both the projected decrease in the availability of calcium carbonate 
and increase in sea-surface temperatures, Meissner et al. (2012) 
projected that most coral reef locations in the Caribbean sea and 
western Atlantic will be subject to a 60–80 percent probability of 
annual bleaching events with 2°C warming by 2050, with areas at 
the coast of Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana being exposed 
to a 100 percent probability. In contrast, under 1.5°C warming by 
2050, most locations in the Caribbean sea have a comparably low 
risk of 20–40 percent probability of annual bleaching events, with 
the waters of Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana, and the north 
Pacific being at slightly higher risk (up to 60 percent probability). 
By the year 2100, almost all coral reef locations are expected 
to be subject to severe bleaching events occurring on an annual 
basis in a 4°C world. Exceptions are major upwelling regions, 
which experience a risk of 50 percent. Compared to impacts in the 
year 2050, the Caribbean sea experiences more locations under 
risk in 2100 despite no significant further increase in emissions 
and temperatures, highlighting the long-term impact of climate 
change on marine ecosystems even under emissions stabiliza-
tion. A potentially limiting assumption made by Meissner et al. 
(2012) is that no changes in the frequency or amplitude of El Niño 
events is expected.
The study from Meissner et al. (2012) is based on a single Earth 
System Model. Van Hooidonk et al. (2013) used a large ensemble 
of climate models to analyze the onset of bleaching conditions 
for different emissions scenarios. With warming leading to a 2°C 
world, the median year in which bleaching events start to occur 
annually is 2046. While this median applies to most regions within 
the Caribbean, some parts experience bleaching 5–15 years ear-
lier. These include the northern coast of Venezuela and Colombia 
as well as the coast of Panama. With warming leading to a 4°C 
world, the median year in which annual bleaching starts to occur 
is 2040 (with no earlier onset in the Caribbean region). Generally, 
the reefs in the northern waters of the Caribbean Sea appear to be 
less sensitive than those in the south. However, as Caldeira (2013) 
points out, those reefs at the higher latitude fringes of the tropical 
coral range (both north and south of the tropics) are likely to be 
more heavily affected by ocean acidification. 
Buddemeier et al. (2011) computed coral losses in the Caribbean 
for three different scenarios, which would lead to a 2°C, 3°C, and 
4°C world by 2100. Temperature trajectories diverge around 2050, 
by which time warming reaches about 1.2°C. A comparison of 
all trajectories shows little difference between scenarios in terms 
of coral cover. By 2020, live coral reef cover is projected to have 
halved from its initial state. By the year 2050, live coral cover is 
less than five percent; in 2100, it is less than three percent, with 
no divergence among emissions scenarios. Notably, a 5–10 per-
cent live coral cover is assumed as the threshold below which 
the ecosystem no longer represents a coral reef (but is instead a 
shallow-water ecosystem that contains individual coral organ-
isms). Assuming a scenario in which corals are able to adapt by 
gaining an additional 1°C of heat tolerance, the loss of live coral 
cover below five percent is prolonged by around 30 years. Bud-
demeier et al. (2011) noted that results can be extrapolated for 
the wider Southeast Caribbean, albeit with the caveat that the 
assumed high mortality rate of 50 percent was lower in regions 
outside the Virgin Islands. 
The modeling projections of future bleaching events and loss 
of coral cover presented above are based on changes in marine 
chemistry and thermology. While the adaptive potential of coral 
reef species remains uncertain, it should be noted that further 
impacts impeding the resilience of coral reefs are not included 
in these future estimates. These include potential impacts that 
are likely to change in frequency and/or magnitude under future 
warming, such as hurricanes and the variability of extreme tem-
peratures. Taking these uncertainties into account, Buddemeier 
et al. (2011) concluded that the presented projections are likely 
unduly optimistic, which leads the authors to predict that the 
“highly diverse, viable reef communities in the Eastern Caribbean 
seem likely to disappear within the lifetime of a single human 
generation.” According to some estimates, a 90 percent loss of 
coral reef cover would lead to direct economic losses of $8.712 
billion (2008 value) (Vergara et al. 2009).
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Overall, while there are limitations to the projections of the 
state of coral reefs in the future, a bleak picture emerges from the 
available studies. Irrespective of the sensitivity threshold chosen, 
and indeed irrespective of the emissions scenario, by the year 2040 
Caribbean coral reefs are expected to experience annual bleaching 
events. This is in accordance with Frieler et al. (2012) showing 
that, at the global scale, the global mean temperature at which 
almost 90 percent of coral reefs are at risk of extinction is 1.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels. 
3.4.6.3 Synthesis
The rich fishery grounds of the Humboldt Current System in the 
Eastern Pacific react strongly to fluctuations in oceanic condi-
tions related to the El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO), during 
which the upwelling of nutrient-rich waters is suppressed by the 
influx of warm surface waters. Together with ocean acidification 
and hypoxia, which are very likely to become more pronounced 
under high-emissions scenarios, the possibility of more extreme 
El Niño events pose substantial risks to the world’s richest fishery 
grounds. Irrespective of single events, the gradual warming of 
ocean waters has been observed and is further expected to affect 
fisheries particularly at a local scale. Generally, fish populations 
are migrating poleward towards colder waters. Projections taking 
into consideration such responses indicate an increase of catch 
potential by up to 100 percent in the south of Latin America. Off the 
coast of Uruguay, the southern tip of Baja California and southern 
Brazil the maximum catch potential is projected to decrease by 
more than 50 percent. Caribbean waters may see declines in the 
range of 5–50 percent, with the waters around Cuba, Haiti, the 
Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico, as well as Trinidad and 
Tobago, St Lucia, and Barbados, particularly severely affected. Along 
the coasts of Peru and Chile, fish catch is projected to decrease by 
up to 30°percent, but there are also increases towards the south.
It stands to reason that the communities directly affected by 
local decreases in maximum catch potential would not gain from 
catch potentials increasing elsewhere. They may also be the ones 
whose livelihoods would be most affected by the expected deleteri-
ous effects of ocean acidification and warming on tropical coral 
reefs. Irrespective of the sensitivity threshold chosen and indeed 
irrespective of the emissions scenario, by the year 2040 Caribbean 
coral reefs are expected to experience annual bleaching events. 
While some species and particular locations appear to be more 
resilient to such events than others, it is clear that the marine 
ecosystems of the Caribbean are facing large-scale changes with 
far reaching consequences for associated livelihood activities as 
well as for the coastal protection provided by healthy coral reefs.
3.4.7 Human Health
The main human health risks in Latin America and the Caribbean 
include vector-borne diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, 
leishmaniasis, and fascioliasis, and food- and water-borne diseases 
such as cholera and childhood diarrheal disease. Many of these 
diseases have been found to be sensitive to changes in weather 
patterns brought about by ENSO. This indicates that disease 
transmission in LAC could prove highly responsive to changes in 
temperature and precipitation patterns induced by climate change. 
Extreme weather events, including heat waves, hurricanes, floods, 
and landslides, also cause injuries and fatalities in Latin America, 
and these in turn can lead to outbreaks of disease.
3.4.7.1 Vector-Borne Diseases
Dengue fever is widespread in Latin America, with much of the 
region providing highly suitable climatic conditions to the primary 
mosquito vector, Aedes aegypti. There has recently been a reemer-
gence and marked increase in the incidence of dengue fever and 
dengue haemorrhagic fever in countries that had been declared 
free of the illness following successful elimination programs in 
the 1950s and 1960s (Tapia-Conyer et al. 2009). 
Climate change is expected to play a contributing role in 
determining the incidence of the disease (Confalonieri et al. 2007), 
although it is often difficult to separate the impact of climate 
change from the impacts of urbanization and population mobil-
ity (Barclay 2008). In Brazil, the country with the largest number 
of cases in the world, a greater intensity of transmission of the 
disease has been observed during the hot, rainy months of the 
year (Teixeira et al. 2009). Between 2001–2009 in Rio de Janeiro, 
a 1°C increase in monthly minimum temperature was associated 
with a 45 percent increase in dengue fever cases the following 
month, and a 10 mm increase in precipitation with a 6 percent 
increase (Gomes et al. 2012). Analysis from Mexico points to a 
correlation between increases in the number of reported cases 
and increases in rainfall, sea-surface temperature, and weekly 
minimum temperature (Hurtado-Diaz et al. 2007). A study in 
Puerto Rico, based on analysis of a 20-year period, likewise finds 
a positive relationship between monthly changes in temperature 
and precipitation and monthly changes in dengue transmission 
(Johansson et al. 2009). Projections by Colon-Gonzalez et al 
(2013), holding all other factors constant, point to an upsurge in 
dengue incidence in Mexico of 12 percent by 2030, 22 percent by 
2050, and 33 percent by 2080 with a warming scenario leading to 
a 3°C world in 2100; or 18 percent by 2030, 31 percent by 2050, 
and 40 percent by 2080 with a warming scenario leading to a 4°C 
world by 2100. In general, increases in minimum temperatures 
play the most decisive role in influencing dengue incidence, with 
a sharp increase observed when minimum temperatures reach or 
exceed 18°C (Colon-Gonzales et al. 2013).
It appears, however, that climatic conditions alone cannot 
account for rates of disease occurrence. Based on temperature-based 
mechanistic modeling for the period 1998–2011, Carbajo et al.(2012) 
found that temperature can estimate annual transmission risk 
but cannot adequately explain the occurrence of the disease on a 
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national scale; geographic and demographic variables also appear 
to play a critical role. 
Malaria is endemic in Latin America, and rates of transmission 
have increased over recent decades. This resurgence is associated 
in part with local environmental changes in the region, such as 
extensive deforestation in the Amazon basin (Moreno 2006). 
Periodic epidemics have also been associated with the warm 
phases of ENSO (Arevalo-Herrera et al. 2012; Mantilla et al. 2009; 
Poveda et al. 2011). 
It is possible that high temperatures could cause malaria to 
spread into high altitude cities (e.g., Quito, Mexico City) where 
it has not been seen for decades (Moreno 2006). Evidence shows 
an increasing spread of malaria to higher elevations in northwest 
Colombia during the last three decades due to rising temperatures, 
indicating high risks under future warming (Siraj et al. 2014). 
The connection between malaria and climate change, however, 
is unclear given the complexity of factors involved. Indeed, it is 
likely that the effect of climate change on malaria patterns will 
not be uniform. While incidence could increase in some areas, it 
is also possible that it may decrease in others—for example, in the 
Amazon, in Central America, and elsewhere where decreases in 
precipitation are projected (Haines et al. 2006) (see Section 3.3.3, 
Regional Precipitation Projections).
Caminade et al. (2014) projected a lengthening of the malaria 
transmission season in the highlands of Central America and 
southern Brazil by the 2080s, but a shortening in the tropical 
regions of South America. This spatial differentiation is signifi-
cantly more pronounced with warming leading to a 4°C world 
than to a 2°C world. 
Earlier projections, however, offer mixed results. Béguin et al. 
(2011) projected an expansion of malarial area by 2050 in Brazil 
and isolated areas near the west coast of the continent under 
approximately 2°C of global warming, although this is only if 
climatic and not socioeconomic changes are taken into account. 
Van Lieshout et al. (2004), in contrast, found reductions in the 
size of the population exposed to malaria for at least three months 
of the year in all the scenarios they considered, and a reduction 
in exposure to malaria for at least one month of the year in a 4°C 
world (but not in a 3°C world). This study, meanwhile, projects 
an expansion of the malarial zone southward beyond its current 
southernmost distribution in South America—a finding consistent 
with Caminade et al. (2014).
Leishmaniasis is a skin disease carried by sandflies that takes 
two main forms: cutaneous and visceral. Both are found through 
much of the Americas from northern Argentina to southern Texas, 
excluding the Caribbean states (WHO 2014). A spatial analysis by 
Valderrama-Ardilla et al. (2010) of a five-year outbreak of cutaneous 
leishmaniasis in Colombia beginning in 2003 identified temperature 
as a statistically significant variable. The study concluded, however, 
that climatic variables alone could not explain the spatial variation 
of the disease. A positive association has been reported between 
the ENSO cycle and annual incidence of cutaneous leishmaniasis in 
Colombia (Gomez et al. 2006) and visceral leishmaniasis in Brazil 
(Franke et al. 2002). A study from Colombia of both types of the 
disease also identified an increase in occurrence during El Niño and 
a decrease during La Niña (Cardenas et al. 2006). These findings 
suggest that an increased frequency of drought conditions is likely 
to increase the incidence of leishmaniasis (Cardenas et al. 2006). 
Fascioliasis, a disease caused by flatworms and carried by snails 
as an intermediate host, is a major human health problem in the 
Andean countries of Bolivia, Peru, Chile, and Ecuador (Mas-Coma 
2005). Cases have also been reported in Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, 
Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala, and Cuba (Mas-Coma et al. 2014). The 
host infection incidence of fascioliasis is strongly dependent on 
weather factors, including air temperature, rainfall, and/or potential 
evapotranspiration. Temperature increases associated with climate 
change may lead to higher infection and transmission rates and cause 
an expansion of the endemic zone, while increases in precipitation 
could, for example, increase the contamination risk window presently 
linked to the November-April rainy season (Mas-Coma et al. 2009).
3.4.7.2 Food- and Water-Borne Diseases
Cholera is transmitted primarily by fecal contamination of food 
and water supplies. Outbreaks are therefore often associated with 
warm temperatures, flooding, and drought, all of which can aid 
contamination. Climatic variables have been shown to be decisive 
in determining the extent of outbreaks (Koelle 2009). A recent 
study of the relationship between rainfall and the dynamics of the 
cholera epidemic in Haiti, for example, shows a strong relationship 
whereby increased rainfall is followed by increased cholera risk 
4–7 days later (Eisenberg et al. 2013). In South America, ENSO can 
be a driving factor in cholera outbreaks in coastal areas because 
the El Niño phase provides warm estuarine waters with levels of 
salinity, pH, and nutrients suitable for the blooming of the V. Chol-
erae pathogen (Martinez-Urtaza et al. 2008; Salazar-Lindo 2008).
Rates of childhood diarrheal disease have also been shown to 
be influenced by ambient temperature—and by ENSO in particular. 
This was observed during the 1997–1998 El Niño event in Peru. 
During that particularly warm winter, in which ambient tempera-
tures reached more than 5°C above normal, hospital admissions for 
diarrheal disease among children increased by 200 percent over the 
previous rate (Checkley et al. 2000). The relative risk of diarrheal 
disease in South America is expected to increase by 5–13 percent for 
the period 2010–39 with 1.3°C warming, and by 14–36 percent for the 
period 2070–99 with 3.1°C warming (Kolstad and Johansson 2011).
3.4.7.3 Impacts of Extreme Temperature Events
Unusually high or low temperatures can potentially increase 
morbidity and mortality, particularly in vulnerable groups such as 
the elderly and the very young. A strong correlation has been found 
between unusually cold periods and excess deaths in Santiago, 
Chile, for example. In a time-series regression analysis, Muggeo 
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and Hajat (2009) estimated a 2.4 percent increase in all-cause 
deaths among the above-65 age group for every 1°C decrease 
below a cold threshold identified in their model. Cold-related risks 
to human health would therefore be reduced if climate change 
results in a reduction in extreme cold events.
Urban populations tend to be the most vulnerable to extreme 
heat events due to the urban heat island effect, in which the 
built environment amplifies temperatures. In northern Mexico, 
heat waves have been correlated with increases in mortality rates 
(Mata and Nobre 2006); in Buenos Aires, 10 percent of summer 
deaths are associated with heat strain (de Garin and Bejaran 
2003). Excessive heat exposure can cause or exacerbate a range 
of health conditions, including dehydration, kidney disease, and 
cardiovascular and respiratory illnesses (Kjellstrom et al. 2010). 
Increased rates of hospital admissions of kidney disease patients 
have been documented during heat waves (Kjellstrom et al. 2010). 
Heat stress has been identified as a particular danger for work-
ers in Central America and one that coincides with high rates of 
kidney disease in some populations (Kjellstrom and Crowe 2011). 
3.4.7.4 Impacts of Flooding and Landslides
Torrential rain and resulting floods are among the main natural 
hazards in the region and cause widespread injury and loss of 
life, livelihood, and property (Mata and Nobre 2006). Catastrophic 
flooding has affected Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, Chile, 
Argentina, and Uruguay in recent years (WHO/WMO 2012). Flood-
ing can have multiple indirect health impacts, including the spread 
of water-borne disease through water supply contamination and 
via the creation of stagnant pools that serve as habitats for disease 
vectors such as malaria and dengue mosquitoes. Landslides and 
mudslides can also be a consequence of flooding; these tend to 
be exacerbated by factors such as deforestation and poor urban 
planning. Flash floods and landslides are a particular danger for 
informal settlements located on steep slopes and on alluvial plains 
(Hardoy and Pandiella 2009).
Glacial lake outburst floods (see Box 3.4) also pose a risk to 
populations located in the Andean region (Carey et al. 2012). The 
historical impacts of glacial lake outburst floods in Peru’s Cordillera 
Blanca mountain range illustrate the potential for catastrophic loss of 
life during periods of glacial retreat; many thousands of deaths have 
resulted from flooding, most notably in incidents in 1941, 1945, and 
1950 (Carey et al. 2012). The projection of further glacial melting in 
the Andes (see Section 3.4.1, Glacial Retreat and Snowpack Changes) 
means that flooding continues to pose a risk to human populations.
3.4.7.5 Synthesis
The literature on the potential climate change impacts on human 
health in the LAC region shows increased risks of morbidity 
and mortality caused by infectious disease and extreme weather 
events. Observed patterns of disease transmission associated with 
different parts of the ENSO cycle seem to offer valuable clues as 
to how changes in temperature and precipitation might affect the 
incidence of a particular disease in a particular location. 
Projections of how malaria incidence in LAC could be affected 
by climate change over the rest of the century are somewhat 
inconsistent, with some studies pointing to increased incidence and 
others to decreased incidence. Such uncertainty also characterizes 
studies of the relationship between climate change and malaria 
globally and reflects the complexity of the environmental factors 
influencing the disease. Little quantitative data is available on the 
future impacts of extreme weather events on human health, although 
studies based on historical data, such as that of Muggeo and Hajat 
(2009), have revealed a link between extreme temperatures and 
increased rates of mortality in vulnerable sub-populations.
3.4.8 Migration
While migration is not a new phenomenon in the region, it is 
expected to accelerate under climate change. There are many 
areas in LAC prone to extreme events, including droughts, floods, 
landslides, and tropical cyclones, all of which can induce migra-
tion. Faced with severe impacts, migration might seem like the 
only option for finding alternative livelihoods (Andersen et al. 
2010). However, migration typically causes an economic strain on 
both internal and external migrants (Raleigh et al. 2008), and not 
everyone whose livelihood is threatened can afford to migrate. 
The very poorest who do not have the necessary resources to 
migrate can get trapped in a situation of ever-increasing poverty.
The transition from temporary to permanent migration resulting 
from climate events can be facilitated by the existence of strong 
migration ties and networks (e.g., between LAC and the United 
States) (Deprez 2010). There are also important pull factors, which 
have been a major determinant of emigration in the past, including 
more and better paid job opportunities and better access to services. 
They incentivize migration, particularly to North America or to 
countries within LAC with stronger economies. The question to 
be assessed over time is whether climate change will make push 
factors more important than pull factors.
The scientific literature on the interaction between migration and 
climate change is limited in terms of future projections. There is, 
however, a growing body of literature on the demographic, economic, 
and social processes of the interactions of climate and migration 
(Piguet et al. 2011; Tamer and Jäger 2010). Migration is considered 
an adaptive response to maintain livelihoods under conditions of 
change. Assunção and Feres (2009) show that an increase in poverty 
levels by 3.2 percent through changes in agricultural productivity 
induced by regional warming of 1.5°C in 2030–2049 is reduced to 
two percent if sectoral and geographic labor mobility is allowed 
for. This means that migration can reduce the potential impact of 
climate change on poverty (Andersen et al. 2010).
The projections of environmentally-induced migration agree 
that most of the movement is likely to occur within the same 
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country or region (Deprez 2010). The largest trend in migration 
continues to be major movements from rural areas to urban areas. 
Given the well-established migration channels between most LAC 
countries and the United States, however, the impacts of climate 
change may increase South-North migration flows.
There are no official statistics to show how many migrants 
in LAC are moving in response to climate-related or other envi-
ronmental factors (Andersen et al. 2010). Although functioning 
as an adaptive strategy, environmentally-induced migration has 
strong negative impacts on transitory areas and final destinations. 
For example, the International Organization for Migration reports 
that “rapid and unplanned urbanization has serious implications 
for urban welfare and urban services”, particularly in cities with 
“limited infrastructure and absorption capacity” (IOM 2009). For 
areas of origin, the general consensus for LAC seems to be that the 
impact of environmentally induced migration is overwhelmingly 
negative (Deprez 2010).
3.4.8.1 Drought
The effects of drought on migration have not been fully researched. 
Perch-Nielsen et al. (2008) explained that drought is the “most 
complex and least understood natural hazard,” and that there 
are a number of adaptive measures households might take before 
resorting to migration. Nevertheless, scenarios based on projec-
tions of Mexico–United States migration rates (Feng et al. 2010) 
and of Brazilian internal migration (Barbieri et al. 2010) suggest 
that drought will lead to increased emigration along established 
migration routes and the depopulation of rural areas (Faist and 
Schade 2013). Other examples of drought-induced migration 
include the flow of migrants from Brazil’s and Argentina’s north-
east regions to the state capitals and to the south-central regions 
(Andersen et al. 2010). Examples indicate that drought-induced 
migration is already occurring in some regions. In Northeastern 
Brazil, a primarily agricultural region, spikes in the rate of migra-
tion to rapidly growing coastal cities or to the country’s central 
and southern regions have been observed following decreases in 
crop yields in years of severe drought (Bogardi 2008). Barbieri 
et al. (2010) projected emigration rates in Brazil from rural areas 
and found that depopulation is expected to occur—especially with 
increasing temperatures. This study, meanwhile, finds the biggest 
increase in migration coming from productive agricultural areas 
that support a large labor force. 
3.4.8.2 Sea-Level Rise and Hurricanes
Projections considering the impacts of sea-level rise on migration 
in Latin America and the Caribbean are sparse (Deprez 2010). 
There is more research, however, on the impact of hurricanes. 
Although projections posit that migration resulting from hurricanes 
will continue to be mostly temporal and internal (Andersen et al. 
2010), stronger hurricane impacts in the Caribbean will increas-
ingly drive households that have repeatedly suffered from these 
events to consider permanent domestic, regional, or international 
migration (ECLAC 2001). In 1998, Hurricane Mitch affected sev-
eral Central American countries and displaced up to two million 
people either temporarily or permanently. The impact was highly 
differentiated by country, with much lower displacement rates in 
Belize compared to Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador, and a 
300 percent increase in international emigration from Honduras 
(Glantz and Jamieson 2000; McLeman and Hunter 2011). Although 
the number of migrants has decreased over time, it has so far 
remained above the level prior to the hurricane (McLeman 2011).
3.4.8.3 Exacerbating Factors
The largest level of climate migration is likely to occur in areas 
where non-environmental factors (e.g., poor governance, political 
persecution, population pressures, and poverty) are already present 
and already putting migratory pressures on local populations. In addi-
tion, poverty and an unequal geographical population distribution 
heighten people’s vulnerability to biophysical climate change impacts, 
thus compounding the potential for further migration (Deprez 2010).
3.4.8.4 Social Effects of Climate-Induced Migration
Similar to traditional migrants, climate migrants with more edu-
cation and skills are able to benefit the most from migration. 
Benefits to migrants and their families can include, for example, 
the possibility of finding better jobs. But migration can also have 
a strong negative social impact on those who stay behind, par-
ticularly on the poorest who typically do not have the resources 
to migrate and therefore risk being trapped in an adverse situation 
with limited coping strategies (Andersen et al. 2010). In addition, 
climate-change-induced labor migration can have implications 
on families left behind (e.g., challenges to children resulting 
from being raised in single parent homes with limited economic 
resources). In addition, climate change may induce greater levels 
of female migration; in the context of gender-based discrimination, 
these women may face more challenges settling down and finding 
adequate housing and stable jobs (Deprez 2010).
Labor migration can also provide benefits to migrants and 
their families. Migration can generate an increase in a family’s 
financial assets, as work in the new location often pays better. 
This contributes to better living conditions if the family is able to 
migrate together or generates remittances that can be sent back 
to help the family left behind. 
Despite some benefits, climate migrants face significant risks. 
For example, the cost of migration (including travel, food, and 
housing) can be very high and result in a worse financial situa-
tion for the family. There is also evidence that migrants’ working 
and housing standards can, in some cases, be very poor (such 
as in marginalized areas, informal settlements, and slums) with 
possible negative effects on health (Andersen et al. 2010). Further, 
migrants who do not have networks or social capital in their new 
location can be socially isolated or discriminated against, resulting 
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in tensions or conflict. In addition, ties to families and networks 
in the communities of origin may deteriorate while they are away 
(Andersen et al. 2010). 
In the case of climate-related evacuations, the social effects 
are mostly negative (see Box 3.12: Distress Migration during Hur-
ricane Mitch). These include serious damage to physical assets 
(e.g., housing and livestock), and to other natural resources in 
the community of origin. In many cases, natural disasters can also 
contribute to financial and health problems (Andersen et al. 2010). 
Migration contributes strongly to structural and sociodemo-
graphic change in LAC cities. Migrants tend to come from similar 
locations and settle in the same areas which usually are marginal 
areas in urban areas where they might have social capital or 
social networks (Vignoli 2012). This contributes to creating social 
vulnerability to climate change by increasing spatial segregation 
at the destination, or by modifying social networks of migrant 
households in their origin (Pinto da Cunha 2011; Vignoli 2012). 
As a result, immigrant populations may lack the knowledge 
of disaster risk management plans, especially if they are new 
to urban areas and had not encountered disaster management 
plans in the rural areas where they migrated from (Adamo 2013). 
3.4.9 Human Security
The LAC region is considered to be at low risk of armed conflict, 
with the incidence of armed conflicts declining substantially in 
the last 15 years (Rubin 2011). With the downfall of many military 
regimes in the 1980s, and continued economic integration, the 
region has achieved relative stability (Rubin 2011). However, in 
the context of high social and economic inequalities and migration 
flows across countries, disputes regarding access to resources, 
land, and wealth are persistent. 
Several countries in the region have also faced political 
instability in the past few years. For example, Bolivia has seen 
some internal social movements calling for the independence of 
some regions; and there are important challenges related to the 
drug trade which has become increasingly violent, particularly in 
Mexico (Necco Carlomagno 2012). In fact, the activities of criminal 
groups and organized crime syndicates in countries like Brazil 
and Mexico are a major source of some of the most significant 
conflicts (Rubin 2011).
Climate change could aggravate these situations, further 
increasing conflicts over the use of resources. Socioeconomic 
disparities could be exacerbated, and in the worst case scenario, 
government capacities could be insufficient to face these along 
with natural disasters and climate-related challenges (McLeman 
2011). In some Latin American countries where criminal organi-
zations already have significant power, such security gaps can 
enable them to increase their influence, further weakening the 
capacity of the state (Carius and Maas 2009). It is important 
to note that in the past, environmental degradation has often 
been used as a pretext for conflicts that are in fact caused by 
underlying ethnic tensions and injustices associated with an 
unequal geographical distribution of the population and income 
inequality (Deprez 2010).
In this context, Rubin (2011) suggests four ways in which 
climate change could increase the risk of conflict in LAC:
• More resource scarcity. Climate change is likely to exacerbate 
resource scarcities. Increasing scarcity of food, water, forests, 
energy, and land could intensify competition over the remaining 
resources, triggering internal unrest and even border conflicts.
• More migration. The LAC region has important migration 
dynamics that are being exacerbated by climate change as 
households face increased resource scarcities, rising sea levels, 
and more (and more intense) natural disasters. Larger flows 
of migrants could potentially destabilize destination countries.
• Increasing instability. Climate change and variability may 
undermine the capacity of the state by increasing the cost of 
infrastructure in remote rural areas, limiting the reach of the 
state. This could be aggravated by the rising costs of disaster 
management (e.g., an increase in the level of agricultural 
subsidies needed to maintain adequate food production) as 
well as by the general need for increased adaptation spending. 
These limits in state capacity might result in a weakening of 
the relationship between the state and its citizens. 
• Increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters. The 
chaotic conditions that follow in the wake of natural disasters 
may provide opportunities for rebel groups to challenge the 
government’s authority. 
The empirical literature is inconclusive regarding the linkages 
between climate change and an increasing risk of conflict globally. 
Box 3.12: Distress Migration during 
Hurricane Mitch
A typical example of distress migration took place when Hurricane 
Mitch struck Central America in 1998. Honduras evacuated 45,000 
citizens from Bay Island. The government of Belize issued a red alert 
and asked citizens on offshore islands to leave for the mainland. 
Much of Belize City was evacuated. Guatemala issued a red alert 
as well. By the time Mitch made landfall those evacuated along 
the western Caribbean coastline included 100,000 in Honduras, 
10,000 in Guatemala, and 20,000 in the Mexican state of Quintana 
Roo. Despite this, nearly 11,000 people were killed and more than 
11,000 were still missing by the end of 1998. In all, 2.7 million were 
left homeless or missing. The flooding caused damage estimated 
at over $5 billion (1998 dollars; $6.5 billion in 2008 dollars). Source: 
Andersen et al. (2010). 
9099_CH03.pdf   84 11/17/14   6:16 PM
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
85
Rubin (2011) suggests, however, that while resource scarcity in isola-
tion from other socioeconomic factors does not necessarily increase 
the risk of conflict, it often acts as a catalyst or driver, amplifying the 
existing (often traditional) causes of conflict. In this sense, Haldén 
(2007) notes that disparities in standards of living and income can 
be problematic for several reasons: (1) disparities and divisions 
might by themselves impede growth and undermine adaptation 
strategies; (2) substantial inequality might also destabilize societ-
ies and increase the risk of conflict in the light of climate change 
and variability; and (3) the differences between large segments of 
the populations imply that climate change will have very unequal 
impacts on the population, further exacerbating tensions. This is 
particularly relevant in the LAC region, which has one of the most 
unequal income distributions in the world (Fereira et al. 2013).
Large inequalities among groups (differentiated along ethnic, 
religious, political, or geographical lines) increase the risk of violent 
conflict and high individual income inequality is a driver of crime 
(Dahlberg and Gustavsson 2005; Fajnzylber et al. 2002; Østby 2007). 
In the case of Bolivia, for example, highly unequal distributions of 
natural resources create tensions among regions. In response to the 
nationalization of gas and oil reserves, the resource-rich regions 
of Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando (comprising 35 percent of 
the Bolivian population) unsuccessfully sought autonomy. Violent 
disputes erupted between the government and the regions seeking 
autonomy (Rubin 2011); this has since subsided due to the 2010 
Autonomies Law and other agreements.
Relatively small populations can have a tremendous impact on 
the environment (Hoffman and Grigera 2013). There are examples–
notably in the Amazon basin—where the rural poor have turned 
to illicit extractive activities (e.g., illegal logging) because they 
lack legal or formal alternatives. The effects of climate change 
and environmental degradation, along with the rapid growth of 
the extractive industry, is expected to take the greatest toll on the 
most vulnerable—small-hold farmers, indigenous populations, and 
the poor (Hoffman and Grigera 2013). The resulting increase in 
resource competition, (particularly for water and land)—together 
with increasing market pressure on landholders with tenuous legal 
tenure—is expected to exacerbate existing inequities and tensions 
surrounding the proper and equitable allocation of the region’s 
natural wealth (Hoffman and Grigera 2013).
Climate change could also increase violence in small com-
munal or household settings. One example is gender-based vio-
lence, which is already widespread in Latin America (Morrison 
et al. 2004). Although there is little research on this topic, there 
are some studies (e.g., Harris and Hawrylyshyn 2012) which 
indicate that climate change (by transforming livelihoods and 
social structures) could spur social violence in non-conflict 
situations. Moser and Rogers (2005) showed how rapid socio-
economic changes might have a destabilizing effect not only on 
societies but also within families, leading to an increased risk 
of domestic violence.
3.4.10 Coastal Infrastructure
Coastal areas, infrastructure, and cities are all vulnerable to cli-
mate change. This is particularly true for the Caribbean region 
due to its low-lying areas and the population’s dependence on 
coastal and marine economic activities (Bishop and Payne 2012). 
Tropical cyclones and sea-level rise represent the main risks as 
their combination can severely affect economic development (and 
have generated significant losses and damages in past decades). 
For example, category 5 Tropical Cyclone Ike generated approxi-
mately $19 billion in damages, including $7.3 billion in Cuba 
alone (Brown et al. 2010).
Overall losses induced by climate change stressors such as 
increased wind speed, storm surge, and coastal flooding could 
amount to 6 percent of GDP in some Caribbean countries (CCRIF 
2010). Climate change-related impacts, including local sea-level 
rise, increased hurricane intensity, and modified precipitation and 
temperature patterns could increase current economic losses by 
33–50 percent by the 2030s (CCRIF 2010).
3.4.10.1 Impacts of Sea-Level Rise on Coastal Cities
Several studies (Brecht et al. 2012; Hallegatte et al. 2013; Hanson 
et al. 2011) have recently estimated the potential costs of sea-level 
rise, and the modification of storm patterns and land subsidence 
(which is not induced by climate change), for coastal cities in LAC. 
Hallegatte et al. (2013) found that, by 2050, coastal flooding could 
generate approximately $940 million of mean annual losses in the 
22 largest coastal cities in the region with a sea-level rise of 20 cm, 
and about $1.2 billion with a sea-level rise of 40 cm (Table 3.8). 
The study likely underestimates the overall impact as it only 
assesses the costs of climate change on the largest coastal cities.
3.4.10.2 Impacts on Port Infrastructure
Port infrastructures are particularly vulnerable to the direct and 
indirect consequences of climate change (Becker et al. 2013). 
Becker et al. (2013) identified sea-level rise, higher storm surges, 
river floods, and droughts as the main direct impacts, and coastal 
erosion, which could undermine port buildings and construction, 
as one of the indirect impacts of climate change. The potential 
increase in tropical cyclone intensity may increase ships’ port 
downtime and, therefore, increase shipping costs (Chhetri et al. 
2013; Esteban et al. 2012). 
Port infrastructure is crucial to economic development as 
international trade is principally channeled through ports. Fur-
thermore, in Caribbean countries, port infrastructure plays a very 
significant role as they often are the only vector for trade in goods 
and assets (Bishop and Payne 2012). Impacts on seaports will 
also have indirect consequences on local economies as import 
disruptions generate price increases for imported goods and 
export disruptions lead to revenues and incomes decreasing at 
the national level (Becker et al. 2012). 
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3.4.10.3 Impacts on Tourism Activities
Tourism in the region, especially beach tourism in the Caribbean, is 
projected to be affected by the impacts of climate change (Hyman 
2013). The total contribution of travel and tourism in the Caribbean 
was about 14 percent of the regional GDP and directly supported 
approximately 650,000 jobs (World Travel and Tourism Council 2013). 
As a result, the impact of climate change on tourism could detrimen-
tally affect regional economic development (Simpson et al. 2011, 2010).
Beach tourism is particularly exposed to several direct and 
indirect climate change stressors, including sea-level rise, modi-
fied tropical storm pattern, heightened storm surges, and coastal 
erosion (Simpson et al. 2011). In a study comparing the vulner-
ability of four different tourist destinations in Jamaica, Hyman 
(2013) found that coastal tourist resorts are two-to-three times 
more exposed to climate change-related stressors than inland 
touristic resorts. 
Table 3.8: Projected losses from sea-level rise under two different sea-level-rise scenarios and land subsidence in the largest 
LAC cities.
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MEAN INCREASE DUE TO 
SLR AND SUBSIDENCE 
COMPARED TO CURRENT 
LOSSES
La Habana (Cuba) 9 5939% 21 13660%
Port-au-Prince (Haiti) 8 1090% 11 1482%
San Juan (Puerto Rico) 1.680 2365% 4.238 6118%
Santo Domingo (Dominican 
Republic)
263 1166% 410 1880%
Baixada Santista (Brazil) 274 3041% 467 5256%
Barranquilla (Colombia) 87 1782% 102 2106%
Belém (Brazil) 93 698% 586 4955%
Buenos Aires (Argentina) 161 268% 592 1257%
Panama City (Panama) 431 916% 451 962%
Fortaleza (Brazil) 52 2762% 108 5814%
Grande Vitória (Brazil) 2.643 1289% 10.096 5208%
Guayaquil (Ecuador) 31.288 1012% 32.267 1047%
Lima (Peru) 39 1009% 48 1254%
Maceió (Brazil) 54 887% 283 5025%
Maracaibo (Venezuela) 67 1086% 588 10238%
Montevideo (Uruguay) 50 258% 180 1181%
Natal (Brazil) 150 1505% 487 5100%
Porto Alegre (Brazil) 71 641% 483 4918%
Recife (Brazil) 259 1279% 970 5063%
Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) 411 1088% 1.803 5108%
Salvador (Brazil) 245 4903% 262 5248%
San Jose (Costa Rica) 10 551% 67 4133%
Total 2769.6 6164.4
Source: Hallegatte et al. (2013).
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3.4.10.4 Impacts of Tropical Cyclones
Although projections on tropical cyclone frequency are still uncertain, 
they indicate an augmentation of the number of Category 4 and 5 
high-intensity tropical cyclone on the Saffir-Simpson scale (see Chap-
ter 3.3.6, Tropical Cyclones/Hurricanes). The losses and damages 
associated with tropical cyclones making landfall are also projected 
to change (Hallegatte 2007; Mendelsohn et al. 2011). Quantifying the 
future impact of tropical cyclones and their associated costs is complex 
as it involves not only climate model projections but also projections 
of socioeconomic conditions and potential adaptation measures. 35 36 37
In a scenario leading to a 4°C world and featuring a 0.89–1.4 m 
sea-level rise, tropical cyclones in the Caribbean alone could gen-
erate an extra $22 billion and $46 billion in storm and infrastruc-
ture damages and tourism losses by 2050 and 2100, respectively, 
compared to a scenario leading to a 2°C world (Bueno et al. 
2008). The sea-level rise assumed in this study is based on 
semi-empirical sea-level rise projections (Rahmstorf 2007) and is 
higher than the upper bound projected in Section 3.3.7, Regional 
Sea-level Rise. Curry et al. (2009) project that cumulative losses 
induced by tropical cyclones in the Caribbean, Central America, 
and Mexico are going to increase to about $110 and $114 billion 
during the period 2020–2025. These numbers assume an increasing 
tropical cyclone intensity of 2 percent and 5 percent, respectively, 
compared to average values from 1995–2006. The majority of the 
costs, approximately $79 billion in cumulative losses, would incur 
in Mexico (Table 3.9). The estimates of Curry et al. (2009) take 
35 Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
36 Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico.
37 Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, 
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
into account GDP and population projections but not potential 
adaptation measures.
3.4.11 Energy Systems
Energy access is a key requirement for development, as many 
economic activities depend on reliable electricity access (Akpan 
et al. 2013). At the individual and household level, electricity 
access enables income-generating activities, increases safety, and 
contributes to human development (Deichmann et al. 2011). In 
LAC, the population generally has extended access to electricity in 
rural and urban areas (apart from Haiti, where only 12 percent of 
the rural population and 54 percent of the urban population had 
access to electricity in 2010) (World Bank 2013z).
Climate change is projected to affect electricity production and 
distribution both globally and in the region (Sieber 2013). This 
challenges the LAC countries, which will have to increase or at 
least maintain electricity production at the current level to support 
economic development and growing populations. 
The effects of extreme weather events and climate change 
could lead to price increases and/or power outages (Ward 2013). 
Thermal electricity and hydroelectricity are projected to be most 
vulnerable. Three types of climate-change-related stressors could 
potentially affect thermal power generation and hydropower gen-
eration: Increased air temperature (which would reduce thermal 
conversion efficiency); decreased available volume and increased 
temperature of cooling water; and extreme weather events (which 
could affect the production plants, the distribution systems, and 
grid reliability) (Han et al. 2009; Sieber 2013).
3.4.11.1 Current Exposure of the 
LAC’s Energy Systems
LAC countries have a diverse energy mix (Table 3.10). The majority of 
the South American countries heavily rely on hydroelectricity(almost 
100 percent, for example, in Paraguay); Central American countries 
use thermal electric sources and hydroelectricity. Caribbean coun-
tries, meanwhile, rely on thermal electric sources for electricity 
production. Between 91 percent (for Jamaica) and 55 percent (for 
Cuba) of the electricity consumed is generated from these sources. 
With a projected change in water availability, from decreas-
ing precipitation and river runoff and/or increasing seasonality 
and shrinking snow caps and decreasing snow fall in the Latin 
American mountainous regions, thermal electricity plant cooling 
systems may become less efficient and electricity production 
could be affected (Mika 2013; Sieber 2013). Hydroelectric power 
generation is similarly affected (Hamududu and Killingtveit 2012).
3.4.11.2 Impacts of Climate Change 
on Energy Supply
There are limited studies specifically quantifying the impacts of 
climate change on thermal electricity and hydroelectricity genera-
tion in LAC. As the larger share of the electricity produced in the 
Table 3.9: Cumulative loss for the period 2020–2025 for Latin 
American and Caribbean sub-regions exposed to tropical 
cyclones under scenarios A1 (constant frequency, intensity 
increased by 2 percent) and A2 (constant frequency, intensity 








and Yucatan35 5.128 5.847
Greater Antilles36 22.771 26.041
Lesser Antilles37 1.813 2.073
Bahamas, The 985 1.241
Total 110.362 114.867
The data and calculations are based on Curry et al. (2009). Please note 
that the scenarios named here ‘A1’ and ‘A2’ are not SRES scenarios but 
based on Emanuel (2005) and Webster et al. (2005).
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region originates from hydropower, general impacts of climate 
change on thermal electric generation plants are discussed in 
Section 4.4.6, Energy Systems. 
Hydropower
Hydropower produces the larger share of electricity in the LAC 
region (see Table 3.10). The core natural resource for hydroelec-
tricity is river runoff, which has to be inter- and intra-annually 
stable to allow hydropower installations to produce electricity most 
efficiently (Hamududu and Killingtveit 2012; Mukheibir 2013). In 
Peru it is estimated that a 50 percent reduction in glacier runoff 
would result in a decrease in annual power output of approxi-
mately 10 percent, from 1540 gigawatt hours (GWh) to 1250 GWh 
(Vergara et al. 2007).
Hamududu and Killingtveit (2012) found that production will 
increase by 0.30 TWh (or 0.03 percent) in the Caribbean compared 
to 2005 production levels, and by 0.63 TWh (or 0.05 percent) in 
South America, under 2°C global warming by the middle of the 
21st century. Maurer et al. (2009) projected the impacts of climate 
change on the Rio Lempa Basin of Central America (flowing through 
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador and into the Pacific—see 
Table 3.11). They concluded that an increase in frequency of 
Table 3.10: Electricity production from hydroelectric and thermoelectric sources, including natural gas, oil, coal, and nuclear in 




















Cuba 1326.6 0.56 54.89 44.55
Dominican Republic 893.31 11.79 87.99 0.21
Haiti 32.49 16.71 78.97 4.32
Jamaica 1549.23 1.96 91.81 6.22
Trinidad and Tobago 6331.94 – 100 –
Latin America
Argentina 2967.39 24.36 73.97 1.66
Bolivia 623.37 32.50 64.10 3.41
Brazil 2437.96 80.55 12.77 6.68
Chile 3568.08 31.97 60.40 7.63
Colombia 1122.73 79.06 17.64 3.30
Costa Rica 1843.94 72.56 8.78 18.66
Ecuador 1192.28 54.93 42.27 2.79
El Salvador 829.57 34.64 34.06 31.30
Guatemala 539.08 39.84 33.10 27.07
Honduras 707.76 39.50 56.51 3.99
Nicaragua 521.58 11.61 65.99 22.41
Panama 1829.01 52.16 47.55 0.29
Paraguay 1228.19 100.00 0.00 0.00
Peru 1247.75 55.00 43.13 1.87
Uruguay 2810.12 62.64 28.10 9.26
Venezuela, RB 3312.68 68.55 31.45 0.00
Mexico 2091.69 12.26 84.13 3.62
 Sources: World Bank (2013e, f, g, h, i, j). – means not available.
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low-flows in scenarios leading to a 2°C world and a 3°C world 
implies a proportional decrease in hydropower capacity for the 
two main large reservoirs used for hydroelectricity generation in El 
Salvador (Cerron Grande and 15 Setiembre). Low-flow frequency 
is a key indicator of the economic viability of hydropower infra-
structures as it determines the firm power, which is the amount 
of “energy a hydropower facility is able to supply in dry years” 
(Maurer et al. 2009). The projected increase in low-flow frequency 
could therefore reduce the economic return from the existing facil-
ity and reduce the return on investments in future hydroelectric 
infrastructures (Maurer et al. 2009).
For Brazil, de Lucena et al.(2009) project that average annual 
river flows will decrease by 10.80 percent with 2.9°C global warm-
ing, and by 8.6 percent with 3.5°C global warming, by 2071–2100. 
This decrease in annual flow will lead to a decrease in firm power 
of 3.2 and 1.6 percent, respectively, during this time period com-
pared to production level for 1971–2000. For the Rio Grande river 
basin, average river flow could be between –20 and +18 percent 
with a global warming of 2.1°C depending on the different GCM 
chosen. This difference between the lowest and the highest esti-
mates highlights the limitations of the current models to project 
the potential hydropower production from dams built on this river 
basin and reflects that projections vary from one GCM to another 
(Nóbrega et al. 2011). Popescu et al. (2014) showed an increase 
in the maximum hydropower energy potential for the La Plata 
Basin of between 1–26 percent with a global warming of 1.8°C 
by 2031–2050 (see Table 3.12). There were also great disparities 
in the sub-basin projections depending on the model used. The 
La Plata basin is one of the most economically important river 
basins in Latin America (being part of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay). It has a major maximum hydropower 
energy potential, producing on average 683,421 GWh per year 
during the period 1991–2010 and 76 percent of the 97,800 MW 
total electricity generation capacity of the five countries in the La 
Plata basin (Popescu et al. 2014).
The results of these studies, however, need to be interpreted 
with care. For example, the significant decrease in hydropower 
capacity at the micro-level as projected by Maurer et al. (2009) 
strongly contrasts with the results of Hamududu and Killingtveit 
(2012), who projected an increase in hydropower generation at 
the macro-level. The Hamududu and Killingtveit study may be 
limited for several reasons. First, it does not take into account 
seasonality and the impacts of climate change on the timing of 
river flows. Second, changes in hydrology and temperatures are 
accounted for at the country level but not at the river basin level; 
this does not take into account potential spatial variability and 
changes occurring over short distances. Third, the study does not 
consider the potential impacts of floods and droughts, which have 
very significant impacts on hydroelectricity generation and are 
projected to occur more frequently and with a greater intensity in 
the coming decades (Marengo et al. 2012, 2013; Vörösmarty et al. 
2002) (see also Section 3.4.2, Water Resources, Water Security, 
and Floods). Finally, the study does not consider the impacts on 
river runoff from decreasing snow cover and snowfall in the Latin 
American mountainous regions (Barnett et al. 2005; Rabatel et al. 
Table 3.12: Maximum hydropower energy potential for the La Plata Basin with present, near future, and end-of-century climate 




FUTURE CLIMATE 2031–2050 
(1.8°C IN SCENARIO A1B)
END OF CENTURY 2079–2098 












688,452 1.01 715,173 1.05
RCA-SMHI 861,214 1.26 838,587 1.23
Source: Popescu et al. (2014).
Table 3.11: Projected temperature and hydrologic changes 
in the Rio Lempa River during the period 2040–2069 and 
2070–2099 relative to the period 1961–1990 for hydrological 
change and pre-industrial levels for temperature changes.
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Source: Maurer et al. (2009).
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2013; Vuille et al. 2008). These limitations could potentially explain 
why their results are different from those of Maurer et al. (2009), 
who use monthly precipitation rates to calculate annual inflows. 
Further research is needed to adequately inform decision mak-
ers in the region on the impacts of climate change on hydropower 
generation. Similarly to Hamududu and Killingtveit (2012), de 
Lucena et al. (2009) only accounted for the average behavior of 
flows and did not integrate potential change in seasonality or the 
effects of extreme dry or wet events on hydropower generation. In 
this context, projections for hydropower production in Brazil by 
de Lucena et al. (2009) may underestimate the potential impacts 
of climate change. The projections by Popescu et al. (2014) only 
estimated a maximum hydropower potential, but this does not 
mean that more hydropower electricity will be produced from 
existing or future installations. For example, the specifications 
for existing dams (e.g., reservoir size, dam height, and so forth) 
may not be sufficient to efficiently manage projected excess flows. 
Despite these uncertainties, there are some clear climate 
change impacts on hydropower. Mukheibir (2013) inventoried the 
climate-related stressors that are projected to affect hydroelectric-
ity generation. He separated climate-change-related stressors into 
three categories: (1) long-term trends or gradual changes induced 
by climate change; (2) increases in extreme climate variability; 
and (3) indirect climate change impacts (Table 3.13). These 
stressors could potentially reduce firm energy and increase vari-
ability and uncertainty of supply in the energy sector (Ebinger 
and Vergara 2011). 
Oil and Gas
Some LAC countries, such as the Republica Bolivariana de Ven-
ezuela, Brazil, and Mexico, benefit from significant oil and/or 
gas reserves. For example, Venezuela is the world’s tenth largest 
exporter of oil and Mexico was the ninth biggest producer in 
2013 (EIA 2014a). The production of gas and oil in LAC countries 
contributed 7.38 percent in 2012 and 12.01 percent in 2013 to 
global production (Table 3.14). Furthermore, some countries in 
the region have a very significant share of their GDP originating 
Table 3.14: Natural gas production for LAC countries in 2012 and oil production in 2013.
NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION IN 2012 
(IN BILLION CUBIC FEET)
OIL PRODUCTION IN 2013 (IN 










Trinidad and Tobago 1,504.74 118.12
Venezuela, RB 2,682.81 2,489.24
Total LAC region 10,878.68 10,851.42
LAC percentage of global production 7.38% 12.01%
The LAC countries not displayed in the table produce little oil or natural gas. Source: EIA (2014a; b).
Table 3.13: Climate change-related stressors projected to 






Long term trends or gradual 
changes induced by climate 
change
Reduction in average precipitation
Increase in average precipitation
Increase in average temperature




Indirect climate change impacts Water scarcity
Siltation through land degradation
Source: Mukheibir (2013).
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from oil and natural gas rents (defined as the difference between 
value of natural gas or oil production and the total cost of produc-
tion); in Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, for example, about 
30 percent of 2012 GDP in 2012 came from oil and gas rents (World 
Bank 2013e; f). The assessment of climate change impacts on oil 
and gas presented here focuses on direct impacts and does not 
consider the possible decrease in fossil fuel assets value induced by 
future mitigation policies, which would contribute to a reduction 
in fossil fuel demand at the global level (IPCC 2014d).
Off-shore platforms and on-shore infrastructures are susceptible 
to climate related impacts, such as sea-level rise and coastal ero-
sion that could damage extraction, storage and refining facilities 
(Dell and Pasteris 2010) and also to extreme weather events such 
as tropical cyclones which could lead to extraction and production 
disruption and platform evacuation (Cruz and Krausmann 2013). 
For example, in the aftermath of tropical cyclones Katrina and 
Rita in 2005, 109 oil platforms and five drilling rigs were damaged 
leading to interruptions in production (Knabb et al. 2005). Cozzi 
and Gül (2013) identify two key climate related risks for the LAC 
region: sea-level rise and an increase in storm activity (particularly 
for Brazil). These risks would mainly lead to an increase in the 
shutdown time of coastal refineries and an increase in offshore 
platform costs, which will have to be more resistant to high-speed 
winds associated with tropical cyclones (Cozzi and Gül 2013). 
Wind and Solar Energy
Solar and wind energy sources play an important role in climate 
change mitigation strategies to reduce global emissions from fossil 
fuel combustion. Even though wind and solar energy still play a 
very minor role in LAC, significant development of the sector is 
projected (Bruckner et al. 2014). In this context, a more precise 
understanding of the effect of climate change on these energy 
sources is of great significance. 
For wind energy, the main climate change impact relates to 
changing wind patterns and how climate change will affect inter- 
and intra-annual variability and geographical distribution of wind 
(Arent et al. 2014). Despite significant progress, GCMs and RCMs 
still do not produce very precise projections for inter-annual, sea-
sonal, or diurnal wind variability (Arent et al. 2014). Furthermore, 
specific studies estimating the effects of climate change on wind 
patterns and therefore wind energy in LAC are still missing (Pryor 
and Barthelmie 2013). However, drawing on conclusions from Pryor 
and Barthelmie (2013) for the United States and Europe stating 
that “generally, the magnitude of projected changes over Europe 
and the contiguous USA are within the ‘conservative’ estimates 
embedded within the Wind Turbine Design Standards,” it can be 
assumed that future climate change may not significantly affect 
wind energy supply. Pryor and Barthelmie (2013) nonetheless 
highlight the need for more research in this area to better quantify 
the effects of long-term climate change and extreme events on 
wind energy supplies.
Solar energy installations are subject to two types of climate-
related impacts: reduced insulation induced by cloudiness, which 
decreases heat or electricity output, and extreme weather events 
such as windstorms or hail, which could damage production units 
and their mounting structures (Arent et al. 2014). According to 
Arent et al. (2014), gradual climate change and extreme weather 
events “do not pose particular constraints to the future deploy-
ment of solar technologies.” Studies estimating projected impacts 
of climate change and extreme weather events on solar energy 
outputs are not available. 
3.4.11.3 Impacts of Tropical Cyclones 
on Power Outages
The Caribbean and Central American regions are particularly 
exposed to the impacts of tropical cyclones and a higher frequency 
of high-intensity tropical cyclones is projected (see Section 3.3.6, 
Tropical Cyclones/Hurricanes). Strong winds, heavy precipitation, 
and floods associated with tropical cyclones have the capacity to 
disrupt and even damage essential power generation and distribu-
tion infrastructures leading to power outages. A growing number of 
studies have developed models to estimate and forecast the risks 
of power outages to energy systems in order to improve disaster 
assistance and recovery (Cao et al. 2013; Han et al. 2009; Nateghi 
et al. 2013; Quiring et al. 2013). However, studies and models spe-
cifically quantifying or taking into account the projected effect of 
climate change on tropical cyclones intensity and frequency and 
the potential disruptions to power generation and distribution in 
the Caribbean and Central American countries are lacking.
3.4.11.4 Effects of Climate Change 
on Energy Demand
Climate change will also affect energy demand. Increasing 
temperatures and heat extremes (see Sections 3.3.1, Projected 
Temperature Changes, and 3.3.2, Heat Extremes) lead to a higher 
demand for air conditioning (Cozzi and Gül 2013); on the other 
hand, demand for heating may decrease. At the global level, Isaac 
and van Vuuren (2009) estimated that by 2100 in a 4°C world the 
number of cooling degree days will rise from 12,800 during the 
period 1971–1991 to 19,451, (a 51.9 percent increase) while demand 
for heating (measured in heating degree days) was projected to 
remain almost constant. At the regional level, they project that 
by 2100 demand for heating is going to decrease by 34 percent 
compared to the 1971–1991 period—from 364 to 240 heating 
degree days. They project the demand for cooling to increase by 
48 percent, from 1802 to 2679 cooling degree days.
3.4.11.5 Synthesis
The assessment of the current literature on climate change impacts 
on energy in LAC shows that there are only a few studies, most of 
which make strong assumptions about key issues such as seasonality 
of water supply for hydropower. These studies are more qualitative 
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than quantitative, and important gaps remain. However, in general 
substantial climate change impacts can be expected for the energy 
sector. There is also a lack of studies with respect to the impacts 
of climate change impacts on renewable energies. In general, the 
impacts of climate change on energy demand is less well studied 
than those on energy supply—and, yet, demand and supply interact 
in a dynamic way. For example, the concomitant increase in energy 
demand during heat extremes and the decrease of energy supply 
through reduced river flow and low efficiencies may put existing 
energy systems under increasing pressure in the future.
3.5 Regional Development Narratives
In this section, implications of climate change for regional devel-
opment are discussed in order to relate climate change impacts to 
existing and future vulnerabilities in the LAC region. The develop-
ment narratives are split into overarching development narratives 
across the region and in sub-regional development narratives. It 
is important to note that each development narratives presents 
only one of the many possible ways in which climate change can 
put key development trajectories at risk. Table 3.15 summarizes 
the key climate change impacts under different warming levels 
in the Latin American and the Caribbean region and Figure 3.22 
summarizes the key sub-regional impacts.
3.5.1 Overarching Development Narratives
3.5.1.1 Changes to the Hydrological Cycle Endanger 
the Stability of Freshwater Supplies and Ecosystem 
Services
An altered hydrological system due to changing runoff, glacial melt, 
and snowpack changes will affect the ecosystem services that the 
rural population depends on, freshwater provisioning in cities, 
and major economic activities such as mining and hydropower.
Throughout the 20th century the tropical glaciers in the Central 
Andes have lost large amounts of their volume (see Section 3.4.1, 
Glacial Retreat and Snowpack Changes). As land surface tempera-
tures rise, this trend is expected to accelerate possibly leading to 
an almost complete deglaciation of 93–100 percent in a 4°C world. 
In concert with decreasing snowpack, changes to precipitation pat-
terns, and higher evaporation, increasing glacial melt will impact 
the timing and magnitude of river flows. In general, runoff is 
projected to increase during the wet season, increasing flood risk 
(see Section 3.4.2, Water Resources, Water Security, and Floods). 
Accelerated melting rates may lead to a localized short-term surge 
in water supply that might lead to unsustainable dependency (Vuille 
2013). For example, in the area known as Callejon de Huaylas in the 
central highlands of Peru, climate-change-induced glacier retreat 
will add water stress to an area in which agriculture has already 
shifted toward more water-intensive irrigated crop production since 
the 1990s (Bury et al. 2011). As the glacier reservoirs gradually 
disappear, however, runoff will tend to decrease (particularly in 
the dry season). The peak in runoff is expected to be reached in 
about 20–50 years from now (Chevallier et al. 2011) if it has not 
yet peaked already (Baraer et al. 2012). 
Changes to river flow translate into risks to stable water supplies 
for much of the region. Diminishing downriver water flow will 
also undermine hydropower generation; crucial to the economic 
development of the continent (Hoffman and Grigera 2013) (see 
also Section 3.4.11). Current studies project that by 2050, up to 
50 million people in the vast lowland area fed by Andean glacial 
melt, will be affected by the loss of dry season water for drink-
ing, agriculture, sanitation, and hydropower (Cushing and Kopas 
2011). Deforestation and land degradation can furthermore alter 
the water cycle and possibly endanger water availability (Buytaert 
et al. 2006; Viviroli et al. 2011).
Changes to the seasonal cycle of water availability affect the 
ecosystems that rely on a stable water supply. Consequently eco-
system services are put at risk. For example, freshwater fisheries 
may be exposed to climate-related risks as decreasing river flows 
reduce the floodplain for spawning and the natural seasonal flood-
ing of lakes is reduced. A projected decrease in annual precipita-
tion and increasing risk of drought will in turn increase the risk 
of large-scale forest degradation, not only in the Amazon, with a 
loss of associated ecosystem services. 
In the Andes in particular, water stress will reduce pasture 
land availability in the dry season and increase the potential for 
conflict over land use (Kronik and Verner 2010). Social conflicts 
over water rights and water access may increase in the Peruvian 
Andes between farming communities and mining companies. 
Moreover, higher river flow peaks can lead to landslides and devas-
tating floods associated with glacial lake outburst (Chevallier et al. 
2011)—with direct consequences for human lives and settlements. 
Cities are highly vulnerable as continuous urbanization and 
population growth increases water demand (Hunt and Watkiss 2011) 
and as they depend on ecosystem services provided by surround-
ing areas. The high Andean moorlands (known as páramos—see 
Box 3.10, Critical Ecosystem Services of High Andean Mountain 
Ecosystems), which are key ecosystems able to stock large amounts 
of carbon on the ground and act as water regulators, are threatened 
by temperature rise, precipitation changes, and increasing human 
activity. Major population centers, such as Bogota and Quito, rely 
on páramo water as a significant supply source. The melting of 
the Andean glaciers, increasingly unpredictable seasonal rainfall 
patterns, and the overuse of underground reserves are affecting the 
urban centers of the highlands (e.g., La Paz, El Alto, and Cusco), 
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Figure 3.22: Sub-regional risks for development in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) under 4°C warming in 2100 compared 
to pre-industrial temperatures. 
Data sources: Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University; United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Programme; and Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical—(2005). 
Gridded Population of the World, Version 3 (GPWv3): Population Count Grid. Palisades, NY: NASA Socio-
economic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). This map was reproduced by the Map Design Unit of 
The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map 
do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or 
any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
Central America & the Caribbean
Higher ENSO and tropical cyclone frequency, 
precipitation extremes, drought, and heat 
waves. Risks of reduced water availability, crop 
yields, food security, and coastal safety.
Poor exposed to landslides, coastal erosion 
with risk of higher mortality rates and migration, 
negative impacts on GDP where share of 
coastal tourism is high.
Amazon Rainforest
Increase in extreme heat and aridity, risk of 
forest fires, degradation, and biodiversity loss.
Risk of rainforest turning into carbon source. 
Shifting agricultural zones may lead to conflict 
over land. Risks of species extinction threatening 
traditional livelihoods and cultural losses. 
Andes
Glacial melt, snow pack changes, risks of 
flooding, and freshwater shortages.
In high altitudes women, children, and 
indigenous people particularly vulnerable; and 
agriculture at risk. In urban areas the poor living 
on steeper slopes more exposed to flooding.
Dry Regions
Increasing drought and extreme heat events 
leading to cattle death, crop yield declines, and 
challenges for freshwater resources.
Risks of localized famines among remote 
indigenous communities, water-related health 
problems. Stress on resources may lead to 
conflict and urban migration.
Southern Cone
Decreasing agricultural yields and pasture 
productivity, northward migration of agro-
ecozones.
Risks for nutritious status of the local poor. 
Risks for food price increases and cascading 
impacts beyond the region due to high export 
share of agriculture. 
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which rely to some extent on glacial melt for dry season water 
supplies and are already facing dire shortages. The arid coastal 
plain of Peru faces similar challenges. Water shortage has become 
a huge risk and a source of tension in Lima, which is dependent 
on water from the Andes. In Santiago de Chile, meanwhile, an 
estimated 40 percent reduction in precipitation will impact water 
supplies in a city that is expecting a 30 percent population growth 
by 2030 (Heinrichs and Krellenberg 2011). Quito is another city 
that will face water shortages as a result of glacier retreat (Hardoy 
and Pandiella 2009). 
Freshwater in coastal areas is particularly exposed to the 
risks associated with sea-level rise. Here, a substantial section of 
the population is exposed to repeated flooding, contamination of 
groundwater by salt water, and constraints on the availability and 
quality of drinking water (Magrin et al. 2007). Low-income groups 
who already lack adequate access to water will be even less able 
likely to obtain it unless there is a considerable improvement in 
the provision of basic services. 
3.5.1.2 Climate Change Places at Risk Both Large-
Scale Agricultural Production for Export and Small-
Scale Agriculture for Regional Food Production
Latin America and the Caribbean is a climatically highly heteroge-
neous region. As a result, agricultural production systems and their 
outputs differ greatly among climatic zones and countries, as will 
the impacts of climate change on agricultural production. Despite 
the relatively low contribution of agriculture (10–12 percent) to 
the total GDP, agriculture plays a vital role for the LAC economy, 
with 30–40 percent of the labor force engaged in the agricultural 
sector (IAASTD 2009). However, the numbers and proportion of 
the sector comprised by subsistence and commercial agriculture, 
differ greatly among the LAC countries. 
Climate change is expected to have different impacts over 
different timeframes (see Section 3.4.3, Climate Change Impacts 
on Agriculture). In the short run, expected changes in agricultural 
outputs in the region are likely to be heterogeneous, with some 
regions and crops seeing gains and others losses (Table 3.15). In 
the long run, however, larger reductions in agriculture are expected 
with important impacts on livelihoods (Calvo 2013; Sanchez and 
Soria 2008; Samaniego 2009) despite uncertainties with regard 
to the importance of CO2 fertilization and potential adaptation. 
Overall, the potential risks estimated for the agricultural sector 
in LAC are substantial, particularly during the second half of the 
21st century.
By putting agricultural production at risk, climate change 
threatens an important regional export. LAC plays a vital role 
in global agriculture (IFPRI 2012). The two biggest exporters of 
agricultural products in Latin America are Brazil and Argentina 
(Chaherli and Nash 2013). Agricultural production in LAC countries 
has increased by roughly three percent per annum since the 
early 1990s (IFPRI 2012). In LAC, large parts of agriculture are 
rain-fed and therefore very vulnerable to climatic variations such 
as droughts and changing precipitation patterns. Only 10.5 mil-
lion ha of agricultural area are irrigated, amounting to roughly 
0.6 percent of the total agricultural area. Of those 10.5 million ha 
of irrigated area, 3.5 million are located in Brazil, amounting to 
1.3 percent of Brazil’s agricultural area (FAOSTAT 2013; Oliveira 
et al. 2009). Changing precipitation patterns and extreme events 
could therefore affect important parts of the economy. Moreover, 
Hoffman and Grigera (2013) calculate that for the Amazon and 
Cerrado regions, shifting rainfall patterns and temperature rises due 
to climate change will lead to more frequent droughts and forest 
fires in the dry season and floods in the rainy season, threatening 
the growth of monoculture agribusiness and the livelihoods of 
small-holder farmers and ranchers. 
Besides the implications of climate change for large-scale 
agriculture, there is also evidence that climate change will 
strongly affect small-to-medium-scale agriculture and regional 
food security as well as indigenous communities. This is par-
ticularly true for rural communities who heavily rely on sub-
sistence farming and the urban poor who are most hard-hit by 
rising food prices. A projected 15–50 percent decline in fishery 
catch potential along the Caribbean coast, and by more than 
50 percent off the Amazonas estuary and the Rio de la Plata 
(Cheung et al. 2010), together with widespread coral reef loss, 
further adds to the challenge of maintaining a healthy diet for 
the poorest in the region. Coral reef loss and more frequent 
extreme events could also affect the viability of the tourism 
industry, with significant implications for livelihoods across 
different socio-economic groups.
Overall undernourishment in the region has decreased. In 
1990, roughly 65 million people (14.6 percent of the population) 
were undernourished; by 2012, the number decreased to 49 mil-
lion people (8.3 percent of the population) (FAO 2012a). The LAC 
countries most affected by undernourishment are Haiti, Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. In all five countries more 
than 20 percent of the population are undernourished (FAO 2012a). 
However, population growth and changing nutritional patterns 
are expected to increase global food demand by 60 percent by 
2050 (FAO 2012a). As a result, increased agricultural production 
is essential to maintain the currently positive trend of decreasing 
undernourishment. The expected negative effects of climate change 
on agriculture (Table 3.15) will make the challenge of achieving 
food security in LAC all the more difficult. According to one study, 
without adaptation measures climate change is likely to stall the 
projected decline in child undernourishment in LAC by 5 percent 
by 2050 (Nelson et al. 2009). This study does not take into account 
the impacts on food resources other than agricultural crops; it 
9099_CH03.pdf   94 11/17/14   6:16 PM
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
95
therefore may underestimate the multidimensional impacts that 
climate change has on food security. 
There are potentially direct consequences of climate change on 
the levels of poverty and food security in the region. According to 
an exploratory modeling study by Galindo et al. (2013) an average 
decline of six percent in agricultural production due to climate 
change by 2025 would result in 22.6 percent and 15.7 percent 
fewer people overcoming the $1.25 and $2 per day poverty lines 
respectively, given losses in livelihoods. This means a total of 
6.7–8.6 million people who would remain under the poverty line 
as a result of climate change impacts on agriculture. In addition, 
important indirect effects resulting from reductions in agricultural 
yields include risks to agro-industrial supply chains. Given the 
exploratory nature of this study, however, exact numbers have to 
be interpreted with care.
3.5.1.3 A Stronger Prevalence of Extreme Events 
Affects Both Rural and Urban Communities, 
Particularly in Coastal Regions
A changing frequency and intensity of extreme events, such as 
drought, heat extremes, tropical cyclones, and heavy precipitation, 
will have strong implications for the urban and rural populations 
of the region, with particular vulnerability patterns shaping the 
risks of different population groups. 
The LAC region is heavily exposed to the effects of strong 
ENSO events, including extreme precipitation and disastrous 
flooding, especially in the Andes and Central America where 
steep terrains are common (IPCC 2012; Mata et al. 2001; Mimura 
et al. 2007; Poveda et al. 2001). Glacial lake outbursts present 
a further permanent hazard for Andean cities (Chevallier et al. 
2011). Along the Caribbean and Central American coasts, tropical 
cyclones and rising sea levels expose the population to storm 
surges and coastal inundation (Dilley et al. 2005; Woodruff et 
al. 2013). Although the scientific evidence is limited, there are 
studies indicating an increase of 80 percent in the frequency 
of the strongest category 4 and 5 Atlantic Tropical Cyclones 
(Bender et al. 2010; Knutson et al. 2013) and a doubling in the 
frequency of extreme El Niño events above 20th century levels 
(Cai et al. 2014). The latter two projections are especially wor-
risome as they concur with a sea-level rise up to 110 cm (see 
Section 3.3.7, Regional Sea-level Rise). A poleward migration 
of tropical cyclones as recently observed (Kossin et al. 2014) 
could potentially lead to less damage to tropical coasts but 
countries would also benefit less from the water replenishment 
that cyclone rainfall brings and areas currently less exposed to 
tropical cyclones would face additional risks.
The vulnerability of people exposed to extreme events is 
shaped by a multitude of non-climatic factors. Some socioeco-
nomic factors shaping vulnerability are the same for rural and 
urban populations, including social marginalization and limited 
access to resources. However, conditions such as dense and poorly 
constructed housing in urban areas or high, direct dependence 
on ecosystem services among rural indigenous populations result 
in specific vulnerability patterns for different population groups. 
Despite these differences in vulnerabilities, climate impacts also 
act along an urban-rural continuum. For example cities depend 
on the surrounding landscape to provide ecosystem services and 
the rural population benefits from remittances sent from urban to 
rural areas. However, the effectiveness of remittances in support-
ing adaptive capacity under rising impacts is open to question, as 
both demand on the receiving end and exposure to climate risks 
on the sending end are expected to rise. 
The rural poor are likely to feel the impacts of climate change 
and variability most directly given their dependency on rain-fed 
agriculture and other environmental resources (e.g., forests and 
fish) which are particularly susceptible to the effects of climate 
change in general and extremes in particular. Moreover, these 
populations have limited political voice and are less able to 
leverage government support to help curb the effects of climate 
change (Prato and Longo 2012; Hardoy & Pandiella, 2009). Rural 
poverty in the LAC region has declined considerably over the past 
two decades—both in terms of the numbers of people who live in 
poverty and the rate of poverty among rural populations—with 
many countries in the region showing positive trends both in 
poverty reduction and in a better distribution of income. That 
said, many rural people in the region continue to live on less than 
$2 per day and have poor access to financial services, markets, 
training, and other opportunities. There is a strong concentra-
tion of extreme poverty among landless farmers and indigenous 
peoples, particularly among women and children; indeed, close 
to 60 percent of the population in extreme poverty live in rural 
areas (RIMISP 2011). 
Extreme events will also strongly impact the urban poor as 
urban areas are also a focal point of climate change impacts from 
extreme events (Vörösmarty et al. 2013). In 2010, the urban popu-
lation accounted for 78.8 percent of the total population (ECLAC 
2014). National economies, employment patterns, and government 
capacities—many of which are highly centralized—are also very 
dependent on large cities; this makes them extremely vulnerable 
to the effects of extreme events (Hardoy and Pandiella 2009). 
Urbanization in the region includes unplanned, haphazard 
expansion of cities (ONU-Habitat 2012) over floodplains, mountain 
slopes, or areas prone to flooding or affected by seasonal storms, 
sea surges, and other weather-related risks (Hardoy and Pandiella 
2009). Houses in informal settlements are frequently built with 
inadequate materials, which make them damp and cold in the 
winter and very hot in the summer (Hardoy and Pandiella 2009). 
Hence, there are concentrations of low-income households at high 
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risk from extreme weather (Hardoy et al. 2001). For example, an 
estimated 1.1 million people live in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro that 
sprawl over the slopes of the Tijuca mountain range, making them 
particularly at risk from mudslides (Hardoy and Pandiella 2009).
Moreover, most low-income people live in housing without air 
conditioning or adequate insulation; during heat waves, the very 
young, pregnant women, the elderly, and people in poor health are 
particularly at risk (Bartlett 2008) (see also Section 3.4.7, Human 
Health). In northern Mexico, heat waves have been correlated 
with increases in mortality rates; in Buenos Aires, 10 percent of 
summer deaths are associated with heat strain; in Peru, records 
show a correlation between excessive heat and increases in the 
incidence of diarrhea (Mata and Nobre 2006). Such effects may 
be compounded by a climate-change-related increase in the broad 
geographic areas and microclimates in which certain vector-borne 
diseases, such as malaria and dengue fever, can flourish (Costello 
et al. 2009).
Adverse socioeconomic conditions in concert with exposure to 
climate change impacts undermine the development of adaptive 
capacity. People living in informal urban settlements without legal 
tenure rights—who are generally from poor and socially excluded 
communities (including marginalized ethnic groups)—in principle 
have limited means or incentive to attempt to climate-proof their 
houses (Moser et al. 2010). A lack of accountability to the citizens 
and a very limited scope for public participation in decision making 
means that poorer areas are deprioritised for infrastructural upgrad-
ing, and thus frequently have inadequate infrastructure (e.g., storm 
drains) to cope with extreme events (Hardoy and Pandiella 2009). 
Furthermore, the impacts of extreme weather events are often more 
severe in areas that have been previously affected or have not yet 
been fully recovered from previous a previous extreme event; these 
cumulative effects are difficult to overcome (Hardoy and Pandiella 
2009; Hardoy and Romero Lankao 2011). Damage to housing as a 
result of extreme weather can lead to loss of key assets used in urban 
informal sector businesses (Moser et al. 2010), further undermining 
the buildup of resilience and increasing the risk of poverty traps. 
3.5.2 Sub-regional Development Narratives
3.5.2.1 Central America and the Caribbean—
Extreme Events as a Threat to Livelihoods
In a 4°C world, the Central American and Caribbean countries 
are projected to be at risk from higher ENSO and tropical cyclone 
frequency, drought and heat extremes, and precipitation extremes 
(Table 3.15). The impacts of tropical cyclones will be exacerbated 
by rising sea levels fostering storm surges. Moreover, by the year 
2040, Caribbean coral reefs are expected to experience annual 
bleaching events due to sea-level rise, ocean warming, and 
sedimentation from flood events, which will diminish the coastal 
protection provided by healthy coral reefs. Altogether these impacts 
may augment impacts on coastal infrastructure (including beach 
erosion), thus threatening transport, settlements, and tourism. 
In combination with an up to 50 percent decrease in fish catch 
potential under a 4°C world (Cheung et al. 2010), damage to coral 
reefs threatens artisanal fisheries that support local livelihoods. 
Infrastructure in the Caribbean is already highly vulnerable 
to natural hazards, and important assets (including airports) are 
often low-lying. Further climate change impacts may affect the 
condition of infrastructure, increasing failures and maintenance 
costs. The high vulnerability to hurricanes and tropical storms in 
low-lying states could further increase with a growing population, 
putting growing numbers of assets at risk, exacerbating pervasive 
poverty/inequality and potentially leading to displacement of a 
greater proportion of the population, as was observed in the wake 
of Hurricane Mitch (Glantz and Jamieson 2000; McLeman and 
Hunter 2011). Ultimately, due to the small size of many Caribbean 
islands, more frequent natural disasters may cause severe setbacks 
to the overall economy. However, not only coastal areas are at high 
risk. In Central America and the Caribbean, the poor are often 
living on steep slopes or close to rivers; they are therefore espe-
cially exposed to landslides and floods. Such hydro-meteorological 
events may damage the poor quality (often informal) residential 
structures of vulnerable communities, which could in turn lead to 
higher mortality rates and population displacement. More generally, 
intensified non-climate stressors related to land use change and 
ecosystem degradation could impair the resilience and the ability 
to cope with the impacts of extreme hydro-meteorological events.
Climate extremes (e.g., drought, heat waves) in combination 
with long-term decreases in precipitation may reduce crop yields 
in Central America and Caribbean countries and affect food secu-
rity and market prices. This is particularly relevant in the case of 
coffee crops, which are important for the livelihoods of workers 
and small farmers in Central America. 
There are several studies projecting reduced runoff and ground-
water recharge in a 4°C world (Table 3.15), which will reduce 
water availability. This may disproportionately affect the lives of 
women responsible for managing household water resources, as 
well as the health and wellbeing of vulnerable members of poor 
households (e.g., infants, the chronically ill, and the elderly). 
Ultimately, water stress could increase conflicts over land, affect 
food security, and provoke climate-induced migration. Additionally, 
Central America is heavily dependent on hydropower to generate 
electricity; it is expected that energy security could become an issue.
3.5.2.2 The Andes—Changing Water Resources 
Challenge the Rural and Urban Poor
Climate change already affects and will further affect water resources 
in the Andes (Table 3.15). These resources are already scarce as 
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a result of insufficient management and degradation of critical 
ecosystems (including the páramo and cloud forests). Increas-
ing temperatures leading to higher evapotranspiration, changing 
precipitation patterns, and more extreme precipitation events all 
directly affect river runoff. Moreover, glacial melt and snow pack 
changes are important components of the regional hydrological 
balance. Increased glacial melt may increase water availability 
in the next few decades while reducing it thereafter. Both glacial 
melt and snowmelt affect the amount and seasonality of water 
flows. These changes threaten the water supply for hydropower, 
agriculture, and domestic use. This is particularly relevant because 
many large cities and populations are located at high altitudes or 
in arid regions in the lowlands where alternative sources of water 
are not abundant and where the urban poor are already suffering 
from limited access to water. Moreover, the regional energy mix 
strongly depends on hydropower; higher risks of power outages 
may impact household and community welfare. In addition, 
subsistence farming and cattle herding in the highlands, as well 
as large-scale agriculture in the coastal areas, depend on water 
coming from the mountains. While a decreasing water supply is 
an important risk to food security and poverty levels in general, 
women and children who are often in charge of agriculture in high-
altitude communities are at particular risk of increasing poverty 
and water-scarcity-related conflicts. The same applies to indigenous 
people whose traditional water management systems are likely to 
be affected and whose livelihoods are already threatened. Other 
water-dependent activities, such as large-scale or artisanal mining, 
may be affected as well. These stresses could exacerbate the cur-
rent urbanization trend, leading to further rural-urban migration 
and amplifying the risks to the urban poor. 
Besides these more gradual changes, extreme hydrological 
events (such as an intensification of ENSO, extreme precipitation, 
high flows, and glacial lake outburst floods) increase the risk for 
natural disasters, erosion, and landslides. While such events may 
generally decrease GDP, the impact across different layers of the 
population is uneven, with the urban poor living on steep slopes 
typically at the highest risk. 
3.5.2.3 The Amazon—Risk of Tipping Point, Forest 
Degradation, and Biodiversity Loss Threatens Local 
Communities
Despite an improved understanding of processes linking climate, 
vegetation, land-use change, and fire in the Amazon, the identifica-
tion of the processes and the quantification of thresholds at which 
an irreversible approach toward a tipping point is triggered (i.e., 
a potential transition from forest to savannah) is still incomplete. 
Overall the most recent studies suggest that forest dieback is an 
unlikely, but possible, future for the Amazon region (Good et al. 
2013). Should such die-back occur, the livelihoods of forest-dwelling 
and forest-fringe communities would be at particular risk, which 
could, in turn, spur additional migration of affected groups to 
cities, and could also open up forest regions to settlers, spurring 
additional deforestation.
Besides the risk of a tipping point, climate change is expected 
to contribute to forest degradation and biodiversity loss. There 
are variable rainfall patterns and significant differences in rain-
fall projections between the northern and southern zones of the 
Amazon. In a 4°C world, in the southern zone, winter annual 
precipitation is likely to decrease while evapotranspiration and 
aridity is expected to increase (see Section 3.3). This puts the 
southern part of the forest at increased fire risk. 
Increasing fires will not only lead to large emissions of CO2 
but, in combination with deforestation, declining rainfall, and 
forest drying, may also draw the agricultural frontier northwards. 
This threatens the livelihoods of forest-dependent communities 
and could lead to land-use conflicts between existing communi-
ties and newly arriving farmers. In addition, timber harvest from 
concessions could be negatively affected. Moreover, increasing 
fires in the Amazon threaten rural and urban settlements and the 
resulting smoke/haze could aggravate respiratory disease for both 
forest dwellers and urban residents in central Brazil. 
Negative effects of climate change on biodiversity resulting from 
habitat contractions and extinctions are very likely in a warmer 
than 2°C world. In combination with increasing forest degrada-
tion, changes in the range of certain species will affect resource 
availability for indigenous populations that are very reliant on 
native plants and animals. This could increase malnutrition among 
children and the elderly and undermine traditional knowledge of 
ecosystems, impacting the community social structure and the 
value placed on traditional knowledge. Altogether, these changes 
may push local communities to expand subsistence agriculture 
as an alternative livelihood strategy or to migrate to other forest 
areas, thereby amplifying forest degradation and threatening 
existing protected areas.
3.5.2.4 Southern Cone—Risks to Export 
Commodities from Intensive Agriculture
The Southern Cone countries are currently a major grain and 
livestock producing region for local and global markets (Chaherli 
and Nash 2013). The region has experienced significant climate 
shocks, mainly related to ENSO, which have resulted in floods 
or droughts at critical phases of the crop cycle. Moreover, despite 
small and uncertain increases in precipitation, the region faces 
increasing evapotranspiration rates under a 4°C world, (see Sec-
tion 3.3). This highlights the high risks to agricultural production 
from climate change in a 4°C world; this is particularly true for 
rain-fed agriculture, which is prevalent in more than 98 percent 
of Brazil’s agricultural area (FAOSTAT 2013; Oliveira et al. 2009). 
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The results of agricultural modeling studies differ in the severity 
of the climate change impact, but most agree that climate change 
will very likely decrease agricultural yields for important food 
crops in Latin America in the absence of adaptation measures and 
persistent CO2 fertilization (ECLAC 2010; Fernandes et al. 2012; 
Nelson, Rosegrant, Koo et al. 2010) (see also Section 3.4.3, Climate 
Change Impacts on Agriculture). Moreover, while CO2 fertiliza-
tion may increases yields, there is some evidence of it decreasing 
protein contents in major grains (Müller et al. 2014; Myers et al. 
2014). For sugarcane, there might be beneficial effects with yield 
increases (Table 3.15). Moreover, agro-ecozones in Brazil, includ-
ing major grain belts, may move northward (to central Brazil) to 
already cleared lands in the Cerrado region; Assad et al. (2013) 
project displacement of poorly productive and degraded pasture 
with intensive multicrop grain cropping and intensified pastures. 
The impacts on agriculture and livestock (Table 3.15) may 
lead to increasing food prices that could entail trade impacts and 
stresses on other regions’ food production systems and may alter 
dietary patterns (especially of the poor). Alongside price risks, 
reduced nutrient contents (especially protein) could also raise the 
risk of malnutrition in children. Opportunities may arise from the 
reshuffling of agricultural zones as plantation forestry, horticultural 
crops, and biofuel production from sugarcane may be able to 
expand on lands that become unsuitable for grain crops. Reduced 
crop and livestock productivity can be moderated via adaptation 
measures and climate-smart technologies (e.g., improved varieties 
and breeds, irrigation, conservation agriculture, liming, and fertil-
izers to enhance crop rooting depth). These intensification and 
climate-smart innovations would, however, require a significant 
upgrading of knowledge and extensive field testing.
3.5.2.5 Dry Regions (Mexican Dry Subtropics and 
North Eastern Brazil)—Increasing Drought Stress 
Threatening Rural Livelihoods and Health
There has been significant development progress in these regions 
in recent decades, which has lifted a number of communities 
out of extreme poverty. The possibility of increasing droughts, 
however, threatens to force many of these populations back into 
extreme poverty. 
The Central and Northern arid areas in Mexico and the semi-
arid areas in Mexico and Northeast Brazil are already under water 
stress and are sensitive to inter-annual climate variability. For 
example, parts of northeast Brazil are situated within the so-called 
“drought polygon,” an area characterized by a semi-arid climate 
that suffers from recurrent droughts (Krol and Bronstert 2007). 
Parts of this region in Brazil have been identified as having socio-
climatic hotspots, given the naturally limited water availability, 
a relatively low human development index, a high population 
density (Torres and Lapola et al. 2012), and existing conflicts over 
water (Araújo and Knight 2005; Krol et al. 2006). Especially in a 
4°C world, dry regions in Mexico and Brazil face strong increases 
in highly unusual heat extremes and aridity leading to more 
intense and longer drought events (Table 3.15). Northeast Brazil 
is particularly impacted by ENSO-related droughts; these may 
become more frequent in a 4°C world. In dryland Brazil, urban 
migration to rapidly growing coastal cities in the northeastern 
states is highly likely to be the result of the loss of agricultural 
income (Mendelsohn 2007).
In these dry regions, increasing drought events may lead to 
problems for urban water supply or widespread cattle deaths. In 
addition, small-hold family farmers in rural areas may experience 
lower productivity or even lose entire harvests, threatening their 
livelihoods. A decline in agricultural productivity may cause local-
ized famines, especially among remote indigenous communities 
(particularly in Northern Mexico), and possibly result in long-term 
impacts on the household nutritional status. 
Increases in irrigated agriculture, if not well integrated with 
long-term water resource planning and management, pose another 
risk as they will exacerbate issues of water availability and also 
concentrate wealth. A diminished drinking water supply in rural 
communities may also lead to an increasing reliance on water trucks 
that occasionally deliver contaminated water (resulting in illness 
and death). Moreover, the need to search for drinking water and 
the associated health problems associated with low-quality drinking 
water could decrease the work force and income in rural areas, 
leading to increased crime, social exclusion, and other problems 
related to rural-urban migration during drought events. Increasing 
water stress may also lead to further over-exploitation of aquifers 
in the Northern part of Mexico. This in turn would lead to the 
release of groundwater minerals, affecting groundwater quality, 
and, in coastal aquifers, lead to sea water intrusion. In general, 
hydropower and energy systems will be stressed across these dry 
regions. Direct damages from droughts and secondary impacts 
on the agriculture sector and related labor markets may result in 
negative GDP growth rates in the agriculture sector.
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Endnotes
1 Years indicate the decade during which warming levels are exceeded with a 50 percent or greater change (generally at start of decade) in a business-as-usual scenario 
(RCP8.5 scenario) (and not in mitigation scenarios limiting warming to these levels, or below, since in that case the year of exceeding would always be 2100, or not at all). 
Exceedance with a likely chance (>66 percent) generally occurs in the second half of the decade cited. Impacts are given for warming levels irrespective of the timeframe (i.e., 
if a study gives impacts for 2°C warming in 2100 then the impact is given in the 2°C column). If a study refers to a warming level by the end of the century, this is marked 
with an asterisk (*). Impacts given in the observations column do not necessarily form the baseline for future impacts. Impacts for different warming levels may originate 
from different studies and therefore may be based on different underlying assumptions; this means that the impacts are not always fully comparable (e.g., crop yields may 
decrease more under a 3°C than a 4°C scenario because underlying the impact at 3° warming is a study that features very strong precipitation decreases). Moreover, this 
report did not systematically review observed impacts. It highlights important observed impacts for current warming but does not conduct any formal process to attribute 
impacts to climate change.
2 Skansi et al. (2013).
3 Kharin et al. (2013); 20–year return value of maximum precipitation refers to 1986–2005.
4 Sillmann et al. (2013b).
5 Marengo et al. (2011); Zeng et al. (2008).
6 Dai (2012). 
7 Prudhomme et al, (2013) increase in days under drought conditions refers to 1976–2005.
8 Dai (2012). 
9 Li et al. (2013). This is a tree-ring-based reconstruction of ENSO strength over the last 700 years, but attribution to climate change is uncertain.
10 Cai et al. (2014). 
11 IPCC AR5 WGI (2013). Frequency increase in the North Atlantic over the past 20–30 years.
12 Villarini et al. (2013). The Power Dissipation Index  is a combination of frequency and intensity.
13 Knutson et al. (2013).
14 Bender et al. (2010); Knutson et al. (2013).
15 Marzeion et al. (2012). Past period for glacial volume loss and area loss refers to 1901–2000.
16 Giesen and Oerlemans (2013). For past: 6.1 percent (southern) and 7.3 percent (tropical) loss of glacial volume over 1980–2011 compared to 1980.
17 Lopez et al. (2010).
18 Ivins et al. (2011); Jacob et al. (2012) refers to 2000s.
19 Schaefer et al. (2013) refers to 1990–2011.
20 Radic et al. (2013).
21 Rabatel et al. (2013). Andes of Venezuela over 1952–2003; Andes of Colombia over 1950–1990s; Chimborazo over 1962–1997; in Cotopaxi and in Artinsana over 1979–2007; 
and Peruvian Andes over 1960–2000s.
22 Jacob et al. (2012) for past refer to 2000s.
23 Milly et al. (2005).
24 Maurer et al. (2009).
25 Hidalgo et al. (2013).
26 Nakaegawa et al. (2013).
27 Portmann et al. (2013).
28 Baraer et al. (2012).
29 Arnell and Gosling (2013). 
30 Juen et al. (2007). No differentiation possible for changes in warming for >1.5°C in 2050 and >2°C in 2080.
31 Döll (2009).
32 Vicuña et al. (2010).
33 Hirabayashi et al. 2013).
34 Espinoza Villar et al. (2009).
35 Guimberteau et al. (2013).
36 Nakaegawa et al. (2013).
37 Langerwisch et al.(2013).
38 Döll and Schmied (2012).
39 Schewe et al. (2013).
40 García and Vargas (1998); Jaime and Menéndez (2002); Menéndez and Berbery (2005); Milly et al. (2005).
41 Nóbrega et al. (2011).
42 Camilloni et al. (2013).
43 Hirabayashi et al. (2013). There was little consistency across the 11 GCMs used.
44 Fernandes et al. (2012).
45 With CO2 fertilization.
46 Nelson, Rosegrant, Koo et al. (2010).
47 Meza and Silva (2009).
48 ECLAC (2010).
49 Ruane et al. (2013).
50 Costa et al. (2009), including technological progress.
51 Lapola et al. (2011).
52 Marin et al. (2012), including technological progress.
53 Seo et al. (2010).
9099_CH03.pdf   109 11/17/14   6:16 PM
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CONFRONTING THE NEW CLIMATE NORMAL
110
54 Thomas et al. (2004). Mammal species (n=96), bird species (n= 186), and butterfly species (n=41) in Mexico all with dispersal; plant species in Cerrado (n=163) 
without dispersal. The study was criticized by Harte et al. (2004) for overestimating potential extinction rates by using a common species-area exponent z for all species 
which may not be justified.
55 Loyola et al. (2013).
56 Loyola et al. (2012).
57 Lawler et al. (2009).
58 Gerten et al. (2013).
59 Rojas-Soto et al. (2012).
60 Souza et al. (2011).
61 Feeley et al. (2012). Large range stems from different assumption about deforestation, land-use, and adaptation and migration potentials.
62 Lemes et al. (2014).
63 Ponce-Reyes et al. (2012).
64 Simon et al. (2013).
65 Poulter et al. (2010).
66 Rammig et al. (2010).
67 Cook et al. (2012).
68 Zelazowski et al. (2011).
69 Gumpenberger et al. (2010).
70 Cox et al. (2004).
71 Betts et al. (2004).
72 Cook and Vizy (2008).
73 Meissner et al. (2012).
74 Buddemeier et al. (2011).
75 Van Hooidonk et al. (2013).
76 Cheung et al. (2010).
77 Blanchard et al. (2012).
78 Kolstad and Johansson (2011), compared to 1961–1990 levels.
79 Colon-Gonzalez et al. (2013), compared to 2000.
80 Beguin et al. (2011).
81 Caminade et al. (2014).
82 Van Lieshout et al. (2004).
83 Popescu et al. (2014).
84 Isaac and van Vuuren (2009).
85 Hamududu and Killingtveit (2013), compared to 2005 levels.
86 De Lucena et al. (2009), compared to 1971–2000.
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 Middle East and Nort h Africa
The Middle East and North Africa region is one of the most diverse in the world in economic terms, with per-capita annual GDP 
ranging from $1,000 in Yemen to more than $20,000 in the Arab Gulf States. As a consequence, adaptive capacity and vulnerability 
to climate risks varies enormously within the region. The region will be severely affected at both 2°C and 4°C warming, particularly 
because of the large increase in projected heat extremes, the substantial reduction in water availability and expected consequences 
for regional food security. In some countries, crop yields could decrease by up to 30 percent at 1.5–2°C and by almost 60 percent 
at 3–4°C in parts of the region. Deteriorating rural livelihoods may contribute to internal and international migration, adding further 
stresses on particularly urban infrastructure with associated health risks for poor migrants. Migration and climate‐related pressure 
on resources might increase the risk of conflict.
4.1 Regional Summary
The population in Middle East and North Africa is projected to 
double by 2050, which together with projected climate impacts, 
puts the region under enormous pressure for water and other 
resources. The region is already highly dependent on food imports. 
Approximately 50 percent of regional wheat and barley consump-
tion, 40 percent of rice consumption, and nearly 70 percent of maize 
consumption is met through imports. The region has coped with its 
inherent water scarcity through a variety of means: abstraction of 
groundwater, desalinization, and local community coping strategies. 
Despite its extreme water scarcity, the Gulf countries use more 
water per capita than the global average, with Arab residential 
water and energy markets among the most heavily subsidized in 
the world. The region is very diverse in terms of socio-economic 
and political conditions. Thus, adaptive capacity and vulnerability 
to climate risks varies enormously, especially between the Arab 
Gulf States and the other countries in the region.
Middle East and Northern Africa heavily relies on agriculture 
as a source of food and income, not only in the historically impor-
tant “fertile crescent” of the Euphrates and Tigris region, but also 
at the Mediterranean coast and the Nile, while at the same time 
being largely covered by drylands and deserts. Seventy percent of 
the region’s agricultural production is currently rain-fed, which 
leaves the region highly vulnerable to temperature and precipitation 
changes, and the associated implications for food security, social 
security, and rural livelihoods. This, in combination with social 
changes and strong urbanization rates, indicates a very vulner-
able future for the Middle East and North Africa, particularly for 
the urban and rural poor. All countries in the region face a severe 
and fast growing resource squeeze, especially relating to severe 
water and land scarcity. The region is very diverse in terms of 
socio-economic and political conditions. Thus, adaptive capacity 
and vulnerability to climate risks varies enormously, especially 
between the Arab Gulf States and the other countries. 
4.1.1 Regional Patterns of Climate Change
4.1.1.1 Temperatures and Heat Extremes
Warming of about 0.2° per decade has been observed in the 
region from 1961–1990, and at even faster rate since then, which 
in line with an increase in frequency in temperature extremes. 
Geographically, the strongest warming is projected to take place 
close to the Mediterranean coast. Here, but also in inland Algeria, 
Libya and large parts of Egypt, warming by 3°C in a 2°C world 
is projected by the end of the century. In a 4°C world, mean 
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summer temperatures are expected to be up to 8°C warmer in 
parts of Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq by the end of the century 
(see Figure 4.1). 
By the end of the century, in a 2°C world, highly unusual38 
heat extremes will occur in about 30 percent of summer months 
almost everywhere in the MENA region. This implies that on 
average one of the summer months each year will exceed tem-
peratures warmer than three standard deviations beyond the 
baseline average. Unprecedented heat extremes, however, will 
remain largely absent in a 2°C world, except for in some isolated 
coastal regions including the Mediterranean coasts of Egypt, and 
in Yemen, Djibouti and Oman. Here these events are projected to 
be relatively rare in a 2°C world, but are nevertheless expected 
to occur in 5–10 percent of summer months.
Whereas the increase in frequency of heat extremes is expected 
to level off by mid-century in a 2°C world, in a 4°C world it will 
continue increasing until the end of the century. in a 4°C world, 
80 percent of summer months are projected to be hotter than 5-sigma 
(unprecedented heat extremes) by 2100, and about 65 percent are 
projected to be hotter than 5-sigma during the 2071–2099 period.
4.1.1.2 Precipitation and Aridity
Future northward shifts of air moisture associated with a stronger 
North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) anomaly are projected to reduce 
rainfall in North Africa, Maghreb, and Mashrek. In a 4°C world, 
countries along the Mediterranean shore, notably Morocco, Algeria, 
and Egypt, are projected to receive substantially less rain. However, 
a projected northward shift of the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone 
(ITCZ) is expected to increase moisture delivery to the southern 
parts of the region (which are already under the influence of 
38 In this report, highly unusual heat extremes refer to 3-sigma events and unprec-
edented heat extremes to 5-sigma events (see Appendix).
monsoon systems), in particular to the southern Arabian Penin-
sula (Yemen, Oman). Consequently, projected annual mean pre-
cipitation changes show a clear North-South dipole pattern, with 
regions north of 25°N becoming relatively drier and regions to the 
south becoming wetter. The absolute increase in precipitation in 
the southern regions, however, will be very small, because these 
regions (with the exception of Yemen) are already very dry today. 
Furthermore, the effect of an increase in precipitation on water 
availability should be counteracted by a simultaneous increase in 
temperature, resulting in a higher rate of evaporation. Lastly, an 
increase in precipitation in the southern part of the region may 
be associated with more intense and extreme precipitation events. 
There is a close match between the pattern of change in 
the annual mean aridity index (AI) and projected precipitation 
changes. Changes in the aridity are primarily driven by changes 
in precipitation, with wetter conditions south of 25°N and in 
most southern parts of the Arabian Peninsula causing a drop in 
aridity, and drier conditions north of 25°N causing aridity there to 
increase. In the Mediterranean coastal region, the relative increase 
in aridity is more pronounced than would be expected from the 
drop in precipitation, because there is a substantial increase in 
evapotranspiration here due to enhanced warming. 
4.1.2 Regional Sea-Level Rise
In the Mediterranean area, tide gauges recorded below-
average sea-level rise during the 20th century, with average 
rise of 1.1–1.3 mm per year (slower than the global average of 
1.8 mm per year). There has been significant interdecadal vari-
ability, however, with a slow gradual rise from 1960–1990, and 
rapid (above-average) rise after 1990.
Analysis for the 21st century indicates slightly below-average rise 
in the Mediterranean basin mostly as a result of the gravitational 
Figure 4.1: Multi-model mean temperature anomaly for RCP2.6 (2°C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4°C world, right) for the months of 
June-July-August for the Middle East and North African region.
Temperature anomalies in degrees Celsius are averaged over the time period 2071–2099 relative to 1951–1980.
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Figure 4.2 : Multi-model mean of the percentage change in the aridity index in a 2°C world (left) and a 4°C world (right) for the 
Middle East and North Africa by 2071–2099 relative to 1951–1980.
Hatched areas indicate uncertain results, with two or more out of five models disagreeing on the direction of change. Note that a negative change cor-
responds to a shift to more arid conditions (see Appendix).39
influence of Greenland ice sheet. Tunis, on the Mediterranean 
Sea coast, is projected to experience a median sea-level rise of 
0.56 m (with a maximum of 0.96 m) by the end of the century 
in a 4°C world. This is 8 cm less than in Muscat, on the Arabian 
Sea coast, where a median 0.64 m (low estimate: 0.44 m, high 
estimate: 1.04 m) sea-level rise is projected. On the Atlantic coast, 
a 0.58 m sea-level rise is projected for Tangier (low estimate: 
0.39 m, high estimate: 0.98 m). In a 1.5°C world, median sea 
level rises of 0.34 m, 0.35 m and 0.39 m are projected for Tunis, 
Tangier, and Muscat. 39
4.1.3 Sector-based and Thematic Impacts
4.1.3.1 The Agriculture-Water-Food Security Nexus
The Middle East and North Africa region is water scarce, with 
most of the land area receiving less than 300 mm of annual 
rainfall (200–300 mm represents the lower limit of rain-fed agri-
culture). Semi-arid belts along the coasts and mountains are the 
only water source areas and provide productive land for rain-fed 
agriculture. The annual availability of renewable water resources 
in most countries is below 1000 m3 per capita (except for Iraq, 
Oman, Syria and Lebanon) and as low as 50 m3 per capita for 
Kuwait. This water scarcity prevents countries from producing 
all required food domestically and makes the region dependent 
39 Some individual grid cells have noticeably different values than their direct 
neighbors (e.g., on Turkey’s Black Sea coast under RCP8.5). This is due to the fact 
that the aridity index is defined as a fraction of total annual precipitation divided by 
potential evapotranspiration (see Appendix). It therefore behaves in a strongly non-
linear fashion and year-to-year fluctuations can be large. As the results are averaged 
over a relatively small number of model simulations, this can result in local jumps.
on food imports. From the current situation of critical water and 
arable land scarcity, both the 2°C and 4°C warming scenarios 
would put further pressure on water resources and agriculture. 
• Cropland: Warmer and drier climate is projected to shift veg-
etation and agricultural zones northward (e.g., by 75 km for 
2090–2099 relative to 2000–2009 in a 4°C world).
• Length of growing period: Lower rainfalls and higher tem-
peratures will shorten growing periods for wheat in large parts 
of the region by about two weeks by mid-century (2031–2050). 
The wheat growing period in Tunisia is expected to be short-
ened by 10 days for 1.3°C warming, by 16 days for 2°C, by 
20 days for 2.5°C and by 30 days for 4°C warming. 
• Crop yields: Crop yields are expected to decline by 30 per-
cent with 1.5–2°C warming and up to 60 percent with 3–4°C 
warming, with regional variation and without considering 
adaptation. Reductions in crop productivity of 1.5–24 percent 
are expected for the western Maghreb and 4–30 percent in 
parts of the Mashrek, by mid-century. Legumes and maize 
crops are expected to be worst affected in both areas as they 
are grown during the summer period.
• Livestock: Climate change will impact livestock production 
through various pathways, including changes in the quantity 
and quality of available feeds, changes in the length of the 
grazing season, additional heat stress, reduced drinking water, 
and changes in livestock diseases and disease vectors. 
Uncertainty in projections arises from different approaches, 
different climate models, and the persistence of CO2-effects because 
increasing atmospheric CO2 concentration can potentially increase 
plant water-use efficiency (and thus crop productivity).
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As a result of regional warming and changes in precipitation 
patterns, water availability is projected to decrease in most parts 
of the region throughout the 21st century. For example, in the 
eastern Anatolian mountains (headwaters of Euphrates and Tigris 
rivers) a runoff decrease of 25 percent to 55 percent is projected 
with 4°C warming.
Mountain areas in Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran 
and Turkey play an important role in the water supply of the region, 
as they store a fraction of precipitation as snow. With projected 
reduction in snowfall and snow water storage, peak flows of melt 
water will shift towards earlier months, with negative impacts 
for downstream river systems and water availability in distant 
regions. For example, snowpack in the upper Nahr el Kalb basin 
in Lebanon was projected to shrink by 40 percent with 2°C warm-
ing, and 70 percent with 4°C warming. Hence, drought periods 
would occur 15–20 days earlier under a 2°C warming scenario, 
and more than a month earlier under a 4°C warming scenario.
4.1.3.2 Desertification, Salinization, and Dust Storms
The importance of climate change for desertification varies depend-
ing on local conditions, and interactions between drivers can be 
multifaceted. An increase in temperatures and evapotranspiration, 
change of precipitation regime, and the intensification or change 
in frequency of extreme events can directly trigger or enhance the 
desertification processes. Being covered mostly by drylands, the 
region is frequently threatened by dust storms, causing damage 
and disruption to people, agriculture and the economy. While 
there are no direct projection studies on dust storms in the region, 
wind as a driving factor can be projected from climate models. 
However, there are no regional studies on changing wind patterns 
under climate change in the region as yet, and future trends have 
to be derived from global studies. 
An increase in salinization under climate change holds for all 
water resources in the region. The densely populated coastal areas 
in the region are most affected by climate-change-induced saliniza-
tion (seawater intrusion), which is accelerated by climate-induced 
sea level rise. River salinization, meanwhile, is documented in 
studies of the Euphrates and Tigris, the Jordan River, and the Nile. 
The salinization process is complex, however, and climate 
change is but one important factor among others (including irriga-
tion, water uptake and land subsidence). Climate change and, in 
particular, projected drier conditions in the region, are expected to 
compound these other drivers (e.g., as more irrigation is needed 
for agriculture).
4.1.3.3 Human Health
The region is currently experiencing a resurgence of several 
vector-borne and viral diseases that had previously been in 
decline. Climate change may compound the challenge of managing 
these diseases, including such vector-board diseases as malaria, 
lymphatic filariasis, and leishmaniasis. In addition, outbreaks of 
cholera (which correlate with high temperatures and can follow 
extreme weather events that disrupt water supply) have in recent 
years caused deaths in Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
Republic of Yemen.
The Middle East and North Africa region is already character-
ized by very high summer temperatures, making the populations of 
the region highly susceptible to further temperature increases. In a 
2°C world, the annual number of hot days with exceptionally high 
temperatures and high thermal discomfort is expected to increase 
in several capital cities, from 4 to 62 days in Amman (Jordan), from 
8 to 90 days in Baghdad (Iraq) and from 1 to 71 days in Damascus 
(Syria). The greatest increase is expected in Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) 
where the number of hot days is projected to rise from 3 to 132 
days per year. In a 4°C world, the average number of hot days is 
projected to exceed 115 days per year in all of these cities.
4.1.3.4 Migration and Security
The literature review revealed a link between climate change 
and migration in the region. It is expected that migration options 
will be more limited in a warmer world. Internal migration will 
continue to be important, but traditional patterns of mobility 
might be disrupted. Many people will be forced to move, while 
others trapped in poverty will be forced to stay. This indicates that 
climate-induced migration should be addressed not only within 
the context of climate change but also within economic, cultural, 
technological, and political frameworks.
Climate change could act as a threat multiplier in the region 
by placing additional pressure on already scarce resources and 
reinforcing preexisting threats as political instability, poverty, and 
unemployment. This can create the conditions for social uprising and 
violent conflict. Establishing a direct link between climate change 
and conflicts is challenging due to contradictory conclusions and 
methods. The findings are in some cases based on a single extreme 
event; others use rainfall or temperature variability as proxies for 
long-term changes; and some examine short-term warming. Further 
research is needed to investigate and establish the link between 
climate change and conflict and to relate long-term climate change, 
instead of single climatologic hazards, to migration and to conflicts. 
4.1.3.5 Coastal Infrastructure and Tourism
Middle East and in North Africa countries are vulnerable to the 
impacts of sea-level rise. The population at risk in coastal cit-
ies numbered approximately 60 million in 2010; that number is 
expected to rise to 100 million by 2030. Separating out the socio-
economic drivers of vulnerability from the effects of sea-level 
rise, a study of 136 coastal cities identified Alexandria, Benghazi, 
and Algiers as particularly vulnerable to a 0.2 m sea-level rise by 
2050. The study projected that, in the event of the failure of flood 
defenses, the effects of sea-level rise would increase damages from 
$16.5 billion to $50.5 billion in Alexandria, from $1.2 billion to 
$2 billion in Benghazi, and from $0.3 billion to $0.4 billion in 
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Algiers. Annual losses would increase to $58 billion, $2.7 billion 
and $0.6 billion with 0.4 m of sea-level rise for these three cities 
respectively. A sea-level rise of one meter could impact 10 percent 
of Egypt’s population, five percent of its urban area, and decrease 
the country’s GDP by six percent. One study estimated that a 
sea-level rise of 0.30 m (projected for 2025 in this study) would 
flood 30 percent of metropolitan Alexandria, forcing about 545,000 
people to abandon their homes and land, and leading to the loss 
of 70,500 jobs. With a sea-level rise of 0.5 m, projected for 2050, 
the same study calculated that about 1.5 million people would 
be displaced and about 195,500 jobs lost. 
The impacts of climate change on tourism are unclear due to 
other non-climatic aspects of tourism, such as changes in travel 
costs, demand, and options for tourism destinations. 
4.1.3.6 Energy Systems
Three types of climate-change-related stressors could potentially 
affect thermal power generation and hydropower generation: 
(1) Increased air temperatures could reduce thermal conversion 
efficiency; (2) changes in the water regime and water temperatures 
may decrease the available volume and decrease efficiency of 
water for cooling; and (3) extreme weather events could affect the 
production plants and the distribution systems. Regional studies 
published in English that quantify the impacts of climate change 
on thermoelectricity generation in the Middle East and in North 
Africa appear to be lacking. For North Africa, one study projects 
that hydropower production will decrease by almost 0.5 percent 
with 2°C warming compared to 2005 production levels due to 
changes in river runoff. In the same study the production is pro-
jected to decrease by 1.4 percent in the Middle East.
4.1.4 Overview of Regional Development 
Narratives
The development narratives build on the climate change impacts 
analyzed in this report (Table 4.10) and are presented in more detail 
in Section 4.5. The Middle East and North Africa region is one of 
the world’s most climate vulnerable regions. With its high and 
growing import dependency, the region is particularly vulnerable to 
worldwide and domestic agricultural impacts and related spikes in 
food prices. While never mono-causal, such climate-related market 
signals may fuel the potential for social unrest and migration and 
have a lasting effect on poverty in the region. Both the rural poor 
and the urban poor would be hard hit by agricultural impacts, as 
poor farmers in rural areas are particularly vulnerable to hunger and 
malnutrition and the urban poor are hit hard by rising food prices. 
While biophysical impacts vary only slightly across the region, 
there is also a clear division in vulnerabilities and socioeconomic 
impacts between the (oil-) rich Arab Gulf States and other countries 
in the region. The former have the financial means to afford adap-
tation options, such as desalination technology and food imports. 
4.2 Introduction
In this report, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is com-
posed of 20 countries from Morocco to Iran. For the projections on 
changes in temperature, precipitation, aridity, heat extremes, and 
sea-level rise, the MENA region stretches from 2°W to 63°E and 
from 10°N to 42°N. The countries in the region can be divided 
into four groups, which share geographical, historical, and/or 
economic similarities: 
• the Maghreb in the western part of North Africa: Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. 
• the Mashrek in the East: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and 
Syria.
• the Arab Gulf States, defined here as member states of the 
“Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf” (and not 
as the countries bordering the Persian Gulf): Iraq, Kuwait, Bah-
rain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
• the least developed countries (LDC) with the lowest indicators 
of socioeconomic development following a definition from the 
United Nations: Yemen and Djibouti.
The region also includes the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, 
and the West Bank and Gaza.
MENA is one of the most diverse regions in the world from a 
socioeconomic point of view as illustrated by the wide spectrum 
of per-capita annual GDP. It ranges from $1,000 in Yemen to more 
than $20,000 in the Arab Gulf States. Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab 
Emirates, Morocco, Egypt, and Yemen rank 4, 12, 27, 130, 132, 
and 151 in GDP per capita on a list of 189 countries (Table 4.1). 
Accordingly, adaptive capacity and vulnerability to climate change 
and other risks also vary greatly among MENA countries.
The main vulnerabilities of the MENA region related to climate 
change impacts are highlighted below.
There is growing demand for water, food, and other agricul-
tural products, driven by a growing population but with strong 
sub-regional variances. While Qatar, Oman, the United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, and Bahrain rank number 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10 in 
population growth among 205 countries, with annual growth rates 
ranging between 3 and 9 percent, Morocco, Iran, Tunisia, Libya, 
and Lebanon rank only 99, 104, 115, 130, and 132 on that same list, 
with annual growth rates between 1.0 and 1.3 percent (World Bank 
2013h). Population is projected to double by 2050 (Verner 2012).
Low-Economic Diversification
Agriculture employs more than 35 percent of the MENA population 
and contributes 13 percent to the region’s GDP (the global aver-
age is 3.2 percent) (Verner 2012); if the agricultural value chain 
is accounted for, then this percentage more than doubles (Valdés 
and Foster 2010). Agriculture generally depends more strongly on 
natural resources and climate than other sectors. Accordingly, the 
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region’s economy also strongly depends on water, as well as on 
climate conducive to food crop growth. As climatic conditions are 
projected to become increasingly unfavorable, natural resources—
in particular land and water—will become overexploited and 
degraded. The fraction of total employment made up by agriculture 
ranges from 1.5 percent in Bahrain and three percent in Jordan 
to 32 percent in Egypt, 41 percent in Morocco, and 54 percent 
in Yemen (2013b). Another aspect of the region’s low economic 
diversification is its strong dependence on gas and oil revenues, 
which make up 38 percent of total regional GDP (Arab Monetary 
Fund 2010). With decreasing availability of fossil fuels, export 
revenues and adaptive capacity may suffer. 
Dependence on Import
The region strongly depends on food and associated virtual water 
imports (water embedded in the trade of agricultural commodities—
see Section 4.4.1, The Agriculture-Water-Food Security Nexus). 
About 50 percent of regional wheat and barley consumption, 
40 percent of rice consumption, and nearly 70 percent of maize 
consumption is met through imports (Verner 2012), and the world’s 
top nine wheat importers are MENA countries. High levels of per 
capita net food imports are due to severe domestic water (and 
land) constraints (i.e. low resource availability in combination 
with often low resource productivity). Import dependency results 
in a high vulnerability to fluctuating global food prices, which to 
some extent are also driven by climate impacts in food-exporting 
regions. On the other hand, food imports reduce the region’s direct 
vulnerability to local climate risks. The Nomura Food Vulnerabil-
ity Index40 (Nomura Global Economics and Strategy 2010) ranks 
Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon, and Egypt as the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 
6th most vulnerable among 80 countries listed.
High Electricity and Water Consumption
Demand-side measures do not feature prominently, as illus-
trated by considerable over-consumption of various goods and 
services—in particular among the Arab Gulf States. The Gulf 
States hold world records in energy-intensity, per capita electric-
ity consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, and domestic water 
demand. Despite its extreme water scarcity, the Arab region uses 
more water per capita than the global average, due in consider-
able part to very low resource use efficiencies of Arab residential 
water and energy markets as they are among the most heavily 
subsidized in the world. Electricity consumption per capita is 
twice as high as or higher than the world average in Bahrain, 
Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates (World Bank, 2013e), and water withdrawal per capita 
is nearly twice as high as the world average in Bahrain, Iraq, 
and Kuwait (FAO 2013).
40 The index is composed of the indicators net food trade, household spending on 
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UNIT MILLION % OF POPULATION ANNUAL % CURRENT $1000 % OF GDP YEARS
YEAR 2011 2012 2012 2012 2009–2010 2011
ID SP.POP.TOTL SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS SP.URB.GROW NY.GDP.PCAP.CD NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS SP.DYN.LE00.IN
Arab Gulf Sta tes
Bahrain 1 89 2.0 22 - 76
Kuwait 3 98 4.0 51 - 74
Oman 3 74 9.5 23 - 76
Qatar 2 99 7.2 90 - 78
Saudi Arabia 28 82 2.1 25 2.4 75
United Arab Emirates 9 85 3.4 39 0.9 77
Least Developed Countries
Djibouti 1 77 1.6 - - 61
Yemen, Rep. 23 33 4.1 1 7.7 63
Maghreb
Algeria 38 74 3.0 5 6.9 71
Libya 6 78 1.1 103 75
Morocco 32 57 2.1 3 15.4 70
Tunisia 11 67 1.3 4 8.0 75
Mashrek
Egypt 79 44 2.0 3 14.0 71
Iraq 32 66 2.5 6 - 69
Jordan 6 83 2.5 5 3.4 74
Lebanon 4 87 1.1 10 5.6 80
Syrian Arab Republic 22 56 2.7 3 23.0 75
Other MENA Countries
Iran, Islamic Rep. 75 69 1.5 7 - 73
Israel 8 92 1.9 33 - 82
West Bank and Gaza 4 75 3.3 - - 73
World 6,966 53 2.1 10 3.2 71
1Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1–5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net 
output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
depletion and degradation of natural resources.
²Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of y ears a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout 
its life.
3in 2009.
Source: World Bank (2013b).
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Governance
Challenges and uncertainties associated with climate change, in 
combination with other pressures, require diverse, adaptable, 
and participatory governance structures (Folke 2003). Judging 
from commonly used indicators of democracy, corruption, and 
gender equity, the region may not be well prepared in this respect. 
According to the Economist’s democracy index41 of 167 countries, 
the MENA countries rank very poorly at positions 90 (Tunisia), 
149 (United Arab Emirates), 150 (Bahrain), 158 (Iran), 163 (Saudi 
Arabia), and 164 (Syria) (The Economist 2012). UNDP’s gender 
inequality index42 (UNDP 2012), which lists 148 countries, ranks 
Qatar at position 117, Syria at 118, Iraq at 120, Egypt at 126, Saudi 
Arabia at 145, and Yemen at 148. The representation of women in 
Arab governments is nine percent, or just half of the global aver-
age (Verner 2012). According to the corruption perception index43 
(Transparency International 2012), which lists 174 countries, 
Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq are ranked at positions 144, 156, 
160, and 169 respectively. Regarding the economic governance 
of the region, large-scale and centralized supply-side measures 
are seen as solutions to the growing demand-supply gap, such 
as large-scale water transfers in Tunisia and Libya. There is less 
emphasis on diverse, distributed, decentralized, and small-scale 
solutions, which would increase the region’s flexibility, diversity, 
and resilience to climate change (Folke 2003; Sowers et al. 2011). 
Low Investment in Research and Development
Innovation in supply-and-demand-side management and adaptation 
to climate change and other risks requires research and develop-
ment. While globally countries spend on average 1.7 percent of 
GDP on research and development, the Arab region44  ranks lowest 
of all the world’s regions at 0.2 percent in 2007 (UNESCO 2010). 
Private investment in the region as a share of total investment 
is around 40–45 percent (lower than Africa, Latin America, and 
the Caribbean, where the share of total investment is around 
75–80 percent) (Verner 2012).
41 The index, on a 0 to 10 scale, is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped 
in five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of 
government; political participation; and political culture. Each category has a rating 
on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of the 
five category indexes.
42 A composite measure reflecting inequality in achievements between women and men 
in three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment, and the labor market. Data 
are those available to the Human Development Report Office as of October 15, 2012.
43 The index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sec-
tor is perceived to be. A country or territory’s score indicates the perceived level of 
public sector corruption on a scale of 0- to 100, where 0 indicates that a country 
is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 indicates it is perceived as not corrupt. A 
country’s rank indicates its position relative to the other countries and territories 
included in the index.
44 The Arab region in the UNESCO report is composed of Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, West Bank and Gaza, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United 
Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
Underemployment
High fertility rates in rural areas and technological changes are 
driving the movement of labor from the agricultural sector, leading 
to rural migration and urban population growth. Forty percent of 
the region’s unemployed are young job seekers (UNESCWA 2007).
Undernourishment and Malnutrition
The number of undernourished people in the region45 in 2011–2013 
reached 21 million in Western Asia (about 10 percent of the popu-
lation) and 4 million in Northern Africa (about 3 percent of the 
population), higher than in 2008–2010 (FAO 2013); on the other 
hand, an estimated one quarter of the population is obese.46
All MENA countries face severe and fast-growing resource 
squeezes, in particular relating to extreme water and land scarcity; 
this leaves most of these countries unable to produce enough food 
for their population. The main focus of this chapter is therefore 
on agriculture and water resources. 
The most recent IPCC Assessment report found that a reduction 
in precipitation by the end of the 21st century is likely over Northern 
Africa under the A1B and A2 scenarios, and that land temperatures 
over Africa are likely rising faster than the global average. There is 
high confidence that climate change will amplify existing stresses 
on water availability across the whole of Africa; acting together 
with non-climate drivers, this will exacerbate the vulnerability of 
agricultural systems, particularly in semi-arid regions (Niang et al. 
2014). Water scarcity is expected to be a major challenge in West 
Asia, including the Arabian Peninsula and other MENA countries, 
due to increased water demand and lack of good management 
(medium confidence), although the impacts of climate change on 
food production and food security in West Asia will vary by region. 
Studies on the regional impacts of climate change are still inadequate, 
including for the Arab Gulf States and parts of the Mashrek (e.g. 
there is only limited information and knowledge gaps on the impacts 
on crops and farmland remain) (Hijioka et al. 2014).
4.3 Regional Patterns of Climate Change
4.3.1 Projected Temperature Changes
The projected increase in temperatures during the boreal summer 
(June, July, August or JJA) over the Middle East and North African 
land area is shown in Figure 4.3 for both the 2°C and 4°C world. 
45 The FAO region Near East and North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
46 According to WHO. Data for adults aged 15 years and older from 16 countries in the 
region show the highest levels of overweight and obesity in Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. The prevalence of overweight and 
obesity in these countries ranges from 74–86 percent in women and 69–77 percent 
in men. A person with a BMI of 25 or more is considered by WHO to be overweight, 
while obesity is defined as having a BMI of 30 or more.
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Figure 4.3: Temperature projections for the Middle East and 
North African land area compared to the baseline (1951–1980).
Temperature projections for the Middle East and North African land area 
compared to the baseline (1951–1980) for the multi-model mean (thick line) 
and individual models (thin lines) under RCP2.6 (2°C world) and RCP8.5 
(4°C world) scenarios for the months of JJA. The multi-model mean has 
been smoothed to give the climatological trend. 
Figure 4.4: Multi-model mean temperature anomaly for RCP2.6 (2°C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4°C world, right) for the months of 
JJA for the Middle East and North African region.
Temperature anomalies in degrees Celsius (top row) are averaged over the time period 2071–2099 relative to 1951–1980, and normalized by the local 
standard deviation (bottom row). 
The multi-model mean warming by 2100 is about 2.5°C in a 2°C 
world and about 7.5°C in a 4°C world, which is substantially more 
than the global mean land warming (see Figure 2.5 in World Bank 
2013). Under the low-emissions scenario (i.e., a 2°C world), sum-
mer temperatures in MENA peak by 2040 at about 2.5°C above 
the 1951–1980 baseline and remain at this level until the end of 
the century. In a 4°C world, warming continues almost linearly 
beyond 2040, reaching about 7.5°C above the 1951–1980 baseline 
by 2100 (Figure 4.3).
Geographically, the strongest warming is projected to take 
place close to the Mediterranean coast (see Figure 4.4). Here, and 
also inland in Algeria, Libya, and large parts of Egypt, regions 
warm by 3°C in a 2°C world. In a 4°C world, mean summer 
temperatures in 2071–2099 are expected to be up to 8°C warmer 
in parts of Algeria. Warming over the Sahel region (i.e., below 
about 20°N in Figure 4.4) is more moderate (2°C in a 2°C world 
and 5°C in a 4°C world), which is likely related to an increase in 
precipitation (see Figure 4.7). 
The lower panels of Figure 4.4 show the normalized warm-
ing (i.e., the warming expressed in terms of the local year-to-year 
natural variability—see Section 6.1, Methods for Temperature, 
Pr ecipitation, Heat Wave, and Aridity  Projections) over the Middle 
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East and North African land area. The normalized warming is a 
useful diagnostic tool as it indicates how unusual the warming is 
compared to fluctuations experienced in the past in a particular 
region (Coumou and Robinson 2013; Hansen et al. 2012; Mora and 
Frazier et al. 2013). In a 4°C world, the probability density function 
of monthly temperatures (associated with the year-to-year vari-
ability of monthly temperatures) shifts by six standard deviations 
toward warmer conditions across all regions, from the Sahara to 
the Arabian Peninsula to the eastern Mediterranean coast. Such a 
large shift implies that summer temperatures here will move to a 
new climatic regime by the end of the 21st century. Such a dramatic 
change would be avoided in a 2°C world; even then, however, a 
substantial shift is expected (i.e., by about 2–3 standard deviations). 
4.3.2 Heat Extremes
An increase in the number of extremely high temperatures since the 
1960s has been detected, as would be expected for an increase in 
global mean temperatures over the same period (Seneviratne et al. 
2012). An increase in the warm spell duration index (WSDI47) for 
heat waves has also been observed and is particularly pronounced 
47 The Warm spell duration index (WSDI) is one of the 27 indices developed and 
recommended by the WMO CCl/CLIVAR/JCOMM Expert Team on Climate Change 
Detection and Indices (Zhang et al. 2011b). It is defined as the longest annual spell 
of at least six consecutive days with maximum temperatures exceeding the local 
90th percentile relative to a reference period (in days).
over North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle 
East (Donat et al. 2013; Donat, Peterson et al. 2013; Hoerling et 
al. 2012; Kuglitsch et al. 2010).
As expected from the large shifts in normalized warming, the 
number of threshold-exceeding extremes is expected to strongly 
increase across the Middle East and North African region under 
projected future warming (Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6). In a 2°C world, 
by the end of the century about 30 percent of summer months will 
be hotter than 3-sigma (see Section 6.1, Methods for Temperature, 
Precipitation, Heat Wave, and Aridity Projections) almost every-
where in this region. This implies that every year on average one 
of the summer months (June, July, or August) is expected to exceed 
temperatures by more than three standard deviations beyond the 
1951–1980 mean. This value is substantially higher than the global 
mean projections (20 percent of summer months) (see Figure 2.7 in 
World Bank 2013). The Mediterranean and Middle East are particu-
larly prone to an increase in extreme temperatures and heat waves, 
because temperature extremes in these regions are expected to be 
amplified by a reduction in soil moisture, resulting from decreasing 
precipitation (Lorenz et al. 2010; Orlowsky and Seneviratne 2011; 
Vautard et al. 2013). Summer months warmer than 5-sigma, however, 
will remain largely absent, except for some isolated coastal regions 
(including the Mediterranean coasts of Egypt and over Yemen, 
Djibouti, and Oman). Here 5-sigma events will still be relatively 
rare in a 2°C world but are nevertheless detectable and expected 
to occur between 5–10 percent of summer months. 
Figure 4.5: Multi-model mean of the percentage of boreal summer months in the time period 2071–2099, with temperatures 
greater than 3-sigma (top row) and 5-sigma (bottom row) for scenarios RCP2.6 (2°C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4°C world, right) over 
the Middle East and North Africa. 
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in some isolated coastal areas (The Egyptian Red Sea coast and 
the Mediterranean coasts of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia) is the 
frequency higher than the regional mean during the 2071–2099 
period (i.e., close to 80 percent of summer months). The large 
shift in normalized temperatures to warmer conditions (i.e., by 
about six standard deviations in a 4° C world, see Figure 4.4) 
will cause almost all summer months to be warmer than 3-sigma 
(i.e., more than 90 percent of summer months for the 2071–2099 
period in a 4°C world).
These projections in heat extremes are consistent with published 
analyses based upon the full CMIP5 dataset of climate projections. 
These studies indicate that over the Mediterranean, the Sahara, 
and the Arabian Peninsula, the minimum nighttime temperature 
and the maximum daytime temperature increase by about 2oC 
under RCP2.6 and by 6oC under RCP8.5 by 2081–2100 compared 
to 1981–2000 (Sillmann et al. 2013a; b); this is very similar to the 
seasonal changes shown in Figure 4.3. In addition, the increase in 
the percentage of 3-sigma and 5-sigma monthly heat extremes as 
Figure 4.6: Multi-model mean (thick line) and individual 
models (thin lines) of the percentage of Middle East and North 
African land area warmer than 3-sigma (top) and 5-sigma 
(bottom) during boreal summer months (JJA) for scenarios 
RCP2.6 (2°C world) and RCP8.5 (4°C world). 
The increase in frequency of heat extremes is projected to 
plateau by mid-century in a 2°C world. In a 4°C world, however, 
heat extremes are projected to become ever more frequent up to 
and beyond the end of the century (see Figure 4.5). This is simi-
lar to the timing of the mean summer warming (see Figure 4.3). 
The multi-model mean projection indicates that in a 4°C world 
80 percent of summer months will be hotter than 5-sigma by 2100 
(Figure 4.6), with about 65 percent of summer months reaching 
this level during the 2071–2099 period (Figure 4.5). Figure 4.6 also 
clearly shows that there is substantial inter-model spread, with 
the area of land experiencing 5-sigma events by 2100 ranging from 
30 percent to almost 100 percent in different models. The inter-
model spread for projected mean summer temperatures is much 
more limited (see Figure 4.3) compared to that of the projected 
frequency of 3- and 5-sigma events (see Figure 4.6). It is possible 
that the large spread in the projected frequency of heat extremes 
is primarily due to the difference in simulated inter-annual vari-
ability in surface temperatures in the models for this particular 
region. Further research would be needed to confirm this. Only 
Table 4.2: Mean WSDI (Warm Spell Duration Index) for capital 
cities in the MENA region for different levels of global warming 




OBSERVATION OBSERVED 1.5 2.0 3.0 4.0
Abadan 1951—2000 6 43  82  99 134
Amman 1959–2004 4 31  62  84 115
Ankara 1926–2003 7 44  67 111 128
Athens 1951–2001 1 40  61 121 166
Baghdad 1950–2000 8 47  90 113 162
Beirut – – 47  93 126 187
Belgrade 1951–2010 9 39  39  76 113
Cairo – – 32  53  80  94
Damascus 1965–1993 1 36  71  98 129
Istanbul 1960–2010 0 26  41  78 113
Jerusalem 1964–2004 7 26  46  73 102
Kuwait – – 45  87 123 167
Nicosia 1975–2001 6 25  58  81 162
Riyadh 1970–2004 3 81 132 157 202
Sofia 1960–2010 1 40  49  88 136
Tehran 1956–1999 5 48  92 122 159
Tirana 1951–2000 6 49  71 125 168
Tripoli 1956–1999 3 13  22  33  59
 The observational record is taken from Klok and Tank (2009). The annual 
WSDI is averaged over the observational period as well as over 20-year 
periods from the A1B scenario over the 21st century that correspond to a 
mean warming of the given temperature level. The 4.0°C warming level is 
averaged over the 2079–2099 interval from the A2 scenario.
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shown in Figure 4.5 is consistent with the results of Coumou and 
Robinson (2013), who analyzed all climate models in the CMIP5 
dataset. Although an above-global average increase in Mediterra-
nean summer temperatures is robust over a wide range of regional 
and global climate models, it might be partly overestimated due 
to systematic warming bias (Boberg and Christensen 2012). 
Using a high resolution regional climate model, Lelieveld et al. 
(2013) projected a substantial increase in the warm-spell duration 
index (WSDI) for several capital cities in the region (Table 4.2). 
The mean WSDI over the observational period lies between zero 
and about one week; it is projected to exceed four months for most 
capital cities in the region in a 4°C world and even six months for 
Beirut and Riyadh. The mean WSDI would be limited to between 
1–2 months for most capital cities and would rarely exceed three 
Figure 4.7: Multi-model mean of the percentage change in winter (DJF, top), summer (JJA, middle) and annual (bottom) 



















Hatched areas indicate uncertain results, with two or more out of five mod els disagreeing on the direction of change. Note that projections are given as 
relative changes; thus, over dry regions like the Sahel/Sahara, large relative changes reflect only small absolute changes.
months in a 2°C world. The increase in future heat wave risk as 
indicated by the increase in the WSDI represents a serious risk for 
a variety of sectors, including health and tourism.
4.3.3 Projected Precipitation Changes
Annual precipitation is projected to decrease north of ~25°N 
and to increase south of that latitude. It is important to note tha t 
the projections shown in Figure 4.7 are given as relative changes 
(percentage changes compared to the 1951–1980 average); thus, 
especially over already dry regions, large relative changes do 
not necessarily reflect large absolute changes. The Sahel and 
the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula bordering the Indian 
Ocean (Yemen, Oman) are projected to become wetter in both a 
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2°C and 4°C world, primarily during the summer months (JJA). 
The IPCC AR5 reports similar seasonal precipitation changes for 
the Sahel, but the wetting region is substantially smaller (limited 
to the southeast only) and model disagreement is larger. Thus, 
the projected JJA wetting of the Sahel as shown here should be 
treated with caution due to the limited number of models used. 
During the winter months (DJF), the eastern part of the Sahel 
region in fact becomes drier. Wetting of the southern Arabian 
Peninsula is part of a larger and well-documented pattern of wetter 
conditions over the Horn of Africa expected under future climate 
change (Giannini et al. 2008; World Bank 2013). Rainfall in this 
region is associated with tropical convection, which is projected 
to strengthen under future warming. Future wetting in this region 
is also supported by paleo-climate data, and it is likely to intensify 
inter-annual rainfall variability (Wolff et al. 2011). 
In a 2°C world, the relative wetting of regions south of 25°N is 
pronounced (~50 percent more rain), whereas the relative drying 
to the North is small (with the Mediterranean coasts receiving about 
10–20 percent less rain annually). In fact, the climate models used 
here disagree on the direction of change over substantial areas, 
notably between 25°N and 30°N. This is true for both seasons. 
However, the larger set of CMIP5 models used for the IPCC AR5 
project robust drying of the Mediterranean coastal regions. 
In a 4°C world, the magnitude of change in the models used 
becomes much more pronounced in the region north of 25°N and the 
models converge toward drier conditions. Only over Saudi Arabia, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, and parts of Libya do the projected 
relative changes in annual-mean precipitation remain small, and 
models show disagreement on the direction of change. Clearly, in 
a 4°C world, countries along the Mediterranean shore (notably 
Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey) will receive substantially less 
rain annually (up to 50 percent less precipitation). In this region 
relative changes in seasonal precipitation are similar to changes in 
the annual mean, indicating that the drying happens year-round. 
4.3.4 Extreme Precipitation and Droughts
The observational record for North Africa, the Middle East, and 
the Arabian Peninsula indicates an overall reduction in extreme 
precipitation events since the 1960s, despite a local positive trend 
over the Atlas mountains since the 1980s (Donat and Peterson et al. 
2013). At the same time, an increase in meteorological drought has 
been reported since the 1960s, consistent with an overall regional 
drying trend (Donat and Peterson et al. 2013; Sousa et al. 2011).
Despite a global trend toward more extreme precipitation events 
over the 21st century, Kharin et al. (2013) conducted an analysis 
using CMIP5 models under the RCP8.5 scenario and reported no 
significant change or even a slight decrease in heavy precipitation 
across most of North Africa and the Middle East. It is not clear, 
however, to what extent these models are able to reproduce rare 
climatological phenomena like the Active Red Sea Trough (ARST) 
that is associated in the observational record with extreme heavy 
precipitation events in the Middle East (de Vries et al. 2013).
While the projected changes in extreme precipitation events are 
below the global average for Saudi-Arabia and Iran, the southern tip 
of the Arabian Peninsula (notably Oman and Yemen) is projected 
to experience a substantial intensification of extreme precipitation 
events over the 21st century under the RCP8.5 scenario (Kharin et 
al. 2013; Sillmann et al. 2013b). This is consistent with the robust 
projection for increasing annual precipitation over the Horn of Africa. 
The North African countries (and notably Morocco, Algeria, 
and Tunisia), as well as the countries of the Middle East, are con-
sistently projected to become global hotspots for drought by the 
end of the 21st century under the RCP8.5 (Dai 2012; Orlowsky and 
Seneviratne 2013; Prudhomme et al. 2013; Sillmann et al. 2013b). 
Dai (2012) projects severe drought conditions for Morocco and 
the Middle East under the RCP4.5 scenario, which is found to 
strongly intensify under RCP8.5 (Prudhomme et al. 2013). Based 
on the comprehensive ISI-MIP modeling framework, Prudhomme 
et al. (2013) report an increase of more than 50 percent in the 
number of drought days around the Mediterranean by the end of 
21st century (2070–2099) under the RCP8.5 scenario relative to the 
1976–2005 period. For the same region, Orlowsky and Seneviratne 
(2013) project an average of more than six months per year with at 
least moderate drought conditions in the 2080–2100 period under 
the RCP8.5 scenario, compared to less than one month per year 
under RCP2.6. Although projections of future droughts not only 
suffer from large model uncertainties—and also largely depend 
on the methodology and baseline periods chosen (Trenberth et al. 
2014)—the projections for an increase in extreme drought condi-
tions around the Mediterranean, Northern Africa, and the Middle 
East are consistent across a variety of studies (IPCC 2012). Drought 
projections for the Mediterranean are strongly dependent on the 
emissions scenario used, and are much less pronounced under 
RCP2.6 (Orlowsky and Seneviratne 2013; Prudhomme et al. 2013).
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, a weaker intensification of 
future droughts is expected compared to projections for Northern 
Africa and the Middle East (Dai 2012; Orlowsky and Seneviratne 
2013; Prudhomme et al. 2013); uncertainty in this region, however, 
is large (Hemming et al. 2010) and these projections might not 
be statistically robust (Sillmann et al. 2013b). For the Arabian 
Peninsula, a possible reduction in future droughts, or at least no 
further intensification in the already-extreme drought conditions, 
is projected by Dai (2012). 
4.3.5 Aridity
The availability of water for both people and ecosystems is a 
function of supply and demand. The long-term balance between 
supply and demand fundamentally determines whether ecosystems 
and agricultural systems are able to thrive in a certain area. This 
section assesses projected changes in the aridity index (AI), an 
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48 Some individual grid cells have noticeably different values than their direct neighbors (e.g. on Turkey’s Black Sea coast under RCP8.5). This is due to the fact that the aridity 
index is defined as a fraction of total annual precipitation divided by potential evapotranspiration (see Appendix). It therefore behaves in a strongly non-linear fashion and 
year-to-year fluctuations can be large. As the results are averaged over a relatively small number of model simulations, this can result in local jumps.
indicator designed to identify regions with a structural precipita-
tion deficit (Zomer et al. 2008). AI is calculated as the total annual 
precipitation divided by the annual potential evapotranspiration—a 
standardized measure of water demand (see Section 6.1.3, Aridity 
Index and Potential Evaporation). Although several meteorological 
variables affect potential evapotranspiration, including radiation 
and near-surface wind speed, it is to a large extent governed by 
changes in temperature. A smaller AI value indicates a larger water 
deficit (i.e. more arid conditions), with areas classified as hyper-
arid, arid, semi-arid, and sub-humid as specified in Table 6.1).
Annual-mean monthly potential evapotranspiration is projected 
to increase throughout the region with robust model agreement. 
The magnitude of the relative changes forms rather uniform geo-
graphical patterns (Figure 4.8). There is a small increase under 
RCP2.6, typically of only 10 percent although somewhat more 
in regions directly surrounding the Mediterranean Sea. In a 4°C 
world, a more substantial increase is observed, again especially 
in countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea.
There is a close match between the pattern of change in 
the annual mean AI value (Figure 4.9) and projected precipita-
tion changes (Figure 4.7). This indicates that changes in AI are 
primarily driven by changes in precipitation causing an increase 
in AI (wetter conditions) south of 25°N (i.e., the Sahel and the 
most southern part of the Arabian Peninsula) and a decrease in 
AI (drier conditions) north of 25°N. The relative increase in AI 
values in  the southern region is similar to the relative increase in 
annual mean precipitation (about 50 percent wetter conditions), 
as the change in potential evapotranspiration is small. Note that 
this relative increase in AI south of 25°N is imposed on an already 
very low AI value, which results in AI values still classified as arid.
Figure 4.8: Multi-model mean of the percentage change in the annual-mean (ANN) of monthly potential evapotranspiration for 
RCP2.6 (2°C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4°C world, right) for the Middle East and North African region by 2071–99 relative to 1951–80.
Hatched areas indicate uncertain results, with two or more out of five models disagreeing on the direction of change. 
Figure 4.9: Multi-model mean of the percentage change in the aridity index under RCP2.6 (2°C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4°C 





Hatched areas indicate uncertain results, with two or more out of five models disagreeing on the direction of change. Note that a negative change cor-
responds to a shift to more arid conditions.48
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In the Mediterranean coastal region, the percentage decrease in 
AI is more pronounced than that for precipitation because there is 
a substantial increase in evapotranspiration here due to enhanced 
warming. In other words, the opposing trends of more evapotrans-
piration and less annual-mean precipitation mean that this region 
is expected to see a shift to much more arid conditions. In fact, this 
is linked to a feedback between precipitation and evaporation via 
temperature. In regions where the soil dries out because of a decline 
in precipitation, less heat can be converted into latent heat and thus 
more heat is present to warm surface temperatures (Coumou and 
R ahmstorf 2012; Schär et al. 2004). Higher surface temperatures then 
lead to enhanced potential evapotranspiration. Thus, a decline in 
precipitation can make local conditions more arid in two ways: directly 
via a reduction in the supply of water, and indirectly via an increase 
in surface temperatures which further enhances evapotranspiration 
(Trenberth 2011). This results in a reduction of up to 30 percent in 
AI (increased aridity) over the African and eastern shores of the 
Mediterranean in a 2°C world; in a 4°C world, essentially all coastal 
regions will see a reduction in AI of about 50 percent. Trends in AI 
over the Arabian Peninsula are weaker and models disagree on the 
direction of change due to the uncertainty in precipitation changes.
The shift in AI in Figure 4.9 translates into a shift of categoriza-
tion of areas into specific aridity classes . The total hyper-arid area is 
projected to grow by about five percent in a 4°C world, something 
which would mostly be avoided in a 2°C world (see Table 4.3). 
Less than half of this increase in hyper-aridity can be explained by 
a reduction in arid, semi-arid, and sub-humid areas, indicating that 
humid regions (i.e., AI > 0.65) have shifted into the arid classification.
4.3.6 Regional Sea-level Rise
Sea-level rise projections for MENA present a particular challenge 
due to the semi-enclosed nature of both the Mediterranean and Red 
Sea basins. They are connected to the broader Atlantic and Indian 
Oceans, respectively, through relatively narrow straits which are not 
well represented in the coarse resolution of GCMs (Marcos and Tsimplis 
2008). For that reason, this report notes that the steric-dynamical49 
section of the analysis of the new CMIP5 ensemble is explorative. 
In the Mediterranean area, tide gauges recorded below-average 
sea-level rise during the 20th century, with an average rise of 
1.1–1.3 mm per year (Tsimplis and Baker 2000); this is lower than 
the global average of 1.8 mm per year (Meehl et al. 2007). There 
has been significant inter-decadal variability, with reduced rise 
between 1960 and 1990 and rapid (above-average) rise after 1990. 
In the 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 winters, sea levels rose 10 cm above 
the seasonal average. Atmospheric influence is thought to be the 
primary driver, where pressure and wind variations associated with 
the North Atlantic Oscillation control water flow through the Gibral-
tar Strait (Gomis et al. 2006; Landerer and Volkov 2013; Tsimplis et 
al. 2013). Compared to the well-studied Mediterranean basin, tide 
gauge records in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea are much sparser—
limited to a few, non-continuous records.50 Available evidence from 
the neighboring Northern Indian Ocean, also including satellite 
altimetry and modeling, suggests past rates of rise consistent with 
the global mean (Han et al. 2010; Unnikrishnan and Shankar 2007).
This report’s analysis of the 21st century projections indicates 
slightly below-average rise in the Mediterranean basin (Figure 4.10 
and Figure 4.11 top panel), mostly as a result of the gravitational 
influence of the Greenland ice sheet (Figure 4.11 bottom panel). 
In our GCM ensemble, this is compensated by the above-average 
steric-dynamic contribution in this area (but lower than in the 
neighboring Atlantic Ocean) (Figure 4.11 middle panel). The com-
bined gravity- and steric-dynamic pattern induces a stronger rise 
in the Arabian Sea compared to the Mediterranean (see Figure 4.10 
and Figure 4.11). Consistent with this finding, Tunis is projected to 
experience 0.56 m (0.38–0.96 m) sea-level rise by the end of the 
century (2081–2100) compared to 1986–2005 in a 4°C world (see 
Figure 4.12 and Table 4.4). This is eight cm less than in Muscat, 
where 0.64 m is projected (0.44–1.04 m). On the Atlantic coast, 
0.58 m (0.39–0.98 m) sea-level rise is projected for Tangier. Across 
all the locations present in the figures, the projected high-end 
rates of sea-level rise range from 6.4 mm per year (Alexandria) 
to 7.8 mm per year (Tangier) in a 1.5°C world and from 20 mm 
per year (Tunis) to 21.4 mm per year (Alexandria) in a 4°C world 
(Table 4.5). This is comparable with global mean projections (up 
to 7.2 mm per year in a 1.5°C world and 21.9 mm per year in a 
4°C world by the end of the century).
Note that this report excludes the steric-dynamic component 
of three models (MIROC-ESM, HadGEM-ES, CSIRO-Mk3-6-0) with 
obvious deficiencies in this area (e.g., projecting more than one meter 
deviation from the global mean or from the neighboring oceans, 
or simulating a reversed sea-level gradient across Gibraltar). The 
remaining 5 models simulate a present-day sea-level difference of 
49 Related to changes in ocean density and circulation.
50 Tide gauge records can be found at http://www.psmsl.org/data/obtaining/map.html.
Table 4.3: Multi-model mean of the percentage of land area in 
the Middle East and North African region which is classified as 
hyper arid, arid, semi-arid and sub-humid for 1951–1980 and 
2071–2099 for both the low (2°C world, RCP2.6) and high (4°C 






Hyper Arid 68.9 70.7 74.2
Arid 13.2 13.0 12.4
Semi-Arid 7.1 7.0 6.3
Sub-Humid 1.8 1.7 1.4
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Figure 4.11: Regional sea-level rise anomaly pattern and its 
contributions to the median RCP8.5 scenario (4°C world).
Total sea-level rise (top), steric-dynamic (middle), and land-ice (bottom) 
contributions to sea-level rise are shown as anomalies with respect to the 
global mean sea-level ri se. Global mean contributions to be added on top 
of the spatial anomalies are indicated in the panel titles. 
Table 4.5: Rate of sea-level rise in MENA between 2080–2100 
(mm per  year).
 RCP2.6 (1.5°C WORLD) RCP8.5 (4°C WORLD)
Tangier 3.3 (1.8, 7.8) 10.2 (6.8, 21.0)
Tunis 3.5 (1.2, 6.6) 10.1 (6.4, 20.0)
Alexandria 3.4 (1.2, 6.4) 10.9 (6.9, 21.4)
Muscat 4.2 (1.5, 6.9) 12.0 (8.9, 20.6)
Numbers in parentheses indicate low and high bounds (see Section 6.2, 
Sea-Level Rise Projections for an explanation of the 1.5° world).
Table 4.4: Sea-level rise between 1986–2005 and 2080–2099 
in selected MENA locations (m). 
 RCP2.6 (1.5°C WORLD) RCP8.5 (4°C WORLD)
Tangier 0.35 (0.21, 0.57) 0.58 (0.39, 0.98)
Tunis 0.34 (0.20, 0.57) 0.56 (0.38, 0.96)
Alexandria 0.35 (0.21, 0.57) 0.58 (0.40, 1.00)
Muscat 0.39 (0.22, 0.64) 0.64 (0.44, 1.04)
 Numbers in parentheses indicate low and high bounds (see Section 6.2, 
Sea-Level Rise Projections for an explanation of the 1.5° world).
Figure 4.10: Patterns of regional sea-level rise (m).
Median (left column) and upper range (right column) of projected regional sea-level rise for the RCP2.6 scenario (1.5°C world, top row) and the RCP8.5 scenario 
(4°C world, bottom row) for the period 2081–2100 relative to the reference period 1986–2005. Associated global mean rise is indicated in the panel titles. 
9099_CH04.pdf   128 11/17/14   6:06 PM
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
129
11–30 cm between the neighboring Atlantic Ocean and Mediterra-
nean Sea; this is consistent with observations (Rio et al. 2014). The 
difference between the Mediterranean and nearby Atlantic sea-level 
rise depends on processes at the Strait of Gibraltar which are poorly 
represented in GCMs (Marcos and Tsimplis 2008) and which are just 
beginning to be investigated with regional climate models (Artale et 
al. 2010; Gualdi et al. 2013; Somot et al. 2008). Any addition of mass 
in the Atlantic, such as from melting ice sheets, would be immedi-
ately transferred through the Strait of Gibraltar; this may not be the 
case for steric-dynamic changes (including atmospheric influences). 
On top of these projections, decadal and shorter-term variability 
will continue to occur (Calafat et al. 2012; Landerer and Volkov 
2013). Sea-level extremes are generally lower in the Mediterranean 
basin than along the neighboring Atlantic coasts, except for a 
few hotspots (such as in the Gulf of Gabes) due to the presence 
of large tides (Marcos et a l. 2 009). Available evidence from past 
observations and modeling indicate that sea-level extremes will 
change in line with mean sea levels (Marcos et al. 2009). 
As mentioned in the introduction, this analysis only considers 
absolute sea-level changes; it omits vertical land movements despite 
their relevance for local planning and adaptation. Alexandria is a 
well-known example where sediment compaction in the Nile delta 
provokes land subsidence (Syvitski et al. 2009), thereby enhancing 
the effect of climate-induced sea-level rise. Alexandria is ranked 
top among the cities with projected increased loss of local GDP 
as a result of damages from sea-level rise by 2050 (Hallegatte et 
Figure 4.12: Sea-level projections for Tangier, Tunis, and Alexandria.
Time series for sea-level rise for the two scenarios RCP2.6 (1.5°C world, blue) and RCP8.5 (4°C world, green). Median estimates are given as full thick 
lines and the lower and upper bound given as shading. Full thin lines are global median sea-level rise with dashed lines as lower  and upper bounds. Vertical 
and horizontal black lines indicate the reference period and reference (zero) level. 
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al. 2013). Post-glacial rebound and tectonic movements may also 
provoke land subsidence or uplift in the Mediterranean area. There 
is a sustained effort to detect these processes with a combination 
of tide gauges, satellite altimetry measurement, GPS stations, and 
modeling (Lambeck and Purcell 2005; Ostanciaux et al. 2012; 
Wöppelmann and Marcos 2012), as well as via archaeological 
information (Anzidei et al. 2011). 
4.4 Regional Impacts
4.4.1 The Agriculture-Water-Food Security Nexus
4.4.1.1 Water Scarcity and Climatic Limitations 
to Agricultural Production
Most of the land area of the MENA region receives less than 300 mm 
annual rainfall (and 200–300 mm per year roughly represents 
the lower limit for rain-fed agriculture). Semi-arid belts along the 
coasts and mountains are the only water sources and provide 
productive land for rain-fed agriculture (Immerzeel et al. 2011). 
The availability of renewable water resources is generally below 
1000 m3 per capita per year (except for Iraq, the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, and Lebanon), and as low as 50 m3 per capita for most 
countries on the Arab peninsula (Selvaraju 2013; Sowers et al. 
2011; Verner 2012). Accordingly, withdrawal-to-availability ratios 
Figure 4.13: Major farming systems in the MENA region.
Notes:
Projection = Geographic (Lat/Long)
FAO Disclaimer
The designations employed and the presentation of the 
material in the maps do not imply the expression of any 
opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal 
or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, 
or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.
The major farming systems have been identified based on the available natural resource base (water, land, grazing areas, slope, farm size, tenure, and 
organization) and the dominant pattern of farm activities and household livelihoods, broadly grouped and mapped. Note that besides the systems displayed 
there are small but important irrigated areas which might not be visible in the figure. Source: Dixon et al. (2001b).
exceed the critical threshold of 40 percent in all MENA countries 
except Lebanon; they exceed 100 percent in Jordan, Yemen, Libya, 
and most of the Arab peninsula countries (FAO-AQUASTAT 2012), 
leading to groundwater resource depletion.
This water scarcity prevents MENA countries from producing 
all required food domestically and makes the region depending 
on food imports. From the current situation of critical water and 
arable land scarcity, 2°C and 4°C warming scenarios will result 
in further increased pressures on water resources and agriculture.
Egypt, Syria, and Iraq depend strongly for their water supply 
and food security on precipitation in upstream countries situated in 
different climatic zones. Egypt depends primarily on Ethiopia (via the 
Nile), and Syria and Iraq depend to a large extent on Turkey (via the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers). These two major river basins support 
most of the irrigated farmland in the MENA region (Figure 4.13). 
Despite conditions of extreme water scarcity, MENA uses more 
water per capita than the global average (see Figure 4.14) due in 
large part to very low resource-use efficiencies, with Arab resi-
dential water and energy markets being among the most heavily 
subsidized in the world.
The growing wa ter scarcity prev ents MENA countries from 
producing all their required food domestically. The region as a 
whole exceeded its capacity for domestic food production in the 
1970s (Allan 2001). The growing deficit has had to be met by food 
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imports, with associated imports of virtual water (i.e., water that 
has been used in the production of food abroad).
Across much of MENA, the conditions for rain-fed agriculture 
are marginal in terms of absolute water availability and the fact 
that the months of highest temperatures coincide with lowest pre-
cipitation. Despite this, around 70 percent of cropland area is rain-
fed, with even higher percentages in most Maghreb and Mashrek 
countries. Wheat, barley, and some rice and sorghum are the main 
crops (Selvaraju 2013). Between 60–90 percent of all water used in 
MENA countries goes into agriculture (Selvaraju 2013). The Arab 
Gulf States depend exclusively on groundwater for irrigation, while 
the rest of the region (with the exception of Egypt) depends almost 
equally on surface water and groundwater (Siebert et al. 2010). 
Irrigated agriculture is generally more productive per hectare 
than rain-fed agriculture and, as a result, makes up more than 
50 percent of total agricultural production in the region. The pro-
ductivity of rain-fed agriculture depends on stable and continuous 
rainfall. Rainfall is more variable in the MENA region than almost 
anywhere else (Bucknall 2007); in combination with often inefficient 
systems of production, this causes cereal yields to consistently 
remain below world averages (see Figure 4.15) (Selvaraju 2013). 
As a result of low agricultural productivity and other factors 
(e.g., supply chain losses, lack of access to food, and low income 
levels), about 25 million people in the MENA region are currently 
undernourished—four million in Northern Africa (2.7 percent of 
the total population)51 and 21 million in Western Asia (10 percent 
of the total population)52 (FAO 2012a, 2013). Besides sub-Saharan 
51 With highest shares in Morocco (5.5 percent). The region includes Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. 
52 With highest shares in Iraq (26 percent) and Yemen (32 percent). The region 
includes Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen.
Africa, the MENA region is the only region where the number of 
undernourished has increased since the 1990s (UNDP RBAS 2009). 
While there are opportunities for intensification, agricultural 
production in the MENA region will remain severely water-limited. 
This is due to three key reasons: (1) that rain-fed agriculture 
often takes place under marginal precipitation conditions, so 
that the projected reduction in precipitation, in combination 
with increasing temperatures, will cause conditions to pass the 
threshold whereby irrigation would be required to maintain crop-
ping systems; (2) that blue water resources are already fully or 
even overexploited (with competition from other sectors rapidly 
growing) such that, in t he future, water allocations for irrigation 
cannot be increased or may even need to be reduced; and (3) that 
increasing precipitation variability and extremes will reduce the 
reliability of the crop water supply. 
4.4.1.2 Climate Risks to the Water Sector
According to the IPCC WGII report, there is high agreement that 
climate change will reduce renewable surface water and ground-
water resources considerably in most dry subtropical regions, 
aggravating competition for water within and among sectors. 
Reductions in water availability will generally be greater than the 
underlying reductions in precipitation, due to increases in potential 
evapotranspiration from warmer temperatures and non-linearity 
in the hydrological system (e.g. as precipitation is transforme d 
into river runoff or groundwater recharge).
This analysis distinguishes between green water (plant-available 
water in soils, directly resulting from precipitation) and blue 
water (water in rivers and lakes, groundwater, and other water 
bodies), because these two types of water have different uses and 
Figure 4.14: Water footprints in m3 per capita and year.
Source: Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2011) as cited in Saab (2012). 
Figure 4.15: Average cereal yields (kilograms per hectare) 
from 1961–2010 for Northern Africa and Western Asia as 
compared to the world average.
Source: FAOSTAT data in Selvaraju (2013).
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opportunity costs and respond differently to climate change. Blue 
water is used for irrigation and direct human consumption; green 
water supports rain-fed agriculture as well as other land-based 
ecosystems. Reductions in green water availability closely follow 
reductions in precipitation. Reductions in blue water availability 
are generally greater than the underlying reduction in precipitation.
As a result of global warming, especially changes in precipi-
tation patterns, water availability will decrease in most parts of 
the MENA region throughout the 21st century (García-Ruiz et al. 
2011) with decreases possibly exceeding 15 percent in a 2°C world 
and 45 percent in a 4°C world in parts of the region (Schewe et 
al. 2013). The exception is the southernmost areas Figure 4.16 
shows changes in discharge (i.e., blue water availability) in the 
21st century as a result of a multi-model inter-comparison with 
five global climate models and nine global hydrological models 
under the RCP8.5 scenario (Schewe et al. 2013).
The trend toward decreasing average water availability will 
be compounded by higher variability and more extremes, such as 
droughts and flooding, leading to a loss of reliability and increas-
ing uncertainty in water management (García-Ruiz et al. 2011; 
Törnros and Menzel 2014). Examples of previous severe flooding 
events include those in Algiers in 2001, Morocco in 2002, and 
Tunis in 2003.
While decreasing annual average precipitation in combination 
with higher temperatures is likely to cause a reduction in surface 
runoff and groundwater recharge (aggravating current trends 
in groundwater overexploitation and depletion), the effects of 
increasing extremes (with higher rainfall per event) are not so 
straightforward. Liu (2011) found that in some arid regions the 
higher intensity of extreme precipitation events may increase the 
fraction of precipitation that enters the soil and becomes plant-
available soil moisture and contributes to groundwater recharge. 
In other regions, the fraction of runoff and loss of water to unpro-
ductive evaporation, in contrast to productive plant transpiration, 
may increase.
In a Lebanon-based study, Shaban (2008) found that over the 
past four decades there has been a significant decrease (in the order 
of 25 percent) in those water resources, including most rivers and 
groundwater reservoirs, that are subject to climate change and 
other direct human pressures. The decrease was somewhat smaller 
(about 15 percent) for those water resources only subject to climatic 
trends (e.g., snow cover and precipitation). Lebanon’s total water 
resources are projected to decrease by 6–8 percent for an increase 
in average annual temperature of 1°C, and by 12–16 percent for 
an increase of 2°C, using the HadCm3 and PRECIS global and 
regional climate models (Republic of Lebanon 2011).
Surface Water
In a study of the tributaries of the Jordan River, Samuels et al. (2010) 
projected a reduction in mean daily runoff of 17 percent for the 
period 2036–2060 (relative to 1980–2004), using the A1B scenario 
and the ECHAM 5 global/RegCM regional climate model and the 
HYMKE watershed model. For the Zarqa basin in Jordan, Abdulla et 
al. (2008) projected changes in surface runoff ranging from –23.6 to 
+36.6 percent, and changes in groundwater recharge from –57.5 to 
+89.8 percent, in response to stylized combinations of temperature 
increases of 0–3.5°C and precipitation changes of between –20 and 
+20 percent, using the BASINS-HSPF model. It is important to note 
that the positive changes for precipitation (and subsequently runoff 
and recharge) are very hypothetical, given the strong agreement of 
global climate models projecting a decrease in precipitation.
For the eastern Anatolian mountains (the headwaters of the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers), snow water storage is expected to 
decrease (see Box 4.1: Snow Water Storage) and, accordingly, a 
runoff decrease of 25–55 percent is projected between 1961–1990 
and 2071–2 099, using different SRES scenarios (A1FI, A2 and B1), 
different GCMs (ECHAM5, CCSM3 and HadCM3), and the RegCM3 
regional climate model (Bozkurt and Sen 2013).
For Morocco, the 2nd National Communications (Kingdom 
of Morocco 2010) projected a decrease in river discharge of 
Figure 4.16: Relative change in annual water discharge in the Middle East and North Africa region in a 4°C world.
Relative to the 1986–2006 period based on an ISI-MIP model intercomparison using climate projections by CMIP5 GCMs as an input for global hydrology 
models (GHMs)21 (based on Schewe et al. 2013). Colors indicate the multi-model mean change, whereas the saturation indicates the agreement in sign 
of change over the ensemble of GCM—GHM combinations. 
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15–55 percent by 2080 (relative to 1961–1990) for different sce-
narios and river basins, with an average decrease under the B2 
scenario of 21 percent, and a decrease of 34 percent under the A2 
scenario, using the WatBal model.
Ground Water
Groundwater in many water-scarce regions serves as a buffer 
for variable surface water availability. The buffering function of 
groundwater can only be maintained in the long term if there is a 
balance between recharge and withdrawal. In most MENA coun-
tries, however, groundwater is severely over-extracted (beyond 
the recharge rate). With falling groundwater levels, extraction 
becomes ever more energy intensive and expensive, eventually 
forcing the abandonment of wells. Climate change is expected to 
accelerate the loss of groundwater buffer capacity as decreasing 
rainfall decreases groundwater recharge in a non-linear way.
For the West Bank and Gaza, Mizyed (2008) projected a decrease 
in recharge between 7.1 and 50.9 percent for stylized warming 
scenarios from 2°C to 6°C in combination, with a decrease in 
precipitation of 0–16 percent, using a GIS-based spatial analysis.
For Algeria, the 2nd National Communication report (Repub-
lique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire 2010) projected a 
decrease in groundwater resources of 10–15 percent by 2050 relative 
to 1961–1990 under an IS92a scenario and using the GR2M model.
For Saudi Arabia, increases in reference evapotranspiration are 
expected to reduce groundwater recharge by 2–12 percent of total 
annual recharge in 2070–2100 relative to 1960–1990 using the regional 
climate model PRECIS and SRES A2 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2011).
4.4.1.3 Climate Risks to the Agricultural Sector 
and Food Security
The potential impacts of climate change on agriculture are vari-
ous. In water-limited regions, the length of the growing period 
is generally reduced if precipitation decreases while temperature 
and evaporative demand simultaneously increase. Higher rainfall 
variability with more intense and more frequent droughts, and 
possibly also floods, can cause more frequent crop failures. With 
increasing temperatures, several crops will exceed their tempera-
ture tolerance levels. All of these effects contribute to an overall 
reduction in crop yields. 
Increasing atmospheric CO2 concentration, on the other hand, 
can decrease crop water demand and increase crop productivity. It 
is important to note that the following studies do not account for 
adaptation, such as crop breeding, improved agricultural manage-
ment practices, and additional irrigation. Adaptation measures have 
great potential given the very low level of agricultural productivity 
across the MENA region.
Length of the Growing Period and Crop Yields
Lower rainfalls and higher temperatures are expected to shorten 
the growing season for wheat in the MENA region by about two 
weeks by mid-century (Ferrise et al. 2013), as projected under the 
A1B scenario to 2031–2050, using the AORCM model. For Tunisia, 
Mougou et al. (2010) projected a shortening of the wheat growing 
period by 10 days for 1.3°C, by 16 days for 2°C, by 20 days for 
2.5°C and by 30 days for 4°C warming, and a reduction in yields 
of 10 percent for a 10 percent decrease in precipitation, 30 percent 
for a temperature increase of 1.5°C, and 50 percent for a combina-
tion of both scenarios, using the DSSAT crop model. 
Most agricultural activities in the MENA region take place 
in the semi-arid climate zone, either close to the coast or in the 
highlands (Figure 4.13), where rainfall and green water availability 
are predicted to decline most strongly (see Section 4.3.3). The 
resulting increases in irrigation water demand will be difficult 
to meet due to a simultaneously increasing blue water scarcity. 
Due to increasing water scarcity, in combination with higher tem-
peratures which are expected to deviate more and more from the 
temperature optima of several crops (and possibly even exceed 
their heat tolerance levels), agricultural productivity is expected 
to drop in the MENA region. 
In a study by Drine (2011), North African crop yields were pro-
jected to decrease by 0.8–12.8 percent under conditions of 20 percent 
less precipitation, or by 1.6–26.6 percent under conditions of 2°C 
warming, using a logarithmic regression model. For Algeria and 
Morocco, yield reductions of 36 percent and 39 percent (26 percent 
Box 4.1: Snow Water Storage
Mountainous areas notably in Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon, Syria, 
Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Turkey, play an important role 
in the water supply of the MENA region. Under climate change, 
however, mountainous areas are expected not only to experience a 
reduction in total precipitation but also a reduction in the fraction of 
precipitation falling as snow, thereby affecting snow cover and snow 
water storage. 
Changes in melt-water regimes are expected to result in a 
shift in peak river flows toward the earlier months of the year, with 
negative impacts for downstream riparian systems in terms of water 
availability and seasonal shortages during the hot and dry summer 
months. In the 2nd National Communications of the Republic of 
Lebanon (2011), the upper Nahr el Kalb basin was analyzed under a 
stylized warming of 2°C and 4°C. Snowpack volume was projected 
to shrink from a total of 1,200 million m3 to 700 million m3 under 4°C 
warming and 350 million m3 under 2°C warming. Drought periods 
would thereby be expected to occur 15–20 days earlier (for 2°C 
warming) and more than a month earlier (for 4°C warming), accord-
ing to the report. For the Euphrates and Tigris basins, snow water 
equivalent (the amount of water stored in the highland snowpack) 
has been projected to decrease by 55 percent in the B1 scenario 
and 87 percent in the A1F1 scenario by 2071–2099, relative to 
1961–1990 using the CCSM3 global climate model (Bozkurt and 
Sen 2013).
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and 30 percent including the CO2 fertilization) respectively are 
projected for 2080 (relative to 2003) for a B2 scenario (Schilling 
et al. 2012). For the southwestern Mediterranean (Tunisia, Alge-
ria, and Morocco), Giannakopoulos et al. (2009) projected yield 
reductions for a variety of crops of between 1.5 and 23.9 percent; 
for the southeastern Mediterranean (Jordan, Egypt, and Libya), 
yield changes of between +3.7 and –30.1 percent were projected 
for the period 2030–2060 relative to 1961–1990. This study used 
the A2 and B2 scenarios, the HadCM3 climate model, and the 
CROPSYST crop model. 
In a study of Jordan’s Yarmuk basin, Al-Bakri et al. (2011) 
projected changes in wheat yields by mid-century ranging from 
–0.5 to +1.5 tons per hectare and changes in barley yields ranging 
from about –0.05 to –0.5 tons per hectare, starting from current 
values of about 1 ton per hectare. These ranges were calculated for 
different stylized temperature (+1°C to +4°C) and precipitation 
(–20 to +20 percent) scenarios, using the DSSAT crop model. The 
scenarios that include precipitation increases are very hypothetical, 
given the strong agreement of global climate models regarding a 
projected decrease in precipitation.
For Syria, a study by Verner and Breisinger (2013) used the 
DSSAT crop model to project reductions in rain-fed wheat yields 
of between 23 and 57 percent for 2041–60, relative to 1991–2010, 
under the A1B scenario. 
Egypt’s 2nd National Communications report (EEAA 2010) 
projected a reduction in productivity under climate change of 
11–20 percent by 2050 for wheat, rice, maize, and barley, and an 
increase in irrigation water demand by 2050 of about five percent 
across all SRES scenarios.
For Tunisia, a study by Lhomme et al. (2009) found increases 
as well as decreases in yields for 2071–2100 relative to 1961–1990, 
depending on the location within the country and the sowing rules 
applied, using the ARPEGE climate model for the A1B scenario.
Meta-Analysis of the Impacts of Climate Change 
on Crop Yields
A meta-analysis of the impacts of climate change on crop yields for 
the MENA region was conducted based on one single dataset that 
consists of data from 16 different studies analyzed (see Section 6.3, 
Meta-analysis of Crop Yield Changes with Climate Change, for details 
on data processing and methodology). The aim of the meta-analysis 
was to summarize the range of projected crop yield changes in the 
literature and to assess consensus for the MENA region. The dataset 
was used to address three main questions: (1) what are the likely 
impacts of incremental degrees of warming on yields?; (2) what 
is the impact when also considering adaptation measures and the 
effects of CO2 fertilization (see Box 2.4: The CO2 Fertilization Effect) 
on change in crop yields?; and (3) to what extent can adaptation 
measures and/or the effects of CO2 fertilization counteract the nega-
tive effects of increased temperature? Due to the lack of data, both 
the influence of adaptation measures and CO2 fertilization on crop 
yields could only be assessed below a temperature increase of 2°C.
Overall, there exists a significant correlation between crop 
yield decreases and temperature increases (see Figure 4.17 and 
Table 4.6) regardless of crop type or whether the effects of CO2 
fertilization or adaptation measures are taken into account. If 
only studies with temperature increases below 2°C are included, 
then the correlation is no longer significant (see Table 4.6). This 
suggests that below a 2°C threshold the effects of adaptation 
measures and CO2 fertilization may compensate for the adverse 
effects of climate change.
If the effects of CO2 fertilization are considered, no significant 
relationship between crop yield change and temperature increase is 
revealed (Figure 4.17 and Table 4.6). The beneficial effects of CO2 
fertilization are highly uncertain and there is considerable doubt 
that the full benefits can be obtained (Ainsworth et al. 2008) (see 
Box 2.4). The relationship between the change in temperature 
and crop yield response, in a scenario under which the effects of 
adaptation measures are taken into account, is positive but not 
significant (Figure 4.18 and Table 4.6). 
Previous meta-analyses (Easterling et al. 2007; World Bank 2013) 
showed that above this temperature threshold the negative effects 
of climate change on crop yields are dominant, with crop yields 
considerably declining regardless of the positive effects of adaptation 
measures and CO2 fertilization. This could not be tested here due 
to lack of data. The relationship between the change in crop yield 
and temperature increase is significantly negative in scenarios that 
do not consider adaptation measures or CO2 fertilization.
Cropland
According to Evans (2008), a warmer and drier climate is projected 
to shift vegetation and agricultural zones northward (e.g. by 75 km) 
for 2090–2099 relative to 2000–2009 for the A2 scenario at the 0.9 
Table 4.6: Summary of crop yield responses to climate 
change, adaptation measures, and CO2 fertilization. 
SLOPE r2 t-STAT p-VALUE
Full dataset –0.08 0.16 –5.5 <0.001***
Full dataset (below 2°C) –0.06 0.028 –1.86 0.065
CO2 fertilization 0 0 –0.04 0.96
Adaptation measures 0.11 0.33 1.22 0.3
Without adaptation 
measures or the effects of 
CO2 fertilization
–0.08 0.16 –3.54 0.007**
Results of a general linear model applied to all studies with reported values 
for changes in yield and changes in temperature, to studies considering the 
effect of CO2 fertilization, to studies not considering the effect of CO2 fertil-
ization, and to studies not considering the effects of adaptation measures. 
Significance levels: *P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001.
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Figure 4.17: Meta-analysis of the impact of temperature increase on crop yields.
Best-fit line over the full dataset for the MENA region (blue line) and 95 percent confidence interval of regressions consistent with the data based on 500 
bootstrap samples (blue shade). The influence of temperature increase on crop yield change is significant.
Figure 4.18: Meta-analysis of the impact of temperature increases on crop yields excluding adaptation and CO2 fertilization.
Best-fit lines for MENA studies considering neither the effect of adaptation measures nor of CO2 fertilization (blue line) and 95 percent confidence intervals of 
regressions consistent with the data based on 500 bootstrap samples (blue shade), for studies considering the effects of adaptation measures (green line) and 
studies considering the effects of CO2 fertilization (orange line). The solid line depicts a significant relationship and dotted lines non-significant relationships. 
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significance level. In Lebanon, shifts in agro-climatological zones 
may push special crops, including cherry and olive plantations, to 
higher elevations (Republic of Lebanon 2011). Ferrise et al. (2013) 
also projected a shift northward for olive plantations.
Large fractions of currently marginal rain-fed cropland are 
expected to be abandoned or transformed into grazing land; cur-
rent grazing land, meanwhile, may become unsuitable for any 
agricultural activity (Evans 2008). Increasing aridity reduces the 
available soil moisture, exacerbating the effects of ongoing land 
degradation. Evans (2008) projected the area viable for rain-fed 
agriculture in the Middle East to decrease by more than 8,500 km² 
by mid-century, and by more than 170,000 km2 by late-century (at 
the 0.9 significance level), when using the 200 mm isohyet as the 
limit for rain-fed agriculture, below which only seasonal grazing 
is practiced. The study used the A2 scenario and an ensemble of 
18 GCMs which project a temperature increase of 1.4°C in the first 
half, and an additional 2.5°C warming in the second half of the 
century, as well as a decrease in precipitation of 8.4 percent in the 
first half and another 17 percent in the second half of the century.
Livestock
Livestock is an important component of rural livelihoods and food 
security in the MENA region. Climate change will impact livestock 
production through various pathways, including changes in the 
quantity and quality of available feeds and the length of grazing 
season, additional heat stress, loss of drinking water availability, 
and changes in livestock diseases and disease vectors (Thornton 
et al. 2009). These climate-related pressures may be amplified 
by, or may amplify the effects of other pressures (e.g. rangeland 
degradation, fragmentation of grazing land, changes in land tenure, 
and lack of market access).
The vulnerability of livestock production systems to droughts 
was recently on display in northeastern Syria, where herders 
lost almost 85 percent of their livestock as a result of recurring 
droughts from 2005–2010 (Selvaraju 2013). The precarious situa-
tion of the rural population in this region caused large waves of 
migration to the cities.
4.4.1.4 Synthesis
The MENA region, also known as the “cradle of agriculture” or 
“cradle of civilization,” is one of the world’s most vulnerable 
regions to climate change in combination with other pressures. 
From the current situation of critical water and land scarcity, both 
the 2°C and 4°C warming scenarios will result in further increased 
pressures on water resources and agriculture, so that by the end 
of the century climate risks are projected to be much more severe. 
Other pressures, including increasing demand for food and water 
and further resource degradation, if following current trends, will 
multiply the impacts of climate change. 
Impacts on water resources will have severe consequences 
for the agricultural sector, which is the largest user of water in 
the region. There is a close relationship between climate risks 
for the water sector and the agricultural sector, with feedbacks 
from agricultural water use (e.g., increasing water demand, more 
irrigation, and pollution of rivers) potentially compromising other 
water uses (the water-agriculture nexus). 
The MENA region is very likely to experience a decrease in crop 
productivity unless effective adaptation measures are taken and 
global CO2 emissions are reduced. The impacts of climate change 
on agricultural production and food security, which are expected 
to grow throughout the 21st century, will be aggravated by water 
and land resource degradation and also by indirect climate change 
effects (occurring in major food exporting regions) through higher 
food prices on world markets. If groundwater buffers fail due to 
prolonged droughts leading to long-term decreases in recharge, 
as recently observed in northeastern Syria, agricultural land use 
and livelihoods will have to be abandoned. 
MENA countries have at their disposal a wide range of adap-
tation options for reducing their overall vulnerability. Demand 
management and increased resource use efficiencies can provide 
many opportunities for adapting to increased water scarcity. Diver-
sification of the MENA countries’ economies also holds a large 
potential for increasing resilience to climate and other risks. The 
MENA countries are blessed with rich renewable energy resources, 
in particular solar and wind, providing them with climate change 
adaptation and mitigation options (and combinations of them, 
for example, via solar desalination). Knowledge and technology 
transfer and investments across the region from more to less 
advanced countries can help to overcome the resource predica-
ment and contribute to prosperity and stability. 
While biophysical impacts vary only slightly across the region, 
vulnerability and socioeconomic impacts show a clear division 
between the (oil) rich Arab Gulf countries and the rest of the region. 
While the former have the financial means for adaptation (e.g., 
desalination technology, increasing food imports), the latter are 
much more vulnerable to climate risks. Vulnerability also varies a 
lot within countries, with poor and rural populations at particular 
risk (e.g., due to their dependency on agriculture).
4.4.2 Desertification, Salinization, 
and Dust Storms
4.4.2.1 Desertification
Large parts of the MNA region are covered with drylands, either 
dry-subhumid, semi-arid, arid or hyper-arid. These harsh envi-
ronments support, in addition to their limited water resources, 
fragile ecosystems. The concept of desertification is vague, and 
many definitions exist to describe the phenomenon (Verstraete 
et al. 2009). Most reports and studies on this topic refer to the 
UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD 1994), which 
defines desertification as land degradation affecting drylands 
(Adeel et al. 2005; Boko et al. 2007; Reynolds and Stafford Smith 
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2002; Reynolds et al. 2007; Safriel 2009). This process includes a 
change in soil properties, vegetation, or/and climate (D’Odorico 
et al. 2013). 
Desertification transforms a dryland ecosystem into a new 
ecosystem with a lower level of service provision (Safriel and 
Adeel 2005). This causes various stresses. Loss of vegetation 
cover, soil erosion, dust storms, salinization, and a decrease in 
soil productivity are some common threats in a downward spiral 
that lead to a decrease in agricultural yields, loss of biodiversity, 
poverty, reduced human wellbeing, and migration (Bayram and 
Öztürk 2014; Boko et al. 2007; D’Odorico et al. 2013; Safriel and 
Adeel 2005, 2008) (see Figure 4.19). 
The processes and drivers which trigger and control this eco-
system change are often labeled as either the “desert paradigm” 
or the “desert syndrome.” The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(2005) described this phenomenon as the “long-term failure to 
balance demand for and supply of ecosystem services in drylands.” 
Population growth, poverty, marginalization, and environmen-
tal degradation are coupled in socioecological feedback loops 
that drive the system into a downward spiral of desertification 
(D’Odorico et al. 2013; Easdale and Domptail 2014; Reynolds and 
Stafford Smith 2002; Safriel and Adeel 2005; Stafford Smith 2008; 
Verstraete et al. 2009). Finally, the fragile balance between the 
dryland ecosystem and the people living in it, which has been 
established over generations, is destabilized. A new equilibrium 
state is established in the degraded land in a process that is all but 
irreversible (Safriel and Adeel 2005; Seely et al. 2006). 
Desertification and Climate Change
The role of climate change in desertification can be multifaceted, 
and it varies depending on local conditions and the interactions 
among drivers. An increase in temperatures and evapotranspiration 
rates, a change in the precipitation regime, and an intensification 
or change in frequencies of extreme events can all directly trigger 
or enhance desertification processes (Aguirre-Salado et al. 2012; 
Belaroui et al. 2013; Scheiter and Higgins 2009; Schilling et al. 2012; 
Verstraete et al. 2009). Furthermore, these climatic alterations can 
indirectly push the dryland ecosystem towards desertification—for 
example, via a shift in biomes, an increase in bush fires, or the 
lowering of groundwater tables (Geist and Lambin 2004). 
No study has attributed recent climate change as the single 
driver of desertification. As a result, it is difficult to quantify the 
role of climate change relative to other drivers (Evans and Geerken 
2004; Herrmann and Hutchinson 2005; Wessels et al. 2007). It is 
clear, however, that climate change can modify the natural con-
ditions of biomes in many ways and that it generally makes the 
ecosystems more vulnerable to desertification processes (Evans 
and Geerken 2004; Verstraete et al. 2009; Xu et al. 2011). 
The desertification process can also affect the climate. At the 
regional scale, the decline of plant cover reduces evapotranspira-
tion and increases mean temperatures. This leads to a decrease in 
humidity within the regional climate system, which in turn may 
reduce the mean annual precipitation and/or cause greater vari-
ability in precipitation patterns (Abiodun et al. 2007; D’Odorico 
and Bhattachan 2012; Foley et al. 2003; Mahmood et al. 2013). 
At the global scale, desertification is a driver of climate change 
through the loss of carbon sequestration capacity in dryland eco-
systems and an increase in land-surface albedo (Adeel et al. 2005; 
Aguirre-Salado et al. 2012). Recent studies show, however, that the 
effect of CO2 fertilization on drylands (see Box 4.2) can potentially 
reverse the feedback loop and transform desert into grassland.
There are attribution studies on desertification or national 
reports explaining the causes of desertification for all the MENA 
countries. All of these studies attribute desertification at least in 
part to malpractices in land management. 
Some studies identify climate change as an additional driver of 
desertification. In most cases, the observed driver was a change in 
rainfall pattern, with either a negative trend or higher variability. 
For example, Conca et al. (2010) analyzed changes in humidity 
in the United Arab Emirates, and concluded that a reduction in 
humidity linked to climate change during the last decade could 
be responsible for an increase in desertification in the hyper-arid 
areas. For many of the studies, however, it is not clear whether 
the increase in aridity is within the normal climatic variation or 
connected to recent climate change. 
Figure 4.19: The far-reaching impacts and downward spiral of 
desertification.
EXTREME POVERTY
Degradation of the 




Feed me to feed you
Degradation of the 















DLDD & Linkages to
other Global Issues




















Source: (UNCCD Secretariat 2013).
9099_CH04.pdf   137 11/17/14   6:06 PM
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CONFRONTING THE NEW CLIMATE NORMAL
138
Projected Desertification
Although human influences related to land management have 
been identified as direct drivers of desertification, climate change 
is expected to alter the underlying natural conditions under which 
desertification may occur. Projections need to incorporate the natural 
and human aspects of desertification (Verstraete et al. 2009). To 
date, however, there is no regional study of future land degrada-
tion that assesses both climate change and social dynamics as 
drivers of desertification. As land degradation of drylands is likely 
to occur under certain climate change conditions, projections of 
these climate parameters and their potential impact on ecosystems 
may be used as indicators to assess impending desertification.
Gao and Giorgi (2008) projected the climate in the Mediter-
ranean region (including North Africa and the Western Mashrek) 
for the period 2071–2100 with the regional climate model RegCM, 
driven by the global model HadAM3H under the SRES scenarios 
A2 and B2. From the results, they derived three different measures 
of aridity from precipitation and temperatures. As a first measure 
they used the changes in climatic conditions according to the 
Köppen-Geiger classification under both emissions scenarios 
(Köppen 1936) and found that subtropical summer-dry climates 
turn into dry arid or dry semi-arid climates. The Budyko-dryness 
index (Budyko 1958) and the UNEP dryness index (UNEP 1992) 
support this change and they show a strong increase of aridity in 
the whole region. The authors concluded that North Africa and 
western Mashrek are especially at risk of both increased water 
stress on natural ecosystems and desertification.
Scheiter and Higgins (2009) projected a reduction in desert 
ecosystem area over Africa because of the CO2 fertilization effect. 
They used the adaptive dynamic global vegetation model aDGVM, 
which can also account for the influence of bush fires on vegeta-
tion. The model was driven using projected atmospheric CO2 
concentrations under the SRES scenario A1B, and temperature 
and rainfall projections were derived from the climate model 
ECHAM5. At the baseline year of 2008, 32.8 percent of Africa´s 
land surface was covered with deserts. By 2100, desert cover is 
projected to decline to 27.1 percent including bush fires, and to 
26.9 percent without taking bush fires into account. The authors 
explained that the projected reduction in desert ecosystem area is 
due to the CO2 fertilization effect and an increase in the potential 
growing season for grasses and trees under elevated temperatures. 
In a similar study of Africa, Higgins and Scheiter (2012) once 
again used the aDGVM and ECHAM5 models under the SRES 
A1B scenario. They projected a reduction in desert area from 
28 percent in 1850 to 23 percent in 2100, whereby desert biomes 
shift to grassland mainly due to the positive effects of increased 
CO2 concentrations on plant growth and biomass.
4.4.2.2 Salinization
While saline and sodic soils can be found naturally in many parts 
of the MENA region, this report refers to the soil degradation 
processes of salinization and sodification. Salinization is a form 
of soil degradation whereby water-soluble salts accumulate in 
the soil (Jones et al. 2013; JRC 2009). A special form of salinity is 
sodicity, whereby sodium is accumulated in the soil (D’Odorico 
et al. 2013). Salinization is typically connected to the desertifica-
tion process. High levels of salinity in soils affect plant growth 
through an increase in osmotic pressure (making it more difficult 
for plants to draw water from the soil) as well as through the 
toxic effects of salts. These processes make salinization a threat 
to both agriculture and natural ecosystems (Sowers et al. 2011; 
Vengosh 2014). 
The most common causes of salinization are non-groundwater-
associated salinity (whereby dissolved salts from rocks are 
introduced to the soil via rain), groundwater-associated salinity 
(groundwater infusing the salt into the soils), and irrigation-
associated salinity (D’Odorico et al. 2013). Climatic conditions 
in particular influence the latter two mechanisms. A decrease 
in precipitation and an increase in temperatures lead to a higher 
demand for irrigation, which causes salinization when drainage is 
not adequate. The intensification of irrigation may also lead to an 
increase in freshwater withdrawal from the groundwater, trigger-
ing salinization of aquifers and also aggravating soil salinization 
(D’Odorico et al. 2013; Vengosh 2014). 
The increase in salinization with further intrusion due to sea-
level rise under climate change holds not only for groundwater 
but also for other water resources in the region. (Sowers et al. 
Box 4.2: The CO2 Fertilization Effect 
on Drylands
Recent studies show a major influence of the CO2 fertilization effect 
on vegetation cover/growth in dryland ecosystems. Field studies 
found that the CO2 effect already influences African dryland eco-
systems, notably savannahs (Donohue et al. 2013; Kgope et al. 
2009). The increasing atmospheric CO2 concentration affects the 
photosynthetic pathway of C3 plants (trees) and C4 plants (grasses) 
by improving the plants’ water use efficiency. This forces transitions 
in ecosystems characterized by higher biomass and/or woody-plant 
dominance. 
For grassland ecosystems, like savannahs, the CO2 fertilization 
effect leads to an increase in woody species which profit more from 
the additional CO2 in the atmosphere than C4 plants (Bond and 
Midgley 2012). However, C4 plants also profit from the CO2 fertiliza-
tion effect, and Higgins and Scheiter (2012) project a substantial 
re-greening of deserts on the African continent even under decreas-
ing precipitation.
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2011). River runoff and aquifer replenishment rates typically 
decrease under drier conditions, causing an increase in the salt-
concentration of the remaining water. The higher salinity in the 
river also affects other water resources (e.g., lakes and groundwater 
aquifers), leading to a general increase in salinity, including soil 
salinity (Vengosh 2014). In the MENA region, river salinization 
can be observed in the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers (Odemis 
et al. 2010), in the Jordan River (Farber et al. 2004), and in the 
Nile (Elewa and El-Nahry 2008; El-Nahry and Doluschitz 2010).
In coastal areas, the intensive extraction of groundwater leads 
to seawater intrusion into the aquifers, causing severe salinization. 
This process is accelerated by climate-change-induced sea-level 
rise (Carneiro et al. 2009; Niang et al. 2010). The Nile Delta (see 
Box 4.3), an area that is home to more than 35 million people 
and that provides 63 percent of the agricultural production of 
Egypt, is especially vulnerable to salinization under changing 
climate conditions (Bohannon 2010; El-Nahry and Doluschitz 2010; 
Hereher 2010). According to Mabrouk et al. (2013), salinization is 
very likely to rapidly worsen under climate change; the authors 
call for an integrated three-dimensional groundwater modeling 
of the Nile Delta in order to fully understand the implications of 
sea-level rise and salinization.
4.4.2.3 Dust Storms
Dust storms are a typical phenomenon in arid regions without full 
vegetation cover (Squires 2002). Covered mostly by drylands, the 
MENA region is frequently threatened by dust storms that cause 
widespread damage to people, to agriculture, and to the overall 
economy (Akbari 2011; Kumar 2013; UN 2013; UNCCD Secretariat 
2013; Verner 2012). 
The extent of dust storms varies widely, depending on the 
meteorological conditions, the land surface, and the size of the 
particles transported. In the MENA region, dust storms reach large 
scales in terms of mass lifting, spatial extent (i.e., 100–1000 km), 
and duration (i.e., from several hours to several days) (Ghoneim 
2009; Kocha et al. 2012; Miller et al. 2008; Pey et al. 2013). The 
wall of dust and sand can reach concentrations of 6000 μg particles 
per m3 (Goudie 2009), causing traffic accidents, disruptions of 
flight traffic, destruction of telecommunications and mechanical 
systems, and damage to crops. In addition, dust storms influence 
the performance of solar photovoltaic power plants, directly by 
depositing dust on the panels and indirectly by reducing radiation. 
In Egypt, for example, Elminir et al. (2006) found a 12–52 percent 
reduction in transmittance, depending on the amount of dust and 
tilt angle, and a 17 percent per month reduction in output power. 
Mani and Pillai (2010) reviewed several impact studies and reported 
reductions in photovoltaic performance by 17–32 percent in Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait. 
Agricultural productivity is also affected in the long term by soil 
loss, as dust storms in particular remove light, nutrient-rich particles 
and organic matter (Akbari 2011; Elasha 2010; Notaro et al. 2013). 
In addition to economic losses, there are severe health impacts 
for people from breathing dust particles and from the airborne 
microorganisms that are transported in dust clouds (Goudie 2009; 
Griffin 2007; Kanatani and Ito 2010; de Longueville et al. 2013). 
Fine atmospheric dust, as an aerosol, can also affect the local 
climate, as it influences cloud formation and precipitation even 
in remote regions (Creamean et al. 2013; Jung et al. 2013). Dust 
storms not only influence local climate, but the frequency and 
magnitude of dust storms is also affected by climate change and 
desertification in different ways. Decreasing vegetation cover not 
only increases the sources of dust, due to an increase in bare 
soils (Bayram and Öztürk 2014; Mulitza et al. 2010; Pierre et al. 
2012), but may also affect wind speeds by decreasing the surface 
roughness (Cowie et al. 2013; Pierre et al. 2012).
There are no studies linking projected climate change and 
changes in dust storm occurrence in the MENA region (Goudie 
2009). The frequency and strength of dust storms depend on both 
the availability of dust (and therefore regional vegetation cover) 
and wind patterns. The vegetation coverage is directly linked to 
desertification, which is a highly uncertain process under future 
climate conditions and depends on both natural and human fac-
tors. Wind is a climatic factor and changes in wind patterns can 
be projected from climate models. However, there are currently no 
regional studies on changing wind patterns under climate change 
in the MENA region; as a result, future trends have to be derived 
from global studies.
4.4.2.4 Synthesis
Desertification, salinization, and dust storms are closely related 
in the MENA region. In an arid environment in which irrigation 
accelerates the salinization of soils and results in a degraded desert 
environment, dust storms carry away the soils, putting pressure 
on agriculture and further driving the desertification process. 
This narrative is referred to in the literature as the desertification 
paradigm; it is oversimplified, but the core message is clear—none 
of these processes stands alone. In many aspects, salinization is 
an important driver of desertification (JRC 2009), but land use 
and land cover changes (e.g., land clearing and replacing natural 
vegetation with annual crops) can also reinforce or even trigger 
the salinization process (Vengosh 2014). 
In general, desertification, salinization, and dust storms are well 
understood and described in the literature. There are still large gaps, 
however, when it comes to the multifaceted role of climate change 
(Verstraete et al. 2008, 2009) and the role of CO2 fertilization (Donohue 
et al. 2013; Higgins and Scheiter 2012). This may be one reason for 
the lack of quantitative projections on desertification that account for 
biophysical (including climate change), socioeconomic, and anthro-
pogenic drivers (including population growth and land use change). 
Numerous studies on the observed impacts of desertification in the 
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MENA region do however demonstrate a strong need for integrated 
modeling approaches to assess desertification under global climate 
change. As the MENA region is already prone to desertification, and 
with climate change bringing increasingly arid conditions, sensitivity 
to desertification is likely to increase. A reduction in precipitation, 
an increase in extreme events (e.g., drought and flash floods), and 
an increase in temperature and evapotranspiration will reinforce 
desertification in the region (WMO 2007).
4.4.3 Human Health
People in the MENA region face a variety of health risks, many of 
which are exacerbated by the hot and arid conditions and relative 
water scarcity that generally characterize the region. For example, 
trachoma (an infectious disease affecting the eyelids) tends to 
occur in dry areas with poor sanitation; it is endemic in Morocco, 
Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Oman, and 
Yemen (Smith et al. 2013). The MENA region is also experiencing 
a resurgence of several vector-borne and viral diseases that had 
previously been in decline (Lelieveld et al. 2012). Climate change 
may compound the challenge of managing these diseases.
4.4.3.1 Vector-Borne Diseases
Malaria is rarely endemic in North Africa, and the measures in 
place to control the disease are considered effective. The disease 
is also present in the Middle East, with cases reported in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, but in most 
countries endemicity is relatively low and localized. Malaria is, 
however, prevalent in Djibouti and Yemen (WHO 2013a); (WHO 
and EMRO 2009).
While the relationship between climate change and malaria 
remains somewhat in dispute, evidence indicates that changes 
in climatic factors can affect the incidence of the disease in the 
MENA region. Malaria distribution and seasonal occurrence have 
been linked to temperature, elevation, humidity, and low rainfall 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Salehi et al. 2008). Environmental 
changes indirectly associated with climate change could also favor 
the disease vectors of malaria such as the Anopheles sergentii 
mosquito. This mosquito is known as the “oasis vector” due to 
its prevalence in oases across the Sahara and its ability to cope 
with extreme climatic conditions. Lotfy (2013) suggested that 
the underground water reservoirs in the Western Desert being 
constructed by the Egyptian government to mitigate water stress 
could aid the emergence of Anopheles sergentii in new areas. In 
the World Health Organization Eastern Mediterranean region B 
(EMR-B),53 the additional population exposed to risk of malaria 
53 This region includes Bahrain, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. Note 
that it excludes Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and Yemen. Malaria endemicity in 
Djibouti, Iraq, and Yemen is currently relatively high.
for at least one month of the year by the 2080s is 20 million under 
the B2 scenario, 34 million under B1, 62 million under A2, and 
39 million under the A1F1 scenario (van Lieshout et al. 2004). 
Lymphatic filariasis, commonly known as elephantiasis, is a 
disease of the lymphatic system caused by parasitic worms trans-
mitted by mosquitoes. Like malaria and other mosquito-borne 
diseases, the prevalence of lymphatic filariasis could be affected 
by climate change (via the effects of changes in temperature, 
rainfall, and humidity on mosquito breeding and survival rates). 
While it is currently present in North Africa only in Egypt’s Nile 
Delta, Slater and Michael (2012) project with a 75–100 percent 
probability that the range of the disease could extend to include 
much of coastal North Africa by 2050 under both the SRES B2 
and A2 scenarios. 
Leishmaniasis, a skin disease carried by sandflies endemic to 
the MENA region, is also affected by climatic factors (Ben-Ahmed 
et al. 2009; Toumi et al. 2012); it is also affected by environmental 
factors such as dam construction (Riyad et al. 2013). The disease, 
which occurs in several forms, can result in morbidity, disfigurement, 
and mortality (McDowell et al. 2011)—and is considered a major 
public health problem in the region (Postigo 2010). Outbreaks are 
reportedly becoming more frequent in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, 
where the range of the disease has expanded due to a variety of 
environmental (e.g., agricultural projects) and human factors (e.g., 
migration of nonimmune populations) (Riyad et al. 2013). 
A serious and potentially fatal form of the disease is visceral 
leishmaniasis. A study conducted in the northwest part of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran reported a strong association between 
rising temperatures and growing populations of carrier sandflies 
(Oshaghi et al. 2009). A study from Tunisia showed that large 
numbers of Mediterranean visceral leishmaniasis (MVL) cases 
tend to be preceded two years earlier by a particularly rainy season 
(Ben-Ahmed et al. 2009). Increased rates of MVL transmission in 
the canine reservoir following the rainy season could explain the 
delayed increase in the incidence of human cases. 
Schistosomiasis, or bilharzia, is transmitted by snails and is 
found in North Africa, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, and Yemen. Schistosomiasis is expected to be affected by 
temperature changes, although in a non-linear way (Mangal et al. 
2008). Mangal et al (2008) found that the burden of infection within 
infected people increases by more than tenfold as mean ambient 
temperatures rise to 30°C; mean temperatures above 30°C could 
cause the mortality of snail hosts, however, potentially limiting 
further transmission. This means that increased temperatures could 
result in increased morbidity and mortality for infected people 
rather than an increased prevalence of infection. 
4.4.3.2 Food and Water-Borne Diseases
The prevalence of food-borne diseases such as salmonella and 
Escherichia coli, and water-borne diseases such as cholera, dys-
entery, and typhoid fever, is expected to be affected by changing 
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temperature and rainfall patterns. Outbreaks of cholera, for 
example, have followed seasonal patterns in the last three decades, 
with the effect being stronger at latitudes further away from the 
Equator (Emch et al. 2008). Cholera outbreaks correlate with high 
temperatures and can follow extreme weather events that disrupt 
water supplies (e.g., drought and flooding). In recent years, chol-
era has caused deaths in Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and 
Yemen (WHO 2013b).
The incidence of diarrheal disease among children is high in 
parts of the MENA region where warm weather, inadequate access 
to drinking water, poor sanitation, and poverty collide (Kolahi et 
al. 2010). Kolstad and Johansson (2011) projected increased rates 
of diarrheal diseases as a result of climatic changes in the A1B 
scenario. The relative risk of diarrheal disease (compared to a 
1961–1990 baseline) is expected to increase in North Africa by 
6–14 percent for the period 2010–39, and by 16–38 percent for the 
period 2070–99, and by 6–15 percent in the Middle East for the 
period 2010–2039, and 17–41 percent for the period 2070–2099.
4.4.3.3 Impacts of Extreme Heat Events
The MENA region is already characterized by very high summer 
temperatures, making the populations of the region highly susceptible 
to further temperature increases (Habib et al. 2010; Lelieveld et al. 
2012). Giannakopoulos et al. (2013) assessed changes in levels of 
thermal discomfort as indicated by the humidex, an index used to 
express the temperature perceived by people. The number of days 
characterized by high thermal discomfort (humidex > 38°C) in 
the base period of 1961–1990 is approximately 100 days in North 
Africa and the eastern and southern parts of the Arabian Penin-
sula. For 2040–2069 under the SRES A1B warming scenario, this 
is projected to increase by approximately 35 days in North Africa 
and by 70 days in the Arabian Peninsula. 
High temperatures can cause several medical conditions, 
including heat stress, heat exhaustion, and heat stroke, with the 
elderly, young children, and people with existing medical condi-
tions most vulnerable to heat-related mortality. Novikov et al. 
(2012) reported that the number of emergency hospital admissions 
in Tel Aviv increases by 1.47 percent per 1°C increase in ambient 
temperature. Regression modeling has further found extreme high 
temperatures to be linked to increased mortality rates in Tel Aviv 
(Leone et al. 2013; Peretz et al. 2012), Tunis (Leone et al. 2013), 
and Beirut (El-Zein et al. 2004). Peretz et al. (2012) reported an 
increase in mortality of 3.72 percent for every one unit increase in 
the human thermal discomfort index (that involves temperature 
and relative humidity as both additive and multiplicative factors) 
above a discomfort threshold of 29.3.
There are also indications that extreme heat events may have 
an indirect effect on health by worsening air pollution, which can 
aggravate respiratory illnesses (Markandya and Chiabai 2009). 
Together with increased temperatures, elevated concentrations of 
sulfur dioxide and particulate matter have been associated with 
increased hospital admissions in the Israeli cities of Tel Aviv and 
Haifa (Novikov et al. 2012; Portnov et al. 2011).
Increased rates of heat stress under climate change can affect 
labor productivity. Kjellstrom et al. (2009) noted that, in densely 
populated cities of the world that already experience very high 
maximum temperatures and are projected to experience the 
greatest increases under climate change (including some densely 
populated cites in the MENA region), heavy outdoor work (e.g., 
in agriculture and construction) will become more challenging 
and may take a heavier toll on the health of workers. 
According to the Climate Vulnerability Monitor produced 
by the Spanish nonprofit organization DARA, the proportion of 
the workforce expected to be particularly affected between 2010 
and 2030 by reduced productivity under the A2 scenario ranges 
between 10–20 percent in North Africa, as well as in Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Iraq. For the 
countries of the Arabian Peninsula, the proportion is projected to 
be higher—ranging from 15–40 percent (DARA 2012).
4.4.3.4 Synthesis
Several studies exist that investigate how various climatic changes 
affect transmission of vector-borne disease. These studies tend to 
be location-specific, however, which might prevent generalization 
at a broader scale. Emch et al. (2008) show a relatively strong 
observed correlation between cholera outbreaks, elevated tem-
peratures, and contaminated water supply; this appears to point 
to a substantial risk to the MENA region under climate change. 
A strong correlation is also apparent between extreme heat and 
increased mortality rates, although further research on future 
patterns of heat-related illness, as well as on the indirect effects 
of extreme heat, is needed. Likewise, there is evidence in the lit-
erature to suggest that the region will face greater health burdens 
associated with air pollution; this, however, refers to the effect of 
anthropogenic emissions on atmospheric composition and does not 
include the effect of climatic change on air pollution. As pointed 
out by Lieleveld et al. (2013), further work linking projections 
of atmospheric composition to climate simulations is required.
4.4.4 Migration and Security
Mobility as an integral part of people’s livelihoods allows for 
diversification and the securing of income (Gemenne 2011). 
Migration, in the form of pastoral nomadism, has long been a 
part of traditional lifestyles in MENA and the Sahelian adjacent 
territories in the south (Brücker et al. 2012; Fritz 2010). Nomads 
and their livestock have for thousands of years been cyclically 
migrating to places where they could find sufficient fodder and 
water (Nijeri Njiru 2012). Moreover, migration has always been 
a human response to climatic hazards. Migration, in the context 
of climate change, happens as soon as the physical, economic, 
social, or political security of a population decreases and no other 
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resources can be mobilized to adapt to the new conditions. Some 
scholars therefore consider migration as a last resort (Laczko 
and Piguet 2014; Warner et al. 2010, 2008), while others debate 
whether migration should be considered a successful adaptation 
strategy or a failure to adapt (Bardsley and Hugo 2010; Fritz 2010; 
Gemenne 2013; Luecke 2011; Tacoli 2009). 
The goal of a migratory movement is to reach a higher level of 
physical, economic, social, or political security, which can bring new 
opportunities and resilience (Black, Bennett et al. 2011; Scheffran et al. 
2011). An improvement in living conditions is not always achieved, 
however, due to new physical, economic, and social vulnerabilities 
encountered en-route or at the point of destination (Warner et al. 2010). 
Conceptual studies on migration as a response to climate change 
and the relationship of climate and violent conflict are abundant. 
Practical studies, especially those providing numbers, are however 
scarce (Gemenne 2011). The EACH-FOR studies, a series of local 
qualitative household surveys investigating the motivation to 
migrate in Egypt, Morocco, and the Western Sahara (Afifi 2009; 
Gila et al. 2009; Hamza et al. 2009) appear to be among the only 
comprehensive studies on migration and climate change. Wodon 
et al. (2013) also conducted household interviews in five Arab 
countries on migration, climate change, and related topics. Other 
studies are mostly based on documentary research54 and do not 
provide original findings. 
54 The use of sources and documents from the personal, private or public domain, 
such as personal papers, commercial records, state archives, legislation or speeches, 
in order to categorize, investigate and interpret information relating to a topical field. 
This technique of data collection is commonly used in social sciences. 
The research challenges include a general lack of disaggre-
gated data on drivers of migration and conflict as well as very 
divergent projections for the future. Even though the occurrence 
of migration and conflict spatially overlaps with vulnerability to 
climate change, this does not necessarily indicate a topical correla-
tion. Moreover, environmental migrants, environmental refugees, 
climate migrants, and climate refugees (as they are referred to in 
the literature) are not officially recognized as refugees55 by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This 
is a possible explanation for why there is little available data on 
climate-change-related migration. 
4.4.4.1 Climate Change and Migration 
in the MENA Region
Due to the interrelation of several factors and their common con-
tribution to decisions for and against migration, it is difficult to say 
whether migrants are driven by climate changes or are economically, 
socially, or politically motivated (Brücker et al. 2012). Tacoli (2011) 
identified demography as a further dimension (see Figure 4.20). 
It is also difficult to extrapolate future migration patterns from 
current patterns, because these may change with increasing tem-
perature levels and changing socioeconomic conditions, and are also 
dependent on future population growth. Projecting the nature and 
magnitude of migration, especially at the local and regional levels, 
is also fraught with uncertainty. Gemenne (2011) predicted that 
55 Conditions anchored in the 1951 Geneva Convention text exclusively comprise 
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion (UNHCR 2010).
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migration options will be limited in a warmer world, that internal 
migration will prevail, and that traditional patterns of mobility (e.g., 
nomadism, temporary or circular labor migration) might be disrupted. 
Many people will be forced to move, but others will be forced to stay 
because they lack the financial resources or social networks facilitat-
ing mobility. This indicates that climate-induced migration should be 
addressed not only within the framework of climate change, but also 
within other economic, cultural, technological or political conditions 
that might foster or limit migration (Gemenne 2011). 
Migrants from the MENA countries move internally within their 
countries or across borders to neighboring countries. The internal 
migration dynamic within the MENA region is rather short-distance 
(Afifi 2009; Wodon et al. 2013). From past observations it is well 
known that migrants in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco who were left 
homeless after sudden climatic hazards have a high propensity to 
return to their homes after a disaster (Gubert and Nordman 2010). 
Slow-onset hazards that may drive migration include increasing 
water scarcity, drought, desertification, and soil degradation (see 
Section 4.4.2, Desertification, Salinization, and Dust Storms). 
Icduygu and Sert (2011) found that rural populations in particular 
migrate to nearby or larger cities once food self-sufficiency and 
livelihoods are threatened. Jónsson (2010), however, found that 
drought does not necessarily lead to migration. 
Contrary to the situation during the 1950s and 1960s, when labor 
migration from the Maghreb to Europe was prevalent (Wodon et al. 
2014), today the MENA countries are a region of internal migration. 
Urbanization is currently the predominant form of migration (Brücker 
et al. 2012), and it adds additional pressure to urban infrastructure. 
In Algeria, for example, migrants are shown to move from rural 
areas to mid-sized towns rather than to large urban areas (Gubert 
and Nordman 2010). This movement is partly due to slow-onset 
environmental degradation, including water scarcity, soil erosion, 
and desertification which threatens agricultural livelihoods in rural 
Algeria (Wodon et al. 2014). However, unlike for many of its neigh-
bors, climate change is not predicted to drastically increase migra-
tion in Algeria (Wodon et al. 2014) since the country’s agricultural 
sector makes up only a small fraction of GDP (and relatively few 
people are employed in this sector). As Algeria imports 45 percent 
of its food, however, it is exposed to increasing global food prices, 
which may eventually lead to migration if demand can no longer 
be satisfied (Brown and Crawford 2009; Wodon et al. 2014). 
As of 2009, a large share of the Nile Delta and Nile valley 
populations had migrated from the fertile rural areas to Cairo. 
This movement was mostly driven by unemployment and poverty, 
which was in turn caused by land degradation and water scarcity 
(Afifi, 2009). Due to high population growth, the yearly water 
quota from the Nile is reported to be insufficient for the increas-
ing population that is still using outdated and inefficient irrigation 
methods (Afifi, 2009).The steady reduction in water availability 
per capita in Egypt will further drive migration in the country. 
For 2030, the annual water availability per capita is estimated to 
be only 468 m³, whereas in the 1990s it was 1000 m³ per capita 
(Wodon et al. 2014). Other major migratory patterns that have 
been identified in Egypt include migration from south to north, 
and migration from throughout the country to the Suez Canal 
zone (Wodon et al. 2014). 
There are several studies that examine the effect of sea-level 
rise in Egypt and the potential impact on migration. Kumetat 
(2012) found that a one meter sea-level rise could drive up to six 
million migrants from the Nile delta region. The statement for this 
estimate is limited, however, because a reference year is not given. 
For Morocco, internal migration exceeds international migration; 
similar to Egypt and Algeria, rural areas are being abandoned in 
favor of cities. The principal destinations of Moroccan migrants 
are cities on the Atlantic coast, which grew rapidly between 2000 
and 2010 (Wodon et al. 2014). Rural livelihoods in Morocco are 
more prone to climate change, especially due to a high share of 
employment in agriculture. This means that, in the future, the 
urbanization trend will likely continue. Water stress is already 
a severe problem in the country, but it will become worse due 
to high population growth (Hamza et al. 2009); this will further 
influence migratory movements. 
Water availability is also a serious problem in Syria, especially 
for the rural population. The country experienced a drought in 
2007–2008 which affected about 1.3 million Syrians (Wodon et al. 
2014). As a result of the drought, 800,000 people, among them 
small-scale farmers and herders, are believed to have lost their 
livelihoods. As a consequence, about 40,000–60,000 households 
migrated to urban areas (DREF 2009), putting enormous pressures 
on local urban infrastructure (Wodon et al. 2014).
Yemen has experienced strong internal migration flows to its 
fast-growing urban centers (Wodon et al. 2014). Water shortages 
as a result of decreasing rainfall and resource depletion are prob-
lematic in Yemen, and average per capita water availability is low. 
This has serious implications, including for an agricultural sector 
that contributes 15 percent to the country’s GDP and employs over 
half of the population (Wodon et al. 2014; World Bank 2013g). 
Because Yemen’s population is already exposed and vulnerable to 
water shortages, climate change could have a large future impact 
on migration (Joseph and Wodon 2013). 
According to Grant et al. (2014) in a study on the causes of 
migration, migrants in Morocco and Egypt were motivated more 
frequently by socioeconomic opportunities and freedom, whereas 
for example Algerians, and Yemenis were motivated to migrate 
as a result of inhospitable climatic conditions and frequent crop 
failures. Besides agriculture, climate change will probably have 
impacts on other sectors and economic branches, including energy 
production, coastal infrastructure, manufacturing, and tourism 
(Gubert and Nordman 2010). These impacts will also contribute 
to loss of livelihoods and constitute push factors for migration.
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As identified by Wodon et al. (2013) and by Werz and Conley 
(2012), the MENA countries are also a popular destination and 
transit region for migrants coming from Sahelian and Sub-Saharan 
African countries. This Sub-Saharan in-migration and transit migra-
tion constitutes an additional population burden for the Maghreb 
countries, which are themselves weakened by climate change and 
weak governance (see Figure 4.21).
4.4.4.2 Climate Change, Conflict, 
and the Security of Nations
The identification of climate change as a direct cause of conflict 
and insecurity is challenging. To date, research has been able to 
present some evidence of a statistical correlation; the underlying 
causal relationship between climatic change, the occurrence of 
conflicts, and insecurity has not however as yet been explicitly 
explained (Gemenne et al. 2014). For this reason, this report 
focuses on the studies that establish relationships between climatic 
changes and conflicts.
A framework by Scheffran et al. (2011) summarizes the 
climate-society interaction. Climate change puts pressure on 
natural resources, which in return can have adverse impacts 
for human security. Elements which make up human security 
include access to water, food, energy, transportation, health, 
and livelihoods, as well as education, lifestyle, and community. 
Where these aspects of human security are no longer guaranteed, 
possible consequences include societal instability (both violent 
and non-violent conflicts).
There is common consensus among the research community 
that climate change functions as a “threat multiplier” (Center 
for Naval Analysis 2007), amplifying such preexisting threats as 
political instability, high levels of poverty, unemployment, and 
other factors. This implies that conflict-proneness and sensitivity 
to climate change through adaptation failure derive from insti-
tutional fragility and poor governance (Smith and Vivekananda 
2012). Gemenne et al. (2014) suggest extending the focus in this 
research field, so that not only risks and threats, but also factors 
of peace and cooperation, capabilities, and the power of institu-
tions, are taken into account. 
Sterzel et al. (2013) showed the relationship between the 
vulnerability profiles of small dryland farms (composed of envi-
ronmental scarcities, resource overuse, and poverty-related factors) 
and the occurrence of violent conflicts. They stated that it is the 
extent of resource overuse that determines conflict proneness 
under conditions of intermediate resource availability; they found 
that poverty is the crucial factor when resource availability is 
either very poor or rather good (Sterzel et al. 2013). Competition 
over scarce resources, such as land and water, may constitute a 
considerable threat to security, and may even foster conflicts, 
especially when freeriding56 occurs (Brown and Crawford 2009; 
56 Taking advantage of a commonly shared resource by intensifying individual use 
beyond one’s own fair share, while other resource users respect a fair allocation. 
This may lead to overexploitation of the collective resource. 
Figure 4.21: The “Arc of Tension.”
According to Werz and Conley (2012), p.18. Migratory routes from Nigeria and Niger to the densely populated coastal areas of Morocco and Algeria are 
areas that are prone to climate-change-induced hazards and suffer from weak governance and frequent conflicts. 
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Osman-Elasha 2010). In Yemen, water scarcity has led to conflicts 
over water wells (Hoffman and Werz 2013). 
Water scarcity in the MENA region will increasingly consti-
tute a problem for the population—and, in particular, for those 
engaged in agriculture. The problem will be exacerbated in the 
Maghreb region by natural population growth in combination 
with in-migration, and, in the Mashrek region (e.g. in Iraq), by 
weak institutions together with poor resource management (Maas 
and Fritzsche 2012; Sowers et al. 2011; Wodon et al. 2014). These 
findings are consistent with a study on Sub-Saharan Africa by 
Burke et al. (2009), who found the variation in precipitation and 
temperature affecting the agricultural performance to be the major 
mechanism linking global warming and conflict in Africa; they 
concluded that global warming increases the risk of civil war. 
Studies from the peace research community disagree. Drought, 
in particular, is thought to be unlikely to cause civil war (Theisen 
et al. 2011), even though the authors admit that climate events 
may cause poverty (which in turn can lead to conflict). Addition-
ally, a multivariate regression analysis revealed that countries that 
experience climatic disasters are less likely to experience civil war 
(Slettebak 2012). 
Studies linking climate change to conflict are somewhat 
contradictory. From an econometric perspective, and based on 
historical data, Bergholt and Lujala (2012) argue that while certain 
types of climate-related disasters may be serious threats for the 
economy of the affected countries, this still does not necessar-
ily increase the risk of armed conflict. By reanalyzing the data 
of Burke et al. (2009), Buhaug (2010) attempted to show that 
weather or climate patterns do not increase the risk of civil war 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. This study was criticized by Hsiang and 
Meng (2014), however, for incorrect and insufficient statistical 
testing. Another recent study by Hsiang et al. (2013) extended 
the analysis of temperature influence to types of violence (e.g. 
violent crime, domestic crime, and murder). The authors found 
that even small changes from the mean climate toward warmer 
temperatures or more extreme rainfall increases the frequency 
of interpersonal violence by four percent and the frequency of 
intergroup conflict by 14 percent in median estimates. This study 
was criticized among the scientific community for not being com-
prehensive enough and ignoring important controversial findings 
from previous studies (e.g., Buhaug 2014). Most recently, Selby 
and Hoffmann (2014) reversed the mainstream thought on water 
scarcity, state failures, and under-development and introduced 
a model of environment-conflict relations focusing on resource 
abundance, globally embedded processes of state-building, and 
development. They suggested that violent conflict can also emerge 
from water abundance accompanied by inefficient management 
and state-directed processes of economic development as well as 
from internal colonization. However, this model is only applied 
to investigate links between water issues and conflict and does 
not take into account other kinds of climatic issues.
In brief, the scientific discourse shows that this emerging field 
of scientific inquiry has not yet succeeded in establishing a con-
sensus on primary causes, mechanisms, links, and interventions 
between climate change and conflicts and insecurity (Gemenne et 
al. 2014). Adger et al. (2014) concluded that it is not yet possible 
to make confident statements about the present or for the future 
as to how changes in climate may affect armed conflict. This is 
due to the absence of commonly supported theories and a lack 
of evidence about causality. In the following section, the Arab 
Spring serves as case study to illustrate the possible implications 
of climate change on national security in the MENA region. 
4.4.4.3 A Possible Link between Climate 
Change and the Arab Spring?
Finding a possible link between climate change and the Arab 
spring, with its series of violent events, seems far-fetched. Indeed, 
a more global view has to be taken in order to make the causal 
links between climate patterns and the Arab Spring visible. Original 
empirical evidence is provided by Lagi et al. (2011) and Sternberg 
(2011, 2012), who attribute the outbreak of violence in Egypt not 
only to political instability, unemployment, and poverty but also 
to a food crisis induced by extreme climatic conditions and market 
mechanisms. Lagi et al. (2011) found this link by analyzing the 
timing of protests and global food price peaks (see Figure 4.22). 
Sternberg (2012) quantified the drought in China’s eastern wheat 
belt in late 2010 and early 2011, and displayed China’s and Egypt’s 
reaction to this drought and to the world price for wheat. Both Lagi 
et al. (2011) and Sternberg (2012) argue that these rather-indirect 
causes of the Arab Spring have received only little attention. Both 
provide studies with original empirical evidence, in contrast to 
research produced by several policy-related institutions, which is 
often based on documentary review (Femia and Werrell 2013; e.g. 
Johnstone and Mazo 2011, 2013).
Egypt has high population growth rates (World Bank 2013h). 
Being a largely arid country, Egypt is not able to meet domestic 
food demand without importing wheat on a large scale. This 
dependency on wheat imports exposes the country to commodity 
price fluctuations and variability in commodity supplies on the 
world market. Generally, food expenditures in Egypt are at about 
38 percent of income (Sternberg 2012). It is important to note that 
Egypt’s unemployment and poverty rates are relatively high, with 
unemployment at nine percent as of 2010 (World Bank 2013i) and 
15.5 percent of the population living on less than $2 per day (as 
of 2008—World Bank 2013j). Bread subsidies help to stabilize the 
social order in Egypt, with the government spending three percent 
of the country’s GDP on wheat subsidies (Sternberg 2013). 
Drought conditions in eastern China in late 2010 and early 2011 
lead to a reduction in the winter wheat harvest (Lagi et al. 2011). 
Sternberg (2012) estimates the shortfall at 10 million tons of wheat, 
or approximately 10 percent of annual wheat production. Earlier 
in the same year, Russia and Ukraine also experienced drought 
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conditions; meanwhile, heavy rainfall in Canada and Australia led 
to poor wheat harvests (Sternberg 2012) and decreases in wheat 
production.57  In 2011, this drop in supply lead to an increase in the 
world market price for wheat, a commodity for which 18 percent 
of the total global harvest is slated for export (Sternberg 2012).
China, a country with a high population growth rate, saw 
the need to secure its domestic wheat demand. While China’s 
wheat production was reduced by only 0.5 percent, the country’s 
wheat consumption increased by 1.68 percent (Sternberg 2013). 
Consequently, China made a large-scale wheat purchase from the 
world market. Russia levied an export ban on wheat due to its 
domestic shortage, decreasing imports to Egypt by five percent 
(Sternberg 2012). Johnstone and Mazo (2013) report that Egypt 
received only 1.6 million tons of wheat from Russia in the second 
half of 2010 as compared to 2.8 million tons in the same period 
in the previous year. These reductions in global supply lead to 
further increases in commodity prices. 
The climatic events (droughts and floods), together with 
global market forces, were contributing factors to high wheat 
prices in Egypt and affected the price of bread. As Egypt had not 
yet fully recovered from its 2008 food price crisis (Johnstone and 
57 Wheat production in 2010 was down 32.7 percent in Russia, 19.3 percent in 
Ukraine, 13.7 percent in Canada, and 8.7 percent in Australia (Sternberg, 2011, 2013).
Mazo 2013), and as food became unaffordable for the population 
again in 2011, social conflicts developed (Sternberg 2013). While 
partly the result of economic and political instability, conflicts 
were also due to discontent with the food supply situation as, at 
the time, 50 percent of the population relied on ration cards and 
the country’s bread subsidy system was fraught with corruption 
(Johnstone and Mazo 2013). Johnstone and Mazo (2013) report 
similar linkages between food prices and social unrest in Algeria, 
with a correlation between unemployment and high food prices 
for sugar, oil, and other staples. 
In high income countries such as Israel or the United Arab 
Emirates, by contrast, a relatively low percentage of income is 
spent on food and early stabilization of domestic food prices was 
been successful. These countries were spared from protests and 
social conflicts during the same time period (Sternberg 2013). It 
must be noted, however, that some Gulf monarchies purchased or 
leased agricultural land from highly volatile nations and regions, 
such as Ethiopia, Sudan, and countries in South Asia to meet their 
domestic demand (ILC et al. 2014; Spiess, 2012). This is in line 
with the conclusions of Gemenne et al. (2014) and Adger et al. 
(2014) that a government response to price and scarcity signals 
is necessary to manage access to resources and markets. Lagi et 
al. (2011) suggest that the food price is crucial for nations’ social 
stability, and that persistently high food prices might result in a 
global increase in social disruptions. 
Figure 4.22: Food prices and conflict.
Time dependence of the FAO Food Price Index (Jan. 2004–May 2011). Red dashed lines mark the beginning dates of “food riots” and protests in the MENA 
region. Numbers in () show overall death tolls. The blue dashed line marks the day (12/13/2010) when Lagi et al. (2011) warned the U.S. government of 
the link between food prices, social unrest, and political instability. Inset: FAO Food Price Index 1990–2011. Source: Lagi et al. (2011), p. 3.
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Even though the link between the drought in China, harsh 
climatic conditions in other countries, and social conflicts in Egypt 
is plausible, it is not directly verifiable (Sternberg 2012). These find-
ings should therefore be treated with caution. In addition, there is 
no evidence so far that the late 2010 and early 2011 drought events 
in China and Eurasia can be attributed to climate change. Attention 
should be given to the methodologies of the two major studies 
scrutinized in this chapter. Whereas Sternberg (2011, 2012 and 
2013) used the world market price for wheat in his analysis, Lagi 
et al. (2011) used the FAO Food Price Index, which is a composite 
index of five differently weighted sub-indices (FAO 2014a). Since 
wheat was identified as the critical commodity in the Egyptian 
food crisis (Sternberg 2012), results based on the aggregated Food 
Price Index by Lagi et al. (2011) seem somewhat biased, as wheat 
is only represented in the Cereals Price Index along with rice and 
maize, while the Meat Price Index is the sub-index with the great-
est influence on the Food Price Index (Figure 4.23). This suggests 
that the results by Lagi et al. (2011) are less confident than those 
of Sternberg (2012)—and that the conclusion on the relationship 
between FAO Price Index and the Egyptian food crisis, by Lagi et 
al. 2011, should be treated carefully. 
In summary, it can be said that countries with well-established 
institutions have the capacity to build high levels of resilience and 
to respond to climatic changes, extreme events, and other shocks 
such as climate-related increases in food prices over time. Countries 
and institutions weakened by crisis or war have limited capacity to 
build resilience and, as a consequence, have less capacity to cope 
with and adapt to climate change. The case of the Arab Spring 
indicates that climate-related extremes and market mechanisms 
together may have serious implications for food security. Findings 
on the link between climate change, human security, and conflict 
are in agreement with recent IPCC analyses on human security 
(Adger et al. 2014). 
4.4.5 Coastal Infrastructure and Tourism
Globally, human populations, as well as agricultural, industrial, 
and other economic activity, tend to be concentrated in coastal 
zones. Historically this has been amplified in MENA countries, 
where coastal cities and agricultural areas have been particularly 
important due to the aridity of inland regions (Verner 2012). The 
population of MENA’s coastal cities was approximately 60 mil-
lion in 2010, with the number expected to reach 100 million by 
2030 (World Bank 2011b). In Morocco, for example, more than 
60 percent of the population and over 90 percent of industry is 
located in key coastal cities (Snoussi et al. 2009).
As coastal populations and assets in coastal areas continue 
to grow, exposure to impacts associated with sea-level rise is also 
increasing. This is particularly true as populations expand into 
low-lying areas, and as wetlands and other ecosystem protections 
Figure 4.23: Aggregated FAO Food Price Index and its sub-indices.
The Food Price Index score in January 2011, when the Egyptian crisis broke out (black dashed line), was 238. This is particularly due to the high Sugar 
Price and Oils Price Indices, together weighted with 0.207, which is about one-fifth of the Food Price Index. The low Meat Price Index pulled it downward, 
constituting one third of the Food Price Index. Data taken from FAO (2014c). Weight data from FAO (2014a). 
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against floods are removed (World Bank 2011b). One study has 
estimated that annual global flood losses are expected to increase 
from $5 billion in 2005 to $52 billion by 2050 due to socioeconomic 
changes alone (Hallegatte et al. 2013). Climate change and coastal 
subsidence will exacerbate this growing vulnerability. 
4.4.5.1 Types of Physical Impacts
The key impacts of climate change in coastal zones, and in rapidly 
growing urban areas in particular, are expected to include inun-
dation resulting from slow onset sea-level rise, floods, damage 
caused by extreme events (including storms and storm surges), 
and increased erosion (Brecht et al. 2012; Hunt and Watkiss 2011). 
Several MENA countries are highly exposed to sea-level-
rise-related inundation due to their low-lying topographies. One 
study found that with one meter of sea-level rise, Qatar could lose 
2.7 percent of its total land area and Egypt would lose 13.1 per-
cent of its agricultural area (Dasgupta et al. 2009). In terms of 
the percentage of urban area lost to one meter of sea-level rise, 
Egypt (5.52 percent), Libya (5.39 percent), the United Arab Emir-
ates (4.8 percent), and Tunisia (4.5 percent) were all found to be 
highly vulnerable (Dasgupta et al. 2009). 
Global comparative studies have identified Egypt’s Nile Delta 
coastline as one of the most vulnerable areas to sea-level rise 
(Dasgupta et al. 2009; Syvitski et al. 2009). Sea-level rise impacts 
in the Nile Delta will be exacerbated by land subsidence, especially 
in the eastern part of the delta, and by extensive landscape modi-
fications resulting from both coastal modification and changes in 
the Nile’s hydrogeology (Frihy and El-Sayed 2013; El Sayed et al. 
2010; Wöppelmann et al. 2013). 
A study in Abu Dhabi found that, in the absence of adapta-
tion measures, a 2-meter sea-level rise would inundate 15.9 per-
cent of Abu Dhabi’s urban area, increasing to 39.6 percent for 
a 3-meter sea-level rise (Ksiksi et al. 2012). The study estimates 
that 20 percent of Abu Dhabi’s total land area would be inundated 
by a 2-meter sea-level rise, and 30 percent by a 3-meter sea-level 
rise (Ksiksi et al. 2012). 
Apart from direct inundation, sea-level rise is expected to have 
serious impacts in terms of saltwater intrusion, the salinization 
of groundwater, rising water tables, and impeded soil drainage 
(Hunt and Watkiss 2011; Werner and Simmons 2009). These 
effects can reach inland for several kilometers following relatively 
small increases in sea level (Werner and Simmons 2009) (see Sec-
tion 4.4.2, Salinization). 
Saltwater intrusion into coastal aquifers has been documented 
across MENA, including in Tunisia, Egypt, and Israel (Kashef 
1983; Kerrou et al. 2010; Kouzana et al. 2009; Yechieli et al. 2010). 
The principal causes of observed saltwater intrusion have been 
identified as the over-extraction of water for supplementary irri-
gation and reductions in the recharge of aquifers. These factors 
are likely to remain immediate challenges, although they will be 
aggravated by the effects of sea-level rise (Kouzana et al. 2009; 
Zarhloule et al. 2009). 
4.4.5.2 Impacts of Sea-Level Rise 
and Storms on Coastal Areas
Several global studies have noted that while regions such as Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa tend to be more vulnerable in terms of the 
total population exposed to the impacts of sea-level rise, MENA 
countries tend to be more vulnerable in terms of the percentage 
of population at risk (Dasgupta et al. 2011; Dasgupta et al. 2009; 
Ghoneim 2009; Nicholls et al. 2011). 
In terms of the percentage of population exposed to a 1-meter 
sea-level rise, Dasgupta et al. (2009) identified three MENA countries 
among the ten most vulnerable in the world: Egypt (9.28 percent), 
Tunisia (4.89 percent), and the United Arab Emirates (4.59 percent). 
One study of Africa suggested that, in the absence of adaptation, 
1.97 million people in Egypt could be affected by a sea-level rise 
of 0.54 m and 1.82 million people in Morocco could be affected by 
a sea-level rise of 0.44 m with 2.6°C global warming compared to 
1990 levels (Brown et al. 2011) (Table 4.7). Another study identified 
Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya as among the most vulnerable 
African countries in terms of total population affected by sea-level 
rise under scenarios of 0.42–1.26 meters in sea-level rise by 2100, 
assuming no adaptation (Hinkel et al. 2012).
In terms of the GDP impact of a 1-meter sea-level rise, Egypt 
(6.44 percent) and Tunisia (2.93 percent) were also in the top 
ten countries globally (Dasgupta et al. 2009). In the absence of 
adaptation, the annual economic impact of sea-level rise in 2100 
under the A1B scenario with 2.6°C global warming compared to 
1990 has been calculated at $6.55 billion for Algeria, $6.52 billion 
for Egypt, $5.52 billion for Morocco, $3.46 billion for Tunisia, 
and $1.76 billion for Libya (Brown et al. 2011). Table 4.7 shows 
the corresponding sea-level rise and the economic impacts with 
different global warming scenarios. 
Another study considered a 1.26-meter sea-level rise in the 
absence of adaptation and calculated Egypt’s annual losses at 
$5 billion per year, while the annual losses for Tunisia, Morocco, 
and Libya were estimated at less than $500 million per year (Hinkel 
et al. 2012). When the effects of adaptation were included in the 
projections, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya were no longer among 
the most vulnerable countries and Egypt’s ranking had fallen 
from first to third (Hinkel et al. 2012). This indicates that for most 
North African countries adaptation could be effective at reducing 
vulnerability to sea-level rise.
Another expected consequence of climate change is a greater 
intensity of storms (Knutson et al. 2010). Coupled with higher sea 
levels, more intense storms are likely to result in more powerful 
storm surges.
One study has calculated that under a 1-meter sea-level rise 
and a 10 percent increase in storm intensity, 50 percent or more 
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Algeria 328.1 0 0 35.2 0.17 328.1
Djibouti 174.5 0 0 9.5 0.15 174.5
Egypt 2,134.5 38.6 0.79 927.6 0.25 1,482.9
Libya 186.7 3.2 0.31 3.7 0.21 167.1
Morocco 1,195.7 0 0.07 47.1 0.16 1,178.0
Tunisia 722.8 0 0.36 17.0 0.20 710.3
A1B
Algeria 6,546.6 7.1 0 435.4 0.46 916.7
Djibouti 232.0 0.3 0 85.5 0.42 213.6
Egypt 6,518.5 19.4 1.4 1970.3 0.54 3,482.5
Libya 1,756.8 16.1 0.8 39.4 0.50 477.6
Morocco 5,524.3 14.5 0.4 1820.2 0.44 3,388.3
Tunisia 3,459.7 73.3 0.8 263.9 0.49 1,798.1
A1F1
Algeria 5,238.0 21.7 0 708.1 1.06 1,454.8
Djibouti 295.4 2.0 0 92.4 0.99 237.4
Egypt 12,476.3 43.6 2.9 3600.7 1.14 5,362.4
Libya 1,325.0 12.8 1.9 131.2 1.11 745.2
Morocco 5,886.5 4.8 1.1 2078.9 1.04 4,001.3
Tunisia 4,541.0 17.8 1.7 802.8 1.09 2,375.0
Numbers are for 2100 without adaptation in six MENA countries under SRES B1, A1B and A1F1 with global warming of 1°C, 2.6°C and 6.1°C relative to 
1990, respectively. Source: extracted from (Brown et al. 2011). 
Box 4.3: The Nile Delta 
For Egypt, and assuming no adaptation, annual damages have been projected in the range of $5 billion by 2100 for a 1.26-meter sea-level rise 
(Hinkel et al. 2012) and $14.8 billion by 2100 under the A1B scenario (Brown et al. 2009). Dasgupta et al. (2009), meanwhile, projected losses of 
25 percent of the Nile Delta’s land area, affecting 10.5 percent of the population and 6.4 percent of GDP with a 1-meter sea-level rise (Dasgupta, 
Laplante, Meisner et al. 2009). Another study estimated the value of assets exposed to a 0.5-meter sea-level rise by 2070 at $563 billion in the city 
of Alexandria alone (Hanson et al. 2011). 
The Nile Delta, however, has an extensive history of coastal defense that dates back to the construction of the Mohamed Ali Sea Wall in 1830. Modern 
defensive works and other infrastructure, including the International Coastal Road, provide further protection against flooding (Frihy and El-Sayed 2013). 
Studies by Egypt’s Coastal Research Institute concluded that, under the A1F1 scenario, 14.4 percent of the Nile Delta would be at risk from 
inundation by 2100; this fell to three percent when taking into account the value of the Mohamed Ali Sea Wall (EEAA 2010). Another study found 
that, although 22.5–29.2 percent of the area was vulnerable to inundation depending on the sea-level rise scenario and assuming no adaptation, 
much of that impact would fall on undeveloped lands and wetlands, with built-up land accounting for less than five percent of the impact (Table 4.8) 
(Hassaan and Abdrabo 2013).
9099_CH04.pdf   149 11/17/14   6:06 PM
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CONFRONTING THE NEW CLIMATE NORMAL
150
of the coastal population in Kuwait, Djibouti, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen will be at greater risk from storm surges 
(Dasgupta et al. 2011). The effects of climate change would leave 
2.7 million more people in Alexandria and 1.2 million more people 
in Aden exposed to storm surges (Dasgupta et al. 2011). The same 
study calculated that, for the MENA region, storm intensification 
would cause additional annual losses to GDP of $12.7 billion by 
2100, with exposure particularly high in Kuwait, the United Arab 
Emirates, Morocco, and Yemen (Dasgupta et al. 2011). 
Dasgupta et al. (2011) considered only the local effects of 
sea-level rise in developing their projections. But the MENA 
region benefits from being bordered by semi-enclosed bodies of 
water,58 and only those MENA nations exposed directly to the 
Indian Ocean (e.g., Yemen, Oman, and Djibouti) are regularly 
exposed to tropical storms, while the west coast of Morocco is 
exposed to Atlantic storms (Becker et al. 2013; Knapp et al. 2010). 
This could mean that their projections for MENA countries other 
than Djibouti and Yemen are less conservative than they might 
otherwise appear. 
Urban growth in coastal areas means that, even in the absence 
of sea-level rise, increasing losses and damages can be expected 
due to higher concentrations of people and assets exposed to flood-
ing. By separating socioeconomic drivers of vulnerability from the 
effects of sea-level rise, a study of 136 coastal cities59 identified 
Alexandria, Benghazi, and Algiers as particularly vulnerable to 
0.20.4 m sea-level rise by 2050 (Hallegatte et al. 2013). The study 
estimates that, in the event of a failure of flood defenses, the effects 
of 0.2 m sea-level rise would increase damages from $16.5 billion 
to $50.5 billion in Alexandria, from $1.2 billion to $2 billion in 
Benghazi, and from $0.3 billion to $0.4 billion in Algiers. Annual 
losses would increase to $58 billion, $2.7 billion, and $0.6 bil-
lion with 0.4 m sea-level rise for these three cities respectively. A 
study for the city of Tunis found that a 0.2-meter sea-level rise, 
58 The Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and Arabian Gulf are all semi-enclosed seas.
59 Including Alexandria, Beirut, Benghazi, Tel Aviv, Kuwait City, Dubai, Jeddah, 
and Rabat.
with assumptions for expected coastal urbanization by 2030 and 
increases in both storm frequency and the extent of the coastline 
at high risk of erosion, could lead to adaptation costs of $12 mil-
lion per year (Ennesser et al. 2010). 
In Morocco, Snoussi et al. (2009) showed that significant 
potential land and infrastructure losses would result from a relative 
0.86-meter sea-level rise by 2100 for the city of Tangiers. These 
potential losses included 36 percent of roads, 79.2 percent of 
railways, 99.9 percent of port infrastructure, 90.8 percent of water 
diversion canals, 63.4 percent of the city’s industrial zone, and 
34.8 percent of the city’s high density urban area, largely due to 
the increased area at risk from storm surges (Snoussi et al. 2009).
4.4.5.3 Impacts on Coastal Tourism
Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria have developed 
tourism services aimed at the international market (Safa and Hilmi 
2012). In 2006, international visitor spending contributed more 
than 10 percent of GDP to the economies of Morocco, Bahrain, 
Lebanon, and Jordan, and more than five percent to the economies 
of Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria (Gössling et al. 2009). In addition 
to beach tourism, cultural tourism has been highly important in 
Jordan and Egypt in particular, and religious tourism has played 
a key role in Saudi Arabia (Khattabi 2009; Safa and Hilmi 2012). 
Many MENA countries also have well-developed domestic beach 
tourism, with domestic tourists visiting the relatively cool coastal 
areas during the hot summer months. 
Tourism infrastructure in coastal areas (e.g., hotels and mari-
nas) and tourism assets (e.g., protected areas) are vulnerable 
to sea-level rise, although few specific assessments have been 
conducted for the MENA region (see Box 4.4 for the example of 
Morocco). Comparison of slow-onset sea-level rise and shocks 
to tourism demand have, however, indicated that short-term 
shocks resulting from fluctuations in tourist demand60 have a 
60 Tourist demand relates to demand in tourism destination choices and tourist 
demand for recreational activities, hotels, restaurants, and related expenditures. 













A1F1 1.04 m 4,006 22.5 4.4% 42% 53.6%
Rahmstorf 1.85 m 7,336 42.2 3.8% 60.7% 35.5%
Pfeffer 2.45 m 8,769 49.2 3.7% 64% 32.3%
Source: Extracted from Hassaan and Abdrabo (2013). 
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larger economic impact than slow onset changes, particularly in 
developing countries (Bigano et al. 2008).
Beach tourism services are also vulnerable to other aspects 
of climate change, including temperature increases and changes 
in water and energy supplies (Gössling et al. 2012; Moreno and 
Amelung 2009; Perch-Nielsen 2010; Scott et al. 2011). A multi-
criteria analysis of the vulnerability of beach tourism in 51 countries 
found that, of the MENA destinations, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are 
moderate to highly vulnerable to climate change and that Morocco 
and Israel are low to moderately vulnerable (Perch-Nielsen 2010).
Some studies modeling the impact of climate change on inter-
national tourism have found overall reductions in international 
tourism, with tourist preferences shifting to higher latitudes and 
altitudes. One study found that a 1°C temperature rise by 2025 
would result in declines of 10–25 percent in international arrivals 
across the MENA region (Hamilton et al. 2005). Another study 
projected a reduction in tourism demand of eight percent under 
the A1B scenario by 2050 (Bigano et al. 2008). However, these 
models do not necessarily capture the seasonal dynamics of tour-
ism markets, and reductions in summer months may be matched 
by increases in spring and autumn arrivals (Amengual et al. 2014; 
Giannakopoulos et al. 2013). 
Coastal tourism in the MENA region may also experience 
indirect impacts of climate change through pathways such as 
biodiversity loss and ocean acidification (Rodrigues et al. 2013). Of 
particular concern are the potential impacts of ocean acidification 
and warming on coral reefs, which provide ecosystem services 
valuable to tourism in MENA countries, especially Egypt (Hoegh-
Guldberg et al. 2007). Perceptions of poor ecological health can 
create additional vulnerabilities for tourism operators and reduce 
the economic value of ecosystems to tourism (Marshall et al. 2011). 
These assessments have raised concerns regarding the 
viability of tourism as a central economic strategy in developing 
countries under conditions of climate change (Gössling et al. 
2009). Developing countries that invest in tourism infrastructure 
are dependent on future tourist numbers, whilst tourists are 
able to make short-term decisions each season in response to 
warmer conditions. However, a pleasant climate is just one draw 
for tourists, who can also be drawn to a location by its culture, 
proximity, safety, standards, level of service, and the cost of food 
and accommodations (Gössling et al. 2012). Overall, the effects of 
climate change on tourism are likely to be small in comparison 
to changes induced by population and economic growth and/
or conflict and political stability (Gössling et al. 2012; Hamilton 
et al. 2005; Safa and Hilmi 2012).
4.4.6 Energy Systems
Energy access is a key requirement for development. Many economic 
activities depend on ample and reliable electricity access (Akpan et 
al. 2013); similarly, at the individual and household level, electric-
ity access enables income-generating activities, increases safety, 
and contributes to human development (Deichmann et al. 2011). 
In the Middle East and North Africa, almost all of the population 
has access to electricity in both rural and urban areas. However, in 
several countries (notably Yemen, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria) 
electricity consumption per capita remains low compared to other 
nations in the region (see Table 4.9) (World Bank 2013l). 
Climate change impacts are projected to affect electricity 
production and distribution both globally and within the region 
(Sieber 2013), and MENA countries will have to increase or at least 
maintain electricity production at current levels in order to support 
economic development and population growth. In general, three 
types of climate-change-related stressors could potentially affect 
thermal power and hydropower generation: (1) increased air tem-
peratures that reduce thermal conversion efficiency; (2) decreased 
Box 4.4: Impacts of Climate Change on Tourism in Morocco
In Morocco, different studies have explored the complex interlinkages between coastal development, climate vulnerabilities, and tourism. During the 
peak summer months, the population of Morocco’s Mediterranean area doubles from eight to 16 percent of the national population; this has driven 
rapid coastal urbanization (Anfuso et al. 2011). Urbanization has contributed to the increased erosion of Morocco’s sandy beaches, thereby increasing 
vulnerability to coastal flooding (Ahizoun et al. 2009; Anfuso et al. 2011). Ambitious plans to expand coastal tourism in Morocco could exacerbate coastal 
vulnerabilities by increasing the amount of exposed assets and as coastal modifications weaken the coast’s natural defenses (Anfuso et al. 2011). 
Snoussi et al. (2009) found that 99.9 percent of sandy beaches and 84.5 percent of tourism infrastructure in Tangiers would be lost to an 0.86-meter 
sea-level rise by 2100. Snoussi et al. (2008) projected that for the area between Saidia and Ras el Ma, 50 percent of sandy beaches would be eroded by 
2050 under a 0.39-meter sea-level rise and 70 percent by 2100 for a scenario of a 0.86-meter sea-level rise, with consequent impacts on tourism. 
Other studies in Morocco have shown that climate change impacts on water supply and demand are likely to increase competition for water 
between tourism and other uses, which may ultimately affect the economic performance of specific tourism services (Tekken et al. 2009, 2013; 
Tekken and Kropp 2012). This is a particular issue in the context of growing luxury tourism, which requires high water demand for golf courses, 
swimming pools, and other leisure facilities (Tekken et al. 2013; Zarhloule et al. 2009). Together, these factors could contribute to a structural water 
deficit, requiring policy, planning, and investment to manage (Tekken and Kropp 2012). 
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water availability (and increased temperatures) for cooling; and 
(3) extreme weather events (Han et al. 2009; Sieber 2013). Indeed, 
extreme weather events and climate change affect not only power 
plants but also the grid systems and overall reliability of electric-
ity production; this may contribute to an increase in the price of 
electricity and could even lead to power outages (Ward 2013). In 
this context, thermal electricity and hydroelectricity are projected 
to be the most vulnerable electricity sources. 
4.4.6.1 Energy Mix
The MENA countries are heavily dependent on thermal electric 
sources for electricity production. The main characteristics of 
these thermoelectric sources, including natural gas, coal, oil, 
and nuclear, is the use of a cooling system to ensure the safe 
transformation of heat produced by the combustion of fuels into 
electricity. A much smaller fraction of the electricity consumed in 
the MENA region is generated by hydroelectric plants, which are 
also vulnerable to the impacts of climate change as river runoff 
is projected to be modified, with a more pronounced seasonality 
and an overall decrease in water volume expected (Evans 2008, 
2009). Table 4.9 displays the percentage of electricity production 
by source and the total electricity power consumption per capita 
in the different MENA countries. 
With the exception of Yemen, close to 100 percent of the 
population of the MENA region has access to electricity. In Yemen, 
only about 40 percent of the population had access in 2011 (World 
Bank 2013k), which is particularly low compared to the other 
countries of the region. Electricity production capacity in Yemen 
could progressively increase according to the increasing electric-
ity demand in the country. Taking into account demographic and 
socioeconomic development trends, it is projected that demand for 







SOURCES (% OF TOTAL)
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION FROM 
THERMOELECTRIC SOURCES 
(% OF TOTAL)
United Arab Emirates 9,389 0 100
Bahrain 10,018 0 100
Djibouti – – –
Algeria 1,090 1.0 99.0
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1,743 8.3 91.8
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2,649 5.0 95.0
Iraq 1,343 7.6 92.4
Israel 6,926 0 100
Jordan 2,289 0.4 99.5
Kuwait 16,122 0 100
Lebanon 3,499 4.9 95.1
Libya 3,926 0 100
Morocco 826 7.5 92.5
Oman 6,292 0 100
Qatar 15,755 0 100
Saudi Arabia 8,161 0 100
Syrian Arab Republic 1,715 8.0 92.0
Tunisia 1,297 0.3 997
West Bank and Gaza – – –
Yemen, Rep. 193 0 100
Data sources: World Bank (2013e, f; g; h; i; j).
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electricity in the Middle East is going to increase from 822 TWh to 
2010 TWh in 2030 (Granit and Löfgren 2010). In order to meet this 
increased demand for electricity, it is estimated that the countries 
of the region may have to invest approximately $4 trillion (Granit 
and Löfgren 2010). 
MENA countries depend on both hydroelectricity and thermal 
electricity for their power needs. With a projected change in water 
availability, notably induced by a projected overall decrease in 
precipitation and river runoff and/or increased seasonality due 
to climate change impacts, thermal electricity plant cooling sys-
tems may become less efficient and electricity production could 
therefore be affected (Mika 2013; Sieber 2013). A similar threat 
can be observed for hydroelectric power generation, for which a 
change in water availability is also projected to affect electricity 
generation (Hamududu and Killingtveit 2012). 
4.4.6.2 Climate Change and Energy Production
There appears to be a lack of studies specifically quantifying, 
at the regional level, the impacts of climate change on thermo-
electricity generation in the MENA region. However, drawing 
upon the conclusions of studies assessing the impacts of climate 
change on energy systems at the global level or in other regions 
provides qualitative and quantitative indications regarding the 
potential effects of climate change on electricity generation in 
the MENA region. 
Thermal Electric Generation
Assessment of the impacts of climate change on thermal electric 
generation in the Middle East and North Africa are lacking. However, 
these impacts have been studied for European countries and the 
United States; they provide qualitative and quantitative indica-
tions for potential climate change impacts. A study by van Vliet et 
al. (2012) took into account the effects of changes in river water 
temperature and river flows on thermal electricity production. The 
study evaluated these impacts under the IPCC SRES A2 and B1 
scenarios for the 2040s (2031–2060) and 2080s (2071–2100).61 They 
found that the capacity of nuclear and fossil-fueled power plants 
could decrease by 6–19 percent in Europe and by 4–16 percent in 
the United States during the period 2031–2060 (2040s) compared 
to the production levels observed from 1971–2000. Furthermore, 
due to the increased incidence of droughts and extremely low river 
flows, the mean number of days during which electricity produc-
tion will be reduced by more than 90 percent was projected to be 
multiplied by three compared to present level, from 0.5 day per 
year to 1.5 days per year in Europe, and from 0.8 days to 1.3 days 
per year in the US, both from 2031–2060 in the A2 scenario. 
61 The SRES A2 scenario corresponds to a temperature increase of 3.2°C and 1.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels in 2080 and 2040, respectively. The SRES B1 scenario 
corresponds to temperature increases of 2.3°C and 1.4°C above pre-industrial levels 
in 2080 and 2040, respectively. The following three models—ECHAM5/MPIOM, 
CNRM-CM3 and IPSL-CM4—were used.
As a substantial share of the electricity produced in the MENA 
region originates from thermal electric sources, the findings of 
the study by van Vliet et al (2012) give relevant insights into the 
potential exposure of the sector. According to studies such as those 
from Bozkurt and Sen (2013) and Kaniewski et al. (2012), MENA 
could similarly be exposed to reduced river runoff, increased sea-
sonality, and increased water temperatures, which are the main 
biophysical drivers impacting electricity generation in the regions 
studied by van Vliet et al. (2012).
As climate change impacts thermal electric production, the 
vulnerability of power generation in all the MENA countries is 
high. In addition, it is projected that economic development and a 
growing population in the region will increase energy demand (EIA 
2013). In addition to increased energy demand induced by socio-
economic development, climate change is projected to decrease the 
production of thermal electric power plants in other regions—the 
countries in the MENA region could also be put under increasing 
pressure, contributing to a rise in electricity prices and a risk of 
electricity shortages in the absence of any adaptation measures.
Hydropower 
Hydropower plays a minor role in electricity production in the 
MENA region. Some countries, such as Iraq (7.6 percent of the 
total electricity produced), Egypt (8.3 percent), Morocco (7.5 per-
cent), and Syria (8.0 percent), generate more than five percent 
of their electricity from hydroelectric sources (see Table 4.9 for 
more details). In this regard, it is therefore also prudent to exam-
ine hydroelectric production in the MENA region in the context 
of climate change. 
The core resource for hydroelectricity is river runoff, which 
needs to be stable (both inter- and intra-annually) in order for 
hydropower plants to operate most efficiently (Hamududu and 
Killingtveit 2012; Mukheibir 2013). According to the projections 
for river runoff and water availability in the MENA region under 
climate change (see Section 4.4.1 The Agriculture-Water-Food 
Security Nexus), river runoff is projected to decrease and rainfall 
seasonality to increase across all scenarios in the coming decades 
(Bozkurt and Sen 2013; Kaniewski et al. 2012). 
A global study by Hamududu and Killingtveit (2012) assembled 
12 different climate models62 to project future rates of river runoff 
and, therewith, to project the electricity produced by hydroelectric 
plants both at the national level and aggregated at the regional 
level. Applying the scenario IPCC SRES A1B, which corresponds 
to a 2.3°C increase by the middle of the 21st century (compared 
to pre-industrial levels), the authors estimated changes in hydro-
power generation across the region. For North Africa, they found 
that production would decrease by 0.08TWh (or –0.48 percent) 
62 The models used were CGHR, ECHOG, FGOALS, GFCM20, GFCM21, GIEH, HADCM3, 
HADGEM, MIHR, MPEH5, MRCGCM, and NCCCSM.
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compared to 2005 production levels. For the Middle East,63 which 
in the study also includes Central Asian countries, production was 
projected to decrease by 1.66TWh (or –1.43 percent). 
The results of the study by Hamududu and Killingtveit (2012) 
need to be interpreted with care, however, as the authors high-
lighted two key limitations to their projections. First, the study 
did not take into account changes in the timing of flows (just 
annual river flow). Therefore, the potential impacts of floods and 
droughts, which have very significant impacts on hydroelectricity 
generation and are projected to occur more frequently and with a 
greater intensity in the coming decades, is not taken into account 
(Bozkurt and Sen 2013; Kaniewski et al. 2012). Second, changes 
in river runoff were calculated at the country level and not at the 
river basin level. This simplification does not reflect potential 
spatial variability and changes occurring over short distances. 
Furthermore, in the Middle East and North Africa, surface water 
is projected to be significantly affected by changes in precipitation 
and decreases in snow coverage at high altitudes (Abdulla et al. 
2008; Samuels et al. 2010) (see Section 4.4.1, The Agriculture-
Water-Food Security Nexus). River runoff is therefore projected to 
decrease or be subject to large fluctuations, which could decrease 
hydropower supply and reliability. 
4.4.6.3 Climate Change and Energy Demand
As global mean temperatures and the occurrence and intensity of 
heat extremes are projected to increase under climate change (see 
Section 4.3, Regional Patterns of Climate Change), the demand 
for air conditioning is also expected to rise (Cozzi and Gül 2013). 
At the global level, Isaac and van Vuuren (2009) modeled the 
projected demand of cooling as measured in cooling degree days 
(accumulated daily temperatures above 18°C). For this simula-
tion, the TIMER/IMAGE model was used under an emissions 
scenario in which temperatures increase by 3.7°C by the end of 
the century. They estimated that by 2100 the number of cooling 
degree days will rise from 12,800 during the period 1971–1991 to 
19,451 in 2100; this corresponds to a 51.9 percent increase com-
pared to the baseline period. For the same interval, demand for 
heating (measured in heating degree days) is projected to remain 
almost constant.
The International Energy Agency (Cozzi and Gül 2013) esti-
mates that demand for space cooling in the MENA region could 
increase by seven percent (or 1450 cooling degree days) in 2035 
and by 11 percent in 2050 compared to the 2005 energy demand 
for space cooling in the residential sector. These projections are 
made using the IEA World Energy Model, under the New Policies 
63 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Yemen.
Scenarios which correspond to a 2°C temperature increase by 2050 
(and 3°C by the end of the century) compared to pre-industrial 
levels. Demand for space heating in the MENA region is projected 
to remain marginal (Cozzi and Gül 2013). 
4.4.6.4 Synthesis
Based on the current energy mix in the Middle East and North 
Africa, and the projected impacts of climate change on the region, 
it is difficult to reach a robust conclusion regarding the projected 
vulnerability of the region’s energy systems. Whether defining 
vulnerability as the predisposition to being adversely affected 
by the impacts of climate change (IPCC 2012) or as a function of 
the system’s sensitivity, exposure, and adaptive capacity (IPCC 
2007), it appears that the MENA countries are vulnerable to dif-
fering extents. 
Some countries in the region have a very high economic 
capacity (GDP per capita) that could support the implementa-
tion of adaptive measures, whereas others, such as Yemen, have 
a weak economic and technical capacity that would not allow 
them to anticipate and cope with the projected impacts of climate 
change on energy systems. In this context, the vulnerability of 
the region should not be regarded as homogeneous, but rather 
heterogeneous and wideranging. Furthermore, the MENA coun-
tries have one of the highest wind and solar energy potentials in 
the world (OECD 2013). Exploiting this wind and solar potential 
would strongly help these countries, enabling them to decrease 
the vulnerability of their existing energy systems to the projected 
impacts of climate change (OECD 2013). This would also increase 
electricity production, which is important as demand in the 
majority of the countries is expected to increase steeply in com-
ing decades due to demographic and economic development as 
well as to the increasing need for space cooling as temperatures 
rise (Cozzi and Gül 2013).
4.5 Regional Development Narratives
The following implications of climate change are discussed in 
this section in order to relate climate change impacts to existing 
and future vulnerabilities in the MENA region: (1) the implica-
tions for agriculture, water resources, and food security; (2) the 
implications for human health and thermal discomfort; and 
(3) the implications for migration, security, and urban areas. It is 
important to note that each development narratives presents only 
one of the many possible ways in which climate change can put 
key development trajectories at risk. Table 4.10 summarizes the 
key climate change impacts under different warming levels in the 
Middle East and North Africa region and Figure 4.24 summarizes 
the key sub-regional impacts.
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4.5.1 Changing Precipitation Patterns and an 
Increase in Extreme Heat Pose High Risks to 
Agricultural Production and Regional Food 
Security
Farmers in the MENA region have traditionally coped with harsh 
climatic conditions, and climate change adds to the existing chal-
lenges. Most agricultural activities in MENA take place in the 
semi-arid climate zones close to the coast or in the highlands, 
where rainfall, and thus water availability, are predicted to decline 
most strongly. Rainfall is low and water is scarce, while potential 
evapotranspiration is high due to high temperatures. Increases 
in average temperatures and in the frequency of heat waves will 
represent an additional stressor for agricultural systems. 
As agriculture employs more than one third of the MENA 
population and contributes 13 percent to the region’s GDP, climate 
change impacts have important implications for farmers’ liveli-
hoods, national economies, and food security. In addition, as MENA 
Figure 4.24: Sub-regional risks for development in the Middle East and Northern Africa under 4°C warming in 2100 compared to 
pre-industrial temperatures. 
Data sources: Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University; United Nations Food and Agriculture Programme; and Centro Internacional 
de Agricultura Tropical—(2005). Gridded Population of the World, Version 3 (GPWv3): Population Count Grid. Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications 
Center (SEDAC). This map was reproduced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this 
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Maghreb
Strong warming reduction in annual 
precipitation, increased water stress and 
reduced agricultural productivity. Large 
coastal cities exposed to sea level rise.
Climate change risks will have severe 
implications on farmers’ livelihoods, country 
economy, and food security. Exposure of 
critical coastal assets would have impact 
on the economy, including tourism. There is 
risk for accelerated migration flows to urban 
areas and social conflict.  
Mashrek and Eastern Parts
Highly unusual heat and decrease in annual 
precipitation will increase aridity, decrease 
in snow water storage and river runoff for 
example in Jordon, Euphrates and Tigris. 
Adverse consequences for mostly rain-fed 
agricultural and food production.
Climate change risks will have severe 
implications on farmers’ livelihoods, country 
economy, and food security. There is a risk 
for accelerated migration flows to urban 
areas and social conflict. 
Arabian Peninsula 
Highly unusual heat extremes in central 
Arabian Peninsula. In southern parts 
relative increase in annual precipitation, but 
uncertain trend of annual precipitation in 
central part. Sea level rise in the Arabian 
Sea likely higher than in Mediterranean 
and Atlantic coasts with risk of storm 
surges and adverse consequences for 
infrastructure.
More heat extremes expected to increase 
thermal discomfort, posing risk to labor 
productivity and health. 
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countries are heavy food importers, the region also indirectly suffers 
from climate change impacts in distant food-producing regions. 
Some countries (e.g. Egypt, Syria, and Iraq) strongly depend, for 
their water supply and food security, on precipitation in upstream 
countries situated in different climatic zones. 
Climate impacts in the region are likely to be highly unevenly 
distributed, with the poor being most affected by both the direct 
effects of a dwindling resource base and the market effects of 
productivity shocks in remote agricultural regions. Yield reductions 
and increased food import dependency may affect everyone, but 
urban populations are particularly vulnerable to rising food prices, 
while poor farmers in rural areas are particularly vulnerable to 
hunger and malnutrition as a direct consequence of yield losses. 
The sector most vulnerable to negative climate change impacts 
is rain-fed agriculture that represents an important source of 
livelihood for rural populations across MENA. Rain-fed agricul-
ture accounts for 70 percent of the farmed land and representing 
the main occupation and source of income for rural populations 
(particularly in marginal areas). The prevalence of poverty is 
extensive among highland farmers because of poor infrastructure 
and the degradation of natural resources; among small farmers in 
dryland farming systems because of low rainfall and weak market 
linkages; and among small herders in pastoral farming systems 
for the same reasons (Dixon et al. 2001). 
In the context of increasing climate change impacts, farmers in 
rain-fed areas with moderate poverty are at risk of extreme poverty 
without extensive off-farm income opportunities. Yet poverty in 
the first place results from lack of access to resources, including 
inequitable sharing of water, food, and energy resources. Land 
management practices are often inefficient and many policies 
favor urban populations and the supply of cheap food instead of 
supporting rural development (Dixon et al. 2001).
MENA countries have traditionally invested in irrigation as a 
way to improve the performance of the agriculture sector. Irriga-
tion was introduced to complement rainfall and to increase and 
stabilize production. About 25 percent of the agricultural land is 
irrigated, using on average 85 percent of water resources in the 
region while offering a substantial contribution to incomes and 
employment. Countries throughout the region have also focused 
on infrastructural investments to increase irrigation water supply. 
Further mobilization of water resources will become increasingly 
difficult, however, because of constraints on water availability. While 
there is still some room in the region to increase water supplies 
through the exploitation of both conventional and unconventional 
water resources (e.g. desalination), the extent of this increase will 
be more limited than in the past. Thus, regional agriculture will 
be confronted with mounting water restrictions in favor of other 
sectors because of the generally relatively low net returns when 
compared to other water uses. 
Climate change will further reduce the availability of water 
for irrigation. Making the most of the limited available water 
in irrigated agriculture can contribute to achieving the goals of 
improving the rural economy. Increasing water productivity in 
irrigated agriculture, in its broadest sense of yielding more (in 
physical and economic terms) with the same amount or less water, 
will be important to any solution to the region’s water scarcity 
problem. Indeed, it is generally accepted that the efficiency of the 
irrigation sector in the region is suboptimal.
Management of the water-agriculture nexus in the MENA region 
still has a strong supply-side bias. In particular, large-scale and 
centralized supply-side measures are seen as solutions to the grow-
ing demand-supply gap. There is less emphasis on more diverse, 
distributed, decentralized, and small-scale solutions which would 
increase flexibility, diversity, and resilience to climate change and 
other pressures (Folke 2003; Sowers et al. 2011).
Large increases in world food prices do not automatically 
lead to increased poverty for low-income groups, as households 
may adjust their consumption. Thus, even in the low-productivity 
scenario examined by Hertel et al. (2010), an increase in world 
prices for staple grains by more than 30 percent raised the cost of 
living at the poverty line by just 6.3 percent. Nonetheless, relatively 
small increases of this kind would in particular affect urban poor 
households dependent on wage labor income. 
Child malnutrition levels could be affected if food production 
and poor people’s livelihoods are affected, or if food prices rise 
sharply. Child malnutrition levels are already high in parts of the 
Middle East and North Africa, with 18 percent of the region’s chil-
dren under age five stunted (UNICEF 2013); the rates are higher 
in some countries (notably Yemen). Evidence from previous food 
price shocks suggests that child malnutrition levels would be at 
risk. For example, the prevalence of stunting in children under age 
five rose in Egypt from 23 percent in 2000 and 2005 to 29 percent 
in 2008 (UNICEF 2013). This increase may be attributable to the 
global food crisis in 2007 (Marcus et al. 2011), itself partially driven 
by weather-related factors. 
4.5.2 Heat Extremes Will Pose a Significant 
Challenge for Public Health Across the Region
The number of days with exceptional high temperatures is expected 
to increase in several capital cities in the MENA region which can 
cause heat-related illnesses, including heat stress, heat exhaustion, 
and heat stroke. This is a particular risk for people with chronic 
diseases, those who are overweight, pregnant women, children, 
the elderly, and people engaged in outdoor manual labor (Bartlett 
2008; IPCC 2014c; Kjellstrom and McMichael 2013). Conditions 
for workers in the construction industry in the region are already 
very tough today, with workers reported to suffer from heat 
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exhaustion and dehydration. Measures to limit working hours 
during peak heat periods, such as those implemented by Qatar 
(Verner, 2012), may become increasingly necessary, with implica-
tions for productivity. Thermal discomfort is expected to increase, 
in particular in southern parts of the Arabian Peninsula. Thermal 
discomfort will challenge people’s health, especially in densely 
populated large cities (because of urban heat island effects) that 
already experience high maximum temperatures. Heat stress is 
likely to be worse for the urban poor who cannot afford cool-
ing and may also lack access to electricity (Satterthwaite et al. 
2007), as in Yemen, for example, where only about 40 percent 
of the population has access to electricity. Changes in climatic 
factors could also affect the incidence of malaria in the MENA 
region because malaria distribution and seasonal occurrence is 
linked to temperature, elevation, humidity, and rainfall. Malaria 
endemicity is low in North Africa and the Middle East, with cases 
reported in Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia and prevalent in Djibouti 
and Yemen. Poor children under age five are at greatest risk of 
mortality from malaria and other vector-borne diseases (Costello 
et al. 2009; WHO 2009). 
4.5.3 Climate Change Might Act as a Threat 
Multiplier for the Security Situation 
Climate change might act as a threat multipler for the security 
situation in the MENA region by imposing additional pressure on 
already scarce resources and by reinforcing pre-existing threats 
connected to migration following forced displacement.
4.5.3.1 Migration
Rising temperatures and the risk of drought seriously affect rural 
livelihoods, possibly leading to increasing migration flows in the 
future. However, whilst many people will be forced to move, oth-
ers will be forced to stay because they lack the financial resources 
or social networks that facilitate mobility. This indicates that 
climate-induced migration should be addressed not only within 
the framework of climate change, but also within other economic, 
cultural, technological or political conditions that might foster or 
limit migration (Gemenne 2011).
Evidence of migration flows as a response to climate change 
is scarce. The EACH-FOR studies, a series of local qualitative 
household surveys investigating the motivation to migrate in 
Egypt, Morocco, and Western Sahara (Afifi, 2009, Hamza et al. 
2009; Gila et al. 2009) appear to be among the only comprehensive 
studies on migration and climate change in the MENA region. 
Wodon et al. (2013) also conducted household interviews in five 
Arab countries on migration, climate change, and related topics. 
Within the MENA region, most migration is internal. Urbaniza-
tion is the predominant migration pattern, and more than 80 percent 
of the population is currently living in urban areas in Bahrain, 
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United 
Arab Emirates (UN-DESA 2014). As rural livelihoods are more 
affected by climate change, especially where a high proportion of 
the population is employed in agriculture, the urbanization trend 
will likely continue. In Algeria, for example, migrants move from 
rural areas to mid-sized towns (Gubert and Nordman 2010).This 
movement is partly due to slow-onset environmental degrada-
tion, including water scarcity, soil erosion, and desertification, 
which threatens agricultural livelihoods in rural Algeria (Wodon 
et al. 2014).
Several studies bring attention to the quality of housing in 
urban centers and the capacity of urban infrastructure to accom-
modate an increasing population. Migrants to urban areas often 
live in marginal land with poor infrastructure, liable to flooding 
or on unstable slopes, and this at great risk from extreme events. 
The migrants are likely to be poor, face health risks related to 
low-income urban environments (e.g., overcrowding, poor water 
quality, poor sanitation). Such areas are also typically at higher risk 
of crime (Black et al. 2012; Hugo 2011). In some areas, migrants 
also face discrimination based on their ethnicity, making it harder 
for them to access services and find employment, with the risk that 
poor migrant children may have more limited access to education 
than other local children (Marcus et al. 2011). The urban poor 
have also been shown to be the worst hit by rising food prices; 
this poses a particular risk to the MENA region. MENA is likely 
to be exposed to the complex challenges of rising urbanization 
rates and mounting direct and indirect pressures on its resource 
base while simultaneously developing a higher vulnerability to 
global food prices. 
Social ties play an important role in finding employment and 
housing in migration destinations. Migrants, especially those coming 
from rural areas, are often disadvantaged since they usually have 
less education and lower language capabilities (e.g., not speaking 
both French and Arabic in Morocco). Furthermore, many migrants 
live in overcrowded apartments and in slums. Lack of permanent 
access to electricity for cooling in the night can lead to loss of 
sleep and lower productivity during the day. 
If current migration patterns continue, the majority of migrants 
are likely to be men migrating without their families, at least 
initially. Women left behind in rural areas may thus face more 
intensive workloads in agriculture, domestic work, and the man-
agement of scarce water supplies (Verner, 2012). If rural women 
taking on new roles do not have the skills to generate productive 
livelihoods, as a result of discriminatory social norms and limited 
education opportunities, then they are at risk of falling into poverty. 
Promoting gender equity, by tackling both discriminatory norms 
and inequalities in access to resources, is thus a vital component 
in climate-change adaptation strategies (Verner, 2012).
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4.5.3.2 Security
Climate change might act as a threat multiplier for the security 
situation in the MENA region by placing additional pressures 
on already scarce resources and by reinforcing such preexisting 
threats as political instability, poverty, and unemployment. This 
creates the potential for social uprising and violent conflict. Due 
to food imports and international migration, MENA is increas-
ingly vulnerable to climate change impacts in other parts of the 
continent and the world. 
For example, the literature described how droughts in China, 
Russia, and Ukraine, and heavy rainfall in Australia and Canada, 
combined with market mechanisms to contribute to high bread 
prices in Egypt in 2011 (Lagi et al. 2011; Sternberg 2013). The 
studies contend that this, together with a previous food crisis in 
2008, the country’s weak bread subsidy system, and an already 
unstable food supply situation, made the country more vulnerable 
to world market prices and reductions in wheat imports.
Transit migration places an additional external pressure on 
scarce resources in MENA. The Maghreb countries in particular 
serve as receiving and transit countries for Sahelian and other 
Sub-Saharan African migrants who leave their home countries 
due to poverty, conflicts, and environmental degradation (see 
Section 4.4.4, Migration and Security).
Building resilience and institutional capacity is crucial in order 
to react and adapt to climatic changes, extreme weather events, or 
shocks such as climate-variability-related increases in food prices. 
Institutions weakened by conflicts or crises have a lower capacity 
to build resilience to climatic changes and extreme events. Further 
research is needed to investigate the strength of links between 
long-term climate change, instead of single climatologic hazards, 
to migration and social unrest. 
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Endnotes
1 Temperature projections for the Middle East and North African land area, for the multi-model mean during the months of June, July and August.
2 Klok and Tank (2009). 
3 Lelieveld et al. (2013). Number of days in a year when maximum temperatures are above the 90th percentile for six consecutive days or longer relative to the baseline. 
Equals the WSDI index. Please note that the numbers given are multi-annual mean values (which is why values below six for the observation period are possible), whereas 
Lelieveld et al. (2013) derive median values for the non-zero entries only.
4 Sillmann et al. (2013b). Warm spell duration index (WSDI, WSDI, and CSDI count the number of days in a year when TX is above the 90th percentile for six consecutive 
days or longer relative to the 1961–1990 base period. The Sahara is the region spanning from 18N to 30N latitude and from 20W to 65E longitude. The Mediterranean Basin 
is the region spanning from 30N to 48N latitude and from 10W to 40E longitude. See Figure 2 in Sillmann et al. (2013b).
5 On average one of the summer months (June, July or August) each year will exceed temperatures warmer than three standard deviations beyond the 1951–1980 mean.
6 Note that these relatively large percentage changes projected for regions south of 25°N occur in a region that is very dry today. Thus, the absolute changes are small.
7 Orlowsky and Seneviratne (2013). Months with Standard Precipitation Index (12 month) in a 20-year windowed analysis <–1 which indicates moderate drought. The 
region studied is the Mediterranean, comprising southern Europe as well as North Africa and the Middle East. Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, as well as the Middle East, 
appear as hotspots.
8 Physical exposure to drought, a product designed by UNEP/GRID-Europe for the Global Assessment Report on Risk Reduction (GAR). It was modeled using global data. 
It is based on three sources: (1) a global monthly gridded precipitation dataset obtained from the Climatic Research Unit (University of East Anglia); (2) a GIS modeling 
of global Standardized Precipitation Index based on Brad Lyon (IRI, Columbia University) methodology. (3) a population grid for the year 2010, provided by LandScanTM 
Global Population Database (Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory). Unit is expected average annual population exposed (inhabitants). This product was designed 
by Pascal Peduzzi (UNEP/GRID-Geneva, ISDR). Credit: GIS processing UNEP/GRID-Europe.
9 Sillmann et al. (2013b). Increase in the CMIP5 ensemble median in 2081–2100 compared to the reference period 1981–2000. Dry days are days with precipitation of less 
than one mm. The Sahara region is defined as a box stretching from 18N–30N latitude and 20W–65E longitude. The Mediterranean region is defined as a box stretching from 
30N–48N latitude and 10W–40E longitude (only land grid points).
10 Dai (2012). 
11 Lelieveld et al. (2013).
12 Prudhomme et al. (2013). Percentage change in the occurrence of days under drought conditions determined by the runoff deficit index (DI).
13 Kharin et al. (2013). Relative changes (percent) of 20-year return values of annual extremes of daily precipitation rates as simulated by CMIP5 models in 2081–2100.
14 Kharin et al. (2013). The multi-model median of return periods (or waiting times), in years, for late 20th century precipitation extremes as simulated by CMIP5 models 
in 2081–2100 relative to 1986–2005. Changes are statistically significant at the 5-percent level for the Arab Peninsula but are not statistically significant at the 5-percent level 
for North Africa.
15 Sillmann et al. (2013b). Projected changes (in percent) in annual maximum 5-day precipitation (RX5day) over the time period 2081–2100 relative to the reference period 
(1981–2000).
16 See Section 4.3.5.
17 Tsimplis and Baker (2000).
18 Various authors used the MEDALUS model to quantify the vulnerability against desertification in the MNA region. The MEDALUS model integrates regional information on 
vegetation, soil, climate, erosion, and management and quantifies the sensitivity of a region against desertification in four classes: critical, fragile, moderate, and non-sensitive.
19 Brinkmann et al. (2011).
20 Gao and Giorgi (2008).
21 Scheiter and Higgins (2009). Under the influence of fire.
22 Higgins and Scheiter (2012). Only potential vegetation is considered.
23 Samuels et al. (2010). For the period 2036–2060 relative to 1980–2004.
24 Gerten et al. 2013.
25 Bozkurt and Sen (2013).
26 Mizyed (2008).
27 Evans (2008). Using the 200 mm isohyet to indicate the limit of rain-fed agriculture.
28 Giannakopoulos et al. (2009). Southwest Mediterranean includes Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco; southeast Mediterranean includes Jordan, Egypt, and Libya.
29 Mougou et al. (2010). A crop modeling study with stylized temperature (1.5°C) and precipitation scenarios (–10 percent).
30 Lobell et al. (2008). Median changes in crop yields. West Asia covers parts of the MENA region, and includes the Arabian Peninsula (except Kuwait, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Qatar), Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. 
31 Verner and Breisinger (2013).
32 Al-Bakri et al. (2011). A crop modeling study with stylized temperature (1°C–4°C) and precipitation scenarios (+/–20 percent). 
33 Schilling et al. (2012).
34 Mougou et al. (2010). 
35 Hallegatte et al. (2013).
36 Brown et al. (2011).
37 Hinkel et al. (2012).
38 Dasgupta et al. (2009).
39 Snoussi et al. (2008).
40 Snoussi et al. (2009).
41 See Section 4.5.5.3. 
42 WHO and EMRO (2009); WHO (2013a).
43 Toumi et al. (2012). Incidence increases by 1.8 percent with a one mm increase in rainfall lagged by 12–14 months and by 5 percent when there is a 1-percent increase 
in humidity from July to September in the same epidemiologic year.
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44 Ebi (2008). Number of additional malaria cases calculated using relative risk of disease estimations from WHO Global Burden of Disease Study. The results are not directly 
comparable to van Lieshout et al. (2004) as they do not take into account additional population growth and as they use different emissions scenarios and a different climate 
model. 
45 Slater and Michael (2012). 
46 van Lieshout et al. (2004). Increases in population (in millions) exposed to risk of malaria for at least one month of the year including population growth. The population 
at risk in the B1 scenario is higher than in the B2 scenario because population projections for the WHO region EMR-B are higher for this scenario. No additional population 
is exposed to risk of malaria for three months or more in any of the SRES scenarios. The WHO region EMR-B includes Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates.
47 WHO (2002).
48 Kolstad and Johansson (2011). Increased relative risk of diarrheal disease.
49 El-Fadel et al. (2012). It was assumed in this study that the climate is evolving slowly and continuously beyond 2050 and that the increase in average yearly temperature 
is linear within the simulation period 2050–2095. Thus, the average increase in decadal temperatures from 2010 to 2095 was linearly interpolated.
50 Giannakopoulos et al. (2013). The number of days characterized by high thermal discomfort (humidex, an index used to express the temperature perceived by people, 
> 38°C).
51 Novikov et al. (2012).
52 Wodon et al. (2014). In total, 1.3 million people have been affected and 800,000 people lost their livelihoods. Please note that there has been no determination that the 
drought of 2010 in Syria was a climate change event.
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 Europe and Central Asia
The Europe and Central Asia region encompasses a wide range of geographic features ranging from the mountains to coasts in 
the Western Balkans and from the vast plains of Central Asia to Russia’s boreal forests. In the Western Balkans and Central Asia, 
heat extremes and reduced water availability become threats as temperatures rise toward 4°C. This includes earlier glacier melt 
in Central Asia and shifts in the timing of water flows, and a higher risk of drought in the Western Balkans, with potential declines 
for crop yields, urban health, and energy generation. In Macedonia, for example, yield losses are projected of up to 50 percent for 
maize, wheat, vegetables and grapes at 2°C warming. Flood risk is expected to increase slightly along the Danube, Sava and Tisza 
rivers, and a slight decrease in 100-year flood events is projected in the southern parts of the Western Balkans. At 2°C warming, 
methane emissions from melting permafrost could increase by 20–30 percent across Russia in the mid‐21st century. 
5.1 Regional Summary
The Europe and Central Asia region in this report covers 12 coun-
tries64 within Central Asia, the Western Balkans, and the Russian 
Federation. The region encompasses a wide range of geographic 
features ranging from the mountainous and partly coastal Western 
Balkans to the vast plains of Central Asia and Russia’s boreal for-
ests. The region is inhabited by 226 million people; the population 
is, however, unequally distributed, with Kazakhstan having only 
six inhabitants per square kilometer and Kosovo as many as 166 
inhabitants per square kilometer. The urbanization rate is about 
50 percent. The population in Russia and the Western Balkans is 
projected to decline slightly, while the population of Central Asia 
is projected to increase sharply by 2050. 
The region’s importance is closely related to its rich natural 
resources, including gas and oil reserves as well as carbon stored 
in the boreal forests (the extraction and maintenance of which 
affect worldwide climate mitigation goals). Due to the geographical 
exposure as well as a relatively high share of agriculture in regional 
64 The Europe and Central Asia region in this report includes the following countries: 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, the Kyrgyz Republic, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, the Russian Federation, Serbia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
GDP, poverty rates that are increasing in recent years, inequalities 
and relatively poor social services and public infrastructure, the 
region is highly vulnerable to climate change impacts. 
In climatic terms, the region displays a clear dipole: regions in 
the southwest become drier and regions in the northeast become 
wetter as the world warms toward 4°C. These warming conditions 
lead to a high risk of drought in the west and challenges to stable 
freshwater supplies in the east, where changes in precipitation 
combine with glacial melt to affect the seasonality of river discharge.
5.1.1 Regional Patterns of Climate Change
5.1.1.1 Temperature
Warming over Europe and Central Asia is projected to be above 
the global mean land warming. In a 2°C world, the multi-model 
mean warming by the end of the century is about 2.5°C above 
the 1951–1980 base period. This level of warming is reached by 
mid-century and then remains constant until the end of the century 
in a 2°C world. In contrast, in a 4°C world, summer warming 
continues almost linearly until the end of the century, reaching 
about 8.5°C above the 1951–1980 baseline by 2100 for the region’s 
land area (Figure 5.1). The most pronounced warming is projected 
to occur in Northern Russia in the region bordering the Barents-
Kara Sea, along the Black Sea coast (including the Balkans), and 
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in Northern China and Mongolia. In these areas, mean summer 
temperatures by 2071–2099 will increase by about 3.5°C in a 2°C 
world and by about 7.5°C in a 4°C world. 
5.1.1.2 Heat Extremes
One of the clearest climate change signals is the strong increase in 
threshold-exceeding heat extremes65 in the region surrounding the 
Black Sea, (and, in particular, the Balkans). Here, even in a 2°C 
world, highly unusual heat extremes, with temperatures warmer 
than three standard deviations beyond the baseline average, will 
occur in about 20–30 percent of summer months by 2100, and 
unprecedented heat extremes will occur between 5–10 percent of 
summer months. For the whole region, about 15 percent of the land 
area is projected to be affected by high ly unusual heat extremes in 
a 2°C world by the end of the century, while unprecedented heat 
extremes will remain almost absent. In contrast, in a 4°C world, 
85 percent of land area in the region is projected to be affected by 
highly unusual heat extremes; 55 percent of the area is projected 
to be affected by unprecedented heat extremes by 2100. Most of the 
heat extremes will occur south of approximately 50°N, stretching 
from the Balkans all the way to Japan. The number of tropical 
nights south of approximately 50°N is expected to increase by 
20–30 days in a 2°C world and by 50–60 days in a 4°C world.
5.1.1.3 Precipitation
The basic concept of the “dry-getting-drier and wet-getting wetter” 
under climate change is a good first order estimate for Europe and 
Central Asia. The relative wetting of the Northeast, (i.e., Siberia) 
is the most pronounced signal, possibly associated with a shift in 
65 In this report, highly unusual heat extremes refer to 3-sigma events and unprec-
edented heat extremes to 5-sigma events (see Appendix). 
storm tracks. The increase in precipitation is far more pronounced 
during the winter than during the summer.
Despite an overall negative trend in extreme precipitation 
events, regional and seasonal projections for the Balkans remain 
inconclusive in a 2°C world. However, 20–30 percent reductions 
are projected for a 4°C world. Although projections of precipita-
tion for the Central Asian countries suffer from substantial model 
uncertainties, the overall trend for heavy precipitation intensity is 
below the global average.
Central and Eastern Siberia is one of the regions expected to 
experience the strongest increase in heavy precipitation events. 
Heavy precipitation events with a 20-year return time are projected 
to intensify by over 30 percent in this region and the return time 
of such extremes from the 20-year reference period (1986–2005) in 
a 4°C world is projected to fall below five years by the end of the 
21st century. Changes are much weaker (greater than 10 percent 
increase in intensity and 10–15 year return times) in a 2°C world.
5.1.1.4 Drought and Aridity
In a 2°C world around five percent more land in the region will 
be affected by aridity; in a 4°C world, the land area classified as 
hyper-arid, arid, or semi-arid will increase by more than 30 per-
cent (Figure 5.2). The Western Balkans is projected to suffer 
from increased drought conditions. Though changes in annual 
precipitation are weak, the Balkans and the region surround-
ing the Caspian Sea are projected to become more arid due to 
warming-induced drying. 
Projections for future drought also mimic the overall trend 
toward a wetter climate. Some projections even show a nega-
tive change in drought risk for the eastern Siberia under a 4°C 
world. Projections for central and eastern Russia, meanwhile, are 
inconclusive. 
Figure 5.1: Multi-model mean temperature anomaly for RCP2.6 (2˚C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4˚C world, right) for the months of 
June-July-August for the Europe and Central Asia region.
Temperature anomalies in degrees Celsius are averaged over the time period 2071–2099 relative to 1951–1980.
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5.1.2 Regional Sea-level Rise
The countries of the ECA region considered here (excluding Rus-
sia) cover a relatively short stretch of coast that is affected by sea 
level rise. The sea-level rise in the region is projected to reach 
0.52 m on average (0.37–0.9 m) in a 4°C world from 2081–2100 
above the 1986–2005 baseline, with rates of increase of 10.1 
mm per year (5.9–19.6 mm/yr) from 2081–2100. This is slightly 
below the global mean. One of the most vulnerable coasts in 
the region is the Drini-Mati River Delta in Albania. The sea level 
in the Caspian Sea, that is completely isolated from the global 
ocean, is projected to fall by 4.5 m by the end of the century due 
to increased evaporation.66 
5.1.3 Sector-based and Thematic Impacts
5.1.3.1 Glaciers and Snow
The enhanced runoff from the glaciers is expected to continue 
over the 21st century. Projections of glacier change use different 
scenarios applied to different geographical regions for different 
reference periods, making direct scenario comparisons rather 
difficult. In all projections, however, glaciers are expected to lose 
more than half of their volume by 2100. The loss of stored water 
implies increased runoff in the coming decades, followed by a 
significant shortage until the store is completely emptied.
66 Some individual grid cells have noticeably different values than their direct 
neighbors. This is due to the fact that the aridity index is defined as a fraction of 
total annual precipitation divided by potential evapotranspiration (see Appendix). 
It therefore behaves in a strongly non-linear fashion and year-to-year fluctuations 
can be large. As the results are averaged over a relatively small number of model 
simulations, this can result in local jumps.
The principal driver behind the glacier volume and snow 
cover change is air temperature. Projections show approximately 
50 percent (31–66 percent) glacier volume loss in Central Asia in 
a 2°C world and approximately 67 percent (50–78 percent) gla-
cier volume loss in a 4°C world. A temperature rise higher than 
1.1°C will cause the small glaciers of the Balkans (Albanian Alps 
and Montenegrin Durmitor) to melt completely within decades. 
5.1.3.2 Water
River flows in Central Asia will in general be lower during the 
summer months when the vegetation is present, while winter 
runoff may increase. Climate change in the region is likely to 
have consequences for runoff seasonality, and a shift in the peak 
flows from summer to spring can be expected due to earlier snow 
melt. This may increase water stress in summer, in particular in 
unregulated catchments. The annual amount of water in rivers 
is not likely to decrease considerably, at least until the middle of 
the century when glacier depletion will cause a distinct decrease 
in water volume of Central Asian rivers. Over the short-term, 
enhanced glacier melt rates will provide an inflow of additional 
water into the rivers, though in the more remote future, when 
glaciers are shrinking, their buffer effect will disappear. This effect 
will be more pronounced for the Amu Darya, because of its actual 
higher share of glacier melt water, than for the Syr Darya.
Very few scientific studies about regional impacts on water 
resources and river runoff levels are available for the Western 
Balkan countries, with most projections done on a broader Euro-
pean level. In particular, there is a lack of area-wide hydrological 
data, especially since the 1990s. Water availability over summer 
months In the Balkans is assumed to decrease considerably until 
the end of the century. In the northern parts of the Balkans, spring 
and winter riverine flood risk can increase. Results from a global 
Figure 5.2: Multi-model mean of the percentage change in the aridity index (AI) for RCP2.6 (2˚C world ) (left) and RCP8.5 (4˚C 
world) (right) for the Europe and Central Asia region by 2071–2099 relative to 1951–1980.
Hatched areas indicate uncertain results, with two or more out of five models disagreeing on the direction of change. Note that a negative change cor-
responds to a shift to more arid conditions.66
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study show severe decreases in annual discharge in the Western 
Balkans of more than 45 percent in a 4°C world.
5.1.3.3 Agriculture
Central Asia’s agricultural sector is highly dependent on irriga-
tion water availability, and the impact climate change will have 
on agriculture in both Central Asia and the Western Balkans is 
significant. Changing precipitation patterns, reduced runoff in the 
major river basins, and increasing temperatures will put additional 
pressure on available water resources (and, at the same time, 
increase agricultural water demand). Prolonged periods of above 
average temperatures will exacerbate heat stress of agricultural 
crops, leading to decreasing plant productivity. Droughts, mean-
while, are very likely to increase desertification in the Kyrgyz 
Republic and Kazakhstan. 
• Yields. Yields for a few crops, including alfalfa, grasslands, 
and wheat in parts of the region are projected to increase in 
parts of the region. The overwhelming majority of results, 
however, point toward decreasing crop yields. Climate change 
is also likely to increase heat stress and change river runoff 
reducing agricultural yields in the long term. In the Western 
Balkans, the increasing occurrence of droughts will be a 
major threat to agricultural production under climate change; 
conversely so will the increasing appearance of extreme rain 
and flood events.
• Livestock. Increasing temperatures and reduced water avail-
ability will negatively impact livestock production. Pasture 
growth and regeneration rates are expected to decline in parts 
of Central Asia. If producers react to the changes by increasing 
livestock numbers, pastures might be at added risk from over-
grazing and erosion. In the areas where productivity of alfalfa 
and grasslands is projected to increase (e.g., in Uzbekistan), 
the indirect effect of climate change on livestock production 
might be positive.
• Food Security. The rural population in Central Asia is at a 
particular risk of food insecurity, and there have been recent 
cases of a direct hunger threat. Rising food prices that might 
follow production declines will affect the poorest social groups 
(i.e., people who spend a large portion of their income on 
food). There are, however, opportunities to increase regional 
agricultural production efficiency by, for example, improving 
agricultural policies and institutions as well as by improv-
ing production infrastructure and technology. Finally, while 
access to international food markets could lead to higher food 
security and lower prices, the region is not well integrated into 
international trade networks. 
5.1.3.4 Human Health
A number of diseases and adverse health conditions are already 
present across Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and it is 
anticipated that some of these will be affected by such climatic 
changes as increased temperatures and more frequent and 
intense rainfall and drought events. A lack of certainty about 
the mechanisms through which climate change affects the inci-
dence of diseases, however, prevents strong claims about future 
trends. In general, however, higher temperatures correlate to an 
increased occurrence of tick-borne encephalitis and mosquito 
transmitted malaria and dengue fever. Malaria is endemic in 
Tajikistan; since the 1990s, it has reoccurred in Uzbekistan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, and Turkmenistan. Furthermore, there is 
evidence providing stronger indications of an increased risk of 
dengue in the Western Balkans. 
Historical observations show that increased temperatures, as 
well as extreme weather events such as floods can lead to drink-
ing water contamination, salmonellosis, cholera, typhoid, and 
dysentery. Evidence from Albania and Macedonia in the Western 
Balkans, as well as Tajikistan and Kazakhstan in Central Asia, 
show an increased vulnerability of heat related strokes and mor-
talities. Severe floods, like those that occurred in recent years in 
Serbia, as well as glacial outbursts in the mountains of Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, increase vulnerability to 
injuries and drowning.
5.1.3.5 Energy
Climate change will have a strong impact on the region’s energy 
sector. In Central Asia, the demand for electricity is expected 
to rise as a consequence of population growth, and current and 
projected economic growth. Hydroelectricity can play a major 
role in the future energy mix of the Central Asian countries, as 
only 8 percent of the hydropower potential of the region has 
been developed. Changes in climate and melting of glaciers 
generally mean that the amount of water available for power 
generation could increase, but the new pattern of intra-annual 
runoff distribution means that less water will be available for 
energy generation in the summer. Changes in reservoir manage-
ment and the need to balance water requirements for agriculture 
may also have a negative impact on energy availability over the 
summer months. 
Due to changes in river water temperatures and river flows, the 
capacity of nuclear and fossil-fueled power plants in Southern and 
Eastern Europe could decrease from 6.3 percent to 19 percent in 
Europe from 2031–2060 compared to the production levels observed 
from 1971–2000. Furthermore, due to the increased incidence of 
droughts and extreme river low flows, the mean number of days 
during which electricity production will be reduced by more than 
90 percent is projected to increase threefold; from 0.5 days per 
year (in present days) to 1.5 days per year from 2031–2060 under 
1.5˚C global warming. The challenge to meet growing energy 
demands in the Western Balkans will be further intensified by a 
reduction in energy generation from hydropower sources as the 
result of decreases in precipitation. 
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5.1.3.6 Security and Migration
Climate change impacts will intensify in Central Asia and contrib-
ute to increasing the population’s overall physical, economic, and 
environmental insecurity. A key vulnerability is the high exposure 
of the densely populated, agriculturally productive Fergana Valley 
region to catastrophic floods and mudflows as a result of glacial 
lake outbursts.
Forecasting migration patterns is a challenge because of both 
the complexity of these phenomena and the low reliability of and 
significant gaps in existing datasets particularly with respect to 
information on environmental problems (including disasters) and 
environmentally induced migration.
The Western Balkans, especially those nations bordering the sea, 
are projected to experience sea-level rise and hotter temperatures; 
this is expected to result in growing numbers of people moving 
from coastal zones to cooler mountainous zones. Migration in the 
Western Balkans has already led to severe demographic changes, 
which coupled with an aging population is expected to lead to 
further increased regional climate change sensitivity as a result 
of decreased adaptive capacity.
In Central Asia, the majority of the population lives in climate 
hotspot areas, with projected increase in the intensity and frequency 
of extreme events (e.g. forest fires, heat waves, floods). The rural 
population is among those that is the most vulnerable, and an 
increased rural-to-urban migration could be expected. Women are 
particularly vulnerable, since they typically remain behind in the 
countryside to manage their households as men migrate to urban 
areas. Taking into account the urbanization trends in Central Asia, 
the vulnerability of cities to catastrophes might increase.
5.1.3.7 Forests of the Russian Federation
Russia’s forest covers a large area with a huge amount of carbon 
stored in the soil and vegetation. Future projections highlight 
changes in productivity (both increasing and decreasing, depending 
on species, region, site and so forth) and vegetation composition 
which will typically be stronger under a 4°C world than a 2°C 
world. Changes in species composition toward better-adapted tree 
species may buffer productivity losses, but they will also lead to 
a change in the forest structure and biodiversity.
The region includes a large forest area affected by permafrost 
which contains large stock of carbon and methane. In general, 
changes in the carbon, water and energy fluxes of Russia’s forests 
may strongly affect local, regional, and global forest resource avail-
ability, ecosystem functioning, services such as carbon storage 
and biodiversity, and even feedback on the global climate system. 
Substantial research gaps exist, for example, regarding the effect 
of disturbances such as fire and insect outbreaks on vegetation 
cover or carbon stocks and how climate change will change forest 
productivity under concomitant changes of growing conditions, 
disturbance regimes, and forest management practices.
5.1.4 Overview of Regional Development 
Narratives
The development narratives build on the climate change impacts 
analyzed in this report (cf., Table 5.7) and are presented in more 
detail in Section 5.5. Increasing climate variability and changing 
climate are expected to threaten agricultural and energy produc-
tion in the region by changing the hydrological snow, and glacial 
regimes. Furthermore, climate change in interaction with vegetation 
shifts and fires threaten forest productivity and carbon storage in 
the Eurasian forests. The exposure to climatic changes in combi-
nation with the regional social vulnerability patterns could have 
negative consequences on key development trends. 
• Water resources in Central Asia are projected to increase 
during the first half of the century and decline thereafter, 
amplifying the challenge of accommodating competing 
water demands for agricultural production and hydropower 
generation. The timing of river flows is projected to shift from 
summer to spring, with adverse consequences for water avail-
ability in critical crop-growing periods. An intensification of the 
runoff variability is expected to increase in all river basins in the 
region. The competition for water resources between key sectors 
(e.g., agriculture and energy), as well as between upstream and 
downstream water users, can therefore be expected to intensify. 
Until 2030 the contribution of glacial melt water to river runoff 
might lead to an increase in river runoff and partially offset the 
runoff variability. In the second half of the century, however, 
runoff generation of melt water in the mountainous parts of 
the river basins is likely to decline substantially. An increasing 
population, followed by increased water and energy demand, 
will put an additional pressure on scarce resources. Improving 
irrigation water management and efficiency of irrigation infra-
structure, institutional and technical advancements in agriculture, 
integrated transboundary river management, and new employ-
ment opportunities outside agriculture could counterbalance the 
negative impacts of these environmental changes. 
• Climate extremes in the Western Balkans pose major risks 
to agricultural systems, energy and human health. The vul-
nerability of the Western Balkans to climatic changes is mainly 
related to rain-fed agricultural production and the high share of 
the population that is dependent on income from agriculture. 
There are, however, projections showing production increases 
for irrigated crops in parts of the region (for example, C4 
summer crops and tubers in Serbia). Increased temperatures 
as well as both droughts and extreme river flows could pose 
further challenges to energy production. Recent floods and 
landslides illustrate the threats of extreme events to human 
health and well-being. In addition, the climatic conditions in 
the region are becoming increasingly suitable to dengue fever 
and other vector-transmitted diseases such as dengue fever. 
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• The responses of the permafrost and the boreal forests of Russia 
to climate change have consequences for timber productivity 
and global carbon stocks. Changes to carbon fluxes in response 
to rising temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, and inter-
actions with disturbance regimes in the forest and permafrost 
areas in the region can have far-reaching repercussions—affecting 
the global carbon stock and having an effect on albedo in the 
northern hemisphere. While climate change can increase the 
productivity of some tree species, heat waves, water stress, forest 
fires, and an increased incidence of tree pests and diseases could 
counterbalance any positive effects. Improving forest manage-
ment and sustainable wood extraction are of key importance 
as is sustainable and far-sighted management of Russian forest 
ecosystems, including addressing key research gaps. 
5.2 Introduction
5.2.1 General Characteristics
The report covers 12 countries located in the Europe and Central 
Asia region (ECA) in three sub-regions:
• Central Asia: Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
• Western Balkans: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
the Former Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.
• Russia.
The total population of the region is 226 million people, with 
the highest share living in Russia and the fewest people living in 
Uzbekistan and Montenegro. The population is unevenly distributed 
across the region. Central Asia is less densely populated, with 
Kazakhstan (with six people per square kilometer) and Russia 
(with nine) being the least densely populated and Uzbekistan 
(with 70 people per square kilometer) and Tajikistan (with 57) 
being the more densely populated. In the Western Balkans, the 
least densely populated country is Montenegro (with 46 people 
per square kilometer) and the most densely populated countries 
are Kosovo (with 166 people) and Albania (with 102 people per 
square kilometer). On average, half of the region’s population 
lives in urban areas (World Bank 2013b). In most countries in 
the region population numbers have stabilized in recent years 
and population projections show on average 27 percent popula-
tion declines for Russia and Eastern Europe (including Western 
Balkans) and 50 percent population increases in Central Asia by 
2050 (Lutz 2010).
ECA is a region with relatively low levels of per-capita annual 
GDP, ranging from $800 in Tajikistan to $14,000 in Russia. Agri-
cultural production contributes an important share to the local 
economies, especially in Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbeki-
stan, and Albania (World Bank 2013b)(see Table 5.1).
5.2.2 Socioeconomic Profile of ECA 
All countries in the ECA region underwent a transition at the 
end of the 20th century from various types of closed, plan-based 
economies to more open and free market-based ones. This transi-
tion, with the dissolution of trade networks and production shifts, 
was accompanied by a steep increase in poverty and inequality 
within the region. In 1990, only 1.9 percent of the population 
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7 percent by 2010. The highest poverty rates are currently observed 
in the Kyrgyz Republic (38 percent in 2012), Uzbekistan (17.7 per-
cent in 2010), and Albania (14.3 percent in 2010). Meanwhile, 
Kazakhstan (3.8 percent in 2012) has the lowest poverty rate in 
the region. However, the number of people that are affected by 
extreme poverty has been declining since 1999. Due to very cold 
winters that require people to have a higher caloric intake (and, 
hence, higher food expenditures), higher spending on clothing, 
energy, and transportation, and differences in economic and social 
development, the regional poverty line was set at a $2.5–5 per day 
(World Bank 2011d). The total number of people living on less 
than $5 per day fell from 240 million in 1999 to 91 million in 2010.
There are also pronounced inequalities in the region. In the 
Kyrgyz Republic in 2009, for example, the income share of the 
lowest 10 percent of the population was 2.8 percent compared 
to an income share of 27.79 percent for the highest 10 percent 
of the population (World Bank 2013t). Other issues that increase 
the vulnerability of the population in the region include rural 
poverty, unemployment (particularly among women and youth), 
a shortage of adequate living conditions, poor medical care, and 
deficient water management infrastructure (Lioubimtseva and 
Henebry 2009). Adaptive capacity in the region is negatively 
affected by weak governance. A few countries in Central Asia are 
among 20 percent of countries performing the worst in the World 
Governance Indicator. For example Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
and Turkmenistan are among 20 percent of countries that have the 
lowest ranks in the voice and accountability indicator that captures 
perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Moreover, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyz Republic are 
among the 20 percent of countries that have the lowest ranks in 
the rule of law indicator that captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
















1000 US$ % OF GDP YEARS
YEAR 2011 2012 2012 2012 2009–2010 2011
ID SP.POP.TOTL SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS SP.URB.GROW NY.GDP.PCAP.CD NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS SP.DYN.LE00.IN
Central Asia
Kazakhstan 16.5 54 1.3 11.9 4.8 69
Kyrgyz Republic 5.5 35 1.5 1.2 19.4 70
Tajikistan 7.8 27 2.7 0.8 21.2 67
Turkmenistan 5.1 49 2.0 5.5 14.5 65
Uzbekistan 29.3 36 1.6 1.7 19.3 68
Western Balkans
Albania 3.1 54 2.2 4.4 19.1 77
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.8 49 1.0 4.4 7.6 76
Kosovo 1.8 – – 3.4 12.0 70
Macedonia, FYR 2.1 59 0.3 4.6 11.5 75
Montenegro 0.6 63 0.4 6.8 9.3 75
Serbia 7.2 57 0.1 5.2 9.0 75
Russian Federation 142.9 74 0.6 14 4.0 69
1Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1–5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net 
output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It i s calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricat ed assets, or depletion 
and degradation of natural resources.
²Life  expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its 
life. Source: World Bank (2013b).
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and violence (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2014). The lack 
of good governance is one of the key challenges that will have to 
be addressed by the future mitigation and adaptation strategies 
in the region. Strengthening local institutions and citizen engage-
ment is very important in water management and biodiversity 
protection and is relevant for the sectors such as agriculture and 
forestry (McEvoy et al. 2010; Otto et al. 2011).
People and poverty in ECA are located along a spatial spec-
trum with sparsely populated rural areas and dense urban areas 
at the ends. However, most poor are concentrated in smaller 
and medium-sized towns. In Albania, 42 percent of the popula-
tion is urban but resides almost entirely in very small, small, 
and medium-sized towns. The share of the poor in urban areas 
is 31 percent, and nearly all of the poor reside in similar sized 
towns. Similarly, in Kazakhstan, 57 percent of the population and 
43 percent of the poor live in urban areas—but very large cities 
house only eight percent of the population and one percent of the 
poor (Global Monitoring Report, 2013). Generally, urbanization 
can be a force that helps in the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals but the slums in the Kyrgyz Republic show 
that it can also worsen poverty. The failure of rural migrants to 
find better paying urban jobs forces them to live in informal settle-
ments where without proof of residence they cannot have access 
to health services (Global Monitoring Report, 2013).
5.3 Regional Patterns of Climate Change
5.3.1 Projected Temperature Changes
Figure 5.3 shows projected boreal summer (June, July, August or 
JJA) temperatures for the European and Central Asian land area in 
a 2°C and 4°C world. Warming across the Northern Hemisphere 
land area is projected to be somewhat more than the global mean. 
In the 2°C warming scenario, the multi-model mean warming by 
the end of the century is about 2.5°C above the 1951–1980 base-
line (i.e., about 0.5°C more than the global mean) (World Bank 
2013). This level of warming is reached by mid-century and then 
remains constant until the end of the century. In contrast, in a 
4°C world, summer temperatures continue to increase up to and 
beyond the end of century in an almost linear trend, reaching about 
8.5°C above the 1951–1980 baseline by 2100. The multi-model 
mean warming for the 2071–2099 period reaches about 6.5°C 
(see Figure 5.3) and is reduced due to one model which warms 
far less than the others. Because the transient climate sensitivity 
of this model is lower than the others, results can therefore show 
pronounced regional differences. 
The most pronounced warming is projected to occur in three 
distinct regions: (1) Northern Russia bordering the Barents-Kara 
Sea, (2) the Black Sea coastal region, including the Balkans, and 
(3) northern China and Mongolia. In these hotspot regions (see 
Figure 5.4) summer warming is projected to be roughly 1°C higher 
than the Eurasian mean. Thus, in these regions, mean summer 
warming by 2071–2099 will be about 3.5°C in a 2°C world, and 
about 7.5°C in a 4°C world.
The normalized warming (i.e., the warming expressed in terms 
of the local year-to-year natural variability—see Section 6.1) is a 
useful diagnostic tool as it indicates how unusual the projected 
warming is compared to fluctuations experienced in the past (Cou-
mou and Robinson 2013; Hansen et al. 2012; Mora and Frazier et al. 
2013). The geographical patterns of normalized warming (see the 
lower panels in Figure 5.4) show that the southern hotspot regions 
(i.e., the Black Sea coastal region and northern China/Mongolia) 
experience the strongest shifts. In a 2°C world, the monthly tem-
perature distribution here shifts by 2–3 standard deviations toward 
warmer conditions. In a 4°C world, these southerly regions see a 
shift of up to six standard deviations. Such a large shift implies that 
summer temperatures in these regions will move to a new climatic 
regime by the end of the century. The northern regions will see 
a less pronounced shift in normalized temperature because the 
standard deviation of the natural year-to-year variability is larger 
(i.e., temperatures are already naturally more variable) (Coumou 
and Robinson 2013). Nevertheless, a shift by at least 1-sigma (in 
the 2°C world) or 2-sigma (in the 4°C world) is projected to occur 
here during the 21st century. 
Warming in southern Siberia during the 20th century is already 
evident, and 1990–1999 was the warmest decade in the last century. 
Average summer temperatures increased in the observed regions 
by between 0–0.5°C from 1960 to 1999, but with a significantly 
higher  increase of 1–2°C in the 1990s. Average winter temperatures 
Figure 5.3: Temperature projections for the European and 
Central Asian region, compared to the 1951–1980 baseline for 
the multi-model mean (thick line) and individual models (thin 
lines) under RCP2.6 (2°C world) and RCP8.5 (4°C world) for the 
months of JJA.
The multi-model mean has been smoothed to give the climatological trend. 
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increased between 1–4.5°C within the 40 years analyzed (1960–
1999), with an increase greater than 2–3°C in the 1990s (Soja et al. 2007). 
Precipitation patterns have also become more diverse. Whereas 
precipitation on windward slopes in the Urals and the Altai has 
increased by up to 130–260 mm per year within the 40 years that 
were analyzed, a drastic decrease in precipitation of 230 mm per 
year between 1960 and 1999 has been noted on leeward slopes of 
the Sayans in the interior of Siberia (Soja et al. 2007). 
For the ECA region, IPCC (2001) predicted a warming of 
between 2 and 10°C in the 21st century as compared to the 
20th century; warming rates are expected to be the largest in 
10,000 years. Recent climate projections for the 21st century range 
from –0.1°C to 12°C mean winter temperature and from 0°C to 
8°C mean summer temperature for all climate scenarios in this 
region (IPCC 2013). All projections suggest precipitation increases 
for the entire region of up to 58 percent in autumn and only up to 
35 percent in spring. While projections of local temperature and 
precipitation changes are unevenly distributed across the region, 
both factors are projected to be more pronounced in the northern 
area. Temperature projections for south-central Siberia range from 
4–6°C (Gustafson et al. 2010), although winter temperatures are 
expected to increase by up to 10°C.
Most studies focusing on Central Asia agree that the warm-
ing trend in mean annual temperatures is less pronounced in the 
high altitudes than in the lower elevation plains and protected 
intramontane valleys (Unger-Shayesteh et al. 2013). For the winter 
months, a stronger warming trend can be detected at higher eleva-
tions of the Tien Shan mountains (Kriegel et al. 2013; Mannig et al. 
2013; Zhang et al. 2009a)
5.3.2 Heat Extremes
Figure 5.5 shows the projections of the percentage of boreal sum-
mer months warmer than 3-sigma and 5-sigma (see Section 6.1) 
over the ECA region from 2071–2099 for both 2°C and 4°C warm-
ing. One of the clearest signals identified is the strong increase 
in threshold-exceeding heat extremes in the region surrounding 
the Black Sea, and in particularly in the Balkans. Here, even in a 
2°C world, 20–30 percent of summer months are expected to rise 
beyond the 3-sigma threshold by the end of the century; 5-sigma 
events are also expected to occur (between 5–10 percent of sum-
mer months). The Balkan region is thereby expected to experi-
ence substantially higher frequencies of extreme heat events t han 
those projected for the ECA region as a whole for which about 
Figure 5.4: Multi-model mean temperature anomaly for RCP2.6 (2˚C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4˚C world, right) for the months of 
JJA for the European and Central Asian region. 
Temperature anomalies in degrees Celsius (top row) are averaged over the time period 2071–2099 relative to 1951–1980, and normalized by the local 
standard deviation (bottom row).
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10–15 percent of the land area is projected to be affected by 3-sigma 
events by the end of the century and 5-sigma events essentially 
remaining absent in a 2°C world (see Figure 5.6). Similar to the 
Balkans, Northern China/Mongolia will also see a substantial 
increase in 3-sigma events (~15 percent of summer months) but 
5-sigma events are not expected to occur. The stronger increase 
in summer heat extremes in these two hotspots is thus consistent 
with the broader shift in the mean of the normalized temperature 
distribution (Figure 5.3). 
Compared to the 2°C world, the 4°C world will see a much more 
pronounced increase in the frequency of summer months warmer 
than 3- and 5-sigma. Whereas in the 2°C world the increase in fre-
quency levels-off by mid-century, it continues in the 4°C world as 
seen in projections of the mean summer warming (see Figure 5.3 
and Figure 5.4). The multi-model mean projects 85 percent of land 
area to be affected by events hotter than 3-sigma and 55 percent 
of land area to be affected by hotter than 5-sigma events by 2100 
(Figure 5.6). The bulk of these events occur in a widespread region 
south of approximately 50°N, stretching from the Balkans all the 
way to Japan. Here, over the 2071–2099 period, about 80 percent of 
summer months will be beyond 3-sigma, and 45–55 percent beyond 
5-sigma. Although the 3-sigma threshold level will become the new 
normal in regions north of 60°N (being exceeded in about half of the 
summer months), 5-sigma heat extremes will remain largely absent. 
The increase in the frequency of summer months warmer 
than 3-sigma or 5-sigma, as shown in Figure 5.6, is quantitatively 
consistent, even on the country scale, with published results ana-
lyzing the full set of climate models (Coumou and Robinson 2013). 
The published literature also clearly indicates a strong increase in 
heat extremes south of 50°N and a much more moderate increase 
to the north of that latitude (Sillmann et al. 2013b). In fact, th e 
decrease in frequency of cold extremes in this northern region 
may potentially have beneficial effects. Sillmann et al. (2013b) 
reported that, over Russia, the minimum nighttime temperatures 
in boreal winter are projected to increase by 3–4°C in a 2˚C world, 
and by 10°C in a 4˚C world. Likewise, the number of frost days in 
the European part of Russia is expected to be reduced by between 
approximately 25 days (2˚C world) and 65 days (4˚C world). This 
reduces the cold spell duration in this region by up to seven days 
in a 4°C world (Sillmann et al. 2013b).
South of approximately 50°N, the projections of temperature 
extremes provide a totally different picture. Here the number of 
tropical nights increases by 20–30 days in a 2˚C world and by 
50–60 days under a 4˚C world (Sillmann et al. 2013b). Temperatures 
experienced during the warmest 10 percent of summer nights during 
the 1961–1990 period are expected to occur in about 30 percent 
(2˚C world) or 90 percent (4˚C world) of summer nights by the 
end of the century. These changes will cause a strong increase in 
Figure 5.5: Multi-model mean of the percentage of boreal summer months (JJA) in the time period 2071–2099 with temperatures 
greater than 3-sigma (top row) and 5-sigma (bottom row) for scenario RCP2.6 (2°C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4°C world, right) over 
the European and Central Asian region. 
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the length of warm spells, by up to 90–150 days in a 4˚C world 
(Sillmann et al. 2013b).
5.3.3 Regional Precipitation Projections
Figure 5.7 shows that future changes in annual precipitation 
exhibit a southwest-northeast dipole pattern, with regions in the 
southwest becoming drier and regions in the northeast becoming 
wetter. Thus the basic concept of the “dry-getting-drier and wet-
getting-wetter” under climate change is a good first order estima-
tor for the ECA region. The relative wetting of the northeast (i.e., 
Siberia) is the most pronounced signal, possibly associated with 
a shift in storm tracks. The increase in precipitation is far more 
pronounced during the winter (DJF) than during summer (JJA).
The multi-model mean drying signal in the southwest, includ-
ing the Balkans and the Caucasus region, is very weak (almost 
flat) under low-emissions scenarios (2°C world), and the models 
disagree about the direction of change. There is robust model 
agreement, however, that under the high-emissions scenario (4°C 
world), the Balkans, the Caucasus region, and Turkmenistan will 
receive less rain, with the multi-model mean annual precipitation 
dropping by about 20 percent. 
5.3.4 Extreme Precipitation and Droughts
The footprint of climate change on climatological extremes in the 
21st century is very different for the three sub-regions in ECA. 
Central Asia
Despite a robust warming trend over Central Asia, no clear trend 
for precipitation extremes emerges from the observational record 
(Dai 2012; Donat, Alexander et al. 2013). While uncertainties are 
large, the overall trend regarding heavy precipitation intensity 
is below the global average (Kharin et al. 2013; Sillmann et al. 
2013b). A similar picture emerges from the projections for future 
droughts. A moderate increase in drought risk for Central Asia 
is generally projected (Dai 2012; Prudhomme et al. 2013), but 
confidence in the projections is very low (Sillmann et al. 2013b). 
Although drought projections remain vague, regional water avail-
ability will be strongly affected by changes in river runoff due to 
glacier melting (see Section 5.4.1, Water Resources).
Western Balkans
For the Western Balkans region, little to no increase in extreme 
precipitation events is projected over the 21st century (Kharin et al. 
2013; Sillmann et al. 2013b) despite a global increase of about 
20 percent in heavy precipitation event intensity in a 4°C world 
(Kharin et al. 2013). Regional models suggest, however, that the 
region’s complex topography may strongly influence extreme 
precipitation (Gao et al. 2006). Thus, despite an overall negative 
trend in extreme precipitation events, regional and seasonal pro-
jections for this region remain inconclusive. 
This picture changes for dro ught projections. The Western 
Balkans are robustly projected to suffer from an increase in 
drought conditions based on global analysis; this is similar to 
that expected for the greater Mediterranean region, as discussed 
in the MENA section (Dai 2012; Orlowsky and Seneviratne 2013; 
Prudhomme et al. 2013; Sillmann et al. 2013b). Prudhomme et al. 
(2013) project a 20 percent increase in the number of drought days 
in a 4°C world. However, regionally resolved climate projections 
suggest that the Western Balkans might be less affected, with no 
significant increase in drought risk (Gao and Giorgi 2008), while 
the greater Mediterranean region is considered a global hotspot 
for future drought projections Dai (2012). 
The Russian Federation
Within Russia, the projections of changes in future climatological 
extremes are diverse. Central and Eastern Siberia is one of the 
regions expected to experience the strongest increase in heavy 
Figure 5.6: Multi-model mean (thick line) and individual 
models (thin lines) of the percentage of land area in the 
European and Central Asian region warmer than 3-sigma (top) 
and 5-sigma (bottom) during boreal summer months (JJA) for 
scenarios RCP2.6 (2˚C world) and RCP8.5 (4˚C world). 
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precipitation events (Sillmann et al. 2013b). Heavy precipitation 
events with a 20-year return time are projected to intensify by 
over 30 percent in this region, and the return time is projected to 
fall below five years by the end of the 21st century under a 4°C 
warming scenario (Kharin et al. 2013). The changes are much 
weaker (less than 10 percent increase in intensity and 10–15 years 
return time) under a 2°C warming scenario (Kharin et al. 2013). 
Projections for central and western Russia point in a similar 
direction, although the intensification of heavy precipitation events 
with a 20-year return time is less pronounced (between 10 and 
30 percent). While an increase in extreme precipitation is projected 
throughout Russia for all seasons in a 4°C world, it is strongest 
in boreal winter (DJF). This would lead to a substantial increase 
in the absolute amount of snow-water equivalent (Callaghan et 
al. 2011; Shkol’nik et al. 2012), with far reaching consequences 
for the regional hydrological cycle.
5.3.5 Aridity
Figure 5.8 shows the relative changes in the aridity index (AI), 
which captures the long-term balance between water supply (pre-
cipitation) and demand (evapotranspiration) (see Section 6.1) for 
the ECA region by 2071–2099. The AI is defined as the total annual 
precipitation divided by the annual potential evapotranspiration, 
and fundamentally determines whether ecosystems and agricul-
tural systems are able to thrive in a certain area. A decrease in AI 
Figure 5.7: Multi-model mean of the percentage change in winter (DJF, top), summer (JJA, middle), and annual (bottom) 
precipitation for RCP2.6 (2˚C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4˚C world, right) for the European and Central Asian region by 2071–2099 
relative to 1951–1980. 
Hatched areas indicate uncertainty regions with two or more out of five models disagreeing on the direction of change. 
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value indicates that water becomes more scarce (i.e., more arid 
conditions), with areas classifie d as hyper-arid, arid, semi-arid 
and sub-humid as specified in Table 5.2. 67
The geographical patterns of the relative change in the annual 
mean AI, as shown in Figure 5.9, are similar to those for precipita-
tion. Thus shifts in annual mean precipitation primarily determine 
which regions become more or less arid. In the 4˚C warming 
scenario, this drying region expands further to t he east, covering 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Because these regions 
are already drought-prone, this could have major consequences 
67 Some individual grid cells have noticeably different values than their direct 
neighbors. This is due to the fact that the aridity index is defined as a fraction of 
total annual precipitation divided by potential evapotranspiration (see Appendix). 
It therefore behaves in a strongly non-linear fashion and year-to-year fluctuations 
can be large. As the results are averaged over a relatively small number of model 
simulations, this can result in local jumps.
Figure 5.8: Multi-model mean of the percentage change in the annual-mean of monthly potential evapotranspiration for RCP2.6 
(2˚C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4˚C world, right) for the European and Central Asian region by 2071–2099 relative to 1951–1980.
Hatched areas indicate uncertain results, with two or more out of five models disagreeing on the direction of change. 
Figure 5.9: Multi-model mean of the percentage change in the aridity index (AI) for RCP2.6 (2˚C world, left) and RCP8.5 (4˚C 
world, right) for the ECA region by 2071–2099 relative to 1951–1980.
Hatched areas indicate uncertain results, with two or more out of five models disagreeing on the direction of change. Note that a negative change cor-
responds to a shift to more arid conditions.67 
Table 5.2: Multi-model mean of the percentage of land area 
in the European and Central Asian region which is classified 
as Hyper-Arid, Arid, Semi-Arid and Sub-Humid for 1951–1980 






Hyper-Arid 2.2 2.1 2.7
Arid 3.7 4.1 5.1
Semi-Arid 7.3 7.7 9.7
Sub-Humid 4.0 4.3 4.8
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for water scarcity. Trends in AI over the Southeastern region (i.e., 
Northern China and Southern Mongolia) are weaker, and models 
disagree over the direction of change (partly due to similar uncer-
tainty in projections of precipitation changes).
Northern regions will see an increase in the AI (i.e., wetter 
conditions) as would be expected from the projected increase in 
annual-mean precipitation. The signal is especially strong over 
the Northeast (i.e., the Asian part of Russia), with a 20–30 per-
cent increase forecast under RCP2.6 and a 50 percent forecast in 
a 4˚C world.
The shift in AI shown in Figure 5.9 causes some regions to 
be classified in a different aridity class. In a 4˚C world, the area 
of land classified as hyper-arid, arid, or semi-arid will grow from 
about 13 percent in 1951–1980 to 17.5 percent in 2071–2099, which 
is an increase of more than 30 percent (see Table 5.2). In a 2˚C 
world, this increase in arid regions is much more limited (only 
about five percent larger). 
5.3.6 Regional Sea-level Rise
The region’s coastal area is relatively limited (if excluding the 
Russian Federation), and this section focuses in on the Western 
Balkan coastline. This is where the Drini-Mati River Delta in Albania 
was identified as a vulnerable area in a recent UNDP report (Le 
Tissier 2013), and it serves as an example for the whole Western 
Balkan coastline (see Figure 5.10). This analysis projects a sea-level 
rise of 0.52 m (0.37–0.9 m) in a 4˚C world in 2081–2100 above 
the 1986–2005 baseline, with rates of rise of 10.1 mm per year 
(5.9–19.6 mm per year) (see Figure 5.10 and Table 5.3). This is 
slightly below the global mean. The Caspian Sea, which is isolated 
from the ocean, exhibits a completely different behavior, with 
variations of several meters over the past millennia (Naderi Beni 
et al. 2013) and a projected 4.5 m sea-level fall by the end of the 
century of due to increased evaporation in a warming climate 
(Renssen et al. 2007).
5.4 Regional Impacts
5.4.1 Water Resources 
5.4.1.1 Central Asia
Glaciers: Current Situation and Observed Changes
Central Asian glaciers cover four percent of the Kyrgyz Republic 
(Tien Shan) and six percent of Tajikistan (Pamir); some glaciers 
also  exist in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Figure 5.11). The total 
glaciered area is about 10,300 km2 in the Amu Darya basin and 
1,600 km2 in the Sy r Darya basin (Arendt et al. 2012; Lutz et al. 
2013a). This corresponds to a total volume of frozen water of about 
1,000 km3—the equivalent of about 10 years of water flowing 
down the rivers Amu Darya and Syr Darya (Novikov et al. 2009).
Figure 5.12 shows the loss of glacier area in the Altai-Sayan, 
Pamir and Tien Shan in the period from the 1960s to 2008. As 
ice stocks decline, a reliable water resource is disappearing, and 
additional reservoirs and an improved water management may be 
needed. In the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Basin, however, most of 
the potential for reservoirs has already been exploited (Immerzeel 
and Bierkens 2012). This implies a high risk of water scarcity in 
the future once the peak in  glacial melt runoff has passed. 






SLR in 2081–2100 0.32 (0.21, 0.54) 0.52 (0.37, 0.9)
SLR in 2046–2065 0.21 (0.17, 0.32) 0.26 (0.21, 0.39)
Rate of SLR in 2081–2100 3.0 (–1.5, 5.8) 10.1 (5.9, 19.6)
Rate of SLR in 2046–2065 4.6 (0.6, 7.1) 7.6 (5.3, 12.1)
The sea-level rise (SLR) is expressed in meters above the 1986–2005 
baseline period, while rate of SLR refers to a linear trend over the period 
indicated in the table, in mm/yr. Numbers in parentheses refer to lower and 
upper bounds (see Section 6.2, Sea-Level Rise Projections for an explana-
tion of the 1.5° world). 
Figure 5.10: Sea-level rise projection for Drini-Mati River Delta 
in Albania.
Time series for sea-level rise for the two scenarios RCP2.6 (blue, 1.5˚C 
world) and RCP8.5 (green, 4˚C world). Median estimates are given as full 
thick lines and the lower and upper bound given as shading. Full thin lines 
are global median sea-level rise, with dashed lines as lower and upper 
bound. Vertical and horizontal black lines indicate the reference period and 
reference (zero) level.
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Snow Cover: Current Situation and Observed Changes
An increase in air temperature can generally change the proportion 
of precipitation falling as either rain or snow and shorten the dura-
tion of seasonal snow cover. The impact of snowfall changes on 
the Central Asian rivers is very high, since the seasonal snowmelt 
is a key source of water. Snow reserves in the mountainous river 
basins will respond differently to an increase in air temperatures 
depending on the elevation and topography of the mountain ar ea. 
While glaciers store water over decades and centuries, the seasonal 
snowpack stores water mainly at an intra-annual time scale. At 
its maximum annual extent in late winter, the snow cover in the 
Aral Sea basins extends over major parts of the Amu Darya and 
Syr Darya basins and contributes to a larger share of the mean 
annual runoff than glaciers (Ososkova et al. 2000). 
Projected Snow Cover Changes
The IPCC refers to an expected decrease in Northern hemisphere 
snow cover of 25 percent under a high warming scenario (IPCC 
2013 AR5 WGI). Despite the high relevance of snow cover for the 
water management of Central Asia, only a few studies address 
the future evolution of snow cover with respect to a warming 
climate, and these studies only provide general trends. Based on 
a global assessment (Christensen et al. 2007), a smaller fraction 
of precipitation is expected to fall as snow, as the snow line rises 
by about 150 m per 1°C of warming. The depth and duration of 
seasonal snow cover are also expected to decrease, with a shift 
in the onset of snowmelt toward earlier spring. Through a reduc-
tion in the snow-albedo feedback, the reduced snow coverage is 
expected to affect both the melting rate and the regional climate, 
thereby reinforcing the warming trend in Central Asia (Unger-
Shayesteh et al. 2013).
Projections of Glacial Volume Loss
The Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (Church et al. 2013) states that current 
glacier extents are out of balance with current climatic conditions 
and indicates with high confidence that glaciers will continue to 
shrink in the future, even without further temperature increases.
In a 2°C warming scenario, projections show glacier volume 
losses of about 50 percent (31–66 percent) for Central Asia, which 
represents a mass of about 2800 Gt (Marzeion et al. 2012). 
There are only a limited number of regional studies currently 
available that address the timing and evolution of projected glacier 
shrinkage and related changes in runoff in Central Asia. Siegfried 
Figure 5.11: Upstream parts of the Amu and Syr Darya river basin (green and pale blue), the river basin (blue lines), and the 
glacierized fraction of each 1 km model grid cell (red shades).
KYRGYZ REP.
Source: Lutz et al. (2013a), Figure 1. 
9099_CH05.pdf   183 11/17/14   6:04 PM
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CONFRONTING THE NEW CLIMATE NORMAL
184
et al. (2012) performed projections for the Syr Darya basin under 
2°C warming by 2050; they projected a loss of mass of 31 ±4 per-
cent (50 Gt) in this region compared to 2010 (see Figure 5.13). 
However, the signal varies greatly across the different catchments 
(Siegfried et al. 2012). 
Lutz et al. (2013a) investigated the model spread for projections 
of glacial retreat in the Amu and Syr Darya region and projected 
a retreat in glacial extent in the range of 54–65 percent for the 
period 2007–2050 (see Figure 5.14).
In a 3°C world, the glaciers of the region are projected to lose 
about 57 percent (37–71 percent) of their current mass, equivalent 
to 3200 Gt (Marzeion et al. 2012). Radic´ et al. (2013) considered a 
different sub-region of Central Asia (including Tibet but excluding 
Altai and Sayan, and comprising 5,830 Gt of ice in total). They 
inferred a 55 percent loss for the period 2006–2100, corresponding 
to 3150 ±900 Gt of ice. Giesen and Oerlemans (2013) obtained 
comparable results for the same sub-regions.
Bliss et al. (2014) went a step further and projected monthly 
glacier runoff through 2100 from all mountain glaciers in Central 
Asia. They inferred a 41 percent decrease in average annual runoff, 
from 136 Gt per year to 80 Gt per year, for the reference periods 
2003–2022 and 2081–2100. The study further indicates that the 
net annual mass loss from glacial melt will peak in the middle 
of the 21st century. 
For a 4°C world, Marzeion et al. (2012) projected that glacier 
mass loss in Central Asia will reach 67 percent (50–78 percent) 
by the year 2100, which is a mass loss of about 3800 Gt (also 
stated in Hijioka et al. 2014). For a slightly different sub-region, 
Radic´ et al. (2013) projected a mass loss of 75 percent, which is 
the equivalent of about 4,300 Gt of ice.
Impacts on River Flow and Riverine Floods
The large transboundary rivers, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, 
are the main freshwater suppliers for the arid and semi-arid areas 
of Central Asia (see Figure 5.15). The volume of water in these 
rivers strongly depends on conditions in the headwater catch-
ments, located in the mountains of Tien Shan and Pamir-Alay 
(Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Afghanistan), where winter 
precipitation is stored in snow and ice and released during the 
spring and summer months (Aus der Beek et al. 2011; Krysanova 
et al. 2010). As the water supply (e.g., for irrigated agriculture) in 
the arid downstream areas largely relies on the rivers, changes in 
the volume and seasonality of river runoff have major implication 
for the region’s water management (Unger-Shayesteh et al. 2013).
Figure 5.12: Losses of glacier area in the Altai-Sayan, Pamir, and Tien Shan.
Remote sensing data analysis is from the 1960s through to 2008. Source: Hijioka et al. (2014), Chapter 24, Figure 24–3. 
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Figure 5.13: Map of Syr Darya catchment showing mean percentage loss of glacier ice by 2049 relative to 2010 for sub-regions.
Source: Armstrong et al. (2005) as cited in Siegfried et al. (2012), Figure 8. 
Figure 5.14: Decrease in total glacier area in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins combined for 2008–2050 based on the CMIP3 
(left panel) and CMIP5 (right panel) model runs for the median and extreme values of temperature and precipitation change. 
Source: Lutz et al. (2013a), Figure 13. 
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T he Amu Darya River is characterized by two major high-
flow periods, which often merge into a 4–5 month flood season. 
With more than 90 percent of the total annual runoff of the 
Amu-Darya forming in the mountain catchment (Pamir-Alay), 
the river runoff has a very high share of melt water (Hagg et 
al. 2013). The first high-flow period of the Amu Darya usually 
takes place in the late spring, when snow melts in the lower 
mountain areas and the spring rains fall. The second high-flow 
period is induced by melt water from snow and glaciers in the 
alpine Pamir Mountains. The Tien Shan Mountains, where the 
headwaters of the Syr Darya River originate, have fewer glaciers 
than the Pamir. Hence, the Syr Darya usually has just one mainly 
snowmelt-induced flood season, which occurs in late spring 
(Dukhovny and Schutter 2011).
Projected Changes in River Flows and Seasonality
The impact that climate change will have on river runoff rates in 
Central Asia is unclear due to the uncertainty of future precipita-
tion patterns (Davletkeldiev et al. 2009; Dukhovny and Schutter 
2011; Krysanova et al. 2010). In the next decades, enhanced glacier 
melt rates are expected to somewhat counterbalance increasing 
evaporation rates. Climate change will most likely affect snow 
and glacier storage and melting rates in the Pamir and Tian Shan 
Mountains, hence altering the hydrological regimes of the major 
Central Asian rivers. More than 80 percent of the annual runoff 
of Amu Darya and Syr Darya is formed by snow and glacier melt 
(Dukhovny and Schutter 2011). The Amu Darya has a higher annual 
share of glacier melt water (>20 percent), and this is the main 
cause of the annual summer flood. The Syr Darya, meanwhile, 
is less influenced by glacier melt water. As observed in the last 
decades, higher surface temperatures are leading to higher glacier 
melt rates and significant glacier shrinkage; this trend is expected 
to continue into the future. 
By 2030, river runoff is expected either to increase slightly or 
not to change beyond the natural runoff variability, even in the 
case of potentially higher precipitation rates (Main Administra-
tion of Hydrometeorology 2009). Model projections for 2055, for 
a headwater catchment (Panj) of the Amu Darya river, revealed 
a seasonal shift in peak river flow rates from summer to spring 
(Hagg et al. 2013). The study indicates that, in the near future, the 
reduction in glacial area will be partly compensated by enhanced 
melt rates in a warmer atmosphere, leading to only slight changes 
in total annual river flow. Under a 3.1°C warming scenario, by 2055 
runoff will increase in spring and early summer due to an earlier 
and intensified snowmelt. Under these conditions, the peak flow 
will shift from July to June, leading to a reduction in discharge in 
Figure 5.15: Water resources of the Aral Sea basin.
I . R .  O F
I R A N
K Y R G Y Z  R E P.
Source: ENVSEC and UNEP (2011), p.15.
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July and August of approximately 25 percent, which will further 
limit water availability in the summer (Hagg et al. 2013). 
Climate change will also influence the snow regime in the 
mountains. This will further contribute to a shift of the spring floods 
to earlier periods. River flow will be lower in the vegetation period 
and the winter runoff may increase. Siegfried et al. (2012) found 
for Central Asia that climate changes are likely to affect runoff 
seasonality due to earlier snowmelt. Based on a model set up for 
2050 for the Syr Darya, they projected a shift in the peak flows 
from summer to spring. This may increase water stress in the sum-
mer, particularly in unregulated catchments (Siegfried et al. 2012). 
By the end the 21st century, climate change is expected to lead 
to a distinct decrease in the water volume of the Syr Darya (see 
Figure 5.16) and an even more distinct decrease in the Amu Darya 
River due to its higher share of glacier melt water (Davletkeldiev 
et al. 2009; Main Administration of Hydrometeorology 2009). This 
is due to decreasing precipitation and enhanced glacial retreat 
(see Figure 5.17 for an example). Glacier retreat will continue to 
diminish the stock of water stored in the high mountain areas as 
snow and ice; this will provide enhanced runoff during the next 
few decades, followed by a severe water shortage as the stock 
becomes depleted. In particular, the summer floods of the Amu 
Darya, highly important for irrigation, are expected to decline 
substantially by 2100. A further reduction in surface water flow is 
projected to be caused by an increase in evaporation rates, due to 
higher temperatures. By the end of the 21th century, runoff generation 
rates in the mountainous areas of Central Asia are likely to decline 
substantially (Main Administration of Hydrometeorology 2009).
Impacts on the Aral Sea and Major Lakes
More than 50 years of unsustainable water use for irrigation in arid 
deserts has led to a profound depletion of water resources in the Aral 
Sea basin, with consequences for society, the economy and nature. 
Starting in the 1960s, the Aral Sea has shrunk drastically, mainly 
due to water withdrawals for irrigation purposes and the construc-
tion of water reservoirs along the Syr Darya and Amu Darya Rivers. 
Climate change is expected to affect the Aral Sea indirectly 
through changes in river contributions from the Amu Darya and 
Syr Darya as well as directly through water evaporation and pre-
cipitation changes (Cretaux et al. 2013).
Projections of the future development of lake volumes and 
levels for Central Asia are scarce. The national communication 
report of the Kyrgyz Republic displays modeling results for the 
water level of Lake Issyk-Kul in the Kyrgyz Republic under the 
B2-MESSAGE scenario and indicates a decrease in the average 
water level of the lake of between 5 m (2°C world) and 15 m (4°C 
world) (Davletkeldiev et al. 2009). 
Geohazards and other Water-related Impacts
Climate change is contributing to an increased risk of floods and 
landslides in Central Asia. As glaciers retreat, large volumes of melt 
water are being released into the highland rivers. While this does not 
directly cause flooding, melt water may become trapped behind the 
glaciers’ terminal moraines so that water pressure builds up until the 
natural moraine dam bursts (see also Nayar (2009) for a related discus-
sion on the Himalayas). Glacier lake outbursts can cause catastrophic 
flooding downstream. During the last 50 years, more than 70 glacial 
lake outbursts have been reported in the Kyrgyz Republic alone, with 
the largest one in 1998 at Ikedavan lake resulting in more than 100 
deaths and causing damage to five villages (Slay and Hughes 2011). 
In the southwest Pamir region (Tajikistan), meanwhile, any glacier 
lake outbursts have been observed (Mergili and Schneider 2011).
The potential for outburst floods is expected to increase with 
rising temperatures as well as with a rising number and size of 
moraine-dammed lakes (Armstrong 2010; Bolch et al. 2011; Mar-
zeion et al. 2012). This is associated with an increased risk in 
Figure 5.16: Climate change impact on flow of large rivers in 
Central Asia.
Source: Novikov et al. (2009). 
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inhabited areas, such as the densely populated and agriculturally 
productive Fergana Valley region. The Fergana Valley is particularly 
exposed to these geohazards because glaciers surround the valley 
to the south, the east, and the north (Bernauer and Siegfried 2012; 
Siegfried et al. 2012).
5.4.1.2 Western Balkans
Impacts on Water Resources
The Western Balkans is currently one of the most water-rich 
regions in Europe and has relatively abundant freshwater resources. 
Changes in water availability are especially relevant in areas where 
water is a limiting factor for agriculture, industry, and livelihoods 
in general. In the Mediterranean areas, water is scarce and mainly 
depends on runoff from the mountainous headwaters (García-Ruiz 
et al. 2011)(see Figure 5.18).
Projected Trends in Water Resources 
Changes in the temperature and precipitation regime directly 
affect the amount of water that reaches the soil, and eventually 
the magnitude and seasonality of river discharge. The available 
studies indicate that a progressive decline in water availability, 
especially for the summer months, is expected in the near future 
and will become more pronounced by the end of the 21st cen-
tury (Arnell and Gosling 2013; García-Ruiz et al. 2011; Ministry 
for Spatial Planning Construction and Ecology 2013; Ministry of 
Environment and Spatial Planning 2010). 
Schneider et al. (2013) found that under a regional warming of 
~2°C by the 2050s, the impacts of climate change on the natural 
flow characteristics of most Balkan rivers will be “medium”; for 
the rivers of southern Serbia, Kosovo, and FYR Macedonia, the 
impacts will be “severe.” Dakova (2005) projected a decrease in 
long-term annual mean runoff for Serbia of approximately 12 percent 
Figure 5.17: Dynamics of surface water-flow structure [in km3] 
for the Kyrgyz Republic (all rivers) for different temperature-rise 
scenarios calculated from the difference between the annual 
sum of atmospheric precipitation and annual evaporation; 
m -annual sum of precipitation compared to the baseline 
period 1961–1990 (climate scenario B2-MESSAGE).
Source: Davletkeldiev et al. (2009), Figure 5.4. 
by 2025, and approximately 19 percent by 2100, due to a projected 
decrease in annual precipitation and an increase in temperatures. 
Albania’s water resources are projected to decline by between 
14 percent (Chenoweth et al. 2011) and 40 percent (Dakova 2005) 
by the end of the 21st century. Results from a global study show 
severe decreases in annual discharge in the Western Balkans of 
up to 15 percent in a 2°C world and more than 45 percent in a 
4°C world (Schewe et al. 2013).
Climate change, through rising winter temperatures, directly 
affects snow accumulation and snowmelt by elevating the winter 
0°C isotherm (snow line), leading to a decrease in the accumula-
tion of snow in the headwater catchments. 
More rainfall in the winter months will increase winter runoff 
and decrease the snowmelt flood in spring (Islami et al. 2009). 
Model projections show a reduction of up to 20 days in the snow 
cover duration across the Balkans by 2050 and of up to 50 days 
in the Dinaric Alps (Schneider et al. 2013). Snow-fed river basins 
are very sensitive to climate change, as snow responds rapidly to 
slight variations in temperature and precipitation. In snowmelt-
driven river regimes like the Sava river, climate change is therefore 
expected to result in earlier spring floods and, in some cases, higher 
winter runoff (Arnell and Gosling 2013; García-Ruiz et al. 2011).
Changes in temperature and precipitation patterns can also 
affect the timing, f requency, and intensity of flood, droughts, and 
other extreme events (Dankers and Feyen 2009). Regions under 
M editerranean climate conditions are expected to experience longer 
low-flow periods during the summer season and a distinct reduc-
tion in low-flow magnitudes (Arnell and Gosling 2013; Dakova 
2005; Dankers and Feyen 2009; Schneider et al. 2013). On the other 
hand, projections also suggest an increase in riverine flood risk, 
mainly in spring and winter, caused by more intense snowmelt and 
increased rainfall in the winter months. Modeling results, at the 
European scale, indicate that more floods with a current 100-year 
return time will occur by the end of the 21st century. Dankers and 
Feyen (2009) project a slight increase (less than 20 percent) in the 
frequency of 100-year floods for large rivers such as the Danube, 
Sava, and Tisza in the northern parts of Serbia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and a slight decrease in 100-year flood events in the 
southern parts of the Balkans. For highly snowmelt-influenced rivers, 
the time of greatest flood risk may shift, with peak flows occurring 
earlier in spring or in late winter. For FYR Macedonia, with a more 
Mediterranean climate, a slight reduction in the magnitude of peak 
flows is projected (Schneider et al. 2013).
5.4.1.3 Synthesis
For the region of Central Asia, there exist several peer-reviewed 
studies examining the observed changes in water availability 
(Lioubimtseva and Henebry 2009; Unger-Shayesteh et al. 2013). 
Reliable model-based projections are very scarce, however, and 
no multi-model approaches have yet been applied (Hagg et al. 
2013; Siegfried et al. 2012). 
9099_CH05.pdf   188 11/17/14   6:04 PM
EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
189
River flows in Central Asia are expected to be lower in the 
summer vegetation period while the winter runoff is projected 
to increase. Siegfried et al. (2012) found that, for Central Asia, 
climate change is likely to affect the seasonality of river runoff 
due to earlier annual snowmelt. Using a climate, land-ice, and 
rainfall-runoff model for the Syr Darya basin, they projected that 
by 2050 there will be a shift in peak river flows from summer to 
spring. This may increase water stress in summer, in particular in 
unregulated catchments (Siegfried et al. 2012). However, the total 
annual river runoff is not likely to decrease considerably until at 
least the middle of the century when glacier depletion is projected 
to cause a distinct decrease in the water volume of the Central 
Asian rivers. Over the short-term, enhanced glacier melt rates 
will provide an inflow of additional water into rivers (Hagg et al. 
2013). In the medium to long term, however, as glaciers shrink, 
this buffer effect will be reduced and will eventually disappear. 
This effect will be more pronounced for the Amu Darya than for 
the Syr Darya because of its higher share of glacier melt water. 
For the Western Balkan countries, only a few scientific studies 
on the regional impacts of climate change on water resources and 
river runoff levels are available. There is a lack of comprehensive 
region-wide hydrological data (Dankers and Feyen 2009; García-
Ruiz et al. 2011; Schneider et al. 2013). The available scientific 
studies suggest that across the Balkans water availability over the 
summer months is expected to decrease considerably by the end of 
the century. In the northern parts of the Balkans, however, spring 
and winter riverine flood risk is expected to increase. Results from 
a global study show severe decreases in annual discharge in the 
Western Balkans of more than 45 percent in a 4°C world.
5.4.2 Agricultural Production and Food Security
5.4.2.1 Central Asia
Projected Impacts of Climate Change on Agriculture
Sutton et al. (2013a) analyzed the potential impact of climate change 
on Uzbekistan’s agricultural sector. Without implementing adaptation 
Figure 5.18: River water discharge in the Western Balkans.
K O S O V O
F Y R
Source: ENVSEC and UNEP (2012). 
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measures and technological progress, yields for almost all crops are 
expected to drop by as much as 20–50 percent (in comparison to 
the 2000–2009 baseline) by 2050 in a 2°C world due to heat and 
water stress. Under a lower warming scenario (1.42°C warming), 
the declines are projected to be less pronounced, with wheat yields 
expected to decline by up to 13 percent with the exception of eastern 
parts of the country where yield increases of up to 13 percent are 
possible. For cotton, yield decreases of 0–6 percent are projected. 
Crops which might benefit from changing climatic conditions are 
alfalfa and grasslands. When including the effects of reduced water 
availability, yield decreases are much more pronounced. Irrigation 
water demand is also likely to increase by up to 25 percent by the 
middle of the century, while water availability could decline by 
up to 30–40 percent during the same period (Sutton et al. 2013a). 
According to Sommer et al. (2013), due to the high irrigation 
rates in Central Asia, agriculture is less dependent on precipitation 
than on surface water availability. The authors concluded that 
wheat yields across all periods and scenarios increase by an aver-
age of 12 percent, this ranges from four percent to 27 percent. It is 
necessary to note that their simulations did not include changes 
in irrigation water availability. Sommer et al. (2013) argued that 
irrigation water demand does not necessarily increase under the 
influence of climate change. Instead, they stated that yield increases 
are a consequence of higher winter and spring temperatures, less 
frost damage and CO2 fertilization. 
In an assessment of global hotspots, Teixeira et al. (2013) came 
to a different conclusion concerning the influence of heat stress 
on yields; their study does not include the CO2 fertilization effect. 
The authors simulated the risk of heat stress for wheat, maize, 
rice, and soybeans for the period 2071–2100 relative to the baseline 
period of 1971–2000. They concluded that Central Asia, especially 
Kazakhstan, is likely to be a major future hotspot of heat stress 
for wheat in a 3°C world (Teixeira et al. 2013). 
In Tajikistan, increased water stress due to climate change 
will be the main influencing factor for the agricultural sector. 
According to the World Bank (2013u), yields could drop by up to 
30 percent by 2100 in some parts of the country.
Desertification is already a problem in Kazakhstan, affecting 
up to 66 percent of the country’s land area. A projected tempera-
ture increase of up to 4.6°C in 2085, and highly heterogonous 
changes in precipitation patterns, could increase desertification 
and threaten agricultural production, especially winter wheat 
(World Bank 2013v). Similar to the impacts in Kazakhstan, the 
Kyrgyz Republic is likely to suffer from increasing desertification. 
The country’s arid and semi-arid deserts could spread, covering up 
to 23–49 percent of the country’s territory by 2100, in comparison 
to roughly 15 percent in 2000 (World Bank 2013r).
In Turkmenistan climate change is likely to impact the Amu 
Darya River, reducing its runoff by 10–15 percent by 2050 and put-
ting pressure on existing irrigation systems and crop production. 
Degradation of soils and increased risk from desertification are 
more likely to occur when surface water availability decreases 
(World Bank 2013w). The runoff in the Syr Darya River is expected 
to decrease by 2–5 percent by 2050. At the same time, irrigation 
demand in Uzbekistan could increase by up to 16 percent by 2080, 
increasing the competition for water and imposing risks on current 
agricultural production systems. Uzbekistan’s crop yields could be 
reduced by as much as 10–25 percent by 2050 (World Bank 2013x).
By 2050, a shift in peak river flow and the increasing appearance 
of extreme events (e.g., floods and droughts) are expected for the 
river basins of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya (Schlüter et al. 2010). 
Many water management systems are not equipped to deal with 
the increasing occurrence of drought events (Schlüter et al. 2010).
In the Fergana Valley, climate change is likely to affect the 
water availability for large-scale irrigation. Siegfried et al. (2012), 
for example, modeled changes in runoff for the year 2050. They 
concluded that the runoff peak of the Syr Darya will shift by 30 
to 60 days, leading to water deficits in the vegetation period of 
the Fergana Valley (Siegfried et al. 2012).
Livestock
The direct effects of climate change on livestock are likely to 
be negative. In particular, increasing temperatures and reduced 
water availability will put pressure on the sector. With changing 
precipitation patterns and increasing temperatures, growth and 
regeneration of pastures for livestock grazing will decline in the 
Tian-Shan and Alai valleys as well as in other regions of Central 
Asia (World Bank 2013r). Moreover, as water demand for livestock 
increases with rising temperatures, this will put pressure on exist-
ing water resources in water-scarce regions (Thornton et al. 2009). 
The indirect effects of climate change on livestock may be posi-
tive in some cases, such as in Uzbekistan, where the productivity 
of alfalfa and grasslands is expected to increase under warming 
conditions (Sutton et al. 2013b).
If livestock productivity decreases, producers could react by 
enlarging livestock numbers in order to maintain current levels 
of production. This could lead to overgrazing and degradation of 
pastures as well as to erosion, thereby increasing the negative 
impact on the region’s ecosystems (Fay et al. 2010).
5.4.2.2 Western Balkans
Projected Impacts of Climate Change on Agriculture
A study by Sutton et al. (2013a) analyzed two countries in the 
Western Balkans: Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia. Albania regularly suffers from floods, which are 
problematic for agriculture when they delay the planting of crops 
or destroy harvests. Projections up to 2050 for Albania indicate 
that flooding events could increase in both frequency and intensity 
under the influence of climate change. Yield changes in the Alba-
nian agricultural sector are projected to be most severe for rain-fed 
grapes and olives, with yield declines of up to 20 and 21 percent 
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respectively compared to the baseline (2000–2009) under 1.81°C of 
warming. However, under this scenario wheat yields are projected 
to increase by up to 24 percent due to an extended growing season 
and more moderate temperatures in the winter (Sutton et al. 2013a).
Precipitation changes in FYR Macedonia are similar to those in 
Albania. Yield effects are relatively heterogonous, with yield declines 
of up to 50 percent for maize, wheat, vegetables and grapes under 
1.62°C warming in the Mediterranean and Continental parts of the 
country, whereas in the alpine areas of FYR Macedonia, wheat yields 
are projected to increase considerably by more than 50 percent 
(Sutton et al. 2013a). Low average temperatures and short grow-
ing seasons, both of which will be influenced by climate change, 
characterize the alpine region. Yield declines in grape production 
are especially problematic, as grapes are the most important cash 
crop in FYR Macedonia. Wheat, on the other hand, is the most 
important crop in terms of production area (World Bank 2010b).
Giannakopoulos et al. (2009b) assessed the impact of climate 
change on Mediterranean agriculture for the period 2030–2061 
with warming above 1.5°C (reference period 1961–1990) and dif-
ferentiated between the impacts on irrigated crops (C4 summer 
crops, tubers) and rain-fed crops (legumes, C3 summer crops, 
and cereals). For irrigated crops, yields in Serbia are projected to 
increase by 3–4 percent for C4 summer crops and by 2–5 percent 
for tubers. For rain-fed crops, which dominate Serbian agriculture, 
yields are mostly projected to decline. Cereal yields in Serbia show 
a variation from a 2 percent decline to a 3 percent increase depend-
ing on the climate scenario used. When introducing adaptation 
measures (e.g., early sowing dates, longer growing cycle cultivars), 
the negative impacts of climate change could be reduced or even 
reversed. However, the authors warned that the adaptation options 
they analyzed require up to 40 percent more irrigation water.
5.4.2.3 Food Security
Of the 65 million people living in the five Central Asian countries, 
roughly five million lack reliable access to food (Peyrouse 2013). 
The Central Asian population is expected to increase significantly 
in the future (up to 95 million people by 2050), compounding the 
pressure induced by climate change on land and water resources 
(Lutz 2010). The rural population is the most exposed to food 
insecurity. In Tajikistan roughly 2 million people suffer from food 
insecurity, of which 800,000 were directly threatened by hunger 
in 2009. In the Kyrgyz Republic one million people are affected 
by food insecurity (Peyrouse, 2013). Rising food prices can have 
severe effects on the Central Asian population, as large percent-
ages of household incomes are spent on food and many countries 
in the region are highly dependent on food imports. For example, 
inhabitants of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan spend 80 percent of their 
household incomes on food (Peyrouse, 2013). Tajikistan produces 
only 31 percent of the nation’s food domestically. This indicates 
that Central Asian countries are exposed to fluctuations in inter-
national food prices (Meyers, Ziolkowska, Tothova, & Goychuk, 
2012; Peyrouse, 2013). The access to international markets however 
is problematic due to complex regional trade linkages such as 
the trade blockages, exports/imports bans, and quotas (Bravi & 
Solbrandt, 2011; Chabot & Tondel, 2011). However, according to 
Headey (2013), the Central Asian region is not a hotspot of climate 
change induced food insecurity, even though the region is to a 
certain extent dependent on food imports. The country with the 
highest risk of food insecurity is Turkmenistan (Headey, 2013).
The various threats to food security from climate change in 
Central Asia and the Western Balkans are indicated in the litera-
ture as follows:
• Increasing temperatures and changes in precipitation and pat-
terns of river runoff are serious risks for agricultural production 
(Meyers et al. 2012).
• The availability of suitable arable land and water resources 
is expected to decline simultaneously, changes in the type 
and intensity of pests and diseases will occur, influencing the 
available productive and adapted crop varieties and animal 
breeds (Meyers et al. 2012).
• The availability of irrigation water in Central Asia is crucial in 
order to maintain or expand agricultural production. As the 
available water is likely to decline, competition for the remaining 
water resources among agriculture, industry, and people (for 
human consumption) could increase (Hanjra and Qureshi 2010).
• Heavy rainfall events and storms may occur more often, 
increasing the risk of erosion from wind and water and lead-
ing to the degradation and desertification of scarce, valuable 
arable land (Christmann et al. 2009).
• Sensitivity thresholds of crops might be exceeded more often 
with rising average temperatures and the increased risk of 
temperature extremes (Lioubimtseva and Henebry 2012; 
Teixeira et al. 2013).
• Eastern Europe and parts of the Balkan region will suffer 
from decreasing water availability, leading to yield reductions 
(Meyers et al. 2012).
5.4.2.4 Synthesis
Climate change will have a significant impact on agriculture in 
Central Asia and the Western Balkans. Central Asia’s agricultural 
sector is highly dependent on the availability of water for irriga-
tion. Changing precipitation patterns, reduced runoff in the major 
river basins, and increasing temperatures will simultaneously put 
additional pressure on available water resources and increase 
agricultural water demand (Schlüter et al. 2010; Siegfried et al. 
2012; World Bank 2013r; u; v). Prolonged periods of above aver-
age temperatures will exacerbate the heat stress of agricultural 
crops, leading to decreasing plant productivity (Mannig et al. 2013; 
Teixeira et al. 2013). Increasingly frequent and intense droughts 
are very likely to increase desertification in the Kyrgyz Republic 
and Kazakhstan (World Bank 2013r; v).
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Because of the high importance of irrigation agriculture in large 
parts of southern Central Asia and the discussed inefficiency of 
many irrigation systems, an improvement in irrigation techniques 
would be very helpful in reducing pressure on existing water 
resources (Lioubimtseva and Henebry 2009).
In the Western Balkans, the increasing occurrence of droughts 
has been identified as a major threat to agricultural production 
under climate change (Giannakopoulos et al. 2009b; Gocic and 
Trajkovic 2013, 2014; Kos et al. 2013; UNDP 2014). The risk of 
increasing droughts for this region was also cited in the latest 
IPCC publication (Kovats et al. 2014). The dominance of rain-fed 
agriculture in the Western Balkans makes the agricultural sec-
tor especially vulnerable to changing precipitation patterns and 
increasing temperatures. The increasing appearance of extreme 
rain and flood events also poses risks to agriculture in the region 
(Sutton et al. 2013a). Currently, the agricultural productivity of 
the Western Balkan states is comparably low—even though large 
parts of the region are suitable for agricultural production (Swin-
nen et al. 2010; Volk 2010). Recent years have seen a rise in yields, 
mostly based on improved production techniques (Volk 2010), and 
there is potential for further yield increases. While climate change 
could pose risks to increasing agricultural productivity, the poor 
execution of agricultural policy reforms, inefficient institutions, 
and missing infrastructure also threaten increases in productivity 
(Swinnen et al. 2010; Volk 2010).
While some climate impact studies on agriculture are avail-
able for the countries of Central Asia (Mannig et al. 2013; Schlüter 
et al. 2010; Siegfried et al. 2012; Sommer et al. 2013; Sutton et 
al. 2013a), the Western Balkan countries lack coverage in recent 
research (Meyers et al. 2012). The Western Balkan countries are 
at times the subjects of climate change analyses focusing on 
Europe or the European Union (Giannakopoulos et al. 2009b), 
but very few studies concentrate on the regional climate impacts 
on agriculture (Ruml et al. 2012).
The livestock sector is particularly underrepresented in current 
climate impact research on Central Asia and the Western Balkans. 
While the possible direct and indirect effects of climate change 
on agriculture are discussed in numerous studies (Fay et al. 2010; 
Miraglia et al. 2009; Sutton et al. 2013a; Thornton et al. 2009; 
UNDP 2014), there is almost no regional modeling on climate 
change and agriculture. For example, the effects of climate change 
on livestock diseases and livestock biodiversity lack coverage in 
the scientific literature. More research on the impact of climate 
change on agricultural and livestock productivity, as well as on 
food security in this region, is needed.
5.4.3 Energy Systems
5.4.3.1 Current Energy Access and Systems 
Situation in the ECA Region
The Central Asian and Balkan countries have very different energy 
mixes and varying climate change vulnerabilities. Some Central 
Asian countries heavily rely on hydroelectricity (e.g., close to 
100 percent in Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic). Other countries 
in Central Asia, and the Balkan countries (with the exception of 
Albania), have access to electricity primarily via thermal electric 
sources and, to a lesser extent, hydroelectricity. Table 5.4 dis-
plays the shares of electricity production by source, and the total 
electrical power consumption per capita, in the different Central 
Asian countries. 
5.4.3.2 Hydropower in Central Asia: 
More Conflicting Demands
Hydropower infrastructure plays a key role in Central Asia not 
only for electricity generation but also for river flow regulation 
and irrigation. Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, which are 
located upstream of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya, respectively, 
produce 98.8 percent and 93.3 percent of their total electricity 
Table 5.4: Electricity production from hydroelectric and thermoelectric sources, including natural gas, oil, coal, and nuclear, in 





















Kazakhstan 4,892 9 91 0
Kyrgyz Republic 1,642 93 7 0
Tajikistan 1,714 99 1 0
Turkmenistan 2,444 0 100 0
Uzbekistan 1,626 19.5 80.5 0
Sources: World Bank (2013e, f, g, h, i, j).
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from hydropower (World Bank 2013p). By contrast, the riparian 
downstream countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmeni-
stan produce, respectively, 9.1 percent, 19.5 percent, and close 
to 0 percent of their electricity from hydropower (World Bank 
2013p). Despite the relatively high reliance on hydroelectricity in a 
few countries in the region, in total only 8 percent of the regional 
hydropower potential has been developed (Granit et al. 2010). Tak-
ing into account the steeply growing population of Central Asian 
countries (World Bank 2013h) and their current and projected 
economic growth (World Bank 2013s), demand for energy is pro-
jected to rise. However, the impacts of climate change on river 
runoff and seasonality could affect hydropower generation and 
increase conflicting water demands for hydropower and irrigation. 
A global study by Hamududu and Killingtveit (2012) projected 
both future river runoff and the electricity produced by hydroelec-
tric installations at the national level, aggregated at the regional 
level, for Africa, Asia, Europe, North and Central America, South 
America, and Australasia/Oceania. The authors estimated percent-
age changes in hydropower generation up to 2050 under 2.3˚C 
global warming. For Central Asia, they found that production is 
expected to increase by 2.29TWh, or 2.58 percent, compared to 
the 2005 production level. Other available projections show that 
the potential of installed small hydropower plants is projected to 
decrease by the 2050s under 2°C warming by around 13 percent 
in Turkmenistan and 19 percent in the Kyrgyz Republic, and to 
increase by nearly 7 percent in Kazakhstan (WorleyParsons 2012).
Siegfried et al. (2012) projected the impacts of climate change 
on Syr Darya river runoff and seasonality changes for the middle 
of the 21st century (2040–2049) under 1.8˚C of global warming. 
Their projections took into account glacier melt, precipitation, 
and temperature at six different locations in Central Asia: the 
Fergana Valley (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan); 
the Toktogul Reservoir (Kyrgyz Republic); the Andijan Reser-
voir (Kyrgyz Republic); the Charvak reservoir (Uzbekistan); 
the Kayrakum reservoir (Tajikistan); and the Chardara reservoir 
(Uzbekistan). The authors concluded that the most significant 
consequence of climate change will be the 30–60 days seasonal-
ity shift in river runoff. This shift in seasonality is projected to 
have major consequences for both upstream and downstream 
reservoir management, and the shift could lead to a major water 
demand deficit. For the Fergana Valley, where approximately 
22 million people depend on irrigation for their livelihoods, the 
water demand deficit is projected to increase due to an increase 
in evapotranspiration and changes in runoff seasonality. Accord-
ing to the projections, maximum demand deficits are projected 
to occur in the early growing season, which is the most sensitive 
for plant growth. This increased demand deficit for irrigation 
is projected to put more pressure on hydroelectricity, which is 
likely to be accentuated by a projected population growth and 
will contribute to a reduction in per capita water availability. 
5.4.3.3 Energy Systems in the Western Balkans
The energy mix of the Western Balkans countries is very het-
erogeneous. Albania produces almost all of its electricity from 
hydropower; at the other end of the scale, Kosovo only produces 
two percent of its electricity from hydroelectric sources (World 
Bank 2013p). FYR Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina produce between 20 and 45 percent of their 
electricity from hydroelectric sources. 
As many of the Balkan countries rely on thermal electricity 
sources, the assessment of climate change impacts on this sec-
tor is particularly relevant. These projected impacts on southern 
and eastern European countries were studied by van Vliet et al. 
(2012); their study took into account the effects of the changes 
in river water temperature and river flows on thermal electricity 
production. They found that the capacity of nuclear and fossil-
fueled power plants in Europe could face a 6–19 percent decrease 
in from 2031–2060 compared to the production levels observed 
from 1971–2000. Furthermore, due to the expected increase in 
the incidence of droughts and extreme river low flows, the mean 
number of days in which electricity production will be reduced by 
more than 90 percent is projected to increase threefold compared 
to present levels, from 0.5 days per year (at present) to 1.5 days 
per year from 2031–2060 under 1.5˚C global warming. Table 5.5 
summarizes the results of their projections. 
It has also been projected that decreased production and power 
generation disruption induced by lower runoff and increased air 
and water temperatures will lead to an increase in electricity prices 
(McDermott and Nilsen 2014). As the majority of the countries 
in the region are strongly dependent on thermal electric produc-
tion, climate change is projected to increase their vulnerability by 
affecting the supply of electricity to both households and industry. 
In addition, economic development and a growing population 
are expected to increase energy demand, thereby putting thermal 
electric power plants under increasing pressure. In the absence of 
adaptation measures, climate change, economic development, and 
population growth may together contribute to a rise in electricity 
prices and increase the risk of electricity shortages in the region.
In addition to the gradual slow-onset climate changes expected 
in the region, climate change may also increase the intensity and 
frequency of extreme weather events. The number of studies 
assessing the impacts of extreme weather events, such as floods, 
droughts and storms, on thermal electricity production plants at 
the regional and global level is still very limited, however; this 
does not allow for a comprehensive analysis of this issue. 
Regarding hydropower generation, a study by Hamududu and 
Killingtveit (2012) found that, for Southern Europe (including the 
Balkan countries), overall hydropower production is expected to 
decrease by 1.66TWh, or 1.43 percent compared to 2005 produc-
tion levels. 
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Despite the limitations of this study, the projections for this 
region are supported by a more detailed local study in Croatia. 
Pasicko et al. (2012) projected that energy generation from hydro-
power plants could decrease by 15–35 percent in a 4˚C world. The 
projected decrease in hydropower production in Croatia originates 
from the projected 35 percent reduction in future precipitation, 
affecting the major Croatian rivers basins in the summer months 
from 2080–2100 as compared to the reference period 1961–1990. 
5.4.3.4 Synthesis
Energy demand in the ECA region is projected to rise together 
with population growth and economic development. Warmer 
winter temperature can be expected to lead to decreased energy 
consumption for heating; however, this trend will be counterbal-
anced by higher energy consumption for cooling purposes during 
summers. Energy generation in the ECA region will be affected 
mainly by changes in the river flows and water temperatures. 
In Central Asia hydropower generation has a potential to play a 
major role in the future energy mix, however, the new pattern of 
intra-annual runoff distribution will mean that there will be less 
water available for energy generation in summer months. In the 
Western Balkans, hydropower generation potential could decrease 
due to less precipitation in the region. Furthermore, the capacity 
of nuclear and fossil-fuelled power plants in the sub-region could 
decrease due to increased water temperature. 
5.4.4 Human Health
A number of diseases and health conditions are already present 
across Eastern Europe and Central Asia, some of which will be 
affected by climatic changes such as increased temperatures and 
more frequent and intense rainfall and drought events.
5.4.4.1 Vector-Borne Diseases
The Balkans and parts of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic fall 
into the endemic zone for tick-borne encephalitis (TBE), transmit-
ted by the Ixodes genus of ticks (Lindquist and Vapalahti 2008). 
Although climate is only one factor among several that influence 
the TBE transmission, and climate change could also disrupt the 
conditions required for the disease transmission (Randolph and 
Rogers 2000), the spread of TBE appears to be a real risk associ-
ated with rising temperatures across the region. 
The reemergence of malaria in Tajikistan—following its near-
eradication by the end of the 1950s in the USSR (Lioubimtseva and 
Henebry 2009)—has happened in conjunction with an increase 
in mean temperatures (Ministry of Nature Protection 2003). The 
disease is currently endemic to Tajikistan, with the risk classified 
as very high in much of the Khatlon region in the southwest of the 
country and the Sogd region in the north, and there are currently 
more than 150 days of the year suitable for malaria transmission 
according to the Tajik meteorological agency (Ministry of Nature 
Protection 2003). Since the early 1990s, malaria has also reap-
peared in Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Turkmenistan, 
and locally transmitted cases have also been reported in Russia 
and Kazakhstan (Lioubimtseva and Henebry 2009).
Dengue fever and Chikungunya fever, transmitted by Aedes 
mosquitoes, are already present in Europe (ECDC 2013). Climatic 
conditions in the Balkans have become more suitable over the last 
two decades for one of the potential vectors of dengue and Chi-
kungunya, A. albopictus, also known as the Asian tiger mosquito 
(Caminade et al. 2012). It is currently found in most of Albania 
and Montenegro, and in northwestern areas of Serbia and Bosnia 
and Herzogovina. This is related to wetter and warmer condi-
tions favoring the winter survival of the mosquito. A study from 
Table 5.5: Reduction in usable capacity (expressed in KWmax) of thermal power plants in Europe.
SCENARIO / PROJECTED 
REDUCTION IN USABLE 
CAPACITY
KWMAX REDUCTION > 25% 
(IN MEAN NUMBER 
OF DAYS PER YEAR)
KWMAX REDUCTION > 50% 
(IN MEAN NUMBER 
OF DAYS PER YEAR)
KWMAX REDUCTION > 90% 
(IN MEAN NUMBER 
OF DAYS PER YEAR)
Once-through or combination cooling thermal power plants
1971–2000 64 31  0.5
B1 (2031–2060)(1.4˚C global warming) 84 44  1.4
A2 (2031–2060)(1.5˚C  global warming) 90 50  1.5
Recirculation (tower) cooling thermal power plants
1971–2000 14  9 0.02
B1 (2031–2060)(1.4˚C global warming) 18 10 0.09
A2 (2031–2060)(1.5˚C global warming) 19 11 0.08
Source: van Vliet et al. (2012).
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the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (2012), 
points to increasing climatic suitability for A. albopictus in the 
Western Balkans with climate change. Caminade et al. (2012) also 
projected an increased suitability from 2030–2050 in the Balkans 
with about 1.5°C global warming, and an associated lengthening 
of the mosquito’s activity window.
5.4.4.2 Food- and Water-Borne Diseases
Food-borne diseases, including salmonellosis, display a distinct 
seasonal pattern that has been associated with including increased 
temperatures, heat waves, and flooding (Semenza et al. 2012). 
A time-series analysis of 10 European countries undertaken by 
Kovats et al. (2004) showed a clear relationship in most of the 
countries studied between increases in ambient temperature and 
increases in the incidence of sporadic salmonella poisoning. While 
the overall incidence of salmonellosis is in fact declining in most 
European countries (ECDC 2013), it is likely that, with increased 
temperatures, climate change will increase the risk of outbreaks.
In Central Asia, Novikov et al. (Novikov et al. 2009) noted 
that salmonellosis could become a greater problem due to warmer 
temperatures and the contamination of communal water sources 
exacerbated by either drier conditions or flooding. Contaminated 
water supplies are also associated with cholera, typhoid, and 
dysentery. The reproductive rates of flies, which often play a sig-
nificant role in transmitting food and water-borne diseases, may 
be increased at elevated temperatures, leading to higher incidence 
rates and longer disease seasons (Lioubimtseva and Henebry 2009). 
In Tajikistan, for example, there is a risk of choleric reservoirs 
developing in the lower reaches of the Vakhsh, Kafirnigan, and 
Syrdarya rivers (Ministry of Nature Protection 2003).
5.4.4.3 Impacts of Extreme Weather Events
Heat Waves
Heat waves can impact human health in direct ways (e.g., heat 
stress) and indirectly (e.g., aggravating respiratory and cardiovas-
cular conditions). The increased incidence and intensity of extreme 
heat events could cause the seasonality of temperature-related 
mortality across continental Europe to shift from winter to sum-
mer, with fewer cold-related deaths and more heat-related ones. 
While the decreasing trend in cold-related deaths is expected to 
initially cancel out the increasing trend in heat-related deaths, the 
net total number of deaths is projected to increase for the period 
2050–2100 under 3˚C global warming (Ballester et al. 2011). In 
the Western Balkans, Albania and FYR Macedonia are considered 
particularly vulnerable to heat waves (ENVSEC and UNEP 2012). 
Central Asia has seen an increased incidence of heat-related 
strokes and mortalities. For example, Tajikistan’s Second National 
Communication to the UNFCCC reported that the number of days 
with extremely hot weather has doubled since 1940 (cited in BMU 
and WHO-Europe 2009). In addition, according to Kazakhstan’s 
Second National Communication, most parts of that country have 
seen a doubling in the frequency of heat waves and a decrease in 
the duration of cold waves (BMU and WHO-Europe 2009).
Flooding
In the Western Balkans, northern Serbia is considered particularly 
vulnerable to flooding (ENVSEC and UNEP 2012). Further east, 
severe flooding has been experienced in Tajikistan in recent years. 
Injuries and fatalities as a result of glacial outburst flooding in the 
mountains of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic have 
also been observed (Novikov et al. 2009); glacial lake outburst flood-
ing poses a mounting danger as glaciers retreat with regional warm-
ing. Mudflows in Kazakhstan, meanwhile, are expected to increase 
tenfold with a warming of 2–3˚C (BMU and WHO-Europe 2009).
5.4.4.4 Synthesis
Little modeling of climate change impacts on human health in the 
Western Balkans and Central Asian regions has been undertaken. 
A lack of certainty about the mechanisms through which climate 
change affects the incidence of tick-and mosquito-borne diseases, 
for example, prevents strong claims about future trends. An excep-
tion, perhaps, is dengue fever: stronger indications of an increased 
risk of dengue in the Western Balkans have been provided by 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (2012) 
and Caminade et al. (2012). In addition, historical observations 
of extreme events, including glacial outburst flooding, may offer 
some clues as to what the increased risks of such events under 
climate change could mean for human health in the region.
5.4.5 Security and Migration
5.4.5.1 Climate-related Drivers of Migration
One of the impacts of climate change on the socioeconomic and 
political stability of the ECA region will be manifest from the 
modification and/or intensification of migratory movements 
within and from the Central Asian and Western Balkans countries. 
Concerns associated with population trends and climate change 
have so far been largely treated in separation (Lutz 2010). While 
recent research is gradually trying to bridge this gap (e.g., Drabo 
and Mbaye 2011; Reuveny 2007), the knowledge base remains 
extremely weak in terms of forecasting migratory patterns. 
Frequently cited figures estimate that, globally by 2050, the 
number of people forced to move primarily because of climate 
change will be within a wide range of 200 million and one billion 
(Tacoli 2009, 514). It is likely that both extreme weather events and 
changes in mean temperatures, in precipitation, and in sea levels 
will contribute to increasing levels of mobility (Islami et al. 2009; 
Tacoli 2009). It is difficult to predict with precision, however, the 
extent to which these factors will impact population distributions 
and movements (Kniveton et al. 2008). 
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According to Lutz (2010), future migration within the ECA 
region is likely to be determined by political changes and security 
problems in certain countries (linked, for instance, to the pres-
ence of ethnic minorities) in addition to environmental stresses; 
these are all factors that are very hard to predict with certitude 
(Lutz 2010). The projected increase in the intensity and frequency 
of natural catastrophes (e.g., forest fires, heat waves, floods and 
landslides) (Adger et al. 2014) is likely to result in population 
movements that, in turn, could generate frictions in such politi-
cally sensitive countries as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Kosovo (Maas et al. 2010). In Central Asia, the biggest potential 
threat is an increase in landslides and avalanches, especially in 
the Fergana Valley, which would impact on regional livelihoods 
and food security (Siegfried et al. 2012). 
If it is assumed that the Western Balkans will exhibit similar 
reactions to those of Southeast and Eastern Europe, the increased 
risk of disasters will result in decreasing economic opportunities and 
provide incentives for migration (Maas et al. 2010). The European 
Union could be among the primary destinations. Migration could 
also take place within the region, eventually further aggravating the 
economic situation. In Central Asia, migratory patterns are likely 
to continue to flow toward more productive and secure areas (e.g., 
Russia, Europe, and the United States, from which the majority 
of remittances are currently received) (Asian Development Bank 
2011; Maas et al. 2010; Schubert et al. 2007). 
5.4.5.2 Rural-Urban Migratory Patterns 
as a Consequence of Climate Change
In Central Asia today, migration plays an important role in the 
development of the region, notably through remittances (Asian 
Development Bank 2011). Of the countries in the ECA region, 
Albania, Kazakhstan, and Georgia are among the main sending 
countries of migrants (Fay et al. 2010). Migration in the Western 
Balkans has already led to severe demographic changes; coupled 
with the general demographic trend toward an aging population, 
this is expected to cause increased regional climate change sen-
sitivity and decreased adaptive capacity as an aging population 
is more sensitive to heat (EEA 2012). 
According to the Asian Development Bank (2011), a large part 
of the region’s population already lives in areas at high risk of 
increased water stress due to climate change. Population growth 
is another potential push factor contributing to both internal and 
external migration. For example, the population in the Aral Sea 
basin is expected to grow by about 20 million over the next 40 years 
(about a 30 percent increase relative to today), with Uzbekistan 
contributing about 50 percent and Tajikistan about 25 percent to 
the expected growth (UN World Population Database in Siegfried 
et al. 2010). 
Population growth in climate change hotspots in the Central 
Asian countries indicates that, almost all of the population in the 
sub-region is living in areas at risk from the impacts of climate 
change. By 2050, a 77.2 percent increase in the population living 
in hotspots is expected for Tajikistan, 55.4 percent in Uzbekistan, 
41.3 percent for Turkmenistan, and 31.3 percent for the Kyrgyz 
Republic (with respect to the values for the year 2000) (see 
Table 5.6). 
A study commissioned by the International Organization 
of Migration (IOM) in 2005 found that internal displacements 
in Central Asia amounted to about half of the total migrant 
population (Kniveton et al. 2008). Among internal migrants, a 
significant share moved due to environmental reasons (Jaeger 
et al 2009). Reasons for these displacements included mudslides 
and landslides, floods, hazardous waste and desertification 
(particularly around the Aral Sea) (Asian Development Bank 
2011). In Tajikistan, for example, there is a clear trend of moving 
out of rural areas in the period 1995–2003, with most educated 
employable people moving to cities, especially Dushanbe (Asian 









Kazakhstan  32.1  5.3  5.4  5.5  5.6 6.5
Kyrgyz Republic  99.9  5.0  6.0  6.3  6.6 31.3
Tajikistan 100.0  6.1  8.3  9.4 10.8 77.2
Turkmenistan  80.9  3.9  4.7  5.1  5.5 41.3
Uzbekistan 100.0 24.7 32.4 35.2 38.3 55.4
Source: Asian Development Bank (2011), page 52.
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Development Bank 2011; Khakimov and Mahmadbekov 2009). 
This is expected to be driven by worsening agricultural conditions 
in the southern latitudes and improving conditions in the north, 
but it is unclear whether this push from southern rural areas 
and the pull into northern areas will translate into rural to rural 
migration, or will be associated with rural to urban migration 
into cities in the north (Lutz 2010). 
According to a study by the World Bank, ISDR and CAREC 
under the Central Asia and Caucasus Disaster Risk Management 
Initiative (CAC DRMI), the urban population as a percentage of 
the total is expected to remain roughly constant for most countries 
until 2015, with the exception of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, 
where these figures are expected to increase (World Bank et al. 
2012). However, between 2015 and 2020 the figures for Central 
Asia are expected to start increasing again, up to a rate of around 
6 percent a year by 2050. Therefore, taking the overall growth 
patterns into account, the total urban population is expected to 
increase by 10 million by 2025 and by 27 million by 2050. Such 
an increase in the number of people living in urban areas will 
significantly impact the levels of vulnerability associated with 
high population concentrations, especially in case of disasters 
(World Bank et al. 2012). In fact, because urban areas have higher 
population densities, more concentrated infrastructure, and are 
key contributors to economic growth, the consequences of a cata-
strophic event there will generally be greater than in rural areas 
(World Bank et al. 2012).
5.4.5.3 Other Consequences of Climate-Induced 
Migration
The adverse effects of climate change will be felt most acutely 
by those parts of the population that are already more vulner-
able owing to their gender, age, and disability. Moreover, climate 
change is likely to compound existing food security issues and 
impact heavily upon those dependent on the agricultural economy. 
Its distributional effects, therefore, are more likely to fall upon 
those involved in rain-fed subsistence agriculture or pastoralism 
(Government of the Republic of Tajikistan 2011). 
In Tajikistan, for example, women and children, who consti-
tute the majority of the country’s poor, are especially vulnerable 
to the impacts of climate change as they are often charged with 
the responsibility to secure water, food, and fuel for cooking and 
heating. 
According to a Climate Risk Assessment (CRA) study conducted 
by Camp Alatoo in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2013, the country’s female 
population is likely to experience higher climate change risks and 
vulnerabilities in several situations. Women in the Talas, Chui, 
Naryn, and Issyk-Kul Oblasts were less impacted by landslides, 
but suffered more in cases of snowfall and other natural events, 
as well as from the impacts of climate change on crop production 
(Camp Alatoo 2013). 
5.4.5.4 Synthesis
Projected climatic changes related to temperatures and water 
availability, together with an increased risk of climate extremes, 
will contribute to increased mobility in the ECA region. The exact 
migration patterns are difficult to estimate due to low data avail-
ability as well as due to the fact that the decision to migrate is 
usually an outcome of several processes that might be related to 
bio-physical environmental changes but might also be strongly 
influenced by the social and political context.
The projected increase in the intensity and frequency of extreme 
events in the ECA region is likely to lead to migration. In Central 
Asia almost all of the population lives in climate change hot-spot 
areas and the population of these areas is expected to increase in the 
future. In general terms, climate change may contribute to a revival 
of internal migration movements in Central Asia, as well as from 
Central Asia to Russia. Due to the projected increased urbanization, 
the vulnerability of cities to extreme events might rise, together with 
the increasing population and the concentration of infrastructure.
The adverse effects of climate change will be borne by those 
who are already more vulnerable: women, children and older 
people, disabled people, urban poor, as well as those that are 
dependent on rain-fed agricultural production or pastoralism. 
Furthermore, population movements could generate friction in 
politically sensitive countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, and Kosovo. 
5.4.6 Russia’s Forests: A Potential Tipping Point?
The forests of Russia cover 882 million ha (FAO 2012b). They have 
a growing stock of 79,977,200,000 m³ and are of crucial relevance 
for the regional and global timber supply, despite the fact that 
only half of the annual wood increment is actually available for 
use (FAO 2012b).
The boreal region in Russia is characterized by markedly 
greater shifts to warmer temperatures and altered precipitation 
patterns than the global mean. In a 4°C world, for example, local 
temperature increases in Russian boreal forests are projected to 
be almost twice as high as globally (see Section 5.3.1, Projected 
Temperature Changes). Anthropogenic climate change is altering 
the Russian forest ecosystems and interacting with other changes 
(e.g., the abandonment of agricultural lands). This threatens the 
provision of such ecosystem services as carbon storage and timber 
production. Moreover, there is a risk that the boreal forest may 
cross a tipping point and shift to an alternative state (Lenton et al. 
2008; Scheffer et al. 2012).
Physiological responses to changes in climate depend strongly 
on the limiting factors of forest growth, in particular low sum-
mer temperatures and nitrogen availability. Multiple interacting 
factors such as drought and heat stress, together with a changing 
background climate, could lead to forest diseases or insect pest 
outbreaks—and to increased tree mortality. If, as a response to 
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climate change, tree mortality continues to increase more rapidly 
than growth, and if the permafrost is melting, the carbon balance 
may be substantially altered. This is significant because Russian 
boreal ecosystems store a massive amount of carbon, especially in 
soils, permafrost regions, and wetlands (Tarnocai et al. 2009). In 
addition, Russian forests store about 26.25 billion tons of carbon 
in aboveground biomass (FAO 2012b). Sharmina et al. (2013) 
reviewed the Russian-language climate change impact literature 
and found that the key climate change impacts expected to affect 
forest ecosystems are changes in vegetation zones, more frequent 
and intensive wildfires, and terrestrial CO2 fertilization.
The sensitivity of the vast Russian forests to warming has 
significant implications for the climate system as a result of the 
biosphere-atmosphere exchange of water, carbon, and energy. 
The two dominant feedbacks are changes in carbon cycling and 
changes in reflectance and energy exchange (albedo) that result 
from the loss or gain of evergreen coniferous vegetation at high 
latitudes (Betts 2000; Bonan 2008; O’Halloran et al. 2012). Russian 
boreal ecosystems contribute strongly to the northern terrestrial 
carbon sink, and are estimated to represent around half of the 
terrestrial global sink, which was estimated at 1.3 ±0.15 PgC 
per year between 2000–2009 (Dolman et al. 2012; Schaphoff et 
al. 2013). This estimate takes into consideration emissions from 
land use change. 
Global warming has the potential to reduce the carbon sink 
capacity of the boreal zone (Koven et al. 2011; Schaphoff et al. 
2013). For Eurasia, climate change in interaction with vegetation 
shifts and fires has the potential to turn the Eurasian carbon sink 
into a source in a 4°C world (Kicklighter et al. 2014). In a 1.5°C 
world, Eurasia would remain a small carbon sink (Kicklighter et 
al. 2014). Observations suggest that increased temperatures could 
stimulate photosynthesis (Magnani et al. 2007; Myneni et al. 
1997, 2001). Warszawski et al. (2013) and Ostberg et al. (2013) 
found that across a range of Global Vegetation Model and GCM 
projections the boreal forests are at particular risk of biosphere 
changes, including changes in the type and distribution of vegeta-
tion, carbon pool changes, and carbon and water flux changes. 
In combination, these changes would alter the biosphere-climate 
interactions.
5.4.6.1 Observed Changes in Forest Productivity
Forest growth in the northern latitudes depends on a variety of cli-
matic and non-climatic factors. Increased radiation and atmospheric 
CO2 concentrations as well as temperature increases leading to a 
lengthening of the growing season have stimulated forest growth 
(Berner et al. 2013; Ichii et al. 2013; Myneni et al. 1997). Berner et al. 
(2013) stressed that, in addition to temperature, water availability 
and the seasonality of precipitation also affect growth. Increased 
precipitation has promoted vegetation greening in some regions 
(Ichii et al. 2013). If water availability is sufficient, future warming 
could promote plant growth and forest expansion along the Russian 
arctic tree line (Berner et al. 2013; Devi et al. 2008; MacDonald et al. 
2008). At the same time, water stress, forest fires, insect pests, and 
diseases have led to increased tree mortality—counteracting forest 
growth stimulation. Tchebakova et al. (2009) suggested that growth 
depends on water availability and, in the case of larch forests, on 
other factors potentially related to permafrost dynamics and wildfires. 
Recent analyses of Normalized Differenced Vegetation Index 
(NDVI) data, used as a proxy for terrestrial gross primary produc-
tion, explored the spatial and temporal variability of greening 
and browning patterns in the boreal zone (Beck et al. 2011; Bunn 
and Goetz 2006; Goetz et al. 2007; de Jong et al. 2011). Here, 
the positive trend of seasonal photosynthetic activity is mostly 
confined to tundra ecosystems; a number of boreal forests in the 
continental interior showed a negative trend (especially after 
1990). Furthermore, studies of tree rings have identified complex 
patterns of tree growth in response to climate variability (Lloyd 
and Bunn 2007). Kharuk et al. (2006) found that the radial incre-
ment of larch depends strongly on summer temperatures and the 
amount of precipitation in both summer and winter. 
Productivity Decline
Continuing warming may offset the benefits of an earlier spring 
onset and a delayed end of the growing season. Browning trends 
are shown to occur predominantly in the interior of the forest in 
late summer, despite positive trends in photosynthetic activity at 
the beginning of the vegetation period (Bunn and Goetz 2006). 
Productivity declines in the boreal forests of the continental interior 
appear to be related to warming-induced drought stress (Barber 
et al. 2000; Dulamsuren et al. 2013; McDowell 2011). Browning is 
associated with already-warmer areas (Berner et al. 2013). Many 
trees exhibited a general downward trend in basal area increment 
after the mid-20th century (Berner et al. 2013). Lloyd and Bunn 
(2007) pointed out that the highest frequency of browning occurs 
in the most recent time period during which greening occurs at 
the lowest frequency. Kharuk et al. (2013) suggest that soil mois-
ture stress is the main factor in forest mortality in the eastern 
Kuznetzky Alatau Mountains of South Siberia. They found that 
most Siberian pine mortality was detected on steep slopes; birch 
and aspen trees in the same area did not, however, show drought 
stress. Siberian pine is an important forest species in the region 
and its decline has great significance for forestry. 
Productivity Increase 
Warming has increased net primary production (NPP) north of 
47.5° over the past decade (2000–2009) in spite of a concurrent 
drying trend (Zhao and Running 2010). However, over the Sibe-
rian forest this increase was heterogeneous with an extensive 
negative trend over the western part (Zhao and Running 2010). A 
satellite imagery-based study by Jeong et al. (2011) observed an 
earlier onset and a delayed end of the growing season in Eurasia. 
The authors estimated that from 1982–1999 the growing season 
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increased by more than 0.8 days per year in accordance with a 
significant warming of more than 0.25°C per year. An evaluation 
of satellite remote sensing data shows positive greening trends in 
the transition zone to tundra and wetlands during the summertime 
growing season since the 1990s (Beck and Goetz 2012; Bunn and 
Goetz 2006). Similarly, Lloyd et al. (2011) proved that warming 
has a more positive effect in the northern sites. Greening is more 
often observed in colder areas, and it was most evident in areas of 
low tree cover (Berner et al. 2013). Therefore, the positive trend in 
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index data might reflect enhanced 
understory growth rather than higher tree growth (Berner et al. 
2011); it might also indicate a changing allocation pattern from 
woody parts to green plant material (Lapenis et al. 2005). 
5.4.6.2 Observed Forest Cover Changes 
and Vegetation Redistribution
Russia showed the highest forest cover loss globally from 2000–2012 
(Hansen et al. 2013). Fires and subsequent recovery in Russian 
forests also led to large gains in forest cover over the same period; 
due to the slow regrowth dynamics, however, the gains typi-
cally occurred in different areas than the losses (Hansen et al. 
2013). By analyzing Landsat remote-sensing data, Kharuk et al. 
(2006) estimated an increase in the density of larch forests of 
about 65 percent and an advancement of the northern treeline by 
90–300 m over the period 1973–2000. Devi et al. (2008) reported 
an altitudinal expansion into the formerly tree-free tundra during 
the last century of about 20–60 m in altitude, as well as increasing 
tree ages and high sapling densities. At the trailing end of forest 
distribution, Kharuk et al. (2013) described a decline in Russian 
birch stands in the southeastern Siberian forest-steppe.
Vegetation redistribution affects species composition and forest 
structure and may also lead to biodiversity loss. Evidence from 
warming experiments suggests that climate change may cause 
a decline in biodiversity in the tundra, as warming promotes 
increased height and cover of deciduous shrubs and graminoids 
and, consequently, a decrease in mosses and lichens (and, ulti-
mately, less species diversity) (Walker et al. 2006). An invasion of 
southern conifers was also reported in the zone of larch dominance 
(Kharuk et al. 2006). 
5.4.6.3 Observed Carbon Budget, 
Carbon Balance, and Permafrost
The forests of Russia are of great importance for the global carbon 
cycle. The greenhouse gas inventory approach of Pan et al. (2011) 
estimated a carbon sink of 0.26 PgC per year in Asian boreal 
forests from 1990–2010 (and 0.15 PgC per year in the 1990s and 
0.20 PgC per year overall in the last century). Myneni et al. (2001) 
found a contribution of more than 40 percent to the Northern 
carbon sink in 1995–1999. Pan et al. (2011) found that Russian 
forests stored 34.9 PgC in live biomass in 1990 and 37.5 PgC in 
2007. Thurner et al. (2013) estimated about 32 PgC per year in 
2010 using modified forest inventory data and including remote 
sensing data. Shvidenko and Nilsson (2002, 2003) found carbon 
balance estimates for 1961–1998 based on forest inventories that 
indicated a large carbon sink ranging from 180–322 TgC per year. 
Dolman et al. (2012) estimated a carbon sink of 653 TgC per year 
from 1998–2008 that implies a substantial increase of the Rus-
sian boreal sink in the last 15 years. Tarnocai et al. (2009) have 
reported 331 PgC in permafrost areas of Eurasia in the first meter 
and another 162.8 PgC in peats. Schepaschenko et al. (2013) 
estimated similar amounts of soil carbon in Russia; they dif-
ferentiated Asian (189 PgC) and European (42 PgC) forest areas 
and excluded the tundra. The large range in reported values here 
depends on whether vegetation and soil carbon are considered 
or just vegetation carbon as well as whether or not disturbances 
are taken into account (Balshi et al. 2007).
Northern latitude areas have a high potential to become carbon 
sources. Balshi et al. (2007) found conflicting estimates of mean 
annual changes in carbon storage for Eurasia north of 45°N for 
the period 1996–2002. Using a process-based ecosystem model, 
they simulated either a sink of 280.2 TgC per year with CO2 fertil-
ization or a source of 29.4 TgC per year without CO2 fertilization. 
Changes in permafrost dynamics, soil-vegetation carbon dynam-
ics, and vegetation distribution could cause long-term changes in 
the biosphere at high latitudes. These could also have a large impact 
on the climate system. Permafrost thawing is most pronounced 
within the discontinuous permafrost zone but is also reported in 
the continuous permafrost zone (Romanovsky et al. 2010). 
5.4.6.4 Observed Disturbances
Disturbances play an important role in Russian forests. Fire is the 
single most important forest disturbance, but a larger area is also 
affected by various pests and diseases (FAO 2012b). 
Pests and Diseases
About 13 million ha of East Siberian forest area, representing a 
loss of 2 billion m³ of growing stock, are believed to have been 
destroyed by the Siberian silk moth from 1880–1969 (Shvidenko 
et al. 2013). A single outbreak in 2001 affected an area of almost 
10 million ha in a larch forest that had been thus far unaffected 
(Shvidenko et al. 2013). The area affected by biogenic agents in 
Russian forests is increasing from an average of 2.73 million ha 
during 1973–1987 to 5.48 million ha during 1998–2010 (Shvidenko 
et al. 2013). The study also pointed out that a warmer and drier 
climate would induce large-scale outbreaks. 
Projected climate changes in the boreal zone could increase 
the frequency and intensity of pest outbreaks. Studies of the 
Canadian boreal forest show that insect disturbances can turn the 
forest from a carbon sink into a carbon source (Kurz et al. 2008). 
It is important to note that there are considerably more studies 
on the effects of forest fires than on pests and diseases. What is 
clear, however, is that climate change will lead to northward shifts, 
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longer summer seasons, and warmer temperatures for the growth 
and reproduction of forest insects (Bale et al. 2002).
Fire
The uncertainty regarding the amount of carbon released through 
fires is large, and estimates from several studies compiled by Balshi 
et al. (2007) range from 58 TgC per year up to 520 TgC per year for 
boreal Russia/Siberia for different time periods within 1971–2002. 
A large part of the uncertainty relates to how burn severity is 
accounted for (Balshi et al. 2007). An estimated 59.3 percent 
of vegetation fires occurred in forest areas and accounted for 
about 82 TgC per year of emissions on average during 1998–2010 
(Shvidenko et al. 2012). A later study (Shvidenko and Schepaschenko 
2013) estimated the total amount of carbon burnt in 1998–2010 at 
121±28 TgC per year, with 76 percent (i.e., 92±18 TgC per year) 
occurring on forest lands. Shvidenko and Schepaschenko (2013) 
also stressed that post-fire dieback is uncertain and may amount 
to 90–100 TgC per year. 
Shvidenko and Schepaschenko (2013) highlighted that the 
types of fires have been changing, with a 1.5–2 times higher share 
of crown and underground fires seen of late. They found that the 
forest area affected by fires for 1998–2010 is 8.2 million ha per year 
(or 9.2 million ha per year using data from a global dataset); for 
2000–2010, that number is 8.5 million ha per year. Soja et al. (2007) 
pointed out that 22 percent of the annual burned area is made up 
of severe crown fires with strong impacts on forest productivity 
and carbon pools (Chertov et al. 2013), and that, in severe crown 
fires make up 50 percent of all fires in extreme fire years. Soja 
et al. (2007) found an increase in fire severity during the years 
1998–2006, which can be connected to warmer conditions. In 
addition, the area burnt in the 1990s is 29 percent greater than in 
the 1980s and 19 percent more than reported for a 47-year mean 
(Soja et al. 2007). More recent analysis of both forest statistics 
and remote sensing data reveal that, despite large variability, the 
area affected by fire seems to increase, as shown in Figure 5.19 
(Shvidenko and Schepaschenko 2013).
There are important feedbacks between fire and climate. Rand-
erson et al. (2006) found that the long-term effects of boreal forest 
fires on climate warming are uncertain since positive feedbacks 
(enhancing warming) from increasing greenhouse gas emissions 
may be offset by changes in surface albedo (decreasing warming 
due to loss of canopy and more snow exposure).
It is important to note that forest fires are also affected by 
socioeconomic changes. Ivanova et al. (2010) have shown that 
extant climate change in combination with socioeconomic changes 
(e.g., reduced firefighting funds) has resulted in an increase in 
fire intensity and are a burned (but not fire frequency) in the Tuva 
region in southern Siberia. Moreover, Isaev and Korovin (2014) 
highlighted that the large forest fires that occurred in 2010 were 
due not only to unusual meteorological conditions but also to 
poor forest governance and management and an increasing area 
of abandoned farmlands leading to declining numbers of forest 
managers, forest firefighters, and less-efficient forest protection 
systems. Similarly, Flannigan et al. (2009) noted that, since the 
breakdown of the Soviet system, the effectiveness of the Russian 
firefighting system has decreased—which has led to larger areas 
being burned.
5.4.6.5 Projections of Vegetation Redistribution, 
Forest Productivity, and Carbon Budget Changes
While climate change is expected to have a great impact on veg-
etation distribution, changes in vegetation distribution also feed 
back onto the climate. Enhanced warming of the dark forest (as 
compared to other vegetation) results in an elevated sensible heat 
flux. Northward movement of the boreal forest, with its relatively 
low albedo and the resulting replacement of higher albedo tundra, 
can cause a significant increase in regional and global tempera-
tures (Foley et al. 2003). This climate forcing could have an effect 
of 25.9 W per m2 (Chapin et al. 2005). Such a shift could also 
increase carbon storage by the same magnitude (Field et al. 2007).
For the whole of the Eurasian continent, Kicklighter et al. 
(2014) projected that biomes will shift northward as a consequence 
of climate change, with boreal forest encroaching into the north-
ern tundra zone, temperate forests encroaching into the present 
boreal zone, and steppes encroaching into temperate forests. In 
a 4°C world, this would result in a reduction in the boreal forest 
area of 19 percent and an increase in the temperate forest area of 
258 percent; in a 1.5°C world, boreal forest area would decrease 
by 2 percent and temperate forest area increase by 140 percent. 
Figure 5.19: Dynamics of total area of wildfires in Russia’s 
forests according to (1) GFDE3 (global fire emissions 
database); (2) refined data provided by the Institute of Forest, 
Russian Academy of Sciences; (3) Space Research Institute, 
Russian Academy of Sciences; and (4) Vivchar et al. (2010).
Source: Shvidenko and Schepaschenko (2013), Figure 1.
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This would lead to a 7 percent net gain in forest in a 4°C world, 
and a 12 percent gain in a 1.5°C world (Kicklighter et al. 2014). 
Several studies using a bioclimatic model also suggest that 
vegetation zones will shift northward under climate change 
(Tchebakova et al. 2009, 2011; Tchebakova and Parfenova 2012). 
Tchebakova et al. (2009) showed that, for Siberia, changes in 
vegetation will start as early as the 2020s under all climate change 
scenarios. Vegetation shifts are projected to remain moderate in 
a 3°C world, but are expected to be substantial in a 4°C world 
(see Figure 5.20). Forest-steppe and steppe ecosystems are even 
predicted to become dominant across large areas of the Siberian 
tundra (Schaphoff et al. 2006; Tchebakova et al. 2009).
Study results from eastern Eurasia suggest that only a small 
range of climate change (with warming of no more than 2°C) is 
tolerable in order to maintain current forest structure and biomass, 
(Shuman et al. 2011; Tchebakova et al. 2009; Zhang et al. 2009b, 
2011). Above this level of warming, potential changes include 
permafrost-thaw and changes in forest structure whereby broad-
leaved deciduous trees could increase their spread over Eastern 
Eurasia and coniferous area could decrease (Lucht et al. 2006; 
Schaphoff et al. 2013; Zhang et al. 2009b). In a study of larch 
forests in the region, Zhang et al. (2011a) found that such forests 
could not be sustained under warming of more than 2°C. 
For a forest area in the Kostroma region 450 km northeast 
of Moscow, Shanin et al. (2011) projected an increase in carbon 
stock in trees from 125 tons per ha to 150 tons per ha in a 4°C 
world; this implies strong regional warming of 7.2°C by 2100. The 
productivity of the stands was projected to increase as well due 
to the enhanced availability of nitrogen in the soil. However, soil 
and deadwood carbon stocks were projected to decrease under 
this climate change scenario (98–99 tons per ha without climate 
change vs. 33–35 tons per ha with climate change). It is important 
to note that several key climate change effects, including heat 
stress and CO2 fertilization, were not considered in this study. 
Furthermore, in those simulations that included the effect of fire, 
the climate-change-induced increase in carbon stock was offset 
by higher intensity fires (Shanin et al. 2011). 
Permafrost is projected to be highly vulnerable to warming, 
and thawing is projected to be very pronounced (Koven et al. 2011; 
Schaefer et al. 2011; Schaphoff et al. 2013)—but how exactly carbon 
stocks will be affected is still uncertain. Koven et al. (2011) and 
Schaphoff et al. (2013) stressed that enhanced plant productivity 
could increase biomass input at different soil depths which can 
balance out carbon release due to permafrost thawing until the 
late 21st century. This depends stro ngly, however, on the warm-
ing level. Schaefer et al. (2011) estimated a carbon stock loss of 
190± PgC by 2200. Anisimov (2007) estimated that methane emis-
sions from melting permafrost might increase by 20–30 percent 
with a global mean temperature rise of 2°C, congruent with an 
enhanced permafrost thawing rate of 10–15 percent over Russia 
for the mid-21st century. These fluxes mostly originate in the West 
Siberian wetlands. 
Anisimov and Reneva (2006) highlighted the risk to engineered 
structures in regions affected by permafrost thawing. They pro-
jected a reduction in the permafrost area, down to 76–81 percent 
of the present day value by 2080. Furthermore, Schaphoff et al. 
(2013) and Schaefer et al. (2011) showed that, due to inertia in 
the climate system, carbon release from permafrost thawing will 
continue even if warming ceases.
Projections of carbon stock changes in the boreal forest eco-
systems under climate change are generally uncertain. Simulations 
show that, as a result of vegetation shifts, the potential carbon 
gains from the expansion of boreal forests in the north are likely 
to be offset by losses in the south (Friend et al. 2014; Schaphoff 
Figure 5.20: Vegetation distribution in Siberia in 2080 from HadCM3 A1FI (leading to a 4°C world) and B1 (leading to a 3°C world) 
climate change scenarios.
Simulated hotspots of forest-to-steppe change (1—yellow), tundra-to-forest change (3—green), and no change in major vegetation classes (2—light gray; 
0—water) in 2080. Source: Tchebakova et al. (2009). 
9099_CH05.pdf   201 11/17/14   6:04 PM
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CONFRONTING THE NEW CLIMATE NORMAL
202
et al. 2013). Furthermore, increases in tree growth from climate 
warming may be limited by decreased soil fertility in northern 
and eastern regions (Lawrence et al. 2005). In addition, model 
projections of forest ecosystem change in response to anthropo-
genic climate changes are dominated by plant physiological CO2 
effects (Friend et al. 2014). Moreover, the stability of ecosystems 
in response to such extreme events as flooding and drought is 
unpredictable (Bale et al. 2002). The interplay of disturbances 
(e.g. fire) and vegetation shifts, as well as the effects of climatic 
feedbacks, determine the future of the carbon stored in and the 
goods and services provided by boreal forests.
5.4.6.6 Future Impacts on Timber Harvesting
The FAO Forest Sector Outlook Study (FAO 2012b) does not project 
any radical changes in Russian forests in the next 10–20 years due 
to climate change, but does highlight the potential for substantial 
impacts beyond 2030. Lutz et al. (2013b) used a forest gap model 
to project that, under local warming of 2°C in 2100, larch and pine 
forests are expected to have higher productivity and subsequent 
timber harvests than under the baseline climate scenario. When 
changing from a 2°C to a 4°C local warming scenario, however, 
productivity levels compared to the baseline were mostly negative 
(with the exception of larch forests in central Russia). Modeled 
spruce and fir forests showed small or negative responses to 2°C 
local warming; their response to 4°C local warming was consistently 
negative. The deciduous and more species-rich forests of the kind 
found in northwestern and far eastern Russia showed a projected 
decrease in productivity under 2°C local warming and increasing 
productivity and harvests under 4°C. This counterintuitive response 
pattern was induced by changes in the dominant species toward 
more heat tolerant species and constitutes a substantial shift in 
forest composition and forest resources. The analysis of Lutz et 
al. (2013b) also showed that although harvests are still profitable 
under 4°C local warming, this is partly due to an increased harvest 
in the first 50 simulation years (2010–2060) that compensates for 
strong declines thereafter. Moreover, the study did not include 
the effects of disturbances (e.g., insects or fire). The exclusion 
of fire may explain the somewhat contradictory results regarding 
increasing larch productivity (Lutz et al. 2013b) and decreasing 
larch productivity (Zhang et al. 2011a).
5.4.6.7 Projections of Disturbances
Due to a lack of studies exploring the correlation between climate 
change and forest pests and diseases, this section focuses on the 
future risk from fire. In general, higher temperatures lead to drier 
fuels and hence higher fire risk (Flannigan et al. 2009). Stocks 
et al. (1998) projected an earlier start to and later end of the fire 
season as well as larger areas affected by higher fire danger in a 
doubled CO2 scenario with 4 GCMs. Similarly, Malevsky-Malevich 
et al. (2008) found that the area of maximum fire risk doubles 
by the middle of the century and that the number of days with 
moderate to high fire risk increases by up to 12 days in a 3°C 
world. Mokhov et al. (2006) projected that, under the B2 scenario 
(implying a moderate global warming), fire hazard will increase 
in the southern latitudes and the northwestern areas of European 
Russia and decrease in much of the rest of Russia. The decrease 
in fire hazard in their projections can be explained by increasing 
precipitation and minor summer warming in the climate model 
and scenario used; the increasing fire risk is associated with 
precipitation decreases.
It is important to note that these studies are based on an 
analysis of climatic data only and do not consider current or 
future forest composition and structure nor interacting disturbance 
regimes. Shvidenko and Schepaschenko (2013) argued that a more 
thorough integration of such factors might show that Russian for-
est cover changes even more strongly. Tchebakova et al. (2009) 
projected an increase of an average of 10 days and 20–30 days 
in the annual number of high fire danger days in a 3°C and 4°C 
world, respectively (see Figure 5.21). They explicitly considered 
fire risk within a bioclimatic vegetation model and showed that 
climate-change-induced forest-to-steppe transitions interact with 
fire activity and promote the risks of large fires, especially in 
southern Siberia and Central Yakutia. 
5.4.6.8 Risk of a Boreal Forest Tipping Point
Lenton et al. (2008) identified the boreal forest as a tipping element 
in the Earth system. They argued that, under an estimated 3–5°C 
of global warming, water and peak summer heat stress leading 
to tree mortality, to increased vulnerability to diseases and fire, 
and to decreased reproduction rates could lead to a large-scale 
forest dieback and a transition to open woodlands or grasslands. 
Analyzing satellite data, Scheffer et al. (2012) suggested that the 
only possible ecosystem state at the northern edge and at the 
dry continental southern edge are treeless tundra and steppe. 
Their study also found a broad intermediate temperature range 
where treeless ecosystems states coexist with boreal forest (about 
75 percent tree cover). Tree covers of 10 percent, 30 percent, and 
60 percent are relatively rare. Scheffer et al. (2012) therefore sug-
gest that these may represent unstable states. Such sparse tree 
cover occurs especially in continental permafrost-affected areas 
and on saturated soils. Scheffer et al. (2012) suggest that boreal 
forest may be less resilient than assumed (and thus potentially shift 
into a sparse woodland or treeless state) while tundra may shift 
abruptly to a more abundant tree cover state. The mechanisms 
which could explain such unstable states are not clear, however, 
and uncertainty surrounding these findings is high.
5.4.6.9 Synthesis
Russia’s forests cover a large area and provide important ecosystem 
services. Besides supplying timber, they store huge amounts of 
carbon in soil and vegetation. The evidence for a tipping point of the 
boreal forest is unclear; already, however, under current conditions 
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the impacts of disturbances such as fire and pest outbreaks are 
substantial—and projected climate change impacts could be both 
large-scale and disastrous. Future projections highlight changes 
in productivity, vegetation distribution, and composition that will 
typically be stronger in a 4°C world than in a 2°C world—often 
in non-linear ways. 
It is important to also highlight that change in species compo-
sition toward better adapted tree species may buffer productivity 
losses, although they will also lead to a strong change in the forest 
landscape and associated uses. Projected climate change may also 
induce an increase in fire danger and fire intensity. Defoliators 
and other pests and diseases could be stimulated by a warmer 
and drier climate. 
Transition zones, from forest to steppe, are very vulnerable 
to climate change; in particular, increases in atmospheric water 
demand could lead to water stress and higher tree mortality. 
Increased occurrences of disturbances could also affect vegetation 
distribution in transition zones. 
The impacts of climate change are often overlaid with other 
environmental and societal changes; this could exacerbate both 
existing and projected challenges. These changes may strongly 
affect local, regional, and global forest resource availability, ecosys-
tem functioning, services such as carbon storage and biodiversity 
support, and even feedback on the global climate system.
Russia also contains an extensive area of forested perma-
frost. Changes here are already among the largest and they could 
Figure 5.21: Modeled distributions of annual number of high fire danger days across Siberia in the current climate (a) and during 
the 21st century (b) for HadCM3 A1FI and B1 climate change scenarios.
Fire danger days key: 0—non-forest area; 1—<30 days; 2—40 days; 3—50 days; 4—60 days; 5—70 days; 6—80 days; 7—90 days; 8—100 days; 9—110 
days; 10—120 days; and 11—>120 days. Source: Tchebakova et al. (2009), Figure 4.
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accelerate as a result of permafrost thawing. This has the potential 
to affect the hydrological regimes of vast territories beyond the 
changes in hydrology expected from precipitation changes alone, 
and could affect critical carbon, water, and energy fluxes. Forest 
dieback and thawing of permafrost threaten to amplify global 
warming as stored carbon and methane are released into the 
atmosphere, giving rise to a self-amplifying feedback loop. 
Finally, it is important to note that substantial research gaps 
exist, including the effect of disturbances on vegetation cover 
and how climate change will affect forest productivity under 
concomitant changes in growing conditions, disturbances, and 
forest management practices. 
5.5 Regional Development Narratives
The report covers 12 countries located in the Europe and Central 
Asia region (ECA) that split into three sub-regions: Central Asia, 
Western Balkans, and Russia. The negative consequences for key 
development trends that may be triggered from such exposure 
to climatic changes that are described in the following develop-
ment narratives. It is important to note that each development 
narratives presents only one of the many possible ways in which 
climate change can put key development trajectories at risk. 
Table 5.7 summarizes the key climate change impacts under 
different warming levels in the Europe and Central Asia region 
and Figure 5.22 summarizes the key sub-regional impacts.
5.5.1 Impacts on Water Resources in Central 
Asia Increase the Challenge of Accommodating 
Competing Water Demands for Agricultural 
Production and Hydropower Generation
The scientific basis for observed climate changes and their impacts 
in Central Asia is overall weak or lacking (Hijioka et al. 2014). 
However, as mentioned in Section 5.4.1, sub-regionally pronounced 
winter warming has been observed for Southern Siberia and the 
Tien Shan mountains, concurrent with glacier volume change by 
about a third from the beginning of the 20th century. 
Five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) are particularly vulner-
able to climate change compared to the other ECA countries (Fay 
et al. 2010). They face common climate challenges that affect such 
key resources and sectors as water, land, biodiversity and ecosys-
tems, agriculture, energy, and health. Water resource systems in 
Central Asia are sensitive to climate change and variability, and 
climate impacts on water supplies will reverberate across the agri-
cultural and energy sectors. Increasing temperatures are expected 
to increase both crop water requirements and evaporation and to 
reduce hydro-system storage through changes in snowpack, earlier 
snow melt, and glacial melt. 
Expected glacier loss and reductions in snow pack pose serious 
threats to freshwater resources, which rely on water storage in ice 
and snow. Critically, as ice and snow melt earlier during the year 
due to rising temperatures, the timing of river flow is projected to 
shift within the next few decades. Peak flows are expected to shift 
from summer to spring, with adverse consequences for agricultural 
water demand during critical crop growing periods. Furthermore, 
an intensification of the runoff variability is expected in all river 
basins, increasing the risk of floods, mudslides, and droughts (Main 
Administration of Hydrometeorology 2009). These events already 
have considerable social impacts—for example, economic losses 
from individual mudslide events have been as high as $150 mil-
lion, while over 7000 people have migrated from landslide zones 
in Kyrgyz Republic alone since 1992. Flooding in Tajikistan in 2005 
led to notable reductions in agricultural production (e.g., 70 percent 
reductions in grain production and 95 percent reduction in grape 
production) with 71 percent of affected people stati ng that they 
had experienced a loss in income (Thurman 2011). 
The impacts on water resources are distinctly different for 
the next few decades compared to the end of the century. In the 
coming decades, the contribution of melt water to river runoff is 
expected to increase and may lead to an increase in river runoff—
increasingly high evaporation rates, however, are expected to 
counterbalance this effect (Davletkeldiev et al. 2009). By 2030, 
river runoff is expected either to remain unchanged or to increase 
slightly, even in the case of slightly higher precipitation rates (Main 
Administration of Hydrometeorology 2009). The picture changes 
in the second half of the century: by the end of the 21st century, 
runoff generation rates in the mountainous areas of Central Asia 
are likely to decline substantially (Main Administration of Hydro-
meteorology 2009).
Changes to natural water stocks are expected to severely 
affect irrigated agriculture. This impact will be compounded 
under conditions that further increase the water demands of 
crop production systems, as rising temperatures are expected to 
lead to an around 30 percent increase in potential evapotranspi-
ration (see Section 5.3.5, Aridity). Increasing temperatures and 
water demand also affect rain-fed agriculture, which accounts 
for more than 90 percent of arable land in Kazakhstan (FAO-
AQUASTAT 2012). 
Uncertainties in precipitation projections translate into an 
uncertain future for rain-fed crop production in the region. Fur-
ther, prolonged periods of above-average temperatures and heat 
extremes exacerbate the heat stress of agricultural crops, leading to 
decreased plant productivity and high climatic risks for the sector 
(Mannig et al. 2013; Teixeira et al. 2013). Such risks may limit a 
projected increase in agricultural areas or crop yields. In addition, 
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rising temperatures and seasonally reduced water availability puts 
pressure on livestock directly and indirectly through limiting the 
regeneration potential of pastures. 
Losses in agricultural productivity and employment oppor-
tunities would add pressure to the labor markets and challenge 
poverty reduction for affected population groups. They could 
further stimulate increased migration from affected areas to those 
with stronger economies, potentially following already established 
migration routes, such as from poorer areas of Central Asia to 
Russia, more locally to cities with better job opportunities (IOM 
2011). Groups unable to migrate (older people, people with dis-
abilities, in some cultural contexts, such as parts of Central Asia, 
women), are at greater risk of being trapped in poverty (Black et al. 
2011) particularly if remittance flows are limited or unpredictable.
Further, decreased levels of agricultural production as well as 
lower levels of certainty over future yields are likely to contribute 
to an increase in food prices. Rising food prices may have severe 
effects on the Central Asian population since a large percentage 
of household income is spent on food; up to 80 percent in Uzbeki-
stan and Tajikistan, and 58 percent in the Kyrgyz Republic (Bravi 
and Solbrandt, 2012). In addition, agricultural impacts in other 
large, food-producing regions, including Russia, can have negative 
repercussions on the Central Asian region as some countries (e.g., 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) are 
largely dependent on food imports and are exposed to fluctuations 
in food prices (Meyers et al. 2012; Peyrouse 2013). 
A further risk to development stems from the energy sector, 
which relies on stable water supplies. Despite an expected decrease 
in heating loads during the winter (WorleyParsons 2012), overall 
energy demand is projected to rise together with population and 
economic growth (World Bank 2013s). Changes in climate, reduced 
snow accumulation, and accelerated melting of snow and glaciers 
increase uncertainty in the timing and amount of water available 
for power generation. Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, which 
are located upstream of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya, respec-
tively, produce 98.8 percent and 93.3 percent of the total electricity 
consumed from hydropower (World Bank 2013p). Hydroelectricity 
can also play a major role in the future energy mix of the Central 
Asian countries, as only eight percent of the hydropower potential 
of the region has been developed (Granit et al. 2010). 
Climate change impacts will result in high variability of inflows 
and a shift in the historical water flow patterns. Upstream countries 
would have to manage the impact of this change in their hydropower 
generation systems, which is the back bone of their electricity sec-
tor. The downstream countries would see increased demand from 
both the agriculture and energy generation sectors. Efficiency in 
water use for irrigation and for energy generation would be critical 
for managing this impact. Energy efficiency measures would help 
reduce growth in water demand for energy generation. 
There are many opportunities to improve climate resilience 
in the region. Strengthening capacity and responsiveness of local 
and national disaster risk management institutions in the region 
could significantly boost resilience to rapid-onset effects of climate 
change, such as those related to more rapid spring snow-melt 
(UNISDR 2009). Upgrading of worn-out infrastructure and more 
effective poverty reduction and social protection are also priori-
ties (Thurman 2011).
There is also room to improve water-saving irrigation tech-
niques in the region. Approximately 87 percent of the region’s 
extracted water is used in agriculture (FAO-AQUASTAT 2012), and 
in many Central Asian countries the water irrigation systems are 
inefficient. In Uzbekistan, for example, 70 percent of the irriga-
tion water is lost between the river and the crop (Rakhmatullaev 
et al. 2012). Changes in reservoir management and the need to 
meet water requirements for agriculture can also have a negative 
impact on energy availability over the summer months (Siegfried 
et al. 2012). 
5.5.2 Climate Extremes in the Western Balkans 
Pose Major Risks to Agricultural Systems, 
Energy and Human Health
For the Western Balkans, a pronounced drying trend is projected, 
concurrent with strongly rising temperatures and prevalence of 
heat extremes. Such changes pose high risks to agricultural pro-
ductivity in the region. The majority of arable land in the Western 
Balkans is rain-fed and, therefore, highly vulnerable to changes in 
climatic conditions (UNDP 2014). In the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, 90 percent of the agricultural area is rain-fed; in 
Albania, irrigation agriculture is practiced on roughly 50 percent of 
arable land (World Bank 2010b, 2011c). The share of the working 
population of the Western Balkans that is employed in agricul-
ture varies from 18 to 58 percent depending on the country, and 
agriculture is directly responsible for 17 percent of the region’s 
GDP (Hughes 2012). Cereals and fruits (predominantly grapes) are 
the most important agricultural products in terms of production 
area and economic output, with Serbia being the biggest producer 
(Mizik 2010; Volk 2010).
The region is highly vulnerable to the effects of droughts, 
as the 2012 drought in Serbia illustrates. It led to yield declines 
of up to 50 percent and severe economic losses (Maslac 2012). 
Such events need to be expected to occur more often under 
climate change and absent preventive adaptation. In addition, 
pasture yields and grassland ecosystems for livestock grazing 
are expected to decline and change for large parts of Eastern 
Europe and the Western Balkans (Sutton et al. 2013a, b, c). Feed 
quality could also be negatively affected by changing climate 
conditions (Miraglia et al. 2009). Declines in fodder production 
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Figure 5.22: Sub-regional risks for development for Europe and Central Asia at 4°C warming in 2100 compared to pre-industrial 
temperatures.
Data sources: Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University; United Nations Food and Agriculture Programme; and Centro Internacional 
de Agricultura Tropical—(2005). Gridded Population of the World, Version 3 (GPWv3): Population Count Grid. Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications 
Center (SEDAC). This map was reproduced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this 
map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
could impact feed prices and potentially lead to greater price 
volatility (World Bank 2010b). 
At the same time high vulnerability to flooding events exists. 
Despite large uncertainties about future precipitation extremes 
in the region high risks of riverine flooding are expected mostly 
due to more intense snow melt. The flood of 2014 illustrated the 
region’s vulnerability to such events. The torrential rains led to 
floods and landslides, killing 51 people and rendering over 31,000 
people temporarily homeless. According to health officials, the 
risk of disease outbreaks following the event was particularly 
high in overcrowded refugee centers and as people returned to 
their homes too early (Holt 2014). This flood came against the 
backdrop of slow-onset risks to human health as climatic condi-
tions become increasingly suitable for vectors transmitting such 
diseases as dengue fever (Caminade et al. 2012). Flooding also 
poses high risks to agriculture, as evidenced by a 2010 event that 
caused damages of $450 million in Albania, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, and FYR Macedonia (Hughes 2012).
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A joint assessment report on the social impacts of the 2014 
Floods in Serbia by the United Nations, World Bank and EU sug-
gests that about 51,800 jobs were temporarily lost because of 
interruption of productive activities in the affected municipalities. 
Overall, the floods were estimated to reduce economic growth by 
0.5 percent and to lead to a decrease in the balance of payments 
equivalent to 1 percent of GDP, with a further 1 percent loss related 
to lower tax revenue and post-disaster expenditure. Furthermore, 
the floods are estimated to have pushed 125,000 people below the 
poverty line, an increase of nearly 7 percent over the number of 
people living in poverty in 2013. This increase comprised not only 
people living close to the poverty line, but also a much better-
off group that lost its productive capital as a result of the floods. 
The most affected people were typically those who faced specific 
challenges before the floods, such as access to employment, low 
security of tenure, and limited social support networks. About 
12 percent of the 1.6 million people affected by the floods were 
in groups considered particularly vulnerable, such as Roma and 
people with disabilities. Many women were also doubly affected: in 
addition to sustaining livelihood losses, they have had to increase 
the non-paid time they devote to take care of their family (United 
Nations Serbia et al. 2014).
The 2014 flooding also led to a reported 40 percent cut in 
Serbia’s electricity production and disrupted power supplies 
(Sito-Sucic 2014); this highlights the energy sector’s vulnerability 
to climate impacts and extreme events. Changes in river water 
temperature and river flows can also impact on thermal electricity 
production and reduce the capacity of nuclear and fossil-fuelled 
power plants through changes in cooling water. Critically, reduc-
tions would be concurrent with an increase in energy-intensive 
cooling demand, which is projected to increase by 49 percent 
(Isaac and van Vuuren 2009). 
5.5.3 Responses of Permafrost and the Boreal 
Forests of the Russian Federation to Climate 
Change Have Consequences for Timber 
Productivity and Global Carbon Stocks 
Russia has the largest forest area in the world, representing 
20 percent of the global forest area (FAO 2012b). Its forests store 
enormous amounts of carbon and deliver important ecosystem 
services, including through timber production. These services 
may be compromised or even lost under high levels of warming. 
There is a risk that the boreal forest may cross a tipping point 
and shift to an alternative state (e.g., steppe grasslands) (Lenton 
et al. 2008; Scheffer et al. 2012). Moreover, the effects of biome 
shifts and damages from forest fires would not be confined to 
the region itself. Changes to carbon fluxes in response to rising 
temperatures and changing precipitation patterns, as well as 
interactions with disturbance regimes, would have far-reaching 
repercussions affecting the global carbon stock and planetary 
albedo across large parts of the northern hemisphere. 
The boreal permafrost zones are a further potentially large 
source of greenhouse gases. Already, today, large formerly undis-
turbed permafrost zones are affected by thawing due to current 
warming (Romanovsky et al. 2010), leading to some subsidence of 
housing, disruption of infrastructure and affecting the livelihoods 
of indigenous minorities living in the Russian Arctic (Crate 2013). 
Future thawing is projected to be very pronounced. 
Russian forests contributed 1.3 percent of GDP and 3.7 per-
cent of industrial production in 2010 (FAO 2012b). The forestry 
sector employs one percent of Russia’s population and produces 
2.4 percent of export revenues (FAO 2012b). In 2010, 32 million 
m³ of wood raw material was used for biofuels, and that number 
is expected to double by 2030 (FAO 2012b). Under future climate 
change the productivity of those forests might be at risk. 
Climate projections for Russia show above-average tempera-
ture rise and an overall increase in annual precipitation. While 
fire outbreaks are often currently caused by anthropogenic factors 
rather than climate change, the risk of fire increases as higher tem-
peratures increase the biomass potential of burning as it becomes 
drier (Flannigan et al. 2009). In the future, much larger areas will 
be exposed to forest fires (Stocks et al. 1998). The risk of fire is 
further enhanced by projected changes in vegetation distribution. 
If exposed to continuous water stress, the forest at lower latitudes 
may give way to steppe ecosystems if the CO2 fertilization effect 
does not sufficiently compensate for this stress through enhanced 
efficiency of water use. This would likely promote larger fires, 
particularly in southern Siberia and Central Yakutia (Tchebakova 
et al. 2009). 
While slow-onset changes in mean temperature and aver-
age precipitation will ultimately affect the broad patterns of 
future species distribution, the impacts of climate variability in 
terms of extremes is an important driver of tree responses and 
vulnerability to climate change (Reyer et al. 2013). Even under 
increased annual average precipitation, an increase in heat 
extremes may lead to strong ecosystem responses. Heat-stressed 
trees, for example, may be more susceptible to pest outbreaks. 
Such increased vulnerability would, in turn, interact with an 
expected but understudied expansion of areas at risk of pest 
outbreaks (Bale et al. 2002). In combination, these stressors could 
lead to increasing risks for neighboring forest stands or even a 
threshold behavior whereby ecosystems shift into an alternate 
state (Lenton et al. 2008). 
Different responses and vulnerabilities of tree species to cli-
mate change could result in altered forest compositions. There are 
indications, however, that the largest effects on forest composition 
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and fragmentation are due to timber harvesting (Gustafson et al. 
2010). In line with this, Isaev and Korovin (2014) highlighted that 
the large 2010 forest fire was due not only to unusual meteorologi-
cal conditions but also to poor forest governance and manage-
ment—and to an increasing area of abandoned farmlands leading 
to declining numbers of forest managers, firefighters, and overall 
less efficient forest protection systems. Similarly, Flannigan et al. 
(2009 ) highlighted that, since the breakdown of the Soviet system, 
the effectiveness of the Russian firefighting system has decreased; 
this has led to larger areas being burned. Similarly, a weakening 
of regulatory capacities has facilitated illegal and unsustainable 
logging practices (Vandergert and Newell 2003) that are likely to 
undermine the forest’s resilience to climatic stresses. For example, 
if logging is done in an unsustainable manner and high amounts 
of dead or damaged trees are left in the forest, decaying trees may 
trigger pest outbreaks and increase the risk of forest fires. Such 
negative ecosystem impacts might also undermine the livelihoods 
of groups dependent on the forest for timber and non-wood forest 
products (e.g. berries, mushrooms, medicinal plants), traditional 
agriculture and hunting (FAO, 2014d). It is thus the interaction of 
climate changes, disturbances, and unsustainable forest manage-
ment and governance that will drive the vulnerability of forests, 
and people whose lives and livelihoods depend on them, to 
climate-change-related stresses. 
Climate-related effects on forest productivity can lead to both 
an increase and a decrease in productivity. For now, it remains 
uncertain at what CO2 concentration and temperature increase 
a reversal from sink to source would occur. However, if such a 
reversal were to occur it would affect the global carbon budget 
and thereby regions well beyond Russia itself.
The sustainable and farsighted management of Russian eco-
systems is of global importance. If pushed beyond tolerance limits 
and into positive feedback mechanisms with regional and global 
warming, major carbon and methane stocks in the boreal forests and 
permafrost zones may be released into the atmosphere. Critically, 
carbon release would continue even if warming ceased (Schaefer 
et al. 2011; Schaphoff et al. 2013). Even without such threshold 
effects, southern boreal carbon loss as a result of ecosystem shifts 
is likely to offset carbon gains from potential northern boreal for-
est expansion (Friend et al. 2014; Schaphoff et al. 2013). Given 
the large uncertainties in the overall response of Russian forests 
to effects such as future pest outbreaks and heat stress, manage-
ment practices need to be deployed that foster the resilience of 
forests in order both to minimize the risks for those who depend 
on them and to support global climate protection.
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Appendix
A.1 Methods for Temperature, 
Precipitation, Heat Wave, and Aridity 
Projections
A.1.1 ISI-MIP Bias Correction
The temperature, precipitation, and heat wave projections were 
based on the ISI-MIP global climate database, using the historical 
(20th century) period and future scenarios RCP2.6 and RCP8.5. 
The ISI-MIP database consists of five CMIP5 global climate models 
(gfdl-esm2m, hadgem2-es, ipsl-cm5a-lr, miroc-esm-chem, and 
noresm1-m) which were bias-corrected such that the models 
reproduce historically observed mean temperature and precipita-
tion and their year-to-year variability. The statistical bias correc-
tion algorithm as used by WaterMIP/WATCH has been applied 
to correct temperature and precipitation values. The correction 
factors were derived over a construction period of 40 years, where 
the GCM outputs are compared to the observation-based WATCH 
forcing data. A regression is performed monthly on the ranked 
datasets. Subsequently, the derived monthly correction factors are 
interpolated toward daily ones. The correction factors are then 
applied to the projected GCM data (Warszawski 2013).
A.1.2 Heat Extreme Analysis
For each of the ISI-MIP bias-corrected CMIP5 simulation runs, 
we determined the local standard deviation due to natural vari-
ability over the 20th century for each individual month (Coumou 
and Robinson 2013). To do so, we first used a singular spectrum 
analysis to extract the long-term non-linear warming trend (i.e., 
the climatological warming signal). Next we de-trended the 20th 
century monthly time series by subtracting the long-term trend, 
which provided the monthly year-to-year variability. From this 
de-trended signal, monthly standard deviations were calculated, 
then averaged seasonally (i.e., the seasonally averaged monthly-
standard deviations). For this analysis, we employed the standard 
deviation calculated for the last half of 20th century (1951–2010); 
we found, however, that this estimate was robust with respect to 
different time periods. Following Coumou and Robinson (2013) 
and Hansen et al. (2012), we used the 1951–1980 reference period, 
which has the advantage of being a period of relatively stable 
global mean temperature prior to rapid global warming. 
We defined two different extreme thresholds: one at three 
standard deviations warmer than the mean temperature (3-sigma 
events) and one at five standard deviations warmer than the 
mean temperature (5 sigma events). During the reference period 
(1951–1980), exceeding the 3-sigma threshold is extremely unlikely. 
Over most land regions, the monthly temperature distributions 
are close to a normal distribution for which 3-sigma events have 
a return time of 740 years. Monthly temperature will not be nor-
mally distributed everywhere and hence return times can differ. 
Nevertheless, for the reference period, return times for 3-sigma 
events will on average be at least 100 years, implying that in each 
year the land area expected to experience temperatures beyond 
3-sigma will be one percent or less. The land area experiencing 
3-sigma heat is affected by natural variability, with El Niño years 
seeing a larger area exceeding this threshold (Coumou and Robin-
son 2013). Irrespective of that, 3-sigma heat extremes are unlikely 
events during the reference period. Furthermore, 5-sigma events 
have a return time of several million years in normally distributed 
data. They can thus be considered to be essentially absent during 
the reference period. 
The effect of global warming is to shift the mean temperature 
over almost all land regions toward warmer values. Even in the 
absence of a change in variability (i.e., a broadening or narrow-
ing of the width of the distribution), this shift in the mean will 
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cause an increase in the likelihood that the extreme thresholds 
are exceeded. Therefore, the observed warming since the 1980s 
has already strongly increased the land area experiencing 3-sigma 
heat—it is now about five percent (Coumou and Robinson 2013). 
Currently, at least on a global scale, 5-sigma heat extremes are 
not yet detectable. As shown in this report, future warming will 
strongly increase the likelihood of exceeding—and therefore the 
land area experiencing—the 3- and 5-sigma threshold extremes. As 
discussed in Coumou and Robinson (2013), this increased likeli-
hood is on the global scale is due primarily to the projected shift 
in the mean toward warmer values. Regionally, changes in the 
variability on top of the shift in the mean might play a role as well.
Throughout this report, we analyzed the occurrence of threshold-
exceeding extremes both spatially and temporally (e.g., the 
2071–2100 period) aggregated. Temporal averaging is performed 
on an individual grid cell basis and the results are presented in 
probability maps globally and for the report’s three focus regions. 
Additional spatial averaging is achieved by area-weighted averag-
ing over the individual grid cells in the region of interest. This 
way, a spatial-temporal averaged number is derived that can be 
interpreted either spatially (e.g., 80 percent of land area covered) 
or temporally (e.g., 80 percent of summer months) for a given 
period and region of interest.
A.1.3 Aridity Index and Potential Evaporation
The Aridity Index (AI) quantifies the precipitation supply over 
atmospheric water demand as:
         Pr
AI = 
       
ET0
Where Pr is precipitation and ET0 is the reference crop 
evapotranspiration, sometimes also called potential evaporation. 
It estimates the amount of evapotranspiration from a hypotheti-
cal grass reference crop with specific characteristics at a surface 
which is not short of water. It thus captures the water demand of 
the atmosphere from meteorological conditions. We used the FAO 
Penman-Monteith method (Allen et al. 2006) to estimate potential 
evapotranspiration rate, which is a simple representation of the 
physical and physiological factors governing the evapotranspira-
tion process and generally recommended for the definition and 
computation of the reference evapotranspiration. It requires radia-
tion, near-surface air temperature, humidity, pressure, and wind 
speed data, and is given by:
                         
900           0.408Δ(Rn – G) + γ  u2(es – ea)
                          T + 273ET0 = 
            
Δ + γ(1 + 0.34u2)
With ET0 in mm day–1, Rn the net radiation at the crop surface 
[MJ m–2 day–1], G the soil heat flux density [MJ m–2 day–1], T the 
mean air temperature at 2 m height [°C], u2 the wind speed at 
2 m height [m s–1], es the saturation vapor pressure [kPa], ea the 
actual vapor pressure [kPa], Δ the slope of the vapor pressure 
curve [kPa °C–1], and γ the psychrometric constant [kPa °C–1].
We calculated monthly ET0 values for each grid point using 
climatological input from the ISI-MIP database for both the his-
torical period and future scenarios. 
A.1.4 Spatial Averaging
The time series for precipitation, temperature, heat extremes, and 
aridity index, as provided in this report, have been obtained by 
area-weighted averaging of grid-cells located in the countries of 
interest, as provided by the World Bank. 
A.2  Sea-Level Rise Projections: 
Methods for This Report
A.2.1 Individual Contributions
We followed a process-based approach similar to the IPCC AR5 
report; this is in contrast to the previously employed semi-empirical 
approach (Rahmstorf 2007; Schaeffer et al. 2012), which was the 
method employed in Turn Down the Heat II (in a risk-assessment 
perspective) and presented as the upper bound in Turn Down 
the Heat I.
The projection methods are a synthesis between a recent paper 
by Hinkel et al. (2014) and the references therein (we refer the 
reader to this publication for details) and the Chapter 13 of the 
IPCC AR5 WGI Report (Church et al. 2013). In particular: 
• Similar methods were used for the thermal, glacier, and Green-
land contributions in the two publications and in this report.
• Compared to Hinkel et al. (2014), we (1) accounted for a nega-
tive surface mass balance (SMB) contribution from Antarctica 
in addition to its (positive) dynamic contribution; (2) accounted 
for a dynamic contribution on top of Greenland surface mass 
balance; (3) used a larger number of CMIP5 GCMs (Taylor 
Table A.1: Climatic classification of regions according to 
Aridity Index (AI).
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et al. 2012) in our analysis—CNRM-CM5, CSIRO-Mk3-6-0, 
HadGEM2-ES, IPSL-CM5A-MR, MIROC-ESM, MPI-ESM-MR, 
MRI-CGCM3, and NorESM1-M; (4) considered the uncertainties 
independent when summing the various contributions; and 
(5) we took the cross-ensemble uncertainties as the full GCM 
range (minimum to maximum) to yield a range consistent 
with the IPCC AR5 ensemble (except for Antarctica, where 
the calculations are probabilistic) (Levermann et al. 2014).
• The main difference with the IPCC AR5 is the contribution 
from Antarctica’s ice discharge, which we discuss below. Addi-
tionally, and consistent with the previous Turn Down the Heat 
reports, we did not include a contribution from groundwater 
mining estimated at +0.04 m (–0.01, 0.08) (Church et al. 
2013, SM Table 13.5) since it is not related to climate warm-
ing. The same applies to the post-glacial rebound, which is 
not included here.
A novel approach is employed for Antarctica’s dynamic dis-
charge (Levermann et al. 2014), where model results from the 
fixed-melting SeaRISE experiments (Bindschadler et al. 2013) are 
“transformed” to account for scenario-dependent ocean warming 
and resulting melt rates. It uses the ensemble of CMIP5 models for 
the translation of global mean to subsurface ocean temperatures 
and a well-constrained parameter for the translation of warming 
to ice sheet melting. This new method was also used by Hinkel et al. 
(2014). We found this physically-based approach better suited for 
this report than the approach of Little et al. (2013) on which the 
IPCC assessment is largely based. In particular:
• The Little et al. (2013) estimate comes with a questionable 
assumption of linear growth rate in ice discharge, and must 
use subjective, rather arbitrary prior distributions of the growth 
rate in various basins. 
• The Little et al. (2013) estimate does not include processes that 
are yet to start but expected as Antarctic subsurface waters 
warm. As such, it may underestimate the risk for enhanced 
ice discharge as a response to strong ocean warming toward 
the end of the 21st century. 
• While CMIP5 projections show a clear scenario dependency 
for subsurface temperature in the proximity of the Antarctic 
ice sheet, the IPCC AR5 assumes a scenario-independent 
contribution to sea-level rise from Antarctica.
• Studies subsequent to the IPCC AR5 report add new evidence 
that oceanic melt plays an important role for mass loss in 
general (Rignot et al. 2013), for West Antarctica (Dutrieux 
et al. 2014), and potentially for East Antarctica (Mengel and 
Levermann 2014). 
It is understandable that the “scenario-independence” null-
hypothesis is agreed on in a consensus-driven report like the 
IPCC AR5. In light of increasing evidence for the importance of 
oceanic melt in Antarctica’s mass balance, however, we believe 
that scenario dependency has to be accounted for in the sea-level 
rise projections for Antarctica. While our approach yields mean 
estimates for Antarctic sea-level rise similar to the IPCC, our 
estimated upper bounds are scenario-dependent. Rejecting this 
would undermine this report’s objective to inform on the risks of 
different levels of global warming.
After adding surface mass balance (Church et al. 2013), we 
obtained a contribution of 0.04 m (–0.03 m to 0.30 m) for the RCP8.5 
scenario and 0.04 m (–0.01 to 0.18 m) for the RCP2.6 scenario in 
2081–2100 compared to the reference period 1986–2005. While 
the median projection is similar for both scenarios (and similar 
to the IPCC AR5), the risk of higher sea-level rise is reflected by 
the higher upper bound in the RCP8.5 scenario as compared to 
RCP2.6. Nevertheless, our upper bound only reflects model uncer-
tainty, and can be seen as covering the likely (67 percent) range 
only. In particular, it does not include self-amplifying feedbacks 
in unstable marine ice in Antarctica. Recent literature indicates 
that the Thwaites Glacier may already be in a state of irreversible 
retreat (Joughin et al. 2014; Rignot et al. 2014), which was not 
clear and thus downplayed at the time IPCC AR5 was written 
(Parizek et al. 2013).
A.2.2 Comparison with Previous Reports 
and Expert-Elicitation Studies
A detailed comparison with previous Turn Down the Heat reports, 
IPCC AR4 (Meehl et al. 2007), and IPCC AR5 (Church et al. 2013), 
after removal of land-water contribution for comparison purposes), 
is shown in Figure A.1 for RCP8.5 and other 4°C warming sce-
narios. While our median estimates are similar to AR5, our upper 
estimates of total global sea-level rise in 2081–2100 are significantly 
higher. This is due to the novel method for projecting Antarctica’s 
contribution, as explained above. In a 4°C world, the 90 percent 
model-range of our new projections tightly encompasses the median 
“low” and “SEM” cases investigated in the previous Turn Down 
the Heat reports, indicating a similar level of risk. In a 2°C world 
(Figure A.2), the new process-based projections are more optimistic 
regarding the benefit of cutting emissions to limit sea-level rise. 
The two other projections (light blue on the figures) present 
results from a very different approach based on expect elicitation. 
Bamber and Aspinall (2013) interviewed 14 experts and esti-
mated the sea-level contribution from the large ice sheets, taking 
into account both mass balance and fast ice flow processes. The 
median result is a 29 cm increase from ice sheets by 2100; from a 
risk perspective, the 95th percentile of the estimates is also highly 
relevant being 0.84 m by 2100.68 Adding our estimates for RCP85 
68 Bamber and Aspinall (2013) “find an overwhelming lack of certainty about the 
crucial issue of the origin of recent accelerated mass loss from the ice sheets.”
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thermal expansion and glaciers, the maximum sea-level rise is close 
to 1.4 m in 2100. A broader expert elicitation based on 90 experts 
concluded an upper estimate (95 percent confidence) of 0.7 m sea-
level rise for the low RCP2.6 scenario in contrast to 1.5 m for the 
high RCP8.5 scenario from 2000 to 2100 (Horton et al. 2014). An 
assessment by the U.S. National Research Council (2012) yielded a 
similar range of 0.5–1.4 m. These studies implicitly account for the 
risk of destabilization of the potentially unstable Antarctic marine 
ice, and are consistent with the latest IPCC assessment that any 
additional contribution from the Antarctic ice sheet would remain 
within a couple of tens of centimeters above the likely upper bound. 
Our results include the direct effect of Southern Ocean warm-
ing on ice-shelf basal melting and related ice stream acceleration 
in Antarctica; as in the IPCC AR5, however, they do not include 
self-amplifying feedbacks responsible for marine ice sheet instabil-
ity. It is still unclear at this point whether this mechanism would 
significantly change the picture presented in this report. We note 
that despite significant methodological update, our process-based 
upper bound of 1 m by 2080–2100 above the 1986–2005 baseline is 
comparable to the median projection of the semi-empirical-based 
“high” or “SEM” scenario investigated in the previous Turn Down 
the Heat reports (Figure A.1). 
Figure A.1: Comparison of sea level projections by 2081–2100 above the present day, for the current report, previous Turn Down 
the Heat reports, IPCC reports, and recent subjective expert judgment assessments for a 4°C world (“Experts”: Bamber and 
Aspinall 2013; Horton et al. 2014).
The uncertainty ranges reflect upper and lower bounds as originally reported, without distinction between likely and very likely ranges. Note that expert 
judgment assessments were originally reported for 2100 and subsequently adjusted by us to match the common projection horizon (2081–2100), assuming 
a linear increase in the rate of rise from present day to the projection horizon. Present-day baseline climate refers to 1986–2005 in the current report and 
may vary in other assessments (e.g. 1980–1999 for AR4, 2010 for BA2013), but no adjustment was made because results are less sensitive to the chosen 
baseline. Emissions scenarios vary slightly across the reports, but were selected to make the comparison at least qualitatively meaningful (e.g., A1FI for 
AR4, RCP8.5 for AR5 and Turn Down the Heat). Note that land-water storage is not included in this comparison and was removed from the IPCC AR5 
estimate for consistency (estimated at 0.04 m (–0.01 m, 0.09 m) between 1986–2005 and 2081–2100, Table 13.5 in Church et al. 2013).
9099_CH06.pdf   220 11/17/14   5:59 PM
APPENDIX
221
Figure A.2: Same as Figure A.1 but for a 1.5°C world. 
A.3 Meta-analysis of Crop Yield 
Changes with Climate Change
A meta-analysis of crop yield data was conducted separately 
for the three regions in this report. In addition to the regional 
meta-analyses presented in the main report, we present here the 
meta-analysis of the aggregate crop yield data for all three regions. 
The data from numerous studies were analyzed with the 
goal of summarizing the range of projected outcomes for each 
of the regions and of assessing consensus. We addressed three 
main questions in this analysis: (1) what are the likely impacts of 
incremental degrees of warming on yields?; (2) what is the qualita-
tive impact of considering adaptation measures and the effects of 
CO2 fertilization on changes in crop yields?; and (3) what is the 
ability of adaptation measures and CO2 fertilization to counteract 
the negative effects of increased temperature?
A.3.1 Data Processing
Single studies may provide numbers for multiple countries within 
the region (or even multiple sites within one country) and for 
numerous crops, and could potentially be over-represented in the 
sample (i.e., having therefore a disproportionate impact on the 
meta-analysis). To minimize bias toward those studies, we aver-
aged their yield results for the whole region in order to obtain a 
sample with a good represe ntation of all the available studies. 
Moreover, whenever a study showed a range of GCMs models 
for a specific crop, we interpreted averages as being the expected 
response of aggregate production.
One quality control consisted of examining the datasets for 
outliers. We followed the same procedure described in Challinor et al. 
(2014) and examined in detail site-scaled studies that produced 
changes of greater than 50 percent in either direction. This led 
to the exclusion of four data points. The focus was on crop data 
only; livestock data was not included in this analysis.
Due to the small sample size for the three regions and the 
large variety of crop types analyzed in the different studies, an 
analysis per crop type was not possible. Patterns were analyzed 
for all crops jointly, and particular features for individual crops 
are described only qualitatively and with direct reference to the 
individual study from which they were obtained. Due to the lack 
of data, we were also unable to test the effect of increased pre-
cipitation on crop yield change. A small but significant correlation 
was found between an increase in temperature and an increase in 
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precipitation (Challinor et al. 2014), showing that the coefficient 
found for effect of increase in temperature on yields captures some 
of the effects increased precipitation may have on crop yields.
As mentioned above, we investigated the impact of incremental 
degrees of global warming on crop yields. Not al l studies provided 
all data needed and occasionally the increase in temperature 
 asso ciated with a projected change in yield is not explicit in the 
studies. Because climate change impact studies usually specify 
baseline conditions from which future (e.g., under one of the 
SRES scenario family) impacts are projected, we were able to infer 
the increase in temperature. This was done using the Warming 
Attribution Calculator (see below). We did not retain studies that 
did not provide this information. 
The baseline periods are highly variable between studies and 
seem to have been selected to coincide with the baselines assumed 
in the climate model used in each study. In our datasets, baseline 
periods differed by up to 50 years between different studies; this 
certainly has an important impact on the projected yield (White 
et al. 2011). It is important to bear in mind that the different lev-
els of temperature increase examined here are not the same in 
absolute terms in relation to one baseline as we focused on the 
crop response associated with incremental levels of warming.
This process led to a variable number of studies per region, 
and the meta-analysis summarized the results from a total of 
10 independent studies for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(63 data points), 16 studies for the Middle East and North Africa 
(167 data points), and three studies for Europe and Central Asia 
(51 data points). Due to very low statistical power, we were unable 
to provide confident results for the ECA region.
A.3.2 Statistical Analysis
Statistical analysis was conducted using Matlab 2013a. We fitted 
generalized linear models to the data to investigate the relation-
ship between changes in crop yields and temperature increases, 
and to address the effect of adaptation measures and of CO2. A 
t-test was conducted to test the relationships for significance. For 
the significant relationships, we present plots with best-fit lines 
obtained using a polynomial fit. Five hundred bootstrap replicates 
were carried out to derive a 95 percent confidence interval; these 
are presented in patches. To evaluate the relationships, we looked 
into the values of r-square (the amount of variability share between 
the two variables in question) and the slope of the regression line, 
which told us whether temperature increase influences crop yield 
change positively or negatively (all results are provided in tables).
Previous analysis (Easterling et al. 2007; World Bank 2013) 
showed that the influence of temperature increase on crop yield 
can be considerably stronger under high levels of temperature 
increase (higher than 2°C). Where data was available, we assessed 
for significance the relationship between crop yield and tempera-
ture increase below 2°C and over the whole range of temperature 
increases.
A.4 Warming Level Attribution 
and Classification
Differentiating between impacts at different warming levels is one 
of the key objectives of the Turn Down the Heat report series. Most 
impact studies present their results with regard to time slices and 
scenarios—while not specifying global warming levels that might 
differ substantially due to large variations in climate sensitivity 
between different GCMs. Additionally, not all policy-relevant warm-
ing levels are covered by SRES (CMIP3) or RCP (CMIP5) scenarios; 
often the results are based on a single transient scenario only.
Wherever possible, we derived warming levels for the impact 
studies analyzed in the report that are based on models and sce-
narios from the CMIP3 or CMIP5 database. Generally, impact studies 
analyze changes with respect to a base period (e.g., 1986–2005). 
Consistent with the IPCC AR5 WGI report, the warming level for 
the period of interest was derived as the sum of the projected model 
ensemble warming in global mean temperature (GMT) relative to 
the base period plus warming level of the base period relative to 
pre-industrial levels (1850–1900) based on the HadCrut4 dataset 
(e.g., 0.6°C for 1986–2005).
If the impact study was based on multi-model analysis, a 
mean GMT time series was derived for all ensemble members 
equally weighted. Please note that this approach actually assumes 
linear scaling of the impacts with temperature in the vicinity of 
the warming levels, which is an approximation that might not 
always be appropriate. Many impact studies do not differentiate, 
however, among the different ensemble members underlying the 
projections, but give numbers only for ensemble averages. 
For studies based on regional climate models, the GMT time 
series of the corresponding GCM is used. If no climate model was 
specified in the impact study, the corresponding ensemble aver-
age (either CMIP3 or CMIP5) was used. In addition, the CMIP3 
data base contains not all scenarios that are analyzed in impact 
studies (specifically, SRES A1F1 and SRES B2 are missing). For 
these scenarios, GMT scenarios were emulated using MAGICC6 
(Rogelj et al. 2012).
Based on this methodology, the impacts of climate change as 
apparent from different studies can be classified for different warming 
levels that comprise the following ranges of global mean warming:
WARMING 
LEVEL OBSERVED 1°C 1.5°C 2°C 3°C 4°C
Range [°C] <0.8 0.8–1.25 1.25–1.75 1.75–2.25 2.25–3.5 >3.5
9099_CH06.pdf   222 11/17/14   5:59 PM
APPENDIX
223
A.5 S ummary of Evidence Concerning 
Social Vulnerability
The tables below are based on extensive literature searching on 
social vulnerability in the three focal regions and beyond. While 
extensive, this was not a systematic review process and the tables 
make no claim to cover all relevant literature. The tables are orga-
nized by themes and primarily focus on vulnerability. They do not 
comprehensively review the very large literature on adaptation.  
Most evidence of social vulnerability to the effects of climate 
change is based on and extrapolates from contemporary and his-
torical examples. Because of the inherent difficulties of modelling 
changes in social systems at different degrees of global warming, 
given the multiple other development trends which already interact 
with climate change to affect social vulnerability, and will do in 
the future, most evidence concerns the short to medium term.
Both large-scale quantitative research and small-scale contextual 
research that probes social dynamics in particular locations are 
represented in research on social vulnerability to climate change. 
Most quantitative sources discuss the likely scale of vulnerability 
if no adaptation takes place.
Of the three focus regions, there is considerably more evidence 
of current and potential future social impacts of climate change 
in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Middle East and 
North Africa than there is for the parts of Europe and Central 
Asia studied in this report.69 This may reflect language barriers, 
or the disciplinary emphases of both natural and social scientists 
working in Europe and Central Asia. Much of the existing evi-
dence on social vulnerability has been funded by international 
organizations. 
This said, compared with other regions for which there is 
substantially more socially disaggregated evidence (such as Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia), evidence for the Middle East and 
North Africa, and to a lesser extent Latin America and the Carib-
bean is still relatively thin on social analysis. These tables draw 
on the considerably larger literature from Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South, South-East and East Asia and the Pacific to highlight issues 
that may also be of relevance in LAC, MENA and ECA. 
The aspect of social vulnerability where evidence is clearest 
is health: there is strong evidence on vulnerability to heat waves 
and on access to clean, safe water, mixed but suggestive evidence 
on the likelihood of vector- and water-borne diseases spreading, 
and on the likely implications of climate change for malnutrition. 
The evidence is least strong for impacts on mental health, and on 
all forms of interpersonal violence. Thus, although there has been 
69 Note that this region excludes Western Europe, for which there is a large body 
of evidence.
much research into the extent of relationship between climate 
change and conflict or social tensions, there is no consensus in 
the literature. This may reflect discrepancies between definitions 
or approaches—it does not, for example, reflect a qualitative/ 
quantitative divide, as both types of studies have found evidence 
for and against strong relationship between climate change and 
violence. Though some studies have raised concerns that both 
extreme events and slow-onset disasters could lead to increased 
gender-based violence, evidence remains anecdotal. 
There is also some strong evidence of likely negative impacts 
on agriculture- and fisheries-based livelihoods, and more limited 
evidence concerning pastoral livelihoods—this may reflect research 
priorities, or may reflect limitations of our search. The evidence 
concerning impacts of climate change on urban livelihoods 
emphasizes the destructive effects of extreme events on household 
assets, community infrastructure and the knock-on effects on both 
employed and self-employed workers. There is moderately strong 
evidence that negative effects on livelihoods and wellbeing of both 
extreme events and slow-onset climate change may lead to both 
short-term displacement and longer-term migration. 
Evidence on the poverty implications of climate change is 
relatively limited, and largely based on projections of impacts 
on agriculture, food prices and consumption. These typically 
suggest a likely increase in poverty among (already poor) small-
scale producers in rural areas, and among low-income urban 
households. Few studies discuss the implications of climate 
change for chronic poverty, or on social aspects of poverty, such 
as on social cohesion. Relatively few studies probe the linkages 
between climate change and coping strategies that may under-
mine social wellbeing, such as child labour or forced marriage, 
with a particular gap in evidence from the three focal regions. 
Systematic treatment of the gender dimensions of climate change 
is also weak for the three focal regions, with a particular absence 
in the literature on ECA. 
Although evidence from other regions (and to a lesser extent 
from Latin America) highlights the importance of responsive 
institutions and opportunities for voice in building resilience 
to climate change, there is relatively little evidence from either 
MENA or ECA. Arguments for the importance of greater attention 
to voice, rights and institutional development are largely based 
on experience in other regions. 
The following tables set forth the evidence on current social 
vulnerability, as studies examining potential impacts in scenarios 
of greater climate change extrapolate from contemporary evidence. 
As far as possible, assessments of the strength of evidence are 
based on discussions in the relevant chapters of the IPCC Working 
Group II 5th Assessment Report, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability (IPCC 2014b). Where the strength 
of evidence is not specifically signaled in the relevant IPCC 5th 
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Assessment Report chapter, we made our own assessment and 
categorized the strength of evidence as follows:
• A strong evidence base denotes a consensus among studies, 
and/or eight or more studies with similar findings.
• A moderate evidence base denotes mixed findings, or 4–7 
studies with similar findings.
• A limited evidence base indicates inconclusive findings, or 
fewer than three studies with similar findings. 
These relatively small numbers reflect the limited evidence 
base on many aspects of social vulnerability. 
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